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
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VOLUME 3



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HISTORY OF EUROPE

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT

OF THE

FRENCH REVOLUTION

IN M.DCC.LXXXIX.

TO THE RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS


IN M.DCCC.XV.

BY ARCHIBALD ALISON, F.R.S.E.

ADVOCATE.

"*BELLUM maxime omnium memorabile quæ unquam gesta sint me scripturum ; quod Hannibale duce Carthaginienses cum populo Romano gessere. Nam neque validiores opibus ullæ inter se civitates gentesque contulerunt arma, neque his ipsis tantum unquam virium aut roboris fuit : et haud ignotas belli artes inter se, sed expertas primo Punico conserebant bello ; odiis etiam prope majoribus certarunt quam viribus ; et adeo varia belli fortuna, ancepsque Mars fuit, ut propius periculum fuerint qui vicerunt.*"—*TRT. Liv. lib. 21.*

VOL. III.



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1841.

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FROM THE COMMENCEMENT

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CHAPTER XX.

CAMPAIGN OF 1796 IN ITALY.

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NAPOLÉON BONAPARTE was born at Ajaccio, in Corsica, on the 15th August, 1769. The Duke of Wellington was born in the same month. "Providence," said Louis XVIII, "owed us that counterpoise (1)."

Birth and family of Napoléon. His family, though noble, had not been distinguished, and had suffered severely from misfortune. He was too great a man to attempt to derive distinction from any adventitious advantages which did not really belong to him, and could afford to discard all the lustre of patrician descent. When the Emperor of Austria endeavoured, after he became his son-in-law, to trace his connexion with some of the obscure Dukes of Treviso, he answered that he was the Rudolph of Hapsburg of his family; and when the genealogists were engaged in deducing his descent from an ancient line of Gothic princes, he cut short their labours by declaring, that his patent of nobility dated from the battle of Montenotte (2).

His mother, who was distinguished by great beauty, and no common firmness and intrepidity of mind, shared in the fatigues and dangers of her husband during the civil dissensions which distracted the island at the time of his birth, and had recently before been engaged in some expeditions on horseback with him. His father died at the age of thirty-eight, of a cancer in the stomach, a complaint hereditary in his family, and which also proved fatal to Napoléon himself; but the want of paternal care was more than supplied by his mother, to whose early education and solicitude he, in after life, mainly ascribed his elevation (3). Though left a widow in the prime of life, his mother had already born thirteen children, of whom five sons and three daughters survived their father. She lived to see one of them wearing the crown of Charlemagne, and another seated on the throne of Charles V (4).

On the day of his birth, being the festival of the Assumption, she had been at Church, and was seized with her pains during high mass. She was brought home hastily, and, as there was not time to prepare a bed, laid upon a couch covered with tapestry representing the heroes of the Iliad, and there the future conqueror was brought into the world (5).

(1) Bour, i. 18. Sberer, 1. Las Cas. 137.

(2) Las Cas. i. 108, 112. Bour. i. 23.

(3) "My opinion," said Napoléon, "is, that the future good or bad conduct of a child depends entirely on the mother."—O'MEARA, ii. 100.

(4) Las Cas. i. 117, 119, 120. O'Meara, ii, 100. D'Abr. ii. 376, 377.

(5) D'Abr. ii. 377. Las Cas. i. 126.

In the years of infancy he exhibited nothing remarkable, excepting irritability and turbulence of temper; but these qualities, as well as the decision with which they were accompanied, were so powerful, that they gave him the entire command of his eldest brother Joseph, a boy of a mild and unassuming character, who was constantly beaten, pinched, or tormented by the future ruler of the world. But even at that early period it was observed that he never wept when chastised; and on one occasion, when he was only seven years of age, having been suspected unjustly of a fault, and punished when innocent, he endured the pain, and subsisted in disgrace for three days on the coarsest food, rather than betray his companion, who was really in fault. Though his anger was violent, it was generally of short endurance, and his smile from the first was like a beam of the sun emerging from the clouds. But, nevertheless, he gave no indications of extraordinary capacity at that early age; and his mother was frequently heard to declare, that of all her children, he was the one whom she would least have expected to have attained any extraordinary eminence (1).

His character, residence, and habits, when in Corsica. The winter residence of his father was usually at Ajaccio, the place of his birth, where there is still preserved the model of a cannon, weighing about thirty pounds, the early plaything of Napoléon. But in summer the family retired to a dilapidated villa near the isle Sanguiniere, once the residence of a relation of his mother's, situated in a romantic spot on the sea-shore. The house is approached by an avenue, overhung by the cactus and acacia, and other shrubs, which grow luxuriantly in a southern climate. It has a garden and a lawn, showing vestiges of neglected beauty, and surrounded by a shrubbery permitted to run to wilderness. There, enclosed by the cactus, the clematis, and the wild olive, is a singular and isolated granite rock, beneath which the remains of a small summer-house are still visible, the entrance to which is nearly closed by a luxuriant fig-tree. This was the favourite retreat of the young Napoléon, who early showed a love of solitary meditation during the periods when the vacations at school permitted him to return home. We might suppose that there were perhaps formed those visions of ambition and high resolves, for which the limits of the world were ere long felt to be insufficient, did we not know that childhood can hardly anticipate the destiny of maturer years; and that, in Cromwell's words, a man never rises so high as when he does not know where his course is to terminate (2).

Removed to the Military School at Brienne; his character there. At an early age he was sent to the Military School of Brienne. His character there underwent a rapid alteration. He became thoughtful, studious, contemplative, and diligent in the extreme. His proficiency, especially in mathematics, was soon remarkable; but the quickness of his temper, though subdued, was not extinguished. On one occasion, having been subjected to a degrading punishment by his master, that of dining on his knees at the gate of the refectory, the mortification he experienced was so excessive that it produced a violent vomiting and a universal tremor of the nerves (3). But in the games of his companions he was inferior to none in spirit and agility, and already began to evince, in a decided predilection for military pursuits the native bias of his mind.

During the winter of 1783-4, so remarkable for its severity, even in southern latitudes, the amusements of the boys without doors were completely

(1) D'Abr. i. 49, 52, 54. Las Cas. i. 126.

(2) Benson, 4, 6. Scott, iii. 10.

(3) Las Cas. i. 127. Bour. i. 22.

stopped. Napoléon proposed to his companions to beguile the weary hours by forming intrenchments and bastions of snow, with parapets, ravelins, and horn-works. The little army was divided into two parties, one of which was intrusted with the attack, the other with the defence of the works: and the mimic war was continued for several weeks, during which fractures and wounds were received on both sides. On another occasion, the wife of the porter of the school, well known to the boys for the fruit which she sold, having presented herself at the door of their theatre to be allowed to see the *Death of Cæsar*, which was to be played by the youths, and been refused an entrance, the serjeant at the door, induced by the vehemence of her manner, reported the matter to the young Napoléon, who was the officer in command on the occasion. "Remove that woman, who brings here the license of camps," said the future ruler of the Revolution (1).

It was the fortune of the school at Brienne at this time to possess among its scholars, besides Napoléon, another boy, who rose to the highest eminence in the Revolution, Pichegru, afterwards conqueror of Holland. He was several years older than Napoleon, and instructed him in the elements of mathematics and the four first rules of arithmetic. Pichegru early perceived the firm character of his little pupil: and when, many years afterwards, he had embraced the Royalist Party, and it was proposed to him to sound Napoléon, then in the command of the army of Italy, he replied, "Don't waste time upon him: I have known him from his infancy: his character is inflexible; he has taken his side, and will never swerve from it." The fate of these two illustrious men afterwards rose in painful contrast to each other: Pichegru was strangled in a dungeon when Napoléon was ascending the throne of France (2).

The speculations of Napoléon at this time were more devoted to political than military subjects. His habits were thoughtful and solitary: and his conversation, even at that early age, was so remarkable for its reflection and energy, that it attracted the notice of the Abbé Raynal, with whom he frequently lived in vacations, and who discoursed with him on government, legislation, and the relations of commerce. He was distinguished by his Italian complexion, his piercing look, and the decided style of his expression: a peculiarity which frequently led to a vehemence of manner, which rendered him not generally popular with his school-fellows. The moment their play-time arrived, he flew to the library of the school, where he read with avidity the historical works of the ancients, particularly Polybius, Plutarch, and Arrian. His companions disliked him, on account of his not joining their games at these hours, and frequently rallied him on his name and Corsican birth. He often said to Bourrienne, his earliest friend, with much bitterness,—"I hate these French—I will do them all the mischief in my power." Notwithstanding this, his animosity had nothing ungenerous in it: and when he was intrusted, in his turn, with the enforcing of any regulation which was infringed, he preferred going to prison to informing against the young delinquents (3).

Though his progress at school was respectable, it was not remarkable; and the notes transmitted to government in 1784, exhibited many other young men, much more distinguished for their early proficiency—a circumstance frequently observable in those who ultimately rise to greatness. In the private instructions communicated to government by the masters of the

1. Bosc. i. 25, 26.

2. Las Cases. i. 144, 145. De Beaur. i. 200.

3. Bosc. i. 27, 28, 29, 35. Las Cases. i. 146. De Beaur. i. 171.

school, he was characterised as of a "domineering, imperious, and headstrong character (1)."

During the vacations of school, he returned in general to Corsica; where he gave vent to the ardour of his mind, in traversing the mountains and valleys of that romantic island, and listening to the tales of feudal strife and family revenge by which its inhabitants are so remarkably distinguished. The celebrated Paoli, the hero of Corsica, accompanied him in some of these excursions, and explained to him on the road the actions which he had fought, and the positions which he had occupied during his struggle for the independence of the island. The energy and decision of his young companion, at this period, made a great impression on that illustrious man. "Oh, Napoléon!" said he, "you do not resemble the moderns—you belong only to the heroes of Plutarch (2)".

At the age of fourteen, he was sent from the school of Brienne to the Ecole militaire at Paris, for the completion of his military studies. He had not been long there, when he was so much struck with the luxurious habits in which the young men were then brought up, that he addressed an energetic memorial to the governor on the subject, strongly urging, that instead of having footmen and grooms to wait upon their orders, they should be taught to do every thing for themselves, and inured to the hardships and privation which awaited them in real warfare. In the year 1785, at the age of sixteen, he received a commission in a regiment of artillery, and was soon promoted to the rank of first lieutenant, in a corps quartered at Valence. Shortly after, he gave a proof of the varied subjects which occupied his mind, by writing a History of Corsica, and an Essay for a prize, proposed by the Abbé Raynal, on the "Institutions most likely to contribute to Public Happiness." The prize was adjudged to the young soldier. These productions, as might have been expected, were distinguished by the revolutionary doctrines then generally prevalent, and very different from his maturer speculations. The essay was recovered by Talleyrand after Napoléon was on the throne; but the moment the Emperor saw it he threw it into the flames (3).

At this period, Napoléon was generally disliked by his companions: he was considered as proud, haughty, and irascible; but with the few whose conversation he valued, and whose friendship he chose to cultivate, he was even then a favourite, and high expectations began to be formed of the future eminence to which he might rise. His powers of reasoning were already remarkable; his expressions lucid and energetic; his knowledge and information immense, considering his years, and the opportunities of study which he had enjoyed. Logical accuracy was the great characteristic of his mind; and his subsequent compositions have abundantly proved, that if he had not become the first conqueror, he would have been one of the greatest writers, as he assuredly was one of the profoundest thinkers of modern times (4).

His figure, always diminutive, was at that period thin and meagre in the highest degree; a circumstance which rendered his appearance somewhat ridiculous, when he first assumed the military dress. Mademoiselle Permon, afterwards Duchess of Abrantes, one of his earliest female acquaintances, and who afterwards became one of the most brilliant wits of the Imperial court,

(1) Bour. i. 37, 38.

(2) Las Cas. i. 136, ii. 343.

(3) O'Meara, ii. 168, 169. Las Cas. i. 43, 136, 141. Bour. i. 44. D'Abr. i. 76.

(4) D'Abr. i. 111. Las Cas. i. 140, 141.

mentions, that he came to their house, on the day on which he first put on his uniform, in the highest spirits, as is usual with young men on such an occasion; but her sister, two years younger than herself, who had just left her boarding-school, was so struck with his comical appearance, in the enormous boots which were at that period worn by the artillery, that she immediately burst into an immoderate fit of laughter, saying, he resembled nothing so much as Puss in Boots. The stroke told; the libel was too true not to be felt: but Napoléon soon recovered his good-humour, and a few days afterwards, presented her with an elegantly bound copy of Puss in Boots, as a proof that he retained no rancour for her raillery (1).

He espoused,
with his re-
giment, the
cause of the
Revolution

When the Revolution broke out, he adhered, like almost all the young officers of a subaltern rank, to the popular side, and continued a warm patriot during the whole time of the Constituent Assembly. But, on the appointment of the Legislative Assembly, he has himself declared that his sentiments underwent a rapid change; and he soon imbibed, under the Reign of Terror, that profound hatred of the Jacobins, which his subsequent life so strongly evinced, and which he never, even for the purposes of ambition, made any attempts to disguise. It was his fortune to witness both the mob which inundated the Tuileries on the 20th June, and that which overturned the throne on the 10th August; and on both he strongly expressed his sense of the ruinous consequences likely to arise from the want of resolution in the government. No man knew better the consequences of yielding to popular clamour, or how rapidly it is checked by proper firmness in the depositaries of power: from the weakness shown on the 20th June, he predicted the disastrous effects which so speedily followed on the next great revolt of the populace. When he saw the monarch, in obedience to the rabble, put on the red cap, his indignation knew no bounds. "How on earth," he exclaimed, "could they let those wretches enter the palace! They should have cut down four or five hundred with grape-shot, and the rest would speedily have taken to flight (2).

His first
service in
Corsica.

The first military exploit of Napoléon was in his native country. The disturbances in Corsica having led the revolutionary forces into that island, he was dispatched from Bastia, in spring 1795, to surprise his native city of Ajaccio, and succeeded in making himself master of a tower called the Torre di Capitello, in its vicinity, where he was shortly afterwards besieged, and compelled to evacuate it (3). His talents, and the high character which he had received from the masters of the military academy, soon, however, led to a more important employment. At the siege of Toulon, the command of the artillery, after the operations had advanced a considerable length, was intrusted to his direction, and he soon communicated a new impulse to the hitherto languishing progress of the siege. By his advice, the attack was changed from the body of the place to the forts on the *Hauteur de Grasse*, and on the Mountain of Faron, which proved so successful, that the siege, which before his arrival was on the point of being abandoned in despair, was speedily crowned with complete success. During this operation he was first struck by the firmness and intrepidity of a young corporal of artil-

And at the
siege of
Toulon.

lery, whom he immediately recommended for promotion. Having occasion to send a despatch from the trenches, he called for some person who could write, that he might dictate the order. A young soldier

(1) D'Abr. i. 113.

(2) Peur, i. 19. Las Cas, i. 146.

(3) Benson, 4. Scott, iii. 21.

stepped from the ranks, and resting the paper on the breastwork, began to write as he dictated, when a shot from the enemy's batteries struck the ground close to him, and covered the paper with earth. "Thank you," said the soldier; "we shall have no occasion for sand on this page." Napoléon asked him what he could do for him. "Every thing," replied the young private, blushing with emotion, and touching his left shoulder with his hand; "you can turn this worsted into an epaulet." A few days after, Napoléon sent for the same soldier to order him to reconnoitre in the enemy's trenches, and recommended that he should disguise himself, for fear of his being discovered. "Never," replied he. "Do you take me for a spy? I will go in my uniform, though I should never return." And in effect he set out instantly, dressed as he was, and had the good fortune to return unhurt. Napoléon immediately recommended him for promotion, and never lost sight of his courageous secretary. He was Junot, afterwards Marshal of France, and Duke of Abrantes (1).

On another occasion, an artilleryman having been shot while loading a gun, he took up the dead man's ramrod, and with his own hands served the piece for a considerable time. He first took notice, at the same siege, of another young soldier named Duroc, whom he never afterwards lost sight of, made Marshal of the Palace, and ever treated with the most unlimited confidence, till he was killed by his side on the field of Bautzen. Duroc loved Napoléon for himself, and possessed, perhaps, a larger share of his confidence than any of his other generals; and none knew so well, in after years, how to let the first ebullitions of the imperial wrath escape without producing fatal effects, and allowing the better judgment of his sovereign to resume its sway in cooler moments (2).

The reputation which Napoléon acquired from the successful issue of this siege was very great. All the generals, representatives, and soldiers, who had heard the advice which he gave at the councils, three months before the capture of the town, and witnessed his activity at the works, anticipated a future career of glory to the young officer. Dugommier wrote to the Committee of Public Safety in these words:—"Reward and promote that young man; for, if you are ungrateful towards him, he will raise himself alone (3).

This success procured for Napoléon the command of the artillery of the army of Italy during the campaign of 1794. Dumerbion, who was advanced in years, submitted all the operations to a council of younger officers, among whom Napoléon and Massena soon acquired a decided lead; and the former, from the force of superior talents, gradually came to direct the whole operations of the campaign; and it was his ability which procured for the French armies the capture of Saorgia, the Col di Tende, and all the higher chain of the Maritime Alps. These successes awakened in his ardent mind those lofty visions of ambition which he was so soon destined to realize; one night, in June 1794, he spent on the summit of the Col di Tende, from whence at sunrise he beheld with delight the blue plains of Italy, already to his prophetic eye the theatre of glorious achievement (4).

In July 1794, Napoléon was sent by the Commissioners of the Conven-

(1) Duchess d'Abr. ii. 191. Las Cas. i. 166. Nap. i. 10, 13.

So strongly did Napoléon's character impress Junot at that time, that he quitted his regiment to devote himself to his fortunes as aide-de-camp, and wrote to his father in 1794, in answer to his enquiries, what sort of young man he was to whom he

had attached himself,—“He is one of those men of whom nature is sparing, and whom she does not throw upon the earth but with centuries between them.” [D'Abr. ii. 193. Las Cas. i. 165.]

(2) Las Cas. ii. 156, 157. Scott, iii. 35.

(3) Nap. iii. 15.

(4) Nap. iii. 26, 34.

Is attached
to Dumer-
bion's army
in the Mari-
time Alps.

Sent to Genoa, and there arrested and liberated. tion to Genoa upon a secret mission, in which he was connected with Robespierre's brother, then intrusted with the supreme command at Toulon. This mission saved his life; the younger Robespierre, for whom, at that period, he had conceived the highest admiration, earnestly entreated Napoléon to accompany him to Paris, whither he was returning to support his brother; but he was inflexible in his refusal. Had he yielded, he would infallibly have shared the fate of both; and the destinies of Europe would have been changed. As it was, he was exposed, from his connexion with these leaders, to no inconsiderable dangers even on his Italian mission. Within a month after, he was, in consequence of the fall of Robespierre, arrested by the new commissioners, whom the Thermidorien party sent out to the army of Italy, and made a narrow escape with his life. He addressed, in 6th Aug. 1794. consequence, an energetic remonstrance to the commissioners, remarkable for the strong sense, condensed thought, and powerful expression which it contains; while his friend Junot was so penetrated with grief at his 20th Aug. misfortune, that he wrote to the commissioners, protesting his innocence, and imploring to be allowed to share his captivity. It was attended with complete success; a fortnight afterwards, he was provisionally set at liberty, and immediately returned to Paris. He was there offered a command in la Vendée; and, having declined it, he was deprived of his rank as a general officer, and reduced to private life (1).

The period which now intervened from the dismissal of Napoléon to the attack of the Sections on the Convention, in October 1795, he has himself described as the happiest in his life (2). Living almost without money, on the bounty of his friends, in coffee-houses and theatres, his ardent imagination dwelt incessantly on the future; and visions floated across his mind, tinged with those bright colours in which the eye of youthful genius arrays the path of life,—a striking proof of the dependence of happiness on the mind itself, and the slight influence which even the greatest external success has in replenishing the secret fountains from which the joys or sorrows of existence are drawn. During these days of visionary romance, he dwelt with peculiar pleasure on his favourite idea of repairing to Constantinople and offering his services to the Grand Signior, under the impression that things were too stable in the Western World, and that it was in the East alone that those great revolutions were to be effected, which at once immortalize the names of their authors. He even went so far as to prepare, and address to the French government, a memorial, in which he offered, with a few officers, who were willing to follow his fortunes, to go to Turkey, to organize its forces against Russia; a proposal which, if acceded to, would probably have changed the fate of the world. This impression never forsook him through life; it was, perhaps, the secret motive of the expedition to Moscow; and, even after all the glories of his subsequent career, he looked back with regret to these early visions (3); and, when speaking of Sir Sidney Smith and the check at Acre, repeatedly said—"That man made me miss my destiny."

His destitute condition there. So low, however, were the fortunes of the future Emperor fallen at that period, that he was frequently indebted to his friends for a meal, which he could not afford to purchase himself. His brother Lucien and he brought the black bread received in their rations to Madame Bourrienne, and received in exchange loaves of white flour, which she had clandestinely,

(1) Bour. i. 60, 61, 69, 70. Las Cas. 167. D'Abr. ii. 194.

(2) O'Meara, ii. 155.

(3) O'Meara, ii. 155. Las Cas. i. 172. Bour. i. 72, 76.

and at the hazard of her life, received during the law of the *Maximum*, from a neighbouring confectioner. At this period she lodged in a new house in the Rue des Marais. Napoléon was very anxious to hire, with the assistance of his uncle, afterwards Cardinal Fesch, the one opposite. "With that house," said he, "the society of yourself, a few friends, and a cabriolet, I should be the happiest of men (1)."

But another destiny awaited the young soldier. The approaching conflict of the Convention with the Sections was the first circumstance which raised him from the obscurity into which he had recently fallen. His great abilities being known to several persons of influence in government, he was, on the first appearance of the approaching struggle, taken into the confidence of administration, and had been consulted by them for some months before the contest began. When the attack by Menou on the Section Le Pelletier failed, Napoléon was sent for. He found the Convention in the utmost agitation; and measures of accommodation with the insurgents were already talked of, when his firmness and decision saved the government. He painted in such vivid colours the extreme peril of sharing the supreme authority between the military commander and three commissioners of the convention, that the committee of public safety agreed to appoint Barras commander-in-chief, and Napoléon second in command. No sooner was this done than he dispatched at midnight a chief of squadron, named MURAT (2), with three hundred horse, to seize the park of artillery lying at Sablons. He arrived a few minutes before the troops of the sections, who came to obtain them for the insurgents; and, by this decisive step, put at the disposal of government those formidable batteries, which, next day, spread death through the ranks of the national guard, and, at one blow, extinguished the revolt. Barras declared in his report, that it was to Napoléon's skilful disposition of the posts round the Tuileries that the success of the day was owing; but he himself never ceased to lament, that his first success in separate command should have been gained in civil dissension; and often said, in after times, that he would give many years of his life to tear that page from his history (3).

(1) Bour. i. 76, 81, 86.

In those days Napoléon wore the grey great-coat, which has since become more celebrated than the white plume of Henry IV; he had no gloves, for, as he said himself, they were a useless expense; his hoots, ill made, were seldom blackened; his yellow visage, meagre countenance, and severe physiognomy, gave as little indication of his future appearance, as his fortunes did of his future destiny. Salicetti had been the author of his arrest. "He did me all the mischief in his power," said Napoléon; "but my star would not permit him to prevail." [D'Abr. i. 255, 256.] So early had the idea of a brilliant destiny taken possession of his mind. He afterwards made a generous return to his enemy: Salicetti was ordered to be arrested by the Convention after the condemnation of Romme, the chief of the conspirators, and he was concealed in the house of the mother of the future Duchess of Angoulême. Napoléon learned the secret in consequence of a love intrigue between his valet and their maid; but he concealed his knowledge, facilitated their escape, and sent a letter to his enemy on the road, informing him of the return he had made for his malevolence. [Ibid. 351]

(2) "Murat," said Napoléon, "was a most singular character. He loved, I may rather say, adored me; with me he was my right arm; as without me he was nothing. Order Murat to attack and destroy

four or five thousand men in such a direction, it was done in a moment; leave him to himself, he was an *imbecille* without judgment. In battle he was perhaps the bravest man in the world: his boiling courage carried him into the midst of the enemy, covered with plumes and glittering with gold; how he escaped was a miracle, for, from being so distinguished a mark, every one fired at him. The Cossacks admired him on account of his excessive bravery. Every day Murat was engaged in single combat with some of them, and returned with his sabre dripping with the blood of those he had slain. He was a Paladin in the field; but in the cabinet destitute of either decision or judgment." —O'MEARA, ii. 96.

(3) Bour. i. 90, 96. Nap. iii. 67, 74.

Though not gifted with the powers of popular oratory, Napoléon was not destitute of that ready talent which catches the idea most likely to divert the populace, and frequently disarms them even in the moment of their greatest irritation. When in command at Paris, after the suppression of this revolt, he was frequently brought in collision with the people in a state of the utmost excitement: and on these occasions his presence of mind was as conspicuous as his humanity was admirable. Above a hundred families, during the dreadful famine which followed the suppression of the revolt of the Sections in the winter 1795—6, were saved from

His marriage with Josephine.

The next event in Napoléon's career was not less important on his ultimate fortunes. On occasion of the general disarming of the inhabitants after the overthrow of the Sections, a boy of ten years of age came to request from Napoléon, as general of the interior, that his father's sword, which had been delivered up, should be restored to him. His name was EUGÈNE BEAUHARNAIS; and Napoléon was so much struck by his appearance, that he was induced not only to comply with the request, but to visit his mother, Joséphine Beauharnais. Her husband had been one of the most elegant dancers of his day, and from that quality was frequently honoured with the hand of Marie Antoinette at the court balls. Napoléon, whose inclination already began to revert to the manners of the old *régime*, used to look around if the windows were closed, and say, "Now let us talk of the old court; let us make a tour to Versailles." From thence arose the intimacy which led to his marriage with that lady, and ultimately placed her on the throne of France (1).

Her history, and remarkable adventure at the fall of Robespierre.

Her history had been very remarkable. She was born in the West Indies; and it had early been prophesied, by an old negress, that she should lose her first husband, be extremely unfortunate, but that she should afterwards be greater than a queen (2). This prophecy, the authenticity of which is placed beyond a doubt, was fulfilled in the most singular manner. Her first husband, Alexander Beauharnais, a general in the army on the Rhine, had been guillotined during the Reign of Terror; and she herself, who was also imprisoned at the same time, was only saved from impending death by the fall of Robespierre. So strongly was the prophecy impressed on her mind, that, while lying in the dungeons of the Conciergerie, expecting every hour to be summoned to the revolutionary tribunal, she mentioned it to her fellow prisoners, and to amuse them, named some of them as ladies of the bedchamber; a jest which she afterwards lived to realize to one of their number (3).

death by his beneficence. [D'Abr. ii. 28.] On one occasion, he was trying to appease a mob in a state of extreme irritation, when a fat woman, bursting from the throng, exclaimed, "These wearers of epaulets, provided they fill their own skins, care not though the poor die of famine."—"My good woman," said Napoléon, who at that time was exceedingly thin, "look at me, and say which of us has fed the best." This at once turned the laugh on his side, and he continued his route without interruption. [Las Cas. ii. 173.]

(1) *Las Cas.* i. 173. ii. 190, 191. D'Abr. iii. 314. Nap. i. 72. Scott, iii. 80.

(2) The author heard this prophecy long before Napoléon's elevation to the throne, from the late Countess of Bath, and the Countess of Ancran, who were educated in the same convent with Joséphine, and had repeatedly heard her mention the circumstance in early youth.

(3) *Mém. de Joséphine*, par Mad. Crevier, i. 251, 252, 253. Scott, iii. 82. *Note*.

Joséphine herself narrated this extraordinary passage in her life in the following terms:—

"One morning the jailer entered the chamber where I slept with the Duchess d'Aiguillon and two other ladies, and told me he was going to take my mattress to give it to another prisoner. 'Why,' said Madame d'Aiguillon, eagerly, 'will not Madame de Beauharnais obtain a better one?'—'No, no,' replied he, with a friendly smile, 'she will have no need of one; for she is about to be led to the Conciergerie, and thence to the guillotine.'

"At these words my companions in misfortune

uttered piercing shrieks. I consoled them as well as I could; and at length, worn out with their eternal lamentations, I told them that their grief was utterly unreasonable; that not only I should not die, but live to be Queen of France. 'Why, then, do you not name your maids of honour?' said Madame d'Aiguillon, irritated at such expressions at such a moment. 'Very true,' said I; 'I did not think of that;—well, my dear, I make you one of them.' Upon this the tears of these ladies fell apace, for they never doubted I was mad. But the truth was, I was not gifted with any extraordinary courage, but internally persuaded of the truth of the oracle.

"Madame d'Aiguillon soon after became unwell, and I drew her towards the window, which I opened to admit through the bars a little fresh air;—I there perceived a poor woman who knew us, and who was making a number of signs, which I at first could not understand. She constantly held up her gown (*robe*); and seeing that she had some object in view, I called out '*robe*,' to which she answered 'yes.' She then lifted up a stone and put it in her lap, which she lifted up a second time; I called out '*pierrre*,' upon which she evinced the greatest joy at perceiving that her signs were understood. Joining, then, the stone to her robe, she eagerly imitated the motion of cutting off the neck, and immediately began to dance, and evince the most extravagant joy. This singular pantomime awakened in our minds a vague hope that possibly Robespierre might be no more.

"At this moment, when we were floating between hope and fear, we heard a great noise in the cor-

Her character. Joséphine possessed all the qualities fitted to excite admiration; graceful in her manners, affectionate in her disposition, elegant in her appearance, she was qualified both to awaken the love, and form the happiness of the young general, whose fate was now united with her own. Her influence in subsequent times, when placed on the throne, was never exerted but for the purposes of humanity; and if her extravagance sometimes amounted to a fault, it was redeemed by the readiness with which she gave ear to the tale of suffering. Napoléon himself said, after he had tasted of all the greatness of the world, that the chief happiness he had known in life had flowed from her affection (1).

Marries her, and receives the command of the army of Italy. In the first instance, however, motives of ambition combined with a softer feeling to fix Napoléon's choice; madame Beauharnais had formed an intimacy in prison with Madame Fontenoy, the eloquent and beautiful friend of Tallien: and she was an acknowledged favourite of Barras, at that period the leading character of the Directory, though, with his usual volatility, he was not sorry of an opportunity of establishing her in marriage with the young general (2); and his influence, after the fall of Robespierre, promised to be of essential importance to the rising officer. He married her on the 9th March, 1796; he himself being in the twenty-sixth, and she in the twenty-eighth year of her age. At the same time, he laid before the Directory a plan for the Italian campaign, so remarkable for its originality and genius, as to attract the especial notice of the illustrious Carnot, then minister at war. The united influence of these two directors, and the magnitude of the obligation with Napoléon had conferred upon them, prevailed. With Joséphine he received the command of the Italian armies; and, twelve days after, set out for the Alps, taking with him two thousand louis-d'or for the use of the army, the whole specie which the treasury could furnish. The instructions of the Directory were, to do all in his power to revolutionize Piémont, and so intimidate the other Italian powers; to violate the neutrality of Genoa; seize the forts of Savona; compel the Senate to furnish him with pecuniary supplies, and surrender the keys of Gavi, a fortress, perched on a rocky height, commanding the pass of the Bocchetta. In case of refusal, he was directed to carry it by assault. His powers were limited to military operations, and the Directory reserved to themselves the exclusive power of concluding treaties of peace or truce; a limitation which was speedily disregarded by the enterprising genius of the young conqueror (3).

At this period, the military forces of the Italian states amounted to one hundred and sixty thousand men under arms, which could with ease have raised, from a population of nineteen millions, three hundred thousand. But, with the exception of the Piedmontese troops, this military array was of no real use; except when led on by French officers, the soldiers of the other Italian states have never been able to bear the sight of the French or Austrian bayonets (4).

Bitterly did Italy suffer for this decay in her national spirit, and extinc-

ridor, and the terrible voice of our jailer, who said to his dog, giving him, at the same time, a kick, 'Get on, you cursed Robespierre.' That coarse phrase at once taught us that we had nothing to fear, and that France was saved."—*Mém de Joséphine*, i. 252, 253.

(1) Bour. i. 101; viii. 372. Scott, iii. 83.

"Joséphine," said Napoléon, "was grace personified. Everything she did was with a grace

and delicacy peculiar to herself. I never saw her act inelegantly the whole time we lived together. Her toilet was a perfect arsenal; and she effectually defended herself against the assaults of time."—O'MEARA, ii. 101.

(2) Hard. iii. 301.

(3) Hard. iii. 302 303. Las Cas. i. 173, Bour. i. 103. Scott, iii. 83, 84.

(4) Th. viii. 220. Nap. iii. 129, 130.

Calamities
which the
French in-
vasion
brought on
Italy.

tion of her military courage. With the French invasion commenced a long period of suffering: tyranny, under the name of liberty; rapine, under the name of generosity; excitement among the poor, spoliation among the rich; clamour in public against the nobility, and adulation of them in private; use made of the lovers of freedom by those who despised them; and revolt against tyranny, by those who aimed only at being tyrants; general praise of liberty in words, and universal extinction of it in action; the stripping of churches; the robbery of hospitals; the levelling of the palaces of the great, and the destruction of the cottages of the poor;—all that military license has of most terrible, all that despotic authority has of most oppressive. Then did her people feel, that neither riches of soil nor glories of recollection—neither a southern sun, nor the perfection of art, can save a nation from destruction, if it has lost the vigour to inherit, or the courage to defend them (1).

State of the
French
army when
Napoléon
took the
command,
27th March,
1796.

When Napoléon assumed the command of the army in the end of March, he found every thing in the most miserable state. The efficient force under arms, and ready for offensive operations, did not exceed forty-two thousand men; but it was continually reinforced by troops from the dépôts in the interior, after Napoléon's successes commenced; so that, notwithstanding the losses of the campaign, it was maintained throughout at that amount. The artillery did not exceed sixty pieces, and the cavalry was almost dismounted; but the garrisons in the rear, amounting to eight thousand men, could furnish supplies when the war was removed from the frontier and the arsenals of Nice and Antibes were well provided with artillery. For a very long period the soldiers of all ranks had suffered the extremity of want. Perched on the inhospitable summits of the Apennines, they had enjoyed neither tents nor shelter; magazines they had none; the troops had for a long time been placed on half a ration a day, and even this scanty supply was for the most part procured by marauding expeditions of the soldiers into the neighbouring valleys. The officers, from the effect of the depreciation of paper, had for years received only eight francs a month of pay; and the staff was entirely on foot. On one occasion the Directory had awarded a gratification of three louis-d'or to each general of division; and the future marshals and princes of the empire subsisted for long on the humble present. But, considered with reference to their skill and warlike qualities, the army presented a very different aspect, and were, beyond all question, the most efficient one which the republic possessed. Composed, for the most part, of young soldiers, whom the great levies of 1793 had brought into the field, they had been inured to hardship and privations during the subsequent campaigns in the Pyrenees and Maritime Alps; a species of warfare which, by leading detached parties continually into difficult and perilous situations, is singularly calculated to strengthen the frame, and augment the intelligence of the soldier. "Poverty," says Napoléon, "privations, misery, are the school of good soldiers." Its spirit had been greatly elevated by the successful result of the battle of Loano; and its chiefs, Massena, Augereau, Serrurier, and Berthier, had already become distinguished, and, like stars in the firmament on the approach of twilight, began to give token of their future light (2).

Berthier, above forty years of age, son of a geographical artist, was chief of

(1) Bot. i. 298.

(2) Nap. iii. 135, 136, 151. Jom. viii. 57, 59. Hard. iii. 306. Th. viii. 220, 221.

Character of the staff, a situation which he continued to hold in all the campaigns of Napoléon, down to the battle of Waterloo. Active, indefatigable alike on horseback and in the cabinet, he was admirably qualified to discharge the duties of that important situation, without being possessed of the originality and decision requisite for a commander-in-chief. He was perfectly master of the geography of every country which the army was to enter, understood thoroughly the use of maps, and could calculate with admirable precision the time requisite for the different corps to arrive at the ground assigned to them, as well as direct in a lucid manner the course they were to pursue (1).

Masséna. Masséna, a native of Nice, was a lieutenant in the regiment of Royal Italians when the Revolution broke out, but rose rapidly to the rank of general of division. Gifted by nature with a robust frame, indefatigable in exertion, unconquerable in resolution, he was to be seen night and day on horseback, among the rocks and the mountains. Decided, brave, and intrepid, full of ambition, his leading characteristic was obstinacy; a quality which, according as it is right or wrong directed, leads to the greatest successes, or the most ruinous disasters. His conversation gave few indications of genius; but at the first cannon-shot his mental energy redoubled, and when surrounded by danger, his thoughts were clear and forcible. In the midst of the dying and the dead, of balls sweeping away those who encircled him, Masséna was himself, and gave his orders with the greatest coolness and precision. Even after defeat, he recommenced the struggle as if he had come off victorious; and by these means saved the republic at the battle of Zurich. But these great qualities were disfigured by as great vices. He was rapacious, sordid, and avaricious; shared the profits of the contractors and commissaries, and never could keep himself clear from acts of peculation (2).

Augereau. Augereau, born in the faubourg St.-Marceau, shared in the opinions of the democratic quarter from which he sprung. He had served with distinction both in la Vendée and the Pyrenees. With little education, hardly any knowledge, no reach of mind, he was yet beloved by the soldiers, from the order and discipline which he always enforced. His attacks were conducted with courage and regularity, and he led his columns with invincible resolution during the fire; but he had not the moral firmness requisite for lasting success, and was frequently thrown into unreasonable dejection shortly after his greatest triumphs. His political opinions led him to sympathize with the extreme Republicans; but no man was less fitted by nature, either to understand, or shine in, the civil contests in which he was always so desirous to engage (3).

Serrurier. Serrurier, born in the department of the Aisne, was a major at the commencement of the Revolution, and incurred many dangers in its early wars, from the suspicion of a secret leaning to the aristocracy under which he laboured. He was brave in person, firm in conduct, and severe in discipline; but, though he gained the battle of Mondovi, and took Mantua, he was not in general fortunate in his operations, and became a marshal of France, with less military glory than any of his other illustrious contemporaries (4).

State of the Allied forces.

On the other hand, the Allies had above fifty thousand men, and 200 pieces of cannon; while the Sardinian army, of twenty-four

(1) Nap. iii. 185.

(2) Nap. iii. 187, O'Meara, i. 239.

(3) Nap. iii. 188.

(4) Ibid. 190.

thousand, guarded the avenues of Dauphiné and Savoy, and was opposed to the army of Kellerman of nearly equal strength. Their forces were thus distributed: Beaulieu, a veteran of seventy-five, with thirty thousand combatants, entirely Austrians, and 140 pieces of cannon, was on the extreme right of the French, and in communication with the English fleet; while Colli, with twenty thousand men, and sixty pieces, was in a line with him to the north, and covered Ceva and Coni (1). Generally speaking, the French occupied the crest of the mountains, while the Allies were stationed in the valleys leading into the Italian plains.

Napoleon's
first procla-
mation to
his soldiers.

Napoléon arrived at Nice on the 27th March, and soon gave indications of the great designs which he was meditating, by the following striking proclamation to his troops:—"Soldiers! you are almost naked, half-starved: the Government owes you much, and can give you nothing. Your patience, your courage, in the midst of these rocks, are admirable, but they reflect no splendour on your arms. I am about to conduct you into the most fertile plains on the earth. Fertile provinces, opulent cities, will soon be in your power: there you will find rich harvests, honour, and glory. Soldiers of Italy, will you fail in courage (2)?"

His plan for
the cam-
paign

The plan of the young general was to penetrate into Piémont by the Col de Cadibone, the lowest part of the ridge which divides France from Italy, and separate the Austrian from the Piedmontese armies, by pressing with the weight of his forces on the weak cordon which united them. For this purpose, it was necessary that the bulk of the troops should assemble on the extreme right—a delicate and perilous operation in presence of a superior enemy, but which was rendered comparatively safe by the snow which encumbered the lofty ridges that separated the two armies. Early in April, the whole French columns were in motion towards Genoa, while the French minister demanded from the Senate of that city leave to pass the Bocchetta, and the keys of Gavi, that being the chief route from the maritime coasts to the interior of Piémont. At the same time Beaulieu, in obedience to the directions of the Aulic Council, was, on his side, resuming the offensive, and directing his columns also towards his own left at Genoa, with a view to establish a connexion with that important city and the English fleet. He left his right wing at Dego, pushed his centre, under d'Argenteau, to the ridge of MONTENOTTE, and himself advanced with his left, by Bocchetta and Genoa, towards Voltri, along the sea-coast (3).

The two armies, respectively defiling towards the sea-coast through the higher Alps, came into contact at Montenotte: the Austrian general having advanced his centre to that place, in order to cut asunder the French force, by falling on its left flank, and intercept, by occupying Savona, the road by the Cornice, which they were pursuing, from Provence to Genoa. The Imperialists, ten thousand strong, encountered at Montenotte only Colonel Rampon, at the head of twelve hundred men, whom they forced to retire to the Monte Prato and the old redoubt of Monte Legino; but this brave officer, feeling the vital importance of this post to the whole army, which if lost would have been cut in two, defended the fort with heroic courage, repeatedly repulsed the impetuous attacks of the Austrians, and in the midst of the fire made his soldiers swear to conquer or die. With great difficulty he maintained his ground till nightfall, and by this heroism saved

(1) Th. viii. 223. Jom. viii. 57. Nap. iii. 134, 136. Hard iii. 304, 305.

(2) Nap. iii. 136.

(3) Jom. viii. 64. Nap. iii. 138. Th. viii. 136, 224. Hard. iii. 307.

the French army. The brave Roccavina, who commanded the Imperialists, was severely wounded in the last assault, and forced to be removed to Montenotte. Before retiring he strenuously urged his successor, d'Argenteau, to renew the attack during the night, and gain possession of the fort before the distant aid of the Republicans could advance to its relief; but this advice that officer, not equally penetrated with the value of time and the vital importance of that position (1), declined to follow. If he had adopted it, and succeeded, the fate of the campaign and of the world might have been changed.

Success of the French. When this attack was going forward, Napoléon was at Savona; but no sooner did he receive intelligence of it, than he resolved to envelope the Austrian force, which had thus pushed into the centre of his line of march. With this view, having stationed Cervoni to make head against Beaulieu in front of Voltri, he himself set out after sunset from Savona with the divisions of Masséna and Serrurier, and having crossed the ridge of 12th April. Cadibone, occupied the heights in rear of Montenotte. The night was dark and tempestuous, which entirely concealed their movements from the Austrians. At daybreak the latter found themselves surrounded on all sides. La Harpe and Rampon attacked them in front, while Masséna and Joubert pressed their rear; they resisted long and bravely, but were at length broken by superior force, and completely routed, with the loss of five pieces of cannon, two thousand prisoners, and above one thousand killed and wounded. This great success paralysed the movements of Beaulieu, who had advanced unopposed beyond Voltri; he hastened back with the bulk of his forces to Millesimo, but such was the circuit they were obliged to take, that it was two days before he arrived at that place to support the ruined centre of his line (2).

This victory, by opening to the French the plains of Piedmont, and piercing the centre of the Allies, completely separated the Austrian and Sardinian armies; the former concentrated at Dego to cover the road to Milan, and the latter around Millesimo to protect the entrance into Piémont. Napoléon, in possession of a central position, resolved to attack them both at once, although by drawing together their detachments from all quarters, they had Action at Millesimo. more than repaired the losses of Montenotte. On the 15th, Augereau, on the left, assailed the forces of Millesimo, where the Piemontese were posted, while the divisions of Masséna and La Harpe descended the valley and moved towards Dego. With such fury was the attack on the Piemontese conducted, that the passes were forced, and General Provera, who commanded, was driven, with two thousand men, into the ruins of the old castle of Cossaria. He was immediately assaulted there by superior forces; but the Piemontese, skilled in mountain warfare, poured down upon their adversaries such a shower of stones and rocks, that whole companies were swept away at once, and Joubert, who was in front animating the soldiers, was severely wounded. After many ineffectual efforts, the Republicans desisted on the approach of night, and entrenched themselves at the foot of the eminence on which the castle was situated, to prevent the escape April 14. of the garrison. The following day was decisive; Colli and the Piemontese on the left made repeated efforts to disengage Provera, but their exertions were in vain; and after seeing all their columns repulsed, that brave officer, destitute of provisions and water, was compelled to lay down his

(1) Jom. viii. 69. Th. viii. 226, Bot. i. 306.
Hard. iii. 311, 312. Nap. iii. 139.

(2) Nap. iii. 141, Th. viii. 227, Jom. viii. 70,

And at Dego. arms, with fifteen hundred men. Meanwhile, Napoléon himself, with the divisions of Masséna and La Harpe, attacked and carried Dego after an obstinate resistance, while Joubert made himself master of the heights of Biestro. The retreat of the Austrians was obstructed by the artillery, which blocked up the road in the defile of Spegno, and the soldiers had no other resource but to disperse and seek their safety on the mountains. Thirteen pieces of artillery and three thousand prisoners fell into the hands of the victors. No sooner was this success achieved, than the indefatigable conqueror moved forward the division of Augereau, now disengaged by the surrender of Provera, to the important heights of Monte Zemolo, the occupation of which completed the separation of the Austrian and Piedmontese armies. Beaulieu retired to Acqui, on the road to Milan, and Colli towards Ceva, to cover Turin (1).

Bold advance of Wukassowich to Dego.

Meanwhile the brave Wukossowich, at the head of six thousand Austrian grenadiers, made a movement which, if supported, might have completely re-established the affairs of the Allies. Separated from the body of the Imperial forces, he advanced to Dego, with the intention of forming a junction with d'Argenteau, who he imagined still occupied that place. Great was his surprise when he found it in the hands of the enemy; but instantly taking his resolution, like a brave man, he attacked and carried the place, making prisoners six hundred French, and regaining all the artillery lost on the preceding day. But this success not being supported by the other divisions of the Austrian army, which were in full retreat, only led to the destruction of the brave men who had achieved it. Napoléon instantly

Which, at first successful, being unsupported, failed, at length fails.

returned to the spot, and commenced a vigorous attack with superior forces. They were received with such gallantry by the Austrians, that the Republican columns were in the first instance repulsed in disorder, and the general-in-chief hastened to the spot to restore the combat; but at length General Lanusse, putting his hat on the point of his sword, led them back to the charge, and carried the place, with the loss of fifteen hundred men to the Imperialists, who escaped with difficulty by the road to Acqui, after abandoning all the artillery they had retaken. In this action Napoléon was particularly struck by the gallantry of a young chief of battalion, whom he made a colonel on the spot, and who continued ever after the companion of his glory. His name was LANNES, afterwards Duke of Montébello, and one of the most heroic marshals of the empire (2).

Arrival of the Republicans on the heights of Monte Zemolo.

After the battle of Dego, La Harpe's division was placed to keep the shattered remains of Beaulieu's forces in check, while the weight of the army was moved against the Sardinian troops. Augereau drove the Piedmontese from the heights of Monte Zemolo, and soon after the main body of the army arrived upon the same ridge. From thence the eye could discover the immense and fertile plains of Piémont. The Pô, the Tanaro, the Stura, and a multitude of smaller streams, were descried in the distance, while a glittering girdle of snow and ice, of a prodigious elevation, surrounded from afar the promised land. It was a sublime spectacle when the troops arrived on this elevated point, and the soldiers, exhausted with

(1) Nap. iii. 143, 144. Th. viii. 229, 230. Hard. iii. 312, 315. Nap. iii. 143.

(2) Jom. viii. 85. Nap. iii. 145.

"The talent of Lannes," said Napoléon, "was equal to his bravery. He was at once the Roland of the army, and a giant in capacity." [Las Cas. ii. 374. D'Abr. vi. 326.] He had great experience in war, had been in fifty-four pitched battles, and three

hundred combats. He was cool in the midst of fire, and possessed a clear, penetrating eye, ready to take advantage of any opportunity which might present itself. Violent and hasty in his temper, sometimes even in my presence, he was yet ardently attached to me. As a general, he was greatly superior to either Moreau or Soult." — O'MEARA, i. 239.

fatigue, and overwhelmed with the grandeur of the sight, paused and gazed on the plains beneath. These gigantic barriers, apparently the limits of the world, which nature had rendered so formidable, and on which art had lavished its treasures, had fallen as if by enchantment. "Hannibal," said Napoléon, fixing his eyes on the mountains, "has forced the Alps, but we have turned them." Soon after the troops descended the ridge, passed the Tanaro, and found themselves in the Italian plains (1).

Serrurier was now detached by the bridge of St.-Michael to turn the right of Colli, who occupied the intrenched camp of Cevo, while Masséna passed the Tanaro to turn his left. The Piedmontese, who were about eight thousand strong, defended the camp in the first instance with success; but, finding their communications on the point of being lost, they retired in the night, and took a position behind the deep and rapid torrent of the Cursaglia. There they were assailed, on the following day, by Serrurier, who forced the bridge of St.-Michael; while Joubert, who had waded through the torrent farther up, in vain endeavoured to induce his followers to pass, and was obliged, after incurring the greatest risks, to retire. Relieved now from all anxiety about his flank, Colli fell, with all his forces, on Serrurier, and, after a severe action, drove him back again over the bridge, with the loss of six hundred men (2).

19th April.
Actions of
Serrurier
with Colli.

This check exposed Napoléon to imminent danger. Colli occupied a strong position at Mondovi in his front, while Beaulieu, with an army still formidable, was in his rear, and might easily resume offensive operations. A council of war was held in the night, at which it was unanimously resolved, notwithstanding the fatigue of the troops, to resume the attack on the following day. All the dispositions, accordingly, were made for a renewed assault on the bridge, with increased forces; but, on arriving at the advanced posts at daybreak, they found them abandoned by the enemy, who had fought only in order to gain time for the evacuation of the magazines in his rear, and had retired in the night to Mondovi. He was overtaken, however, in his retreat, near Mondovi, by the indefatigable victor, who had seized a strong position, where he hoped to arrest the enemy. The Republicans immediately advanced to the assault, and, though Serrurier was defeated in the centre by the brave grenadiers of Dichat, yet that courageous general having been struck dead by a cannon-ball at the moment when his troops, somewhat disordered by success, were assailed in flank by superior forces, the Piedmontese were thrown into confusion, and Serrurier, resuming the offensive, attacked and carried the redoubt of Bicoque, the principal defence of the position; and completed the victory. Colli retired to Cherasco, with the loss of two thousand men, eight cannon, and eleven standards. Thither he was followed by Napoléon, who occupied that town, which, though fortified, and important by its position at the confluence of the Stura and the Tanaro, was not armed, and incapable of resistance; and, by so doing, not only acquired a firm footing in the interior of Piémont, but made himself master of extensive magazines (3).

Danger of
Napoléon.

21st April.

Actions at
Mondovi.

This important success speedily changed the situation of the French army. Having descended from the sterile and inhospitable summits of the Alps, they found themselves, though still among the mountains, in communication with the rich and fertile plains of

Immense
advantages
gained by
the French
by these
operations.

(1) Nap. iii. 147. Th. viii. 233.

(2) Th. viii. 233. Jom. viii. 66, 91. Hard. iii.

(3) Th. viii. 234. Nap. iii. 150. Jom. viii. 92, 95.

Italy; provisions were obtained in abundance, and with the introduction of regularity in the supplies, the pillage and disorders consequent upon prior privations disappeared. The soldiers, animated with success, speedily recovered from their fatigues; the stragglers, and those left behind in the mountains, rejoined their colours; and the bands of conscripts from the depôts in the interior eagerly pressed forward to share in the glories, and partake the spoils, of the Italian army. In a short time the Republicans, notwithstanding all their losses, were as strong as at the commencement of the campaign; while the Allies, besides having been driven from the ridge of the Alps, the barrier of Piémont, were weakened by the loss of above twelve thousand men, and forty pieces of cannon (1).

Consternation of the court of Turin. The court of Turin was now in the utmost consternation, and opinions were violently divided as to the course which should be pursued. The ministers of Austria and England urged the king, who was by no means deficient in firmness, to imitate the glorious example of his ancestors, and abandon his capital. But, as a preliminary to so decided a step, they insisted that the fortresses of Tortona, Alexandria, and Valencia, should be put into the possession of the Austrians, in order to give Beaulieu a solid footing on the Po; and to this sacrifice in favour of a rival power, They resolve to submit to France. he could not be brought to submit. At length the Cardinal Costa persuaded him to throw himself into the arms of the French, and Colli was authorized to open negotiations. This was one of the numerous instances in the history of Napoléon, in which his audacity not only extricated him from the most perilous situations, but gave him the most splendid triumphs; for at this period, by his own admission, the French army was in very critical circumstances. He had neither heavy cannon nor a siege equipage to reduce Turin, Alexandria, or the other numerous fortresses of Piedmont, without the possession of which it would have been extremely hazardous to have penetrated farther into the country: the Allied armies, united, were still superior to the French, and their cavalry, of such vital importance in the plains, had not at all suffered; while his own troops, confounded at their own achievements, and as yet unaccustomed to his rapid success, were beginning to hesitate as to the expedience of any farther advance. “The King of Sardinia,” says Napoléon, “had still a great number of fortresses left; and in spite of the victories which had been gained, the slightest check, one caprice of fortune, would have undone every thing (2).”

It was, therefore, with the most lively satisfaction that Napoléon received the advances of the Sardinian government; but he insisted that, as a preliminary to any armistice, the fortresses of Coni, Tortona, and Alexandria, should be put into his hands. The Piedmontese commissioners were at first disposed to resist this demand; but Napoléon sternly replied,—“It is for me to impose conditions—your ideas are absurd: listen to the laws which I impose upon you, in the name of the government of my country, and obey, or to-morrow my batteries are erected, and Turin is in flames.” These words so intimidated the Piémontese, that they returned in consternation to their capital, where every opposition speedily gave way. After some negotiation, Armistice. Its conditions. the treaty was concluded, the principal conditions of which were, that the King of Sardinia should abandon the Alliance, and send

(1) Jom. viii. 66. Nap. iii. 150.

(2) Nap. iii. 151, 152, 193. Hard. iii. 323, 326. Jom. viii. 96, 97.

an ambassador to Paris to conclude a definitive peace; that in the mean time Ceva, Coni, and Tortona, or, failing it, Alexandria, should be delivered up to the French army, with all the artillery and magazines they contained; that the victors should continue to occupy all the positions which at present were in their possession; that Valence should be instantly ceded to the French in lieu of the Neapolitans; that the militia should be disbanded, and the regular troops dispersed in the fortified places, so as to give no umbrage to the French (1).

15th May, 1796. The armistice was followed, a fortnight after, by the treaty of peace between the King of Sardinia and the French Republic.

Followed by a treaty of peace between France and Sardinia. By it his Sardinian Majesty finally renounced the coalition; ceded to the Republic, Savoy, Nice, and the whole possessions of Piedmont to the westward of the highest ridge of the Alps (extending from Mount St.-Bernard by Mount Geneva to Roccabarbonæ near

Genoa): and granted a free passage through his dominions to all the troops of the Republic. The importance of this accommodation may be judged by the letter of Napoléon to the Directory the day the armistice was signed,—“Coni, Ceva, and Alexandria are in the hands of our army; if you do not ratify the convention, I will keep these fortresses, and march upon Turin. Meanwhile, I shall march to-morrow against Beaulieu, and drive him across the Po; I shall follow close at his heels, overrun all Lombardy, and in a month be in the Tyrol, join the army of the Rhine, and carry our united forces into Bavaria. That design is worthy of you, of the army, and of the destinies of France. If you continue your confidence in me, I shall answer for the results, and Italy is at your feet (2).”

Its immense importance to Napoléon. This treaty was of more service to the French general than many victories. It gave him a firm footing in Piedmont; artillery and stores for the siege of Turin, if the final conditions should not be agreed to by the Directory; stores and magazines in abundance, and a direct communication with Genoa and France for the future supplies of the army. Napoléon, from the solid base of the Piedmontese fortresses, was enabled to turn his undivided attention to the destruction of the Austrians, and thus commence, with some security, that great career of conquest which he already meditated in the Imperial dominions. Nevertheless, a large proportion of his troops and officers openly condemned the conclusion of any treaty of peace with a monarchical government; and insisted that the opportunity should not have been suffered to escape of establishing a revolutionary government in the frontier state of Italy. But Napoléon,—whose head was too strong to be carried away by the fumes of democracy, and who already gave indications of that resolution to detach himself from the cause of revolution by which he was ever after so strongly distinguished,—replied, that the first duty of the army was to secure a firm base for future operations; that it was on the Adige that the French standard must be established to protect Italy from the Imperialists; that it was impossible to advance thus far without being secured in their rear; that a revolutionary government in Piedmont would require constant assistance, scatter alarm through Italy, and be a source of weakness rather than strength; whereas the Sardinian fortressess at once put the Republicans in possession of the keys of the Peninsula. (3).

(1) Nap. iii. 155. Hard. iii. 328. Jom. viii. 93.

(3) Nap. iii. 157, 161. Th. viii. 237.

(2) Corresp. Secrète de Nap. 28th April 1796. Jom. viii. 102.

His triumphant proclamation to his soldiers.

At the same time, he despatched his aide-de-camp, Murat, with the standards taken, to Paris, and addressed to his soldiers one of those exaggerated but eloquent proclamations, which contributed as much as his victories, by captivating the minds of men, to his astonishing success. "Soldiers! you have gained in fifteen days six victories, taken one-and-twenty standards, fifty-five pieces of cannon, many strong places, and conquered the richest part of Piedmont; you have made fifteen thousand prisoners, killed or wounded ten thousand men. Hitherto you have fought on sterile rocks, illustrious, indeed, by your courage, but of no avail to your country; now you rival, by your services, the armies of the Rhine and the North. Destitute at first, you have supplied every thing. You have gained battles without cannons; passed rivers without bridges; made forced marches without shoes; bivouacked without bread! The phalanxes of the Republic—the soldiers of liberty,—were alone capable of such sacrifices. But, soldiers, you have done nothing, while any thing remains to do. Neither Turin nor Milan is in your hands; the ashes of the conqueror of Tarquin are still trampled on by the assassins of Basseville! I am told that there are some among you whose courage is giving way; who would rather return to the summits of the Alps and the Apennines. No—I cannot believe it. The conquerors of Montenotte, of Millefino, of Dego, of Mondovi, burn to carry still farther the glories of the French name (1)!"

Intoxication at Paris on this intelligence.

When these successive victories, these standards, these proclamations, arrived day after day at Paris, the joy of the people knew no bounds. The first day the gates of the Alps were opened; the next, the Austrians were separated from the Piedmontese; the third, the Sardinian army was destroyed, and the fortresses surrendered. The rapidity of the success, the number of the prisoners, exceeded all that had yet been witnessed. Every one asked, who was this young conqueror whose fame had burst forth so suddenly, and whose proclamations breathed the spirit of ancient glory? Three times the Councils decreed that the army of Italy had deserved well of their country, and appointed a fête to Victory, in honour of the commencement of the campaign (2).

Designs of Napoléon.

Having secured his rear by this advantageous treaty, Napoléon lost no time in pursuing the discomfited remains of Beaulieu's army, which had retired behind the Po, in the hope of covering the Milanese territory. The forces of the Austrians were plainly now unequal to the struggle; a *coup de main*, which Beaulieu attempted on the fortresses of Alexandria, Tortona, and Valence, failed, and they were immediately after surrendered to the Republicans; while the army of Napoléon was about to be united to the corps of Kellermann, and the division of the Col di Tende now rendered disposable, by the conclusion of the armistice, a reinforcement of above twenty thousand men. Napoléon, on his side, indulged the most brilliant anticipations; and confidently announced to the Directory that he would cross the Po, expel the Austrians from the Milanese territory, traverse the mountains of the Tyrol, unite with the army of the Rhine, and carry the war, by the valley of the Danube, into the heart of the Imperial dominions (3).

(1) Th. viii. 240.

(2) Th. viii. 241. Hard. iii. 338.

(3) Jom. viii. 110, 112. Th. viii. 253. Hard. iii. 337.

Napoléon wrote to the Directory at this pe-

riod:—"The King of Sardinia has surrendered at discretion, given up three of his strongest fortresses, and the half of his dominions. If you do not choose to accept his submission, but resolve to dethrone him, you must amuse him for a few

By inserting a clause in the treaty with the King of Sardinia, that the French army was to be at liberty to cross the Po at Valence, he completely deceived the Austrians as to the place where the passage was to be effected. The whole attention of Beaulieu having been drawn to that point, the republican forces were rapidly moved to Placentia, and began to cross the river in boats at that place. Lannes was the first who effected the passage, and the other columns soon crossed with such rapidity that a firm footing was established on the opposite bank, and two days afterwards Napoléon arrived with the bulk of his forces and established a bridge. By this skilful march not only the Po was passed, but the Ticino turned, as Placentia is below its junction with the former river; so that one great obstacle to the conquest of Lombardy was already removed (1).

Beaulieu was now considerably reinforced, and his forces amounted to thirty-six battalions, and forty-four squadrons, besides 120 pieces of cannon, in all nearly forty thousand men. He was at Pavia, busily engaged in erecting fortifications, when he received intelligence of the passage at Placentia. He immediately moved forward his advanced guard, consisting of three thousand infantry, and two thousand horse, under General Liptay, to Fombio, a small town a short distance from the republican posts. Napoléon, who feared that he might be strengthened in this position, and was well aware of the danger of fighting a general battle with a great river in his rear, lost no time in moving forward his forces to dislodge him. D'Allemagne, at the head of the grenadiers, attacked on the right; Lanusse by the chaussée on the centre; and Lannes on the left. After a vigorous resistance, the Austrians were expelled from the town, with the loss of above a thousand men. Liptay fell back to Pizzighitone (2). Meanwhile, Beaulieu was advancing with the bulk of his forces; and the leading division of his army surprised General La Harpe in the night, who was killed while bravely fighting at the head of his division, but not before the Austrians had been compelled to retire.

The French troops having now entered upon the states of Parma, it was of importance to establish matters on a pacific footing in their rear before pressing forward to Milan. The Grand Duke had no military resources whatever; the victor, therefore, resolved to grant him terms, upon the surrender of what he had to give. He was obliged to pay 2,000,000 of francs in silver, and to furnish 1600 artillery-horses, of which the army stood in great need, besides great supplies of corn and provisions. But on this occasion Napoléon commenced another species of military contribution, which he has himself confessed was unparalleled in modern warfare, that of exacting from the vanquished the surrender of their most precious works of art. Parma was compelled to give up twenty of its principal paintings, among which was the celebrated S.-Jerome by Correggio. The Duke offered a million of francs as a ransom for that inestimable work of art, which many of his officers urged the French general to accept, as of much more service to the army than the painting; but Napoléon, whose mind was fixed on greater things, replied,—“The million which he offers us would soon be

weeks, and give me warning; I will get possession of Valence, and march upon Turin. On the other hand, I shall impose a contribution of some millions on the Duke of Parma, detach twelve thousand men to Rome, as soon as I have beaten Beaulieu and driven him across the Adige, and when I am assured that you will conclude peace with the King of Sar-

dinia, and strengthen me by the army of Kellermann. As to Genoa, by all means oblige it to pay fifteen millions.”—*Secret Despatch to Directory, 29th April, 1796. Corresp. Secrète de Napoléon, i. 103.*

1) Nap. iii. 165. Th. viii. 254, 257. Jom. viii. 116.

(2) Th. viii. 258. Nap. iii. 166. Jom. viii. 117.

spent ; but the possession of such a *chef-d'œuvre* at Paris will adorn that capital for ages, and give birth to similar exertions of genius (1).”

Commence-
ment of
Napoleon's
system of
levying con-
tributions on
the works
of art.

Thus commenced the system of seizing the great works of art in the conquered states, which the French generals afterwards carried to such a height, and which produced the noble gallery of the Louvre. The French have since had good reason to congratulate themselves that the Allies did not follow their bad example ; and that on occasion of the second capture of Paris, they had the generosity to content themselves with enforcing restitution of the abstracted spoils, without, like them, compelling the surrender of those that had been legitimately acquired. Certainly it is impossible to condemn too strongly a use of the powers of conquest, which extends the ravages of war into the peaceful domain of the fine arts ; which transplants the monuments of genius from the regions where they have arisen, and where they can rightly be appreciated, to those where they are exotics, and their value cannot be understood ; which renders them, instead of being the proud legacy of genius to its country, the mere ensign of a victor's glory ; which exposes them to be tossed about by the tide of conquest, and subjected to irreparable injury in following the fleeting career of success ; and converts works, destined to elevate and captivate the human race, into the subject of angry contention, and the trophies of temporary subjugation.

Terrible
Passage of
the Bridge
of Lodi.

On the 10th, Napoléon marched towards Milan ; but, before arriving at that city, he required to cross the Adda. The bridge of Lodi over that river was held by a strong rear-guard, consisting of twelve thousand Austrian infantry and four thousand horse ; while the remainder of their forces had retired to Cassano, and the neighbourhood of Milan. By a rapid advance, he hoped to cut off the bulk of their troops from the hereditary states, and make them prisoners ; but, as there was not a moment to be lost in achieving the movements requisite to attain this object, he resolved to force the bridge, and thus get into their rear. He himself arrived at Lodi, at the head of the grenadiers d'Allemagne ; upon which, the Austrians withdrew from the town, and crossed the river ; drawing up their infantry, with twenty pieces of cannon, at the further extremity of the bridge, to defend the passage. Napoléon immediately directed Beaumont, with all the cavalry of the army, to pass at a ford half a league further up, while he himself directed all the artillery which had come up against the Austrian battery, and formed six thousand grenadiers in close column, under cover of the houses at his own end of the bridge. No sooner did he perceive that the discharge of the Austrian artillery was beginning to slacken, from the effect of the French fire, and that the passage of the cavalry on their flank had commenced, than he addressed a few animating words to his soldiers, and gave the signal to advance. The grenadiers rushed forward through a cloud of smoke over the long and narrow defile of the bridge. The terrible storm of grape-shot for a moment arrested their progress ; but finding themselves supported by a cloud of tirailleurs, who waded the stream below the arches, and led on by their dauntless general, they soon recovered, and, rushing forward with resistless fury, carried the Austrian guns, and drove back their infantry. Had the French cavalry been ready to profit by the confusion, the whole corps of the Imperialists would have been destroyed ; but, as it had not yet come up, their numerous squadrons protected the retreat of the in-

(1) Nap. iii. 169. Th. viii. 235.

fantry, which retired with the loss of two thousand men, and twenty pieces of cannon. The loss of the victors was at least as great. The object of this bold measure was indeed lost, for the Austrians, whom it had been intended to cut off, had meanwhile gained the chaussée of Brescia, and made good their retreat (1); but it contributed greatly to exalt the character and elevate the courage of the Republican troops, by inspiring them with the belief that nothing could resist them; and it made a deep impression on the mind of Napoléon, who ever after styled it “the terrible passage of the bridge of Lodi.”

The victory at Lodi had an extraordinary effect on the French army. After each success, the old soldiers, who had at first been somewhat distrustful of their young commander, assembled, and gave him a new step of promotion. He was made a corporal at Lodi; and the surname of “Le Petit Caporal,” thence acquired, was long remembered in the army. When, in 1815, he was met by the battalion sent against him from the fortress of Grenoble, the soldiers, the moment they saw him, exclaimed, “Long live our little corporal! we will never oppose him.” Nor did this fearful passage produce a less powerful impression on the mind of the general, “The 15th Vendémiaire, and the victory of Montenotte,” said Napoléon, “did not induce me to believe myself a superior character. It was after the passage of Lodi that the idea shot across my mind, that I might become a decisive actor on the political theatre. Then arose, for the first time, the spark of great ambition (2).”

After this disaster, Beaulieu retired behind the Mincio, leaving Milan to its fate; and Pizzighitone, with its garrison of five hundred men, capitulated. Serrurier was placed at Cremona, from whence he observed the garrison of Mantua, while Augereau pushed on from Pizzighitone to Pavia. On the 15th, Napoleon enters Milan. Napoléon made his triumphal entry into Milan at the head of his troops, with all the pomp of war, to the sound of military music, amidst the acclamations of an immense concourse of spectators, and through the lines of the national guard, dressed in three colours, in honour of the tricolor flag (3).

His proclamation there to his troops. On this occasion the conqueror addressed to his soldiers another of those heart-stirring proclamations which so powerfully contributed to electrify the ardent imagination of the Italians, and added so much to the influence of his victories.—“Soldiers! you have descended like a torrent from the summit of the Apennines; you have overwhelmed and dispersed every thing which opposed your progress. Piedmont, delivered from the tyranny of Austria, has felt itself at liberty to indulge its natural inclination for peace, and for a French alliance: Milan is in your hands; and the Republican standards wave over the whole of Lombardy. The Dukes of Parma and Modena owe their existence only to your generosity. The army which menaced you with so much pride, can now no longer find a barrier to protect itself against your arms: the Po, the Ticinio, the Adda, have not been able to stop you a single day; these boasted bulwarks of Italy have proved as nugatory as the Alps. Such a career of success has carried joy into the bosom of your country: fêtes in honour of your victories have been ordered by the National Representatives in all the communes of the Republic; there, your parents, your wives, your sisters, your lovers, rejoice at your success, and glory in their connexion with you. Yes, soldiers! you

(1) Jom. viii. 123, 126. Scott, iii. 134. Bot. iii. 351. Nap. iii. 172—174. Th. viii. 260, 261.

(2) Las Cas. i. 162, 182.

(3) Th. viii. 263. Nap. iii. 176. Jom. viii. 127.

have indeed done much; but much still remains to be done. Shall posterity say that we knew how to conquer, but not how to improve victory? Shall we find a Capua in Lombardy? The hour of vengeance has struck, but the people of all nations may rest in peace; we are the friends of every people, and especially of the descendants of Brutus, Scipio, and the other great men whom we have taken for examples. To restore the Capitol; to replace there the statues of the heroes who have rendered it immortal; to rouse the Romans from centuries of slavery—such will be the fruit of our victories: they will form an era in history; to you will belong the glory of having changed the face of the most beautiful part of Europe. The French people, free within and dreaded without, will give to Europe a glorious peace, which will indemnify her for all the sacrifices she has made for the last six years. Then you will return to your homes, and your fellow-citizens will say of each of you in passing—“He was a soldier in the army of Italy (1)!”

Enthusiasm
excited by
these suc-
cesses
among the
Democratic
party in
Italy.

Great was the enthusiasm, unbounded the joy, which these unparalleled successes and eloquent words excited among all that ardent and generous part of the Italian people, who panted for civil liberty and national independence. To them Napoléon appeared as the destined regenerator of Italy, the hero who was to achieve their liberation from Transalpine oppression, and bring back the glorious days of Roman virtue. His burning words, his splendid actions, the ancient cast of his thoughts, diffused an universal enchantment. Even the coolest heads began to turn at the brilliant career thus begun, by a general not yet six-and-twenty years of age, and the boundless anticipations of future triumph of which he spoke with prophetic certainty. From every part of Italy the young and the ardent flocked to Milan; balls and festivities gave token of the universal joy; every word and look of the conqueror was watched, the patriots compared him to Scipio and Hannibal, and the ladies on the popular side knew no bounds to their adulation (2).

Cruel dis-
pelling of
the illusion
by the
French con-
tributions.

But this illusion was of short duration, and Italy was soon destined to experience the bitter fate and cruel degradation of every people who look for their deliverance to foreign assistance. In the midst of the general joy, a contribution of twenty millions of francs, or L.800,000 sterling, struck Milan with astonishment, and wounded the Italians in their tenderest part—their domestic and economical arrangements. So enormous a contribution upon a single city seemed scarcely possible to be realized; but the sword of the victor offered no alternative. Great requisitions were at the same time made of horses for the artillery and cavalry in all the Milanese territory; and provisions were amassed on all sides, at the expense of the inhabitants, for which they received nothing, or Republican paper of no value. Nor did the Duke of Modena escape more easily. He was compelled to purchase peace by a contribution of ten millions of francs in money, or stores for the army, and to submit to the exaction of twenty paintings from his gallery for the Republican museum. Liberated Italy was treated with more severity than is generally the lot of conquered states (3).

War made
to support
war.

Thus commenced the system of “making war support war,” which contributed so much to the early success of the Republican arms, which compensated for all the penury and exhaustion of the Republican ter-

(1) Nap. iii. 178.

(2) Bot. i. 356—358. Th. viii. 265.

(3) Th. viii. 265. Jom. viii. 130. Nap. iii. 183.

ritory, which raised to the clouds the glory of the empire, and occasioned with certainty its ultimate destruction. France, abounding with men, but destitute of resources,—incapable of supporting war, from the entire stoppage of domestic industry, but teeming with a restless and indigent population,—found in this system the means of advancement and opulence. While the other armies of the Republic were suffering under the horrors of penury, and could hardly find food for their support, or clothes for their covering, the army of Italy was rolling in opulence, and the spoils of vanquished states gave them every enjoyment of life. From that time there was no want of soldiers to follow the career of the conqueror; the Alps were covered with files of troops pressing forward to the theatre of glory, and all the chasms occasioned by the relentless system of war which he followed, were filled up by the multitudes whom the illusion of victory brought to his standard (1).

But the Republican soldiers were far from anticipating the terrible reverses to which this system of spoliation was ultimately to lead, or that France was destined to groan under exactions, as severe as those she now so liberally inflicted upon others. Clothed, fed, and lodged at the expense of the Milanese, the soldiers pursued with thoughtless eagerness the career of glory which was stretched before them. The artillery, the cavalry, were soon in the finest condition, and hospitals established for fifteen thousand sick in the different towns in the conquered territory; for to that immense number had the rapidity of the marches, and the multiplicity of the combats, swelled the hospital train. Having amply provided for his own army, Napoléon dispatched several millions by the route of Genoa for the service of the Directory, and one million over the Alps to Moreau, to relieve the pressing wants of the army of the Upper Rhine (2).

These great successes already began to inspire the French Government with jealousy of their lieutenant, and they in consequence transmitted an order by which Kellermann, with twenty thousand men, was to command on the left bank of the Pô, and cover the siege of Mantua, while Napoléon, with the remainder of the forces, was to march upon Rome and Naples. But he was both too proud to submit to any division of his authority, and too sagacious not to see that by thus separating the forces, and leaving only a small army in the north of Italy, the Austrians would speedily regain their lost ground, drive their inconsiderable opponents over the Alps, and cut off, without the possibility of escape, the corps in the south of the Peninsula. He, therefore, at once resigned his command, accompanying it with the observation, that one bad general is better than two good ones. The Directory, however, unable to dispense with the services of their youthful officer, immediately reinstated him; and abandoned their project, which was indeed in itself so absurd as would have thrown great doubts on the military capacity of Carnot, the minister at war, if it had not in reality been suggested by the wish to extinguish the rising ambition of Napoléon (3).

(1) Th. viii. 137, 265, 266.

(2) Th. viii. 266. Nap. Cor. Conf. i. 159.

(3) Th. viii. 269. Nap. iii. 184. Jom. viii. 133.

Napoléon on this occasion wrote to Carnot:—"Kellermann would command the army as well as I; for no one is more convinced than I am of the courage and audacity of the soldiers; but to unite us together would ruin every thing. I will not serve with a man who considers himself the first general in Europe; and it is better to have one bad general than two good ones. War is, like govern-

ment, decided in a great degree by tact." To the Directory he observed,—"It is in the highest degree impolitic to divide into two the army of Italy, and not less adverse to the interests of the Republic, to place at its head two different generals. The expedition to Leghorn, Rome, and Naples, is a very inconsiderable matter, and should be made by divisions in echelon, ready, at a moment's warning, to wheel about and face the Austrians on the Adige. To perform it with success, both armies must be under the command of one general. I have

In less than ten days after the occupation of Milan, national guards in the Republican interest were organized in the whole of Lombardy; revolutionary authorities were every where established, and the country rendered subservient to the military power of France. The garrison of two thousand men, which Beaulieu had left in the citadel of Milan, was closely invested, and the 25th May. head-quarters moved to Lodi. But an event here occurred which threatened great danger to the French army, and was only averted by the decision and severity of their chief (1).

Alarming insurrection at Pavia. Opinions were much divided in Italy, as in all states undergoing the crisis of a revolution, on the changes which were going forward. The lower classes in the towns had been moved by the equality which the French every where proclaimed; but the peasantry in the country, less liable to the contagion of new principles, and more under the influence of the nobility and priests, were still firmly attached to the ancient *régime*, with which the Austrian authority was now identified. When men's minds were in this divided state, the prodigious contributions levied upon Milan, and the vast requisitions of provisions and horses which had been made for the use of the army, inflamed the rural population to the highest degree. The people of Lombardy did not consider themselves as conquered, nor expect to be treated as such: they had welcomed the French as deliverers, and now they found a severer yoke fastened about their necks than that from which they had just escaped. Roused to indignation by such treatment, a general insurrection was rapidly organized over the whole of that beautiful district. An attack, in concert with a sortie from the garrison of the castle, was made on Milan; and though it failed, the insurgents were more successful at Pavia, where the people rose against the garrison, forced it to capitulate, admitted eight thousand armed peasants within their walls, and closed their gates against the French troops (2).

Storm and sack of that city by the French troops. The danger was imminent; the tocsin sounded in all the parishes; the least retrograde movement would have augmented the evil, and compelled the retreat of the army, whose advanced posts were already on the Oglio. In these circumstances, prudence prescribed temerity; and Napoléon advanced in person to crush the insurgents. Their vanguard, posted at Brescia, was routed by Lannes; the village burnt, and a hundred of the peasants killed; but this severe example having failed in producing intimidation, he marched himself next day to the walls of Pavia, with six pieces of light artillery. The grenadiers rushed forward to the gates, which they

hitherto conducted the campaign without consulting any one; the result would have been very different, if I had been obliged to reconcile my views with those of another. If you impose upon me vexations of every description; if I must refer all my steps to the commissaries of government; if they are authorised to change my movements, to send away my troops, expect no farther success. If you weaken your resources by dividing your forces; if you disturb in Italy the unity of military thought, I say it with grief, you will lose the finest opportunity that ever occurred of giving laws to that fine peninsula. In the position of the affairs of the Republic, it is indispensable that you possess a general who enjoys your confidence; if I do not do so, I shall not complain, and shall do my utmost to manifest my zeal in the service which you intrust to me. Every one has his own method of carrying on war; Kellermann has more experience, and may do it better than I; but together we would do nothing but mischief. Your resolution on this matter is of

more importance than the fifteen thousand men whom the Emperor has just sent to Beaulieu." [Corresp. Secrète Nap. i. 160, 162.] But Napoléon did not intrust this important matter merely to these arguments, strong as they were. Murat, who was still at Paris, received instructions to inform Barras, that a million of francs were deposited at Genoa for his private use; and the influence of Joséphine was employed both with him and Carnot to prevent the threatened division, and the result was that it was abandoned. "The Directory," said Carnot, "has maturely considered your arguments; and the confidence which they have in your talents and republican zeal, have decided the matter in your favour. Kellermann will remain at Chambery, and you may adjourn the expedition to Rome as long as you please."—HARDENBERG, iii. 49, 351:

(1) Nap. iii. 191. Th. viii. 272.

(2) Th. viii. 272, 273. Nap. iii. 195. Jom. viii. 136.

broke open with hatchets : while the artillery cleared the ramparts, the victorious troops rushed into the town, which the peasants precipitately abandoned to its fate. Napoléon, wishing to terrify the insurgents, ordered the magistrates and leaders of the revolt to be shot, and the city to be delivered up to plunder, while the unhappy peasants, pursued into the plain by the French dragoons, were cut down in great numbers. The pillage continued the whole day, and that opulent and flourishing town underwent all the horrors of war ; but the terrible example crushed the insurrection over the whole of Lombardy, where hostages were taken from the principal families, and dispatched into France (1).

In this act was displayed another feature of Napoléon's character, who, without being unnecessarily cruel, never hesitated to adopt the most sanguinary measures when requisite for his own purposes. Pillage and rapine, indeed, invariably follow the capture of a town carried by assault, and it is impossible to prevent it : but Napoléon in this instance authorized it by a general order, and shot the leading persons of the city in cold blood. It is in vain to appeal to the usages of war for a vindication of such cruelty ; the words of Napoléon himself furnish his own condemnation :—"It is the first duty," said the Emperor, in his proclamation to the peasantry of France, in February 1814, "of every citizen to take up arms in defence of his country. Let the peasantry every where organize themselves in bands, with such weapons as they can find ; let them fall upon the flanks and rear of the invaders ; and let a consuming fire envelope the presumptuous host which has dared to violate the territory of the great nation (2)."

28th May. Napoléon enters Brescia and the Venetian territory. Having by this severity stifled the spirit of insurrection in his rear, Napoléon continued his march, and, on the 28th, entered the great city of Brescia, situated on the neutral territory of Venice. Meanwhile, Beaulieu experienced the usual fate of a retiring army, that of being weakened by the garrisons necessary for the fortified places which it leaves uncovered in its retreat. He threw twenty battalions of his best troops into Mantua, and took up a defensive position along the line of the Mincio. There he was assailed on the following day by Napoléon, who, after forcing a bridge in front of his position, attacked his rear-guard at Vallegio with all his cavalry, and made prisoners, in spite of the bravest efforts of the Austrian horse, twelve hundred men, and five pieces of cannon (3).

29th May. Debates in the Venetian Senate on what should be done. When the French army entered the Venetian territory, and it had become evident that the flames of war were approaching its capital, it was warmly discussed in the Venetian Senate what course the Republic should pursue in the perilous circumstances that had occurred. Peschiera had been occupied by the Austrians, but, being abandoned by them, was instantly seized by the French, who insisted that, though a Venetian fortress, yet, having been seized by one of the belligerent powers, it had now become the fair conquest of the other ; and, at the same time, Napoléon threatened the Republic with all the vengeance of France, if the Count de Lille, afterwards Louis XVIII, who had long resided at Verona, was not immediately compelled to leave their territories. The Republican forces, under Masséna, were advancing towards Verona, and it was necessary to take a

(1) Th. viii. 275. Nap. iii. 194. Jom. viii. 133. Bot. i. 390, 394.

(2) Proclamation, Feb. 28, 1814. Baron Fain, Camp. 1814, 142.

(3) Nap. iii. 202. Jom. viii. 139, 142.

decided line. On the one hand it was urged, that France had now proclaimed principles subversive of all regular governments, and in an especial manner inimical to the aristocracy of Venice; that certain ruin, either from foreign violence or domestic revolution, was to be expected from their success: that the haughty tone even now assumed by the conqueror, already showed that he looked upon all the continental possessions of the Republic as his own, and was only waiting for an opportunity to seize them for the French nation; and, therefore, that the sole course left, was to throw themselves into the arms of Austria, the natural ally of all regular governments. On the other, it was contended, that they must beware lest they mistook a temporary irruption of the French for a permanent settlement; that Italy had in every age been the tomb of the French armies; that the forces of the present invader, how successful soever they had hitherto been, were unequal to a permanent occupation of the peninsula, and would in the end yield to the persevering efforts of the Germans; that Austria, therefore, the natural enemy of Venice, and the power which coveted, would, in the end, attempt to seize its territorial possessions; that their forces were now expelled from Lombardy, and could not resume the offensive for two months, a period which would suffice to the French general to destroy the Republic—that interest, therefore, equally with prudence, prescribed that they should attach themselves to the cause of France; obtain thereby a barrier against the ambition of their powerful neighbour, and receive, in recompense for their services, part of the Italian dominions of the Austrian empire. That, in so doing, they must, it is true, to a certain degree, modify their form of government; but that was no more than the spirit of the age required, and was absolutely indispensable to secure the dominion of their continental possessions. A third party, few in numbers but resolute in purpose, contended, that the only safe course was that of an armed neutrality; that the forces of the Republic should by instantly raised to fifty thousand men, and either of the belligerent powers which should violate their territory, threatened with the whole vengeance of the Republic (1).

Had the Venetians possessed the firmness of the Roman Senate, they would have adopted the first course; had they been inspired by the spirit of the Athenian democracy, they would have followed the second; had they been animated by the courage of the Swiss Confederacy, they would have taken the third. In either case, the Republic might have been saved; for it is impossible to consider the long and equal struggle which ensued round Mantua, between France and Austria, without being convinced that a considerable body, even of Italian troops, might have then cast the balance. They had three millions of souls; their army could easily be raised to fifty thousand men; thirteen regiments of Slavonians in their service were good troops; their fleet ruled the Adriatic. But Venice was worn out and corrupted; its nobles, drowned in pleasure, were destitute of energy; its peasantry, inured to peace, were unequal to war; its defence, trusted merely to mercenary troops, rested on a tottering foundation. They adopted in consequence the most timid course, which, in presence of danger, is generally the most perilous: they made no warlike preparations; but merely sent commissioners to the French general to deprecate his hostility, and endeavour to secure his good-will (2). The consequence was, what might have been anticipated from conduct so unworthy of the ancient fame of the Republic: the

(1) Bot. i. 403, 405, 408, 409. Th. viii. 276, 279

(2) Bot. i. 408, 413. Nap. iii. 204, 205. Th. viii. 273, 280. Harl. iii. 357.

commissioners were disregarded; the war was carried on in the Venetian territories, and at its close the Republic was swept from the book of nations (1).

June 3, 1796. Masséna enters Verona, and Napoleon is established on the Adige. Masséna entered the magnificent city of Verona, the frontier city of the Venetian dominions, situated on the Adige, and a military position of the highest importance for future operations, in the beginning of June. Its position at the entrance of the great valley of the Adige, and on the high-road from the Tyrol into Lombardy, rendered it the advanced post of the French army, in covering the siege of Mantua. He occupied, at the same time, Porto Legnago, a fortified town on the Adige, and which, along with Verona, strengthened that stream, whose short and rapid course from the Alps to the Po formed the best military frontier of Italy. There Napoleon received the commissioners of Venice, who vainly came to deprecate the victor's wrath, and induce him to retire from the territories of the Republic. With such terror did his menaces inspire them, that the Venetian government concluded a treaty, by which they agreed to furnish supplies of every sort for the army, and secretly pay for them; and the commissioners, overawed by the commanding air and stern menaces of Napoleon, wrote to the Senate—"This young man will one day have an important influence on the destinies of his country (2)."

June 4, 1796. Description and blockade of Mantua. Napoleon was now firmly established on the line of the Adige, the possession of which he always deemed of so much importance, and to the neglect of which he ascribed all the disasters of the succeeding campaigns of the French in Italy. Nothing remained but to make himself master of Mantua; and the immense efforts made by both parties for that place, prove the vast importance of fortresses in modern war. Placed in the middle of unhealthy marshes, which are traversed only by five chaussées, strong in its situation, as well as the fortifications which surround it, this town is truly the bulwark of Austria and Italy, without the possession of which the conquest of Lombardy must be deemed insecure, and that of the Hereditary States cannot be attempted. The entrance of two only of the chaussées which approached it, were defended by fortifications at that time; so that by placing troops at these points, and drawing a cordon round the others, it was an easy matter to blockade the place, even with an inferior force. Serurier sat down before it, in the middle of June, with ten thousand men; and with this inconsiderable force, skilfully disposed at the entrance of the high-ways which crossed the lake, and round its shores, he contrived to keep in

(1) In adopting this course, Napoleon exceeded the instructions of his government; and, indeed, on him alone appears to rest the atrocious perfidy and dissimulation exercised in the sequel towards that Republic. The directions of the Directory were as follows:—"Venice should be treated as a *neutral*, but not a friendly power; it has done nothing to merit the latter character. [Corresp. Secrète. 7th May, 1796.] But to the Venetian commissioners Napoleon from the first, used the most insulting and rigorous language. "Venice," said he, "by daring to give an asylum to the Count de Lille, a pretender to the throne of France, has declared war against the Republic. I know not why I should not reduce Verona to ashes—a town which had the presumption to esteem itself the capital of France." [Habd. iii. 361.] He declared to them that he would carry that threat into execution that very night, if an immediate surrender did not take place. The perfidy

of his views against Venice, even at this early period, was fully evinced in his Secret Despatch to the Directory on 7th June. "If your object," said he, "is to extract five or six millions out of Venice, I have secured for you a pretence for a rupture. You may demand it as an indemnity for the combat of Borghetto, which I was obliged to sustain to take Peschiera. If you have more decided views we must take care not to let that subject of discord drop; tell me what you wish, and be assured I will seize the most fitting opportunity of carrying it into execution, according to circumstances, for we must take care not to have all the world on our hands at once." [Corresp. Secrète de Nap. i. 232.] The truth of the affair of Peschiera is, that the Venetians were cruelly deceived by the Austrians, who demanded a passage for fifty men, and then seized the town.

(2) Th. viii. 288, 289. Habd. iii. 364. Nap. iii. 205.

check a garrison of fourteen thousand men, of whom more than a third encumbered the hospitals of the place (1).

As the siege of this important fortress required a considerable time, Napoléon had leisure to deliberate concerning the ulterior measures which he should pursue. An army of forty-five thousand men, which had so rapidly overrun the north of Italy, could not venture to penetrate into the Tyrol and Germany, the mountains of which were occupied by Beaulieu's forces, aided by a warlike peasantry, and at the same time carry on the blockade of Mantua, for which at least fifteen thousand men would be required. Moreover, the southern powers of Italy were not yet subdued; and, though little formidable in a military point of view, they might prove highly dangerous to the blockading force, if the bulk of the Republican troops were engaged in the defiles of the Tyrol, while the French armies on the Rhine were not yet in a condition to give them any assistance. Influenced by these considerations, Napoléon resolved to take advantage of the pause in military operations, which the blockade of Mantua and retreat of Beaulieu afforded, to clear the enemies in his rear, and establish the French influence to the south of the Apennines (2).

The King of Naples, alarmed at the retreat of the German troops, and fearful of having the whole forces of the Republic upon his own hands, upon the first appearance of their advance to the south, solicited an armistice,

5th June.

which the French commander readily granted, and which was followed by the secession of the Neapolitan cavalry, two thousand four hundred strong, from the Imperial army. Encouraged by this defection, Napoléon resolved instantly to proceed against the ecclesiastical and Tuscan states, in order to extinguish the hostility, which was daily becoming more inveterate, to the south of the Apennines. In truth, the ferment was extreme in all the cities of Lombardy; and every hour rendered more marked the separation between the aristocratical and democratical parties. The ardent spirits in Milan, Bologna, Brescia, Parma, and all the great towns of that fertile district, were in full revolutionary action, and a large proportion of their citizens seemed resolved to throw off the patrician influence under which they had so long existed, and establish republics on the model of the great Transalpine state. Wakened by these appearances to a sense of the danger which threatened them, the aristocratic party were every where strengthening themselves: the nobles in the Genoese fiefs were collecting forces; the English had made themselves masters of Leghorn; and the Roman Pontiff was threatening to exert his feeble strength. Napoléon knew that Wurmser, who had been detached from the army of the Upper Rhine with thirty thousand men, to restore affairs in Italy, could not be at Verona before the middle of July, and before then there appeared time to subdue the states of central Italy, and secure the rear of his army (3).

Napoléon resolves to proceed against Florence and Rome before the Austrian succours arrive.

June 29.

Castle of Milan taken. Genoese fiefs subdued.

Having left fifteen thousand men before Mantua, and twenty thousand on the Adige, to cover its blockade, the French general set out himself, with the division of Augereau, to cross the Apennines. He returned, in the first instance, to Milan, opened the trenches before its castle, and pressed the siege, so as to compel its surrender, which took place shortly after. From thence he proceeded against the Genoese fiefs.

(1) Th. viii. 290. Nap. iii. 158, 205, 209.

(2) Nap. iii. 209, Join. viii. 146.

(3) Nap. iii. 213. Bot. i. 414, 420. Th. viii. 293, 294.

Lannes, with twelve hundred men, stormed Arquata, the chief seat of hostilities; burned the village; shot the principal inhabitants; and, by these severe measures, so intimidated the Senate of Genoa, that they implicitly submitted to the conqueror, sent off the Austrian minister, and agreed to the occupation of all the military posts in their territory by the French troops. From thence Napoléon moved towards the Apennines, entered Modena; where he was received with every demonstration of joy; and, on the road to Bologna, made himself master of the fort of Urbino, with sixty pieces of heavy artillery, which proved a most seasonable supply for the siege of Mantua. His appearance at Bologna was the signal for universal intoxication. The people at once revolted against the Papal authority; while Napoléon encouraged the propagation of every principle which was calculated to dismember the Ecclesiastical territories. The Italian troops were pursued to Ferrara, which the republicans entered without opposition, and made themselves masters of its arsenal, containing 114 pieces of artillery; while General Vaubois crossed the Apennines, and, avoiding Florence, directed his steps towards Rome (1).

At the intelligence of his approach, the Council of the Vatican was thrown into the utmost alarm. Azara, Minister of Spain, was dispatched immediately with offers of submission, and arrived at Bologna to lay the tiara at the feet of the Republican general. The terms of an armistice were soon agreed on:—It was stipulated that Bologna and Ferrara should remain in the possession of the French troops; that the Pope should pay twenty millions of francs, furnish great contributions of stores and provisions (2), and give up a hundred of the finest works of art to the French commissioners. In virtue of that humiliating treaty, all the great monuments of genius, which adorned the eternal city, were soon after transported to the museum at Paris (3).

Having arranged this important treaty, Napoléon, without delay, crossed the Apennines, and found the division of Vaubois at Pisa. From that point he detached Murat, who suddenly descended upon Leghorn, and seized the effects of a large portion of the English merchants, which were sold in open violation of all the usages of war, which hitherto had respected private property at land, and from their sale he realized twelve millions of francs for the use of the army. What rendered this outrage more flagrant was, that it was committed in the territories of a neutral power, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, and from whom he himself at the time was getting the most splendid reception at Florence (4). Thus early did Napoléon evince that unconquerable hatred of English commerce, and that determination to violate the usages of war for its destruction, by

(1) Jom. viii. 151, 152. Bot. i. 416. Th. viii. 298, 299. Nap. iii. 214.

(2) Nap. iii. 219.

(3) Genoa at the same period occupied the rapacious eyes of the French general. "You may dictate laws to Genoa as soon as you please," were his expressions, in his instructions to Faypout, the 6th July. French envoy there. And to the Directory he wrote,—“All our affairs in Italy are now closed, excepting Venice and Genoa. As to Venice, the moment for action has not yet arrived; we must first beat Wurser and take Mantua. But the moment has arrived for Genoa; I am about to break ground for the ten millions. I think, besides, with the minister Faypout, that we must expel a dozen of families from the government of that city, and oblige

the Senate to repeal a decree which banished two 14th July. families favourable to France.” And to Faypout, Napoléon prescribed his course of perfidious dissimulation in these words: “I have not yet seen M. Catanio, the Genoese deputy; but I shall neglect nothing which may throw them off their guard. The Directory has ordered me to exact the ten millions, but interdicted all political operations. Omit nothing which may set the Senate asleep; and amuse them with hopes till the moment of waking has arrived.” [Confident. Despatch, 14th July, 1796. Corresp. Conf. i. 330, 334.] The moment of waking thus contemplated by Napoléon, was an internal revolution, which was not yet fully prepared.

(4) Th. viii. 301. Bot. i. 436. Nap. iii. 222.

which he was afterwards so strongly actuated, and which had so powerful a share in contributing to his downfall (1).

Massacre of the peasants at Lugo. After a short stay at Florence, Napoléon returned to Bologna, where Augereau took a severe vengeance on the inhabitants of the village of Lugo, which had taken up arms against the Republicans, and killed and wounded some soldiers in a detachment sent for its reduction. The village was carried by assault, burnt to ashes, and the unfortunate peasants, to the number of one thousand, put, with merciless severity, to the sword. This terrible example having struck terror into all the inhabitants of that part of Italy, he returned to the vicinity of Mantua, to superintend the operations of the siege, which Serrurier was now about to undertake in good earnest, with the battering train taken at the castles of Milan, Urbino, and Ferrara; but for the relief of which place Austria was making the most vigorous exertions (2).

The resolution of Napoléon to stir up a quarrel with Venice was more and more clearly evinced, as matters approached a crisis in the north of Italy. On the 25th July, he had a long and confidential conversation with Pesaro, the commissioner of that Republic; and such was the vehemence of his language, the exaggeration of his complaints, and the sternness of his manner, that he forthwith wrote to the Senate of St.-Mark that war appeared inevitable. It was in vain that Pesaro represented, "that ever since the entrance of the French into Italy, his government had made it their study to anticipate all the wishes of the General-in-chief; that, if it had not done more, it was solely from inability, and a desire not to embroil themselves with the Imperialists, who never ceased to reproach them their partiality to France; that the Senate would do every thing in its power to restrain the public effervescence; and that the armaments, so much complained of, were directed as much against the English and Russians as the French (3). The determination of Napoléon in regard to the Venetian Republic is revealed in his secret despatches at this period to the Directory: "I have seized," said he, "the citadel of Verona, and armed it with the Venetian cannon, and summoned the Senate to dissolve its armaments. Venice has already furnished three millions for the service of the army; but, in order to extract more out of it, I have found myself under the necessity of assuming a menacing tone towards their commissaries, of exaggerating the assassinations committed against our troops, of complaining bitterly of their armaments; and by these means I compel them, to appease my wrath, to furnish whatever I desire. That is the only way to deal with such persons. There is not, on the face of the earth, a more perfidious or cowardly government. I will force them to provide supplies for the army till the fall of Mantua, and then announce that they must farther make good the contributions fixed in your instructions (4)."

No sooner had they received intelligence of the defeat of Beaulieu, and the retreat of his forces into the Tyrol, than the Aulic Council resolved upon the most energetic measures to repair the disaster. The army of Beau-

(1) The rapine and pillage of the French authorities consequent on this irruption into Tuscany, knew no bounds. "If our administrative conduct," said Napoléon, to the Directory, "was detestable at Leghorn, our political conduct towards Tuscany has been no better"—*Secret Correspond. of Napoléon*, 11th July, 1796. His views extended even farther, for, on the 25th, he wrote to the Directory,—"Reports are in circulation that the Emperor is dying;

the Grand Duke of Tuscany, the heir to the throne, will instantly set out for Vienna. We must anticipate him, by taking military possession of the whole of Tuscany."—*Secret Despatch*, 25th July.

(2) Bot. i. 420. Nap. iii. 225.

(3) Letter of Lallemand to Napoléon, 26 July, 1796. *Corresp. Confid. de Nap.* Hard. iii. 424.

(4) Secret despatch of Napoléon, July, 22, 1796. *Corresp.* i. 327.

Efforts of the Austrians for the relief of Mantua.

Advance of Wurmser through the Tyrol with 30,000 men.

lieu retired to Roveredo, where they threw up intrenchments to cover their position, while eight thousand Tyrolese occupied the crests of the mountains, which separated the valley of the Adige from the lake of Guarda. Meanwhile, Marshal Wurmser was detached from the Upper Rhine with thirty thousand men, to assume the chief command of the army destined for the relief of Mantua; which, by that great reinforcement, and numerous detachments drawn from the interior, was raised to sixty thousand effective troops. These great preparations, which were magnified by report, and had roused the aristocratic party throughout Italy to great exertions, filled Napoléon with the most lively apprehensions. To oppose them he had only fifty-five thousand men, of whom fifteen thousand were engaged in the siege of Mantua, ten thousand in keeping up his communication and maintaining garrisons in the conquered territory; so that not above thirty thousand could be relied on for operations in the field. He had incessantly urged the Directory to send him reinforcements; but, although eight thousand men from the army of Kellermann had joined his standard, and numerous reinforcements from the dépôts in the interior, they were barely adequate to repair the losses arising from that wasteful campaign (1).

Nothing but the greatest ability on the part of the general, and courage among the soldiers, could have compensated for this inferiority in numbers; but the genius of Napoléon, and the confidence arising from a series of victories, proved adequate to the task (2). His success was mainly owing to the vicious plan of attack adopted by the Austrians, which, like all the others framed by the Aulic Council, was exposed to defeat from the division of their forces.

Description of the theatre of war. The waters which descend from the southern ridges of the Tyrol, unite into two streams, flowing nearly parallel to each other, and issuing in the same latitude into the plain of Lombardy, the Mincio, and the Adige. The first forms in its course, the noble sheet of water called the lake of Guarda, flows through the plain immortalized by the genius of Virgil, swells into the lakes which surround Mantua, and afterwards discharges itself into the Po. The latter, after descending from the snowy ridges of the Higher Alps, flows in an open valley to a narrow and precipitous pass above Verona, next emerges into the open country, winds in a deep and rocky bed to Legnago, after which it spreads into vast marshes, and is lost in the dikes and inundations of Lombardy. Three roads present themselves to an enemy proposing to issue from the Tyrol to the Italian plains.—The first, turning sharp to the left at Roveredo, traverses the romantic defiles of the Val Sugana, and emerges into the open country at Bassano. The second passes by the upper end of the lake of Guarda, and comes down by its western shore to Salo and Brescia; while the third descends the left bank of the Adige, and after traversing the gloomy pass of Calliano and Chiusa, reaches the town of Verona. The space between the Adige and the lake of Guarda, though only three leagues broad, is filled by the Montebaldo, whose precipices restrain the river on the one hand and the lake on the other. In this narrow and rocky space a road descends between the Adige and the lake, from Roveredo to the plain (3). It follows the right bank of the stream as far as Osteria della Dugana, when, meeting impracticable precipices, it turns to the right, and ascends the plateau of Rivoli.

(1) Jom. viii. 302, 303, Nap. iii. 231, 232, Th. viii. 360.

(2) Jom. iii. 305.

(3) Th. viii. 362, 361, Jom. viii. 305.

The entrance of all these passes was occupied by the French troops. Sauret, with only four thousand five hundred men, was posted at Salo, to guard the western side of the lake of Guarda, as the road there was not accessible to artillery. Masséna, with fifteen thousand, guarded the great road on the Adige, and occupied the plateau of Rivoli; while Despinos, with five thousand, was in the environs of Verona; and Augereau, with eight thousand in reserve, at Legnago. Napoléon himself, with two thousand horse took post at Castelnovo, in order to be equally near any of the points that might be menaced (1).

Austrian plan of attack. Wurmser's plan was to make demonstrations only against Verona, and the left of the Adige; and to bring down the bulk of his forces by the Montebaldo and the valley of Salo, on the opposite sides of the lake of Guarda. For this purpose he detached Quasdanowich, with twenty thousand men, to go round the upper end of the lake, and descend upon Salo, while he took the command of forty thousand himself, whom he distributed on the two roads which descend the opposite banks of the Adige; the one division was destined to force Corona and the plateau of Rivoli, while the other was to debouche upon Verona. The whole columns were in motion by the end of July; rumour had magnified their numbers; and the partisans of Austria and of the aristocratic system were already breaking out into exultation, and anticipating the speedy verification of the proverb—That Italy was the tomb of the French (2).

In truth, the circumstances of the Republicans were all but desperate. July 29. On the 29th July, the Imperial outposts attacked the French at all points, and every where with success. Masséna, vigorously assaulted at three in the morning by superior forces, was driven from the intrenchments of Corona, and retired with loss to Rivoli, from whence he was glad to escape And great success in the outset. towards Castelnovo, upon finding that the column which followed the left bank of the Adige was getting in his rear. At the same time, the Imperialists drove in the Republican posts on the great road, forced the pass of Chiusa, and appeared before Verona; while, on the other side of the lake of Guarda, Lusignan attacked and carried the town of Salo, and thus cut off the principal line of retreat towards France (3).

In this extremity Napoléon, for the first time in the whole campaign, called a council of war. All the officers, with the exception of Augereau, recommended a retreat behind the Po; but that intrepid chief resolutely held out for battle. The generals were dismissed without the commander-in-chief having signified his own opinion, but in the course of the night he formed a resolution which not only extricated him from his perilous situation, but has immortalized his name in the annals of war (4).

Extreme peril of Napoléon. The Austrians, fifty thousand strong, were descending the opposite banks of the lake of Guarda, and it was evident that if they succeeded in enclosing the French army near Mantua, they would infallibly crush it by their great superiority of force. But in so doing they exposed themselves to be attacked and beaten by superior forces in detail, if the siege of that place were rapidly raised, and the bulk of the French army borne first on the one invading column and then on the other. Napoléon He raises the siege of Mantua. resolved on this sacrifice. Orders were immediately despatched to Serrurier to raise the siege of Mantua; the division of Augereau was moved from Legnago across the Mincio, and the French army, with

(1) Th. viii. 4. Nap. iii. 235.

(2) Th. viii. 364, 365. Nap. iii. 233.

(3) Th. viii. 366, 367. Jom. viii. 312, 313.

(4) Th. viii. 367.

the exception of Masséna, concentrated at the lower extremity of the lake of Guarda, to fall, in the first instance, upon the corps of Quasdanowich, which already threatened his communication with Milan. These orders were promptly obeyed. During the night of the 31st July, the siege of Mantua was raised, the cannon spiked, and the stores thrown into the lake, while Napoléon himself, with the greater part of his army, crossed the Mincio at Peschiera, and prepared to fall on the Austrian forces on the western shore of the lake of Guarda. There was not a moment to lose; in a few hours the Allied columns would be in communication, and the French compelled to fight greatly superior forces in a single field (1).

1st August. No sooner had Napoléon arrived with his reinforcements, than he sent forward Augereau to clear the road to Milan, and ordered Sauret to retake Salo. Both expeditions were completely successful; Brescia was regained, and the Austrians driven out of Salo. Meanwhile, Napoléon himself, with the brigade of D'Allemagne, advanced to Lonato; and after a violent struggle, drove the Imperialists out of that place, with the loss of five hundred prisoners. In these actions, Quasdanowich lost few men; but they arrested his progress, and, astonished at finding himself assailed by imposing masses, in a quarter where he expected to find only the rear of the enemy, he fell back towards the mountains, to await intelligence of the operations of the main body under Wurmser (2).

August 1. Wurmser enters Mantua. Meanwhile that brave commander, having dislodged Masséna from his position, advanced to Mantua, where he made his triumphal entry on the 1st August. The sudden raising of the siege, the abandonment of the equipage, the destruction of works which it had cost the Republicans so long to construct, all conspired to increase his satisfaction at this event, and promised an easy conquest over the retiring remains of the enemy. But, on the very night of his arrival, he received intelligence of the check of Quasdanowich, and the capture of Brescia. Immediately he advanced his columns across the Mincio, and moved upon Castiglione, with the design of enveloping the French army with all his forces, while Quasdanowich resumed the offensive, and retook the town of Salo (3).

The crisis was now approaching: the Austrian armies were not only in communication, but almost united, while the Republicans, with inferior forces, lay between them. Napoléon immediately drew back the divisions of Masséna and Augereau, above twenty thousand strong, and caused his whole army to face about: what had been the rear became the advanced guard. He put forth more than his wonted activity and rapidity of movement. Incessantly on horseback himself, he caused the soldiers, who had marched all night, to fight all day. Having, by this rapid countermarch, accumulated the bulk of his forces opposite to Wurmser, he resolved to deliver himself from that formidable adversary by an immediate attack. It was full time. The Austrians had discovered a passage over the Mincio, and driven the French from Castiglione, where they had already begun to intrench themselves (4).

3d August On the third August, Napoléon advanced, with twenty-five thousand men, upon LONATO, while Augereau moved towards CASTIGLIONE. The first attack of the Republicans was unsuccessful; their light troops were

(1) Nap. iii. 238, 239. Th. viii. 369. Jom. viii. 316. Hard. iii. 430.

(2) Jom. viii. 316. Nap. iii. 235.

(3) Th. viii. 371. Jom. viii. 318. Hard. iii. 432, 433.

(4) Nap. iii. 241. Th. viii. 372.

thrown into confusion; General Pegion, with three pieces of artillery, captured by the enemy, and Lonato taken. Upon this, the French general put himself at the head of his soldiers, and formed the centre into one formidable mass, while the Imperialists were extending themselves towards Salo, in the double view of enveloping the French, and opening a communication with Quasdanowich, whose artillery was already heard in that direction. Napoléon immediately perceived the error of his adversary, and made a desperate charge, with a column of infantry supported by cavalry, upon his centre, which, being weakened for the extension of the wings, speedily gave way. Lonato was retaken by assault, and the Austrian army cut asunder. One part of it effected its retreat under Bayalitch to the Mincio, but the other, which was moving towards Salo, finding itself irrecoverably separated from the main body of the army, endeavoured to effect a junction with Quasdanowich at Salo; but Gueux, with a division of French, already occupied that place; and the fugitive Austrians, pressed between the dragoons of Junot, who assailed their rear, and the infantry at Salo, who stopped their advance, disbanded, and suffered a loss of three thousand prisoners, and twenty pieces of cannon (1).

While the Austrians were experiencing these disasters at Lonato, Augereau, on the right, had maintained an obstinate engagement at Castiglione. In that quarter the Republicans were the assailants; and the French general had maintained the combat all day with great resolution against superior forces, when Napoléon, having defeated the centre of the enemy, hastened to his support. After a furious combat, Augereau succeeded in carrying the town, and the Austrians retired towards Mantua, with the loss of one thousand killed and wounded, besides as many prisoners (2). They had not proceeded far when they met the reinforcements which Wurmser was bringing up from that place for their relief.

As it was evident that the Austrian veteran was still disposed to contend for the empire of Italy in a pitched battle, Napoléon deemed it indispensable to clear his rear of Quasdanowich before engaging in it. On the following day he employed himself in collecting and organizing his forces at Lonato, with a view to the decisive conflict; while, by moving two divisions against Quasdanowich, whose troops were now exhausted by fatigue, he compelled him to remount the Val Sabbia towards Riva. A singular event at this time took place, highly characteristic both of the extraordinarily intersected situation of the two armies, and of the presence of mind and good fortune of Napoléon.

He had arrived at Lonato to expedite the movement of his forces in the opposite directions where their enemies were to be found; and, from the dispersion which he had directed, only twelve hundred men remained at head-quarters. Before he had been long there he was summoned to surrender by a corps of four thousand Austrians, who had already occupied all the avenues by which retreat was possible. They consisted of a part of the troops of Bayalitch, which, having been defeated in its endeavours to effect a junction with Quasdanowich, was now, in desperation, endeavouring to regain the remainder of the army on the Mincio. Napoléon made his numerous staff mount on horseback; and, having ordered the officer bearing the flag of truce to be brought before him, directed the bandage to be taken from his eyes, and immediately told the astonished Austrian, that he was in the middle of the French army, and in presence of

Surrender
of 4,000
Austrians
to Napoléon's staff
and 1,200
men.

(1) Th. viii. 373, 374. Nap. 242. Jom. viii. 320.

(2) Th. viii. 374. Nap. iii. 242.

its general-in-chief, and that unless they laid down their arms in ten minutes, he would put them all to the sword. The officer, deceived by the splendid *cortége* by which he was surrounded, returned to his division, and recommended a surrender; and the troops, cut off from their companions, and exhausted by fatigue and disaster, laid down their arms. When they entered the town, they had the mortification of discovering not only that they had capitulated to a third of their numbers, but missed the opportunity of making prisoner the conqueror who had filled the world with his renown (1).

On the following day both parties prepared for a decisive engagement. The Imperialists under Wurmser were twenty-five thousand strong, the corps of Quasdanowich, and that which blockaded Peschiera, being detached, and unable to take any part in the battle; the French about twenty-three thousand. Both parties were drawn up in the plain at right angles to the mountains, on which each rested a wing; the French right was uncovered, while the Imperialists' left was supported by the mill of Medola. Augereau commanded the centre, Masséna the left, Verdier the right, but the principal hopes of Napoléon were rested on the division of Serrurier, which had orders to march all night, and fall, when the action was fully engaged, on the rear of

the enemy. The soldiers on both sides were exhausted with fatigue, but all felt that on the result of this contest depended the fate of Italy (2).

Wurmser fell into the same error as Bayalitch had done in the preceding engagement, that of extending his right along the heights, in order to open a communication with Quasdanowich, who was within hearing of his artillery. To favour this movement, Napoléon drew back his left, while at the same time he accumulated his forces against the Austrians' right; Marmont, with a powerful battery of heavy artillery, thundered against the post of Medola,

which Verdier, with three battalions of grenadiers, speedily carried. At the same time, General Fiorilla, who commanded the division of Serrurier, drawn off from Mantua, came up in rear of the Austrians, and completed their confusion by a vigorous attack, which had wellnigh carried off Wurmser himself. Seeing the decisive moment arrived, Napoléon ordered a general charge by all his forces; and the Austrians, pressed in front by Augereau and Masséna, threatened in rear by Fiorilla, and turned on their left by Verdier, fell back at all points. The excessive fatigue of the Republican troops prevented their pursuing the broken enemy far, who fell back behind the Mincio, with the loss of two thousand killed and wounded, one thousand prisoners, and twenty pieces of cannon (3).

This action, the importance of which is not to be estimated by the number of troops engaged, was decisive of the fate of Italy. With a view to prevent Wurmser from reassembling his scattered forces, Napoléon, on the following

day, sent Masséna to raise the siege of Peschiera, and after an obstinate engagement, he succeeded in routing the Austrian division before that place, with the loss of ten pieces of cannon, and five hundred prisoners. In this action a young colonel particularly distinguished himself, named SUCRET, afterwards Duke of Albufera. At the same time Napoléon advanced to Verona, which the Austrians abandoned on his approach; and Masséna, after some sharp skirmishing, resumed his old positions at Rivoli and the Montebaldo; while Wurmser, having revictualled Mantua, and raised its garrison to fifteen thousand men, composed chiefly of fresh troops, re-

(1) Nap. iii. 243, 245. Th. viii. 375. Jom. viii. 326, 327. Bot. i. 453.

(2) Jom. viii. 328. Th. viii. 373, 379.

(3) Nap. iii. 246. Th. viii. 379. Jom. viii. 331.

sumed his former station at Roveredo, and in the fastnesses of the Tyrol (4).

By this expedition Wurmser had relieved Mantua, and supplied it with a garrison of fresh troops; but he had lost nearly twenty thousand men, and sixty pieces of cannon; and the spirit of his soldiers was, by fatigue, defeat, and disaster, completely broken. The great successes which attended the French arms, are mainly to be ascribed to the extraordinary vigour, activity, and talent, displayed by their general-in-chief. The Austrian plan of attack was founded on an undue confidence in their own powers; they thought the main body under Wurmser would be able to defeat the French army, and raise the siege of Mantua, while the detachment under Quasdanowich would cut off their retreat: and it must be admitted, in favour of this plan, that it was on the point of being attended with complete success; and against a general and troops of less resolution, unquestionably would have been so.

Causes of
the success
of the
French.

When opposed, however, to the vigour and activity of Napoléon, it offered the fairest opportunity for decisive defeat. The two corps of the Imperialists could communicate only by Roveredo and the upper end of the lake of Guarda, a circuit of above sixty miles, while the French, occupying a central station between them, at its southern extremity, were enabled, by a great exertion of activity, to bring a superior force, first against the one, and then against the other. Their successes, however, were dearly purchased: above seven thousand men had been killed and wounded; Wurmser carried with him three thousand prisoners into the Tyrol; and the whole siege equipage of Mantua had fallen into the hands of the enemy (2).

The democratic party in all the Italian towns were thrown into transports of joy at this success; and the rejoicings among them at Milan, Bologna, and Modena, were proportioned to the terror with which they had formerly been inspired. But Napoléon, judging more accurately of his position, and seeing the siege of Mantua was to be commenced anew, while Wurmser, with forty thousand men, was still on the watch in the Tyrol, deemed prudence and precaution more than ever necessary. He did not attempt, therefore, to collect a second battering train for the siege of that fortress, but contented himself with a simple blockade, in maintaining which during the autumnal months, his troops became extremely sickly, from the pestilential atmosphere of its marshes. To the powers in the southern parts of the Peninsula who had, during the temporary success of the Austrians, given indication of hostile designs, he wrote in the most menacing strain; the King of Naples was threatened with an attack from seventy thousand French if he violated the armistice; the Papal legate obtained pardon for a revolt at Ferrara only by the most abject submissions; the Venetians were informed that he was aware of their armaments, though he still kept up negotiations, and continued to live at their expense; while the King of Piedmont received commands to complete the destruction of the guerilla parties which infested the mountainous parts of his dominions. To the Milanese, on the other hand, who had remained faithful to France during its transient reverses, he wrote in the most flattering terms, and gave them leave to raise troops for their common defence against the Imperial forces. The most ardent of the youth of Lombardy were speedily enrolled under their banners; but a more efficient force was formed out of the Poles, who, since the last partition of their unhappy country (5), had wandered without a home

Blockade of
Mantua re-
sumed—
Formation
of the Polish
Legion.

(1) Nap. iii. 247, 248. Jom. viii. 333, 335.

(2) Nap. iii. 248, 250. Th. viii. 381.

(3) Nap. iii. 251, 253. Th. viii. 382, 384. Boſ. i. 454. Har. iii. 346.

through Europe, and now flocked in such numbers to the Italian standard, as to lay the foundation of the Polish legion which afterwards became so renowned in the Imperial wars.

The troops on both sides remained in a state of repose for three weeks after this terrible struggle, during which Wurmser was assiduously employed in reorganizing and recruiting his forces, while Napoléon received considerable reinforcements from the army of Kellermann and the interior of France. The numbers on both sides were, at the end of August, nearly equal; Wurmser's forces having been raised to nearly fifty thousand men, by additions from the hereditary states, and Napoléon's to the same amount by the junction of part of Kellermann's forces (1). Untaught by former disasters, of the imprudence

Wurmser again advances, and the French issue forth to meet him.

of forming plans at a distance for the regulation of their armies, the Aulic Council again framed and transmitted to Wurmser a plan for the expulsion of the French from the line of the Adige. According to this design, he was to leave twenty thousand men under Davidowich, to guard Roveredo and the valley of the Adige, and descend himself, with thirty thousand, by the gorges of the Brenta to Bassano, and so reach the plains of Padua. Thus, notwithstanding their former disasters, they were about again to commit the same error, of dividing their force into two columns, while Napoléon occupied a central position equidistant from both (2); with this difference that, instead of a lake, they had now a mass of unpassable mountains between them.

Napoléon, at the same time, resolved to resume the offensive, in order to prevent any detachments from the Imperial army into Bavaria, where the Archduke Charles was now severely pressed by Moreau. The two armies broke up at the same time, Wurmser descending the Brenta, and Napoléon ascending the Adige. Foreseeing the possibility of a descent upon Mantua during his absence, the French general left Kilmaine, with three thousand men, to occupy Legnago and Verona, while ten thousand still maintained the blockade of Mantua, and he himself, with thirty thousand, ascended the Tyrol by the two roads on the banks of the Adige, and that on the western side of the lake of Garda (3).

3d Sept. The French were the first to commence operations. Early in September, Vaubois, with the division of Sauret, ascended the lake, and, after several combats, reached Tortola, at its upper extremity. On the same day Napoléon, with the divisions of Masséna and Augereau, arrived in front

4th Sept. of the advanced posts of the Austrians at Serravalle, on the Adige, and on the following day attacked their position. The Imperialists stood firm; but Napoléon sent a cloud of light troops on the heights on either side of their columns, and, the moment they began to waver, he made so vigorous a charge along the chaussée with the hussards, that the Austrians were driven back in confusion, and the Republicans entered Roveredo pell-mell with the fugitives (4).

Davidowich rallied his broken divisions in the defile of Calliano, a formidable pass on the banks of the Adige, formed where the precipices of the Alps approach so closely to the river, that there is only the breadth of four hundred toises left between them. An old castle, which the Austrians had strengthened and mounted with cannon, was placed at the edge of the pre-

(1) The sick and wounded in the French army at this period were no less than fifteen thousand.—*Confidential Despatch, 25th Aug.—Corresp. Conf. i. 441.*

(2) Th. viii. 393, 394. Nap. iii. 256.

(3) Th. viii. 394. Bot. i. 460. Nap. iii. 256.

(4) Th. viii. 396. Nap. iii. 259.

precipice, and a ruined wall stretched across the gorge, from the foot of the rocks to the margin of the stream. Napoléon threw his light troops on the mountains upon his own right, placed a battery, which commanded the Austrian cannon, and forming a close column of ten battalions, precipitated them along the high-road upon the enemy. Nothing could withstand their impetuosity; the Imperialists were routed; horse, foot, and cannon rushed in confusion through the narrow defile in their rear; and the Republican cavalry, charging furiously along the chaussée, drove them, in the utmost disorder, towards Trent. Seven hundred prisoners, and fifteen pieces of cannon fell into the hands of the victors; and the following day Napoléon entered that city, the capital of the Italian Tyrol, while the discomfited remains of Davidowich's corps retired behind the Lavis (1).

The intelligence of this disaster, so far from stopping, only accelerated the march of Wurmser through the defiles of the Brenta. He now imagined that Napoléon intended to penetrate by Brixen and the Brenner into Germany, in order to co-operate with Moreau in the plains of Bavaria; and the Austrian veteran immediately conceived the bold design of hastening, with his whole disposable force, down the Val Sugana into the plain of Bassano, turning rapidly to the right, seizing upon Verona, and both raising the siege of Mantua and preventing the return of Napoléon into Italy. The French general, who, by treachery at the Austrian headquarters, was uniformly put in possession of his adversary's plans before they could be put into execution, immediately perceived the danger which would result from this measure on the part of the enemy, and resolved to oppose it by another, equally bold, on his own side. This was, to leave the division of Vaubois alone in the Tyrol to make head against Davidowich, and descend himself, with twenty-four thousand men, the defiles of the Brenta, and attack Wurmser before he had got round to Verona. In doing this, he ran the risk, it is true, of being himself shut up in the terrible defiles of the Val Sugana, surrounded by precipices and peaks of a stupendous elevation, between Wurmser in front and Davidowich in rear; but he trusted to the resolution of his troops to overcome every obstacle, and hoped, by driving his antagonist back on the Adige, to compel his whole force to lay down their arms (2).

At break of day on the 6th, the French troops were in motion, and they reached Borgo di Val Sugana at night, after having marched ten leagues. On the following morning they continued their march, and, at the entrance of the narrow defiles, came up with the Austrian rearguard, strongly posted near Primolano. Napoléon put in practice the same manœuvre which had succeeded so well at Calliano, covering the mountain on either side with his tirailleurs, and forming a close column of infantry to attack the pass along the high-road. Nothing could resist the impetuosity of the French troops. The Austrians, who were greatly inferior in number, being only the rearguard of the main force, were routed, with the loss of two thousand prisoners and nine pieces of cannon. The fugitives were pursued as far as Cesmona, where head-quarters were established. Napoléon, in his eagerness to pursue the enemy, outrode all his suite, and passed the night alone, wrapped in his cloak, on the ground, in the midst of a regiment of infantry who bivouacked round the town. A private soldier shared with him his rations, and reminded him of it, after he became Emperor, in the camp of Boulogne (3).

(1) Nap. iii. 258, 260. Th. viii. 397, 398.

(2) Th. viii. 399. Nap. iii. 262. Harl. iii. 448.

(3) Bot. i. 461. Nap. iii. 263, 264. Th. viii. 400.

On the same day in which this action took place, in the gorges of the Val Sugana, the advanced guard of Wurmser, under Mezaros, had reached to Verona, and was already skirmishing with the posts of the Republicans on the fortifications which had been erected round that city, when they were recalled to make head against the terrible enemy which had assailed their rear. Wurmser collected all his forces at Bassano to endeavour to bar the passages, and throw the French back into the defiles; the heavy infantry and artillery were placed on a strong position in front of the town and round its mouldering towers, while six battalions of light troops occupied the opening of the valley into the plain. These were speedily overthrown, and the divisions of Masséna and Augereau, emerging from the defiles, found themselves in presence of a brilliant force of twenty thousand men, with a powerful artillery, drawn up in battle array. But the Austrians, discouraged by repeated defeats, made but a feeble resistance. Masséna speedily routed them on the right, while Augereau broke them on the left: the fugitives rushed in confusion into the town, where they were speedily followed by the victorious troops, who made four thousand prisoners, and captured thirty pieces of cannon, besides almost all the baggage, pontoons, and ammunition of the army (1).

During the confusion of this defeat the Austrians got themselves separated from each other; Quasdanowich, with three thousand men, was thrown back towards Friuli, while Wurmser, with sixteen thousand, took the road to Mantua. The situation of the veteran marshal was all but desperate: Masséna was pressing his rear, while Porto Legnago and Verona were both in the hands of the enemy, and the loss of all his pontoons at Bassano rendered it impossible to pass the Adige but at one or other of these places. Fortunately for him, the battalion which occupied Porto Legnago had been withdrawn to Verona during the attack on that place, and the one destined to replace it had not yet arrived. By a rapid march he reached that town before the Republicans, and thus got his troops across the Adige. Napoléon, following his prey with breathless anxiety, no sooner discovered that the passage at Legnago was secured, than he pushed Masséna across the river to Cerra, in order to cut him from the road to Mantua. But the Austrians fought with the courage of despair, and their cavalry, five thousand strong, who were unbroken, and whose spirit had not suffered by disaster, proved irresistible to their enemies. Napoléon himself, who had come up during the engagement, had great difficulty in saving himself by flight; and Wurmser, who arrived a few minutes after, deemed himself so secure of his antagonist that he recommended to his dragoons to take him alive. Having missed so brilliant a stroke, the old marshal continued his march, passed the Molenilla, cut to pieces a body of eight hundred infantry which endeavoured to interrupt his progress, and entered Mantua in a species of triumph which threw a ray of glory over his long series of disasters (2).

14th Sept. Encouraged by these successes, he still endeavoured to keep the field with twenty thousand infantry and five thousand horse, and soon after his cuirassiers destroyed a regiment of light infantry at Due Castelli. But this was the termination of his transient gleam of prosperity. Napoléon brought up the greater part of his forces, and soon after Augereau stormed Porto Legnago, and made prisoners a thousand men, and fifteen pieces of cannon; a stroke which, by depriving Wurmser of the means of passing the Adige,

(1) Th. viii. 401, 402. Nap. iii. 265, 266. Bot. i. 465.

(2) Th. viii. 404. Nap. iii. 270. Bot. i. 465. Hard. iii. 447, 449.

threw him back on Mantua. On the 19th he was attacked by the divisions of Augereau and Masséna with an equal force. The Austrian cavalry at first drove back Augereau, and the battle seemed for a time doubtful; but a vigorous charge of Masséna in the centre restored affairs, and Wurmser was at length driven back into Mantua, with the loss of three thousand men and twenty pieces of cannon. Two days afterwards, he threw a bridge over the Po, and attacked Governolo, one of the fortresses erected by the French at the conclusion of the dikes, with the design of cutting his way through to the Adige; but he was repulsed with the loss of six hundred men, and four pieces of cannon; and in the beginning of October, Kilmaine resumed his old lines round the town, and the Austrians were shut in on every side within its walls. Wurmser killed the horses of his numerous and splendid cavalry, salted their carcasses, and made every preparation for a vigorous defence; while Napoléon dispatched his aide-de-camp, MARMONT, afterwards Duke of Ragusa, with the standards taken in these glorious actions, to lay at the feet of the French government (1).

Results of
these ac-
tions.

By the result of these conflicts the Austrian army in the field was reduced from fifty thousand to fifteen thousand men, of whom twelve thousand, under Davidowich, had taken refuge in the defiles leading to Mount Bremer, while three thousand, under Quasdanowich, were in the mountains of Friuli. Wurmser, it is true, had brought sixteen thousand into Mantua; but this force, accumulated in a besieged and unhealthy town, was of no real service during the remainder of the campaign, and rather, by increasing the number of useless mouths within the place, accelerated the period of its ultimate surrender. Before the end of October, ten thousand of the garrison were in the hospitals, so that the besieged were unable either to make any use of their superfluous numbers, or get quit of the unserviceable persons who consumed their scanty provisions. But these successes, great as they were, had not been purchased without a very heavy loss to the French army, who, in these rapid actions, were weakened by above fifteen thousand men, in killed, wounded, and prisoners (2).

Vast efforts
on both
sides to re-
cruit their
forces.

Both parties remained in inactivity for a considerable time after these exhausting efforts, during which the Austrians were energetically employed in repairing their losses, and the Republicans in drawing forces from the other side of the Alps. They took advantage of the delay to organize Revolutionary powers throughout all the north of Italy. Bologna and Ferrara were united under a provisional government; Republican forces, and Jacobin clubs established, and all the machinery of democracy put in full operation; Modena was revolutionized, the old government replaced by a popular assembly, and French troops admitted within its walls; while legions of national guards were organized throughout the whole of Lombardy (3).

But more efficient auxiliaries were approaching. Twelve battalions from the army of la Vendée, besides the remainder of the forces of Kellermann, joyfully crossed the Alps, happy to exchange the scene of utter penury and inglorious warfare, for the luxurious quarters and shining achievements of the Italian army. In the end of October, Alvinzi, who had assumed the command of the army in Friuli, had assembled forty thousand men under his standards, while the corps of Davidowich was raised, by the junction of a

(1) Nap. iii. 273. Bot. i. 472, 473. Th. viii. 405.

(3) Jom. ix. 133, 145.

(2) Hard. iii. 450. Nap. iii. 273. Jom. ix. 126.
Th. iii. 406.

large body of the Tyrolese militia, a force admirably adapted for mountain warfare, to eighteen thousand men. To oppose this mass of assailants, Napoléon had twelve thousand men under Vaubois, on the Lavis, in front of Trent; twenty thousand on the Brenta and the Adige observing Alvinzi, and

Nov. 1. ten thousand guarding the lines round Mantua. The disproportion, therefore, was very great in every quarter, and Napoléon, justly alarmed at his situation, and chagrined at the Directory for not putting a larger force at his disposal, wrote to the government that he was about to lose the whole of his Italian conquests (1).

Nov. 6. The Austrian preparations being completed, Alvinzi, on the 1st Alvinzi again advances. November, threw two bridges over the Piave, and advanced against Masséna, whose headquarters were at Bassano. At the approach of the Imperialists in such superior force, the French fell back to Vicenza, and Napoléon hastened, with the division of Augereau and the reserve, to their support. On the 6th, a general battle took place. Masséna overthrew the Austrian left, commanded by Provera and Liptay, and drove them with loss over the Brenta; while Napoléon himself defeated the right, under Quasdanowich, and would have carried the town of Bassano, which the Imperialists occupied in force, had not HOHENZOLLERN, who advanced at the head of the Austrian reserve, made good the place till nightfall. But early on the following morning, the general received intelligence from Vaubois, in the Tyrol, which not only interrupted his career of success, but rendered an immediate retreat on the part of the whole Republican army unavoidable (2).

Nov. 1. In obedience to the orders he had received, that general, on the Defeat of Vaubois by the Imperialists. same day on which the Austrians crossed the Piave, commenced an attack on their position on the Lavis; but he was not only received with the utmost intrepidity, but driven back in disorder, through the town of Trent, to the defile of Calliano, with the loss of four thousand men. There he made a stand; but Davidowich, having caused a large part of his forces to cross to the right bank of the Adige, passed that post, and was moving rapidly down on Montebaldo and Rivoli, so as to threaten his communications with Verona, and the remainder of the army. Nothing was left for Vaubois but to retire in haste towards Verona (3), which was seriously menaced by the increasing forces of the Tyrolese army, while their progress on the Montebaldo could only be arrested by bringing up Joubert in the utmost haste from the lines of Mantua.

Napoléon hastens in person to the Plateau of Rivoli. No sooner was this disastrous intelligence received by Napoléon, than he drew back his whole force through Vicenza to Verona, while Alvinzi, who was himself preparing to retire, after his check

(1) Th. viii. 448, 449. Join. ix. 158. Nap. iii. 345, 346.

8th Oct. Napoléon's letter was in these terms:—1796. "Mantua cannot be reduced before the middle of February; you will perceive from that how critical our situation is; and our political system is, if possible, still worse. Peace with Naples is indispensable; an alliance with Genoa and Turin necessary. Lose no time in taking the people of Lombardy, Modena, Bologna, and Ferrara under your protection, and, above all, send reinforcements. The Emperor has thrice reformed his army since the commencement of the campaign. Every thing is going wrong in Italy; the *prestige* of our forces is dissipated; the enemy now count our ranks. It is indispensable that you take into your instant consideration the critical situation of the Italian army, and forthwith secure it friends both among kings

and people. The influence of Rome is incalculable; you did wrong in breaking with that power; I would have temporized with it, as we have done with Venice and Genoa. Whenever the general in Italy is not the centre of negotiation as well as military operations, the greatest risks will be incurred. You may ascribe this language to ambition; but I am satiated with honours, and my health is so broken, that I must implore you to give me a successor. —I can no longer sit on horseback; my courage alone is unshaken. *Every thing was ready for the explosion at Genoa*; but Foyoult thought it expedient to delay. We must conciliate Genoa till the new order of things is more firmly established."—*Confident. Despatches*, Oct. 8, 1796, ii. 92, 93.

(2) Nap. iii. 437. Th. viii. 543.

(3) Nap. iii. 348, 349. Th. viii 453, 455.

on the preceding day, immediately resumed the offensive. Napoléon in person proceeded, with such troops as he could collect, in the utmost haste to the Montebaldo, where he found the division of Vaubois all assembled on the plateau of Rivoli, and so much reinforced as to be able to withstand an attack. He here deemed it necessary to make a severe example of the regiments whose panic had so nearly proved fatal to the army. Collecting the troops into a circle, he addressed them, with a severe tone, in these words:—"Soldiers, I am displeased with you. You have evinced neither discipline, nor valour, nor constancy. You have allowed yourselves to be chased from positions, where a handful of resolute men might have arrested an army. Soldiers of the 59th and 85th, you are no longer French soldiers. Chief of the staff, cause it to be written on their standards, *They are no longer of the Army of Italy.*" These terrible words, pronounced with a menacing voice, filled these brave regiments with consternation. The laws of discipline could not restrain the sounds of grief which burst from their ranks. They broke their array, and, crowding round the general, entreated that he would lead them into action, and give them an opportunity of showing whether they were not of the Army of Italy. Napoléon consoled them by some kind expressions (1), and, feigning to yield to their prayers, promised to suspend the order, and a few days after they behaved with uncommon gallantry, and regained their place in his esteem.

Returns to
Caldiero
and is there
defeated.

Notwithstanding his check on the Brenta, the operations of Alvinzi had hitherto been crowned with the most brilliant success. He had regained possession of the whole of the Italian Tyrol, and of all the plain of Italy between that river and the Adige. But the most difficult part still remained, which was, to pass the latter stream in the face of the enemy, and effect a junction with the right wing, under Davidowich, which had achieved such important advantages. He followed the retiring columns of the Republicans, who took a position on the heights of Caldiero, determined to defend the road to Verona to the very uttermost. Napoléon arrived there from the Montebaldo on the evening of the 10th, and resolved to attack Alvinzi

Nov. 11. on the following day, who had occupied a strong position directly in front, his left resting on the marshes of Arcola, and his right on the heights of CALDIERO and the village of Colognola. Masséna was directed to attack the right, which appeared the most accessible, and his advanced guard succeeded in ascending an eminence, surmounted by a mill, which the Austrian general had neglected to occupy; but the Imperialists, returning in force, regained the post, and made the brigade prisoners. The action continued the remainder of the day along the whole line, without decisive success to either party; but the rain, which fell in torrents, and the mud which clogged their wheels, prevented the French artillery from being brought up to meet the fire of the Austrian cannon, which, in position, thundered with terrible effect upon the Republican columns (2). Wearied and dispirited, they drew back at night, yielding, for the first time in the campaign, the victory in a pitched battle to their enemies.

The situation of Napoléon was now, to all appearance, utterly desperate. He had lost four thousand men under Vaubois, three thousand in the recent actions with Alvinzi; his troops, dispirited with these disasters, had lost much of their confidence and courage, and a depressing feeling of the great strength of the enemy had gained every breast. The army, it was true, had

(1) Nap. iii. 350. Th. viii. 455.

(2) Nap. iii. 353. Th. viii. 457.

still the advantage of a central position at Verona, in the midst of their enemies; but they could resume the offensive in no direction with any appearance of success. In the north they were arrested by the defiles of the Tyrol; in the east by the position of Caldiero, known by recent experience to be impregnable; in the south the blockading force was hardly able to make head against the frequent sorties of the garrison of Mantua. The peril of their situation rapidly gained the minds of the French soldiers, more capable than any others in Europe of judging of the probable course of events, and extremely susceptible of strong impressions; and it required all the art of the general, aided by the eloquence of his lieutenants, to hinder them from sinking under their misfortunes. Napoléon wrote in the most desponding terms to the Directory, but in public he assumed the appearance of confidence; and the wounded in the city, hearing of the peril of the army, began to issue, with their wounds yet unstanched, from the hospitals. (1).

His new
designs.

But the genius of Napoléon did not desert him in this eventful crisis. Without communicating his design to any one, he ordered the whole army to be under arms at nightfall, on the 14th November, and they began their march in three columns, crossed the Adige, and took the road to Milan. The hour of departure, the route, the universal ignorance in regard to their destination, all inspired the belief that they were about to retreat, and relinquish to their insulting rivals the plains of Italy. Breathless with anxiety, the troops defiled through the gates of Verona; not a word was spoken in the ranks; grief filled every heart; in the dark columns, the measured tread of marching men alone was heard; when suddenly the order was given to turn rapidly to the left, and all the corps, descending the course of the Adige, arrived before daybreak at Ronco. There they found a bridge of boats prepared, and the whole army was rapidly passed to the other side, and found itself in an immense sea of morasses. A general feeling of joy was immediately diffused over the army: the soldiers now perceived that the contest for Italy was not abandoned, and passing quickly from one extreme to another, prepared with alacrity to follow the footsteps of their leader, without any regard to the fearful odds to which they were exposed (2).

(1) Th. viii. 458, 460. Nap. iii. 356, 357.

The gloomy anticipations of Napoléon at this period are strongly depicted in the following interesting secret despatch to the Directory:—"If the events I have to recount are not propitious, you will not ascribe it to the army; its inferiority, and the exhaustion of its brave men, give me every reason to fear for it. Perhaps we are on the eve of losing Italy. None of the promised succours have arrived; they are all arrested at Lyon or Marseille. The activity of our government at the commencement of the war can alone give you an idea of the energy of the Court of Vienna; hardly a day elapses that they do not receive five thousand men, and for two months I have only been joined by a single battalion. I do my duty; the army does its part; my soul is lacerated, but my conscience is at ease. I never received a fourth part of the succours which the Minister of War announces in his despatches.

"To-day I shall allow the troops to repose; but to-morrow we shall renew our operations. I despair of preventing the raising the blockade of Mantua; should that disaster arrive, we shall soon be behind the Adda, if not over the Alps. The wounded are few, but they are the *élite* of the army. Our best officers are struck down; the Army of Italy, reduced

to a handful of heroes, is exhausted. The heroes of Lodi, of Millesimo, of Castiglione, of Bassano, are dead, or in hospital; there remains only their reputation, and the pride they have given to the soldiers. Joubert, Lanusse, Victor, Murat, Charlot, are wounded: we are abandoned in the extremity of Italy.

"I have lost few soldiers, but those who have fallen are the flower of the army, whom it is impossible to replace. Such as remain have devoted themselves to death. Perhaps the hour of the brave Angereau, of the intrepid Masséna, of Berthier, is about to strike; what then will become of these brave soldiers? This consideration renders me circumspect; I know not how to brave death, when it would so certainly be the ruin of those who have so long been the object of my solicitude.

"In a few days we shall make a last effort; should fortune prove favourable we shall take Mantua, and with it Italy. Had I received the 83d, three thousand five hundred strong, I would have answered for every thing; in a few days forty thousand men will perhaps not give me the same security."—*Confidential Despatch, 14th Nov., ii. 246-251.*

(2) Th. viii. 461. Nap. iii. 357.

He moves
down the
Adige, to
turn the
position of
Caldiero by
Arcola.

Having perceived, during the former action at Caldiero, that the position was too strong to be carried by an attack in front, Napoléon had resolved to assail it in flank, by the village of Arcola, and for that purpose placed his army in the midst of the morasses, which stretched from thence to the banks of the Po. He thought with reason that, on the narrow causeways which traversed these marshes, the superiority of numbers on the part of the enemy would be unavailing; every thing would come to depend on the resolution of the heads of columns; and he hoped that the courage of his soldiers, restored by being thus brought to combat on equal terms with the enemy, and animated by this novel species of warfare, would prevail over the discipline and tenacity of the Germans. The position which he had chosen was singularly well adapted for the purpose in view. Three chaussées branch off from Ronco; one, following the left bank of the Adige, remounts that river to Verona; one in the centre leads straight to Arcola, by a stone bridge over the little stream of the Alpon; the third, on the right, follows the descending course of the Adige to Albando. Three columns were moved forward on these chaussées; that on the left was destined to approach Verona, and observe that town, so as to secure it from any sudden attack of the enemy; that in the centre, to attack the flank of their position by the village of Arcola; that on the right, to cut off their retreat (1).

15th Nov.
Dreadful
actions
there.

At daybreak on the 15th, Masséna advanced on the first chaussée as far as a small eminence, which brought him in sight of the steeples of Verona, and removed all anxiety in that quarter. Augereau, with the division in the centre, pushed, without being perceived, as far as the bridge of Arcola; but his advanced guard was there met by three battalions of Croats, who kept up so heavy a fire on the head of the column, that, notwithstanding the greatest exertions on the part of the soldiers, they were driven back. In vain Augereau himself hastened to the spot, and led them back to the charge: the fire at the bridge was so violent, that he was overthrown, and compelled to halt the column. Meanwhile, Alvinzi, whose attention was fixed on Verona, where he imagined the bulk of the enemy's forces to be, was confounded in the morning at hearing a violent fire in the marshes. At first he imagined that it was merely a few light troops, but soon intelligence arrived from all quarters that the enemy were advancing in force on all the dikes, and threatened the flank and rear of his position. He immediately dispatched two divisions along the chaussées by which the enemy was approaching; that commanded by Mitrouski advanced to defend the village of Arcola, while that under Provera marched against the division of Masséna. The latter column soon commenced an attack on their antagonists, but they were unable to withstand the impetuous shock of Masséna's grenadiers, and were driven back with heavy loss. Mitrouski, at the same time, passed through Arcola, crossed the bridge, and attacked the corps of Augereau; but they also were repulsed and followed to the bridge by the victorious French. There commenced a desperate struggle; the Republican column advanced with the utmost intrepidity, but they were received with so tremendous a fire from the artillery in front, and a line of infantry stationed along the banks of the Alpon in flank, that they staggered and fell back. Napoléon, deeming the possession of Arcola indispensable not only to his future operations, but to the safety of his own army, put himself

(1) Nap. iii. 355, 360. Th. viii. 462, 463.

with his generals at the head of the column, seized a standard, advanced without shrinking through a tempest of shot, and planted it on the middle of the bridge; but the fire there became so violent that his grenadiers hesitated, and, seizing the general in their arms, bore him back amidst a cloud of smoke, the dead and the dying. The Austrians instantly rushed over the bridge, and pushed the crowd of fugitives into the marsh, where Napoléon lay up to the middle in water, while the enemy's soldiers for a minute surrounded him on all sides. The French grenadiers soon perceived that their commander was left behind; the cry ran through their ranks, "Forward to save the general," and, returning to the charge, they drove back the Austrians, and extricated Napoléon from his perilous situation. During this terrible strife, Lannes received three wounds. His aide-de-camp, Meuron, was killed by his side, when covering his general with his body, and almost all his personal staff were badly wounded (1).

Meanwhile Guieux, who commanded the column which had been directed against Albaredo, had arrived at that place, and was directly in rear of the village of Arcola: but it was too late. During the desperate stand there made by the Austrians, Alvinzi had gained time to draw off his baggage and artillery, and it was no longer possible to take the enemy in rear. Towards evening, the Austrians abandoned Arcola, and drew up their army, facing the marshes, at the foot of the heights of Caldiero (2).

16th Nov. During the night, Napoléon, on his side, drew back his forces to the right bank of the Adige, leaving only an advanced guard on the left bank; while the Austrians re-occupied the village of Arcola, and all the ground which had been so vehemently disputed on the preceding day. They even advanced, in the confidence of victory, along the dikes, to within six hundred yards of the village of Ronco; but when they were thus far engaged in the defiles, the French attacked them with the bayonet, and drove back their columns, after an obstinate engagement, to the vicinity of Arcola. The battle continued the whole day, with various success, and at nightfall both parties retired, the Austrians over the Alpon, the Republicans across the Adige (3).

During the whole of these eventful days, big with the fate of Italy and the world, the conduct of the Austrian generals was timid, and unworthy of the brave troops whom they commanded. Davidowich, while the contest was raging on the lower Adige, remained in total inactivity on the upper part of that stream; while Alvinzi, fettered by secret instructions from the Aulic Council to attempt nothing hazardous, and rather keep on the defensive, in order to facilitate the hidden negotiations which were going forward or about to commence, repeatedly halted in the career of success, and lost the fairest opportunities of crushing his adversary. Napoléon, aware, from the treachery which constantly prevailed at the Imperial headquarters, of these secret restrictions, augmented the irresolution of the commander-in-chief by privately dispatching intelligence from Verona to him of the approaching mission of Clarke to conduct negotiations for peace, of the conferences opened at Paris with England, and the probability of an immediate accommodation. Alvinzi rejected the proposal for an armistice which he made, but suspended his movements to join Davidowich, and paralysed every successful operation for fear of injuring the negotiations. To such a length did this timidity proceed, that when, after the repulse of the French from Arcola, his bravest

(1) Nap. iii. 361, 363. Th. viii. 463, 467. O'Meara, i. 216, and ii. 226.

(2) Nap. iii. 364. Th. viii. 467.

(3) Nap. iii. 366, 367. Th. viii. 468.

officers besought him instantly to form a junction with Davidowich, and terminate the war by a general attack on Verona, instead of following the heroic advice, he retired towards Viemza (1).

17th Nov. Again the sun rose on this dreadful scene of carnage, and both parties advanced, with diminished numbers but undecaying fury, to the struggle which was to decide the fate of Italy. They met in the middle of the dikes, and fought with the utmost animosity. The French column in the centre was routed, and driven back so far, that the Austrian balls fell upon the bridge of Ronco, where the action was restored by a regiment which Napoléon had placed in ambuscade among the willows on the side of the road, and which attacked the victorious column in flank, when disordered by success, with such vigour, that they were almost all driven into the marshes. Masséna, on his dike, experienced similar vicissitudes, and was only enabled to keep his ground by placing himself at the head of the column, and leading the soldiers on with his hat on the point of his sword. Towards noon, however, Napoléon, perceiving that the enemy were exhausted with fatigue, while his own soldiers were comparatively fresh, deemed the moment for decisive success arrived, and ordered a general charge of all his forces along both chaussées; and, having cleared them of the enemy, formed his troops in order of battle at their extremity, on the firm ground, having the right towards Porto Legnago, and the left at Arcola. By the orders of Napoléon, the garrison of that place issued forth with four pieces of cannon, so as to take the enemy in rear; while a body of trumpeters was sent, under cover of the willows, to their extreme left flank, with orders to sound a charge, as soon as the action was fully engaged along the whole line. These measures were completely successful. The Austrian commander, while bravely resisting in front, hearing a cannonade in his rear, and the trumpets of a whole division of cavalry in his flank, ordered a retreat, and, after a desperate struggle of three days' duration, yielded the victory to his enemies. Alvinzi had stationed eight thousand men in echelon along his line of retreat, so that he was enabled to retire in good order, and with very little further loss (2).

It was so apparent to all the Austrian army that this last retreat was the result of a secret understanding with the French general, and with a view to the negotiation which was now depending, that they openly and loudly expressed their indignation. One colonel broke his sword in pieces, and declared he would no longer serve under a commander whose conduct brought disgrace on his troops. Certain it is, that Alvinzi, during this dreadful strife at Arcola, had neither evinced the capacity nor the spirit of a general worthy to combat with Napoléon;—not that he was in reality deficient in either, but that the ruinous fetters of the Aulic Council paralysed all his movements; and the dread of hazarding any thing on the eve of a negotiation, made him throw away every chance of success (3).

Operations of Davidowich. While this desperate struggle was going forward in the marshes of Arcola, Davidowich, who had opened the campaign with such brilliant success, was far from following up his advantages with the vigour which might have been expected. He merely advanced with his forces to

Nov. 18. the neighbourhood of Verona on the 18th, following Vaubois, who abandoned the positions of Corona and Rivoli on his approach; whereas, had he pressed him hard on the preceding days, Napoléon would have been

(1) Hard. iv. 67, 75.

(3) Hard. iv. 71, 77.

(2) Nap. iii. 368, 369. Th. viii. 470, 472. Jom.
ix. 172, 192.

compelled to cross the Adige, and raise the siege of Mantua. Without losing an instant, the French general returned with a large part of his forces through Verona, and compelled Davidowich to retire into the Tyrol, while the French resumed their old positions at Corona and Rivoli; and Augereau drove them from Dolce, with the loss of one thousand prisoners and nine pieces of cannon. The inhabitants of that town were lost in astonishment when they beheld the army which had left their walls by the gate of Milan three days before, return in triumph, after so terrible a combat, by the gate of Venice; and without halting, pass through the town to make head against the fresh enemies who approached from the Tyrol (1).

Alvinzi, when Napoléon was absent in pursuit of Davidowich, advanced towards Verona, now chiefly occupied by invalids and wounded men, and a universal joy pervaded the army when the order to march in that direction was given; but his old irresolution soon returned; the instructions of the Aulic Council prevailed over his better genius, and the final order to retire to Vicenza again spread grief and despair among his heroic followers (2).

Results of these actions. The results of the battle of Arcola, how glorious soever to the French arms, were by no means so decisive as those of the previous victories gained in the campaign. The actions had been most obstinately contested; and though the Imperialists ultimately retired, and Mantua was unrelieved, yet the victors were nearly as much weakened as the vanquished. The loss of the French in all, including the actions with Davidowich, was fifteen thousand men, while that of the Austrians did not exceed eighteen thousand. During the confusion consequent on such desperate engagements, the garrison of Mantua made frequent sorties; and Wurmser availed himself with such skill of the temporary interruption of the blockade, that considerable convoys of provisions were introduced into the place, and, by putting the garrison on half rations, and calculating on the great mortality among the troops, which daily diminished their number, he still held out hopes that he could maintain his position till a fourth effort was made for his relief (3).

Extraordinary joy at Paris. The intelligence of these hard-fought victories excited the most enthusiastic transports throughout all France. The battle of Arcola especially, with its desperate chances and perilous passages, was the object of universal admiration. The people never were weary of celebrating the genius which had selected, amidst the dikes of Ronco, a field of battle where numbers were unavailing and courage irresistible; and the heroic intrepidity which made the soldier forget the general, and recalled the exploits of the knights of romance. Every where medals were exhibited of the young general on the bridge of Arcola, with the standard in his hand, in the midst of the fire and smoke. The Councils decreed that the Army of Italy had deserved well of their country, and that the standards which Napoléon and Augereau had borne on that memorable occasion, should be given to them, to be preserved as precious trophies in their families (4).

Vast efforts of the Austrians. Nor were the Austrians less distinguished by patriotic feeling. While the triumphs of the Archduke Charles on the Danube had saved Germany, and raised to the highest pitch the ardour of the people, the reverses in Italy came to damp the general joy, and renew, in a quarter where it was least expected, the peril of the monarchy. With unconquerable resolution they prepared to face the danger; the affectionate ardour of the

(1) Nap. iii. 371. Th. viii. 472.

(2) Hard. iv. 75.

(3) Jom. ix. 231. Nap. iii. 371, 372. Th. viii. 472, 473.

(4) Th. viii. 473.

hereditary states showed itself in the moment of alarm; the people every where flew to arms; numerous regiments of volunteers were formed to repair the chasms in the regular forces; Vienna alone raised four regiments, which received standards embroidered by the hand of the Empress; and, before the end of the year, a fourth army was formed in the mountains of Friuli and Tyrol, nowise inferior either in numbers or resolution to those which had wasted under the sword of Napoléon (1).

Mission of
Clarke to
negotiate for
peace, which
is thwarted
by Napo-
léon. After the battle of Arcola, the negotiation, the commencement of which had been attended with such fatal effects to the Imperial fortunes during the action, was continued with the greatest activity between the headquarters of the two armies. General Clarke, the Republican envoy, arrived at the headquarters of Napoléon; and it was at first proposed to conclude an armistice of three months, in order to facilitate the negotiations; but this the French general, who saw the command of Italy on the point of slipping from his grasp, and was well aware that the fate of the war depended on Mantua, resolutely opposed (2). Clarke, however, continued to argue in favour of the armistice, and produced the instructions of his government, which were precise on that point; but Napoléon, secure of the support of Barras, at once let him know that he was resolved not to share his authority with any one. "If you come here to obey me," said he, "I will always see you with pleasure; if not, the sooner you return to those who sent you the better (3)." Clarke felt he was mastered; he did not answer a word; from that moment the negotiation fell entirely into the hands of Napoléon, and came to nothing. So completely, indeed, did the Republican envoy fall under the government of the young general, that he himself wrote to the Directory—"It is indispensable that the general-in-chief should conduct all the diplomatic operations in Italy (4); and thenceforth his attention was almost entirely confined to arresting the scandalous depredations of the civil and military authorities, both on the Italian states and the funds of the Republic; an employment which soon absorbed all his time, and was attended with as little success as those of Napoléon himself had been. The conferences which were opened at Vicenza in December, were broken up on the 5th January, without having led to any result; and both parties prepared to try once more the fate of arms (5).

For two months after the battle of Arcola, and during this negotiation, both parties remained in a state of inactivity, and great efforts were made on either side to recruit the armies for the final contest which was approaching. Napoléon received great reinforcements; numbers of the sick were discharged from the hospitals, and rejoined their ranks on the approach of the cold weather, and ten thousand men flocked to his standards from the interior; so that, by the beginning of January 1797, he had forty-six thousand men under arms. Ten thousand blockaded Mantua, and the remainder of the army was on the line of the Adige, from the edge of the Po to the rocks of Montebaldo (6).

(1) Toul, vi. 142. Jom. ix. 267. Hard. iv. 152.

(2) "Masters of Mantua," said he, "the enemy will be too happy to leave us the line of the Rhine. But if an armistice is concluded, we must abandon that fortress till May, and then find it completely provisioned, so that its fall cannot be reckoned on before the unhealthy months of autumn. We will lose the money (30,000,000) we expect from Rome, which cannot be influenced but by the fall of Mantua; and the Emperor being nearer the scene of action, will recruit his army much more effectually

than we can, and in the opening of the campaign we shall be inferior to the enemy. Fifteen days' repose is of essential service to the Army of Italy; three months would ruin it. To conclude an armistice just now, is to cut ourselves out of all chance of success—in a word, every thing depends on the fall of Mantua."—*Corresp. Confid.* ii. 423.

(3) Hard. iv. 133, 134.

(4) Report, Dec. 1796, by Clarke. *Confid. Corresp.*

(5) Hard. iv. 136, 146, 149.

(6) Jom. ix. 262. Th. viii. 507.

It was high time that the Imperialists should advance to the relief of this fortress, which was now reduced to the last extremity, from want of provisions. At a council of war, held in the end of December, it was decided that it was indispensable that instant intelligence should be sent to Alvinzi of their desperate situation. The English officer attached to the garrison volunteered to perform in person the perilous mission, which he executed with equal courage and address. He set out, disguised as a peasant, from Mantua, on the 29th December, at nightfall, in the midst of a deep fall of snow, eluded the vigilance of the French patrols, and, after surmounting a thousand hardships and dangers, arrived at the head-quarters of Alvinzi, at Bassano, on the 4th January, the day after the conferences at Vicenza were broken up. Great destinies awaited this enterprising officer (1). He was Colonel Graham, afterwards victor at Barrosa, and the first British general who planted the English standard on the soil of France.

They make a fourth effort to relieve Mantua. The Austrian plan of attack on this occasion was materially different from what it had formerly been. Adhering still to their favourite system of dividing their forces, and being masters of the course of the Brenta from Bassano to Roveredo, they transferred the bulk of their troops to the Upper Adige, where Alvinzi himself took the command of thirty-five thousand men. A subordinate force of fifteen thousand was destined to advance by the plain of Padua to Mantua, with a view to raise the siege, extricate Wurmser, and push on to the Ecclesiastical States, where the Pope had recently been making great preparations, and from whose levies it was hoped the numerous staff and dismounted dragoons of the veteran marshal would form an efficient force. This project had every appearance of success; but, unfortunately, it became known to the French general, from the despatches which announced it to Wurmser falling into his hands, as the messenger who bore them was on the point of clearing the last lines of the blockade of Mantua (2).

12th Jan. 1797. They advance to. On the 12th January, 1797, the advanced guard of Alvinzi attacked the Republican posts on the Montebaldo, and forced them back to the plateau of Rivoli; while, on the same day, the troops in the plain pushed forward, drove in all the French videttes towards Porto Legnago, and maintained a desultory fire along the whole line of the lower Adige. For some time Napoléon was uncertain on which side the principal attack would be made, but soon the alarming accounts of the great display of force on the upper part of the river, and the secret intelligence which he received from treachery at the Austrian headquarters, left no doubt that the enemy's principal forces were accumulated near Rivoli; and accordingly he set out with the whole centre of his army to support Joubert, who was there struggling with immensely superior forces. He arrived at two in the morning on the plateau of Rivoli; the weather was clear and beautiful; an unclouded moon silvered the fir-clad precipices of the mountains; but the horizon to the northward was illuminated by the fires of innumerable bivouacs, and from the neighbouring heights his experienced eye could discover the lights of nearly forty thousand men. This great force was divided into five columns, which filled the whole space between the Adige and the lake of Guarda: the principal one, under Quasdanowich, composed of all the artillery, cavalry, and a strong body of grenadiers, followed the high-road on the right, and was destined to ascend the plateau by the zigzag and steep

(1) Hard. iv. 153, 154.

(2) Nap. iii. 408, 409.

ascent which led to its summit. Three other corps of infantry received orders to climb the amphitheatre of mountains which surrounded it in front, and, when the action was engaged on the high-road, descend upon the French army; while a fifth, under Lusignan, was directed to wind round the base of the plateau, gain the high-road in their rear, and cut off their retreat to Verona. The plan was ably conceived, and had nearly succeeded (1): with a general of inferior ability to Napoléon, and troops of less resolution than his army, it unquestionably would have done so.

To oppose this great force, Napoléon had only thirty thousand men, but he had the advantage of being in position on a plain, elevated among the mountains, while his adversaries must necessarily be fatigued in endeavouring to reach it; and he had sixty pieces of cannon, and a numerous body of cavalry, in excellent condition. He immediately perceived that it was necessary, at all hazards, to keep his ground on the plateau; and, by so doing, he hoped to prevent the junction of the enemy's masses, and overthrow them separately. Before daybreak he moved forward the tirailleurs of Joubert to drive back the advanced posts of the Imperialists, who had already ascended to the plateau, and, by the light of the moon, arranged his whole force with admirable precision on its summit (2).

14th Jan.
Battle of
Rivoli.

The action began at nine o'clock, by the Austrian columns, which descended from the semicircular heights of the Montebaldo, attacking the French left. After a desperate resistance, the regiments stationed there were broken, and fled in disorder; upon which Napoléon galloped to the village of Rivoli, where the division of Masséna, which had marched all night, was reposing from its fatigues, led it to the front, and, by a vigorous charge, restored the combat in that quarter. This check, however, had forced Joubert on the right to give ground; the divisions in front pressed down upon the plateau, while at the same instant the head of the column of the Imperial grenadiers appeared at the top of the zigzag windings of the high-road, having, by incredible efforts of valour, forced that perilous ascent, and their cavalry and artillery began to debouche upon the level surface at its summit. Meanwhile, the division of Lusignan, which had wound unperceived round the flanks of the Republicans, appeared directly in their rear, and the Imperial soldiers, deeming the destruction of the French army certain, gave loud cheers on all sides, which re-echoed from the surrounding cliffs, and clapped their hands, as they successively took up their ground. The Republicans, attacked in front, flank, and rear at the same time, saw their retreat cut off, and no resource from the bayonets of the Austrians but in the precipices of the Alps (3).

At this perilous moment, the presence of mind of Napoléon did not forsake him. He instantly, in order to gain time, sent a flag of truce to Alvinzi, proposing a suspension of arms for half an hour, as he had some propositions to make in consequence of the arrival of a courier with despatches from Paris. The Austrian general, ever impressed with the idea that military were to be subordinate to diplomatic operations, fell into the snare; the suspension, at the critical moment, was agreed to; and the march of the Austrians was suspended at the very moment when the soldiers, with loud shouts were exclaiming—"We have them; we have them." Junot repaired to the Austrian headquarters, from whence, after a conference of an hour, he returned, as

(1) Th. viii. 513. Nap. iii. 414. Jom. ix. 275.

(2) Th. viii. 514. Nap. iii. 414. Jom. ix. 276.

(3) Nap. iii. 416. Th. viii. 516. Jom. viii. 279.

might have been expected, without having come to any accommodation; but meanwhile the critical period had passed; Napoléon had gained time to face the danger, and made the movements requisite to repel these numerous attacks. Joubert, with the light infantry, was ordered to face about on the extreme right to oppose Quasdanowich, while Leclerc and Lasalle, with the light cavalry and flying artillery, flew to the menaced point; and a regiment of infantry was directed to the heights of Tiffaro, to make head against the corps of Lusignan. Far from being disconcerted by the appearance of the troops in his rear, he exclaimed, pointing to them, "These are already our prisoners;" and the confident tone in which he spoke soon communicated itself to the soldiers, who repeated the cheering expression. The head of Quasdanowich's division, which had so bravely won the ascent, received in front by a terrible fire of grape-shot, charged on one flank by Lasalle's horse, and exposed on the other to a close discharge of musketry from Joubert, broke and staggered backwards down the steep. The fugitives, rushing headlong through the column which was toiling up, soon threw the whole into inextricable confusion; horse, foot, and cannon struggled together, under a plunging fire from the French batteries, which blew up some ammunition-waggons, and produced a scene of frightful disorder. No sooner was the plateau delivered from this flank attack, than Napoléon accumulated his forces on the troops which had descended from the semicircle of the Montebaldo, and that gallant band, destitute of artillery, and deprived now of the expected aid from the corps in flank, soon gave way, and fled in confusion to the mountains, where great numbers were made prisoners (1).

During these decisive successes, the division of Lusignan had gained ground on the troops opposed to it, and came to the heights in rear of the army, in time to witness the destruction of the three divisions in the mountains. From that moment they foresaw their own fate. The victorious troops were speedily directed against this brave division, now insulated from all support, and depressed by the ruin which it had witnessed in the other parts of the army.

For some time they stood firm; but the fire of fifteen pieces of heavy artillery, to which they had nothing to oppose, at length compelled them to retreat; and, before they had receded far, they met the division of Rey, the reserve of Masséna, which was approaching. Such was the consternation produced by this unexpected apparition, that the whole division laid down its arms; while Quasdanowich, now left to his own resources, retired up the valley of the Adige, and the broken remains of the centre divisions sought refuge behind the rocky stream of the Tasso (2).

Not content with these splendid triumphs, Napoléon, on the very night in which they were gained, flew to the assistance of the troops on the Lower Adige, with part of the division of Masséna, which had marched all the preceding night, and fought on the following day. It was full time that he should do so, for on the very day on which the battle of Rivoli was fought, Provera had forced the passage of the Adige at Anghiari, and marched between Augereau and the blockading force by Sanguinetto to the neighbourhood of Mantua, of which he threatened to raise the siege on the following morning. Augereau, it is true, had collected his forces, attacked the rear-guard of the Austrians during their march, and taken fifteen hundred prisoners and fourteen pieces of cannon; but still the danger was imminent that

(1) Jom. viii. 282, 283. Th. viii. 518. Nap. iii. 416.

(2) Th. 518, 519. Jom. viii. 283, 284. Nap. iii. 417.

15th Jan. the main body of Provera's forces would gain the fort of St.-George and put the blockading force between two fires. Fully aware of the danger (1), Napoléon marched all night and the whole of the following day, and arrived in the evening in the neighbourhood of Mantua.

Meanwhile the hussars of Hohenzollern presented themselves, at sunrise on the 15th, at the gate of St.-George, and being dressed in white cloaks, were nearly mistaken for a regiment of French, and admitted within the walls. But the error having been discovered by an old sergeant who was cutting wood near the gate, the drawbridge was suddenly drawn up, and the alarm communicated to the garrison. Hohenzollern advanced at the gallop, but before he could get in, the gates were closed, and a discharge of grape-shot repulsed the assailants. All that day, the garrison under Miollis combated on the ramparts, and gave time for the succours from Rivoli to arrive. Provera sent a bark across the lake to warn Wurmser of his approach and concert a general attack, on the next day, upon the blockading force; and in pursuance of the summons, the brave veteran presented himself at the trenches on the following morning with a large part

Operations
of Provera
there—who
is forced to
surrender.

16th Jan. of the garrison. But the arrival of Napoléon not only frustrated all these preparations, but proved fatal to Provera's division. During the night he pushed forward four regiments, which he had brought with him, between the fort of Favorite and St.-George, so as to prevent Wurmser from effecting a junction with the Austrians, who approached to raise the siege, and strengthened Serrurier at the former point, in order to enable him to repel any attack from the garrison. At day-break, the battle commenced at all points. Wurmser, after an obstinate conflict, was thrown back into the fortress; while Provera, surrounded by superior forces, and tracked in all his doublings, like a furious stag by ruthless hunters (2), was compelled to lay down his arms, with six thousand men. In this engagement the 57th regiment acquired the surname of the *Terrible*, from the fury with which it threw itself on the Austrian line. It was commanded by Victor, afterwards Duke of Belluno.

Results of
those bat-
tles.

Thus in three days, by his admirable dispositions, and the extraordinary activity of his troops, did Napoléon not only defeat two Austrian armies of much greater force, taken together, than his own, but took from them eighteen thousand prisoners, twenty-four standards, and sixty pieces of cannon. Such was the loss of the enemy besides, in killed and wounded, that the Austrians were totally disabled from keeping the field, and the French left in undisputed possession of the whole peninsula. History has few examples to exhibit of successes so decisive, achieved by forces so inconsiderable (3).

This was the last effort of which Austria was capable, and the immediate consequence of its defeat, the complete subjugation of the peninsula. The

(1) Jom. viii. 290. Th. viii. 520.

(2) Th. viii. 521. Nap. iii. 421. Jom. viii. 290, 293.

(3) Jom. viii. 294. Nap. iii. 422.

In their report on these disasters, the Aulic Council generously threw no blame on Alvinzi, but openly avowed the treachery at their headquarters, which made all their designs known before they were carried into execution. "The chief fatality," said they, "consisted in this, that our designs were constantly made known to the enemy before they were acted upon. Treachery rendered abortive the combinations of Marshal Wurmser for the relief of Mantua: Treachery plunged Alvinzi into all his

misfortunes. General Bonaparte himself says in his report, that from different sources he had become acquainted with the designs of the enemy before their execution; and, on the last occasion, it was only on the 4th January that Alvinzi received his instructions for the attack, and on the 2d of January it was published by Bonaparte in the Gazette of Milan." Alvinzi, notwithstanding his disasters, was continued in favour; but Provera was exiled to his estates in Carinthia, upon the ground, that he had transgressed his orders in advancing against Mantua before he had received intelligence of the progress of Alvinzi.—HARDENBERG, iv. 164. 167.

remains of Alvinzi's corps retired in opposite directions; one part towards Trent, and another towards Bassano. Napoléon, whose genius never appeared so strongly as in pursuing the remains of a beaten army, followed them up without intermission. Loudon, who had taken post at Roveredo with eight thousand men, in order to defend as long as possible the valley of the Upper Adige, was driven by Joubert successively from that town and Trent, with the loss of five hundred prisoners, while Masséna, by a rapid march over the mountains, made himself master of Primolano, descended into the gorges of the Val Sugana, turned the position of Bassano, and drove the Austrians, with the loss of a thousand prisoners, through Treviso to the opposite bank of the Tagliamento; where Alvinzi at length, by the valley of the Drave, reunited the remnant of his scattered forces (1).

Notwithstanding these disasters, the public spirit of the Austrian monarchy remained unsubdued, and the cabinet of Vienna continued unshaken in its resolution to prosecute the war with vigour. On the other hand, the Directory were so much impressed with the imminent risk which the Italian army had run, both at Arcola and Rivoli, and the evident peril to the Republic, from the rising fame and domineering character of Napoléon, that they were very desirous of peace, and authorized Clarke to sign it, on condition that Belgium and the frontier of the Rhine were given to France, an indemnity secured to the Stadtholder in Germany, and all its possessions restored to Austria in Italy. But Napoléon again resolutely opposed these instructions, and would not permit Clarke to open the proposed negotiations. "Before Mantua falls," said he, "every negotiation is premature, and Mantua will be in our hands in fifteen days. These conditions will never meet with my approbation. The Republic is entitled, besides the frontier of the Rhine, to insist for the establishment of a state in Italy, which may secure the French influence there, and retain in its subjection Genoa, Sardinia and the Pope. Without that, Venice, enlightened at last as to its real dangers, will unite with the Emperor, and restrain the growth of democratic principles in its Italian possessions." The influence of Napoléon again prevailed; the proposed negotiation never was opened, and Clarke remained at Milan, occupied with his subordinate duty of investigating the rapacity of the commissaries of the army (2).

Surrender of
Mantua.

Mantua did not long hold out after the destruction of the last army destined for its relief. The half of its once numerous garrison was in the hospital; they had consumed all their horses, and the troops, placed for months on half rations, had nearly exhausted all their provisions. In this extremity Wurmser proposed to Serrurier to capitulate: the French commander stated that he could give no definitive answer till the arrival of the general-in-chief. Napoléon in consequence hastened to Roverbella, where he found Klenau, the Austrian aide-de-camp, expatiating on the powerful means of resistance which Wurmser enjoyed, and the great stores of provisions which still remained in the magazines. Wrapped in his cloak near the fire, he overheard the conversation without taking any part in it, or making himself known; when it was concluded, he approached the table, took up the pen, and wrote on the margin his answer to all the propositions of Wurmser, and when it was finished said to Klenau, "If Wurmser had only provisions for eighteen or twenty days, and he spoke of surrendering, he would have merited no favourable terms; but I respect the age, the valour,

(1) Jom. viii. 302, 304. Nap. iii. 421-422.

(2) Hard. iv. 170, 174.

and the misfortunes of the marshal; here are the conditions which I offer him, if he surrender to-morrow; should he delay a fortnight, a month, or two months, he shall have the same conditions; he may wait till he has consumed his last morsel of bread. I am now about to cross the Po to march upon Rome: return and communicate my intentions to your general." The aide-de-camp, who now perceived that he was in presence of Napoléon, was penetrated with gratitude for the generosity of the conqueror; and finding that it was useless longer to dissemble; confessed that they had only provisions left for three days. The terms of capitulation were immediately agreed on; Napoléon set out himself to Florence to conduct the expedition against Rome, and Serrurier had the honour of seeing the marshal with all his staff defile before him. Napoléon had too much grandeur of mind to insult the vanquished veteran by his own presence on the occasion; his delicacy was observed by all Europe; and, like the statues of Brutus and Cassius at the funeral of Junia, was the more present to the mind because he was withdrawn from the sight (1).

By this capitulation, Wurmser was allowed to retire to Austria with all his staff and five hundred men; the remainder of the garrison, which, including the sick, was still eighteen thousand strong, surrendered their arms, and was conveyed to Trieste to be exchanged. Fifty standards, a bridge equipage, and above five hundred pieces of artillery, comprising all those captured at the raising of the first siege, fell into the hands of the conqueror (2).

Napoléon
marches
towards
Rome.

Having achieved this great conquest, Napoléon directed his arms against Rome. The power which had vanquished, after so desperate a struggle, the strength of Austria, was not long of crushing the feeble forces of the Church. During the strife on the Adige, the Pope had refused to ratify the treaty of Bologna, and had openly engaged in hostile measures at the conclusion of the campaign, in conjunction with the forces of Austria. The French troops, in consequence, crossed the Apennines; and during the march Wurmser had an opportunity of returning the generous conduct of his adversary, by putting him on his guard against a conspiracy which had been formed against his life, and which was the means of causing it to be frustrated. The papal troops were routed on the banks of Senio: like the other Italian armies, they fled on the first onset, and Junot, after two hours' hard riding, found it impossible to make up with their cavalry. Ancona was speedily taken, with twelve hundred men, and one hundred and twenty pieces of cannon, while a small column on the other side of the Apennines pushed as far as Foligno, and threatened Rome itself. Nothing remained to the Vatican but submission; and peace was concluded at Tolentino, on the 19th February, on terms the most humiliating to the Holy See. The Pope engaged to close his ports against the Allies, to cede Avignon and the Venaisin to France; to abandon Bologna, Ferrara, and the whole of Romagna to its allies in the Milanese; to admit a garrison of French troops into Ancona, till the conclusion of a general peace; and to pay a contribution of thirty millions of francs to the victorious Republic. Besides this, he was obliged to surrender a hundred of his principal works of art to the French commissioners: the trophies of ancient and modern genius were seized on with merciless rapacity; and

19th Feb.
Treaty of
Tolentino
between
France and the
Pope.

(1) Nap. iii. 423, 425. Th. viii. 523, 524. O'Meara, i. 126.

(2) Nap. iii. 425. Jom. viii. 305.

in a short time the noblest specimens of the fine arts which existed in the world, the Apollo Belvidere, the Laocoon, the Transfiguration of Raphael, the Madonna del Foligno and the St.-Jérôme of Dominichino, were placed on the banks of the Seine (1).

Retrospect of the campaign. Such was the campaign of 1796—glorious to the French arms, memorable in the history of the world. Certainly on no former occasion had successes so great been achieved in so short a time, or powers so vast been vanquished by forces so inconsiderable. From maintaining a painful contest on the mountain ridges of their own frontier, from defending the Var and the Maritime Alps, the Republicans found themselves transported to the Tyrol and the Tagliamento, threatening the hereditary states of Austria, and subduing the whole southern powers of Italy. An army which never mustered fifty thousand men in the field, though maintained by successive reinforcements nearly at that amount, had not only broken through the barrier of the Alps, subdued Piedmont, conquered Lombardy, humbled the whole Italian states, but defeated, and almost destroyed, four powerful armies which Austria raised to defend her possessions, and wrenched the keys of Mantua from her grasp, under the eyes of the greatest array of armed men she had ever sent into the field. Successes so immense, gained against forces so vast, and efforts so indefatigable, may almost be pronounced unparalleled in the annals of war (2).

But although its victories in the field had been so brilliant, the internal situation of the Republic was in the highest degree discouraging; and it was more than doubtful whether it would continue for any length of time even so glorious a contest. Its condition is clearly depicted in a secret report, presented, by order of the Directory, on 20th December, 1796, by General Clarke to Napoléon:—"The lassitude of war is experienced in all parts of the Republic. The people ardently desire peace; their murmurs are loud that it is not already concluded. The legislature desires it, commands it, no matter at what price; and its continued refusal to furnish to the Directory the necessary funds to carry on the contest, is the best proof of that fact. The finances are ruined; agriculture in vain demands the arms which are required for cultivation. The war is become so universal, as to threaten to overturn the Republic; all parties, worn out with anxiety, desire the termination of the Revolution. Should our internal misery continue, the people, exhausted by suffering, having found none of the benefits which

(1) *Jom.* viii. 312, 313. *Nap.* iii. 425. O'Meara, ii. 127.

This treaty was concluded by the French under the idea that it would eventually prove fatal to the Holy See. Napoléon proposed to overturn at once the papal government:—"Can we not," said he, "unite Modena, Ferrara, and Romagna, and so form a powerful Republic? May we not give Rome to the King of Spaul, on condition that he recognises the new Republic? I will give peace to the Pope on condition that he gives us 3,000,000 of the treasure at Loretto, and pays the 15,000,000 which remain for the armistice. Rome cannot long exist deprived of its richest possessions; a revolution will speedily break out there." [*Corres. Secrète de Nap.* ii. 543. *Hard.* iv. 181.]—On their side, the Directory wrote as follows to Napoléon: "Your habits of reflection, general, must have taught you, that the Roman Catholic religion is the irreconcilable enemy of the Republic. The Directory, therefore, invite you to do every thing in your power to destroy the papal government, without in any degree compromising

the fate of your army,—either by subjecting Rome to another power, or, what would be better still, by establishing in its interior such a government as may render the rule of the priests odious and contemptible, secure the grand object, that the Pope and the cardinals shall lose all hope of remaining at Rome, and may be compelled to seek an asylum in some foreign state, where they may be entirely stripped of temporal power."—*Corres. Conf. de Napoléon*, ii. 349. *HARD.* iv. 181, 182.

(2) In his Confidential Despatch to the Directory of 28th December, 1796, Napoléon states the force with which he commenced the campaign at thirty-eight thousand five hundred men, the subsequent reinforcements at twelve thousand six hundred, and the losses by death and incurable wounds at seven thousand. There can be no doubt that he enormously diminished his losses and reinforcements; for the Directory maintained he had received reinforcements to the amount of fifty-seven thousand men—*Corres. Conf.* ii. 312.

they expected, will establish a new order of things, which will in its turn generate fresh revolutions, and we shall undergo, for twenty or thirty years, all the agonies consequent on such convulsions (1).

Extraordi-
nary com-
position of
the French
army.

Much of Napoléon's success was no doubt owing to the admirable character, unwearied energy, and indomitable courage of the troops which composed the French army. The world had never seen an array framed of such materials. The terrible whirlwind which had overthrown the fabric of society in France, the patriotic spirit which had brought its whole population into the field, the grinding misery which had forced all its activity into war, had formed a union of intelligence, skill, and ability, among the private soldiers, such as had never before been witnessed in modern warfare. The middling—even the higher ranks—were to be seen with a musket on their shoulders; the great levies of 1793 had spared neither high nor low; the career of glory and ambition could be entered only through the humble portals of the bivouac. Hence it was that the spirit which animated them was so fervent, and their intelligence so remarkable, that the humblest grenadiers anticipated all the designs of their commanders, and knew of themselves, in every situation of danger and difficulty, what should be done. When Napoléon spoke to them, in his proclamations, of Brutus, Scipio, and Tarquin, he was addressing men whose hearts thrilled at the recollections which these names awaken; and when he led them into action after a night-march of ten leagues, he commanded those who felt as thoroughly as himself the inestimable importance of time in war. With truth might Napoléon say that his soldiers had surpassed the far famed celerity of Cæsar's legions (2).

Great
genius of
Napoléon.
His system
of war.

But much as was owing to the troops who obeyed, still more was to be ascribed to the general who commanded in this memorable campaign. In this struggle is to be seen the commencement of the new system of tactics which Napoléon brought to such perfection; that of accumulating forces in a central situation, striking with the whole mass the detached wings of the enemy, separating them from each other, and compensating by rapidity of movement for inferiority of numbers. All his triumphs were achieved by the steady and skilful application of this principle. At Montenotte he broke into the centre of the Austro-Sardinian army, when it was executing a difficult movement through the mountains, separated the Piedmontese from the Imperialists, accumulated an overwhelming force against the latter at Dego, and routed the former when detached from their allies at Mondovi. When Wurmser approached Verona, with his army divided into parts separated from each other by a lake, Napoléon was on the brink of ruin; but he retrieved his affairs by sacrificing the siege of Mantua, and falling with superior numbers, first on Quasdanowich at Lonato, and then on Wurmser at Castiglione. When the second irruption of the Germans took place, and Wurmser still continued the system of dividing his troops, it was by a skilful use of his central position that Napoléon defeated these efforts; first assailing with a superior force the subsidiary body at Roveredo, and then pursuing with the rapidity of lightning the main body of the invaders through the gorges of the Brenta. When Alvinzi assumed the command, and Vaubois was routed in the Tyrol, the affairs of the French were all but desperate; but the central positions and rapid movements of Napoléon again

(1) Report by Clarke. *Corresp. Conf. de Nap.* ii.

(2) *Th.* viii. 522.

restored the balance; checking, in the first instance, the advance of Davidowich on the plateau of Rivoli, and next engaging in a mortal strife with Alvinzi in the marshes of Arcola. When Austria made her final effort, and Alvinzi surrounded Joubert at Rivoli, it was only by the most rapid movements, and almost incredible activity, that the double attack was defeated; the same troops crushing the main body of the Austrians on the steep slopes of the Montebaldo, who afterwards surrounded Provera on the lake of Mantua. The same system was afterwards pursued with the greatest success by Wellington in Portugal, and Napoléon himself at Dresden, and in the plains of Champagne.

But it will not succeed against troops equally brave and skillful. But towards the success of such a system of operations it is indispensable that the troops who undertake it should be superior in bodily activity and moral courage to their adversaries, and that the general-in-chief can securely leave a slender force to cope with the enemy in one quarter, while he is accumulating his masses to overwhelm them in another. Unless this is the case, the commander who throws himself at the head of an inconsiderable body into the midst of the enemy, will be certain of meeting instead of inflicting disaster. Without such a degree of courage and activity as enables him to calculate with certainty upon hours, and sometimes minutes, it is impossible to expect success from such a hazardous system. Of this a signal proof occurred in Bohemia in 1815, when the French, encouraged by their great triumph before Dresden, threw themselves inconsiderately into the midst of the Allies in the mountains of Toplitz; but, meeting there with the undaunted Russian and Prussian forces, they experienced the most dreadful reverses, and in a few days lost the whole fruit of a mighty victory.

Causes of the disasters of the Austrians. The disasters of the Austrians were mainly owing to the injudicious system which they so perseveringly adopted, of dividing their force into separate bodies, and commencing an attack at the same time at stations so far distant that the attacking columns could render little assistance to each other. This system may succeed very well against ordinary troops, or timorous generals, who, the moment they hear of their flank being turned, or their communications menaced, lay down their arms, or fall back; but against intrepid soldiers, and a resolute commander, who turn fiercely on every side, and bring a preponderating mass first against one assailant, and then another, it is almost sure of leading to disasters. The Aulic Council were not to blame for adopting this system, in the first instance, against the French armies, because it might have been expected to succeed against ordinary troops, and had done so in many previous instances; but they were inexcusable for continuing it so long, after the character of the opponents with whom they had to deal had so fully displayed itself. The system of concentric attacks rarely succeeds against an able and determined enemy, because the chances which the force in the centre has of beating first one column and then another, are so considerable. When it does, it is only when the different masses of the attacking party, as at Leipsic and Dresden, are so immense, that each can stand a separate encounter for itself, or can fall back, in the event of being outnumbered, without seriously endangering, by such a retreat, the safety of the other assailing columns.

General Reflections on the campaign. The Italian campaign demonstrates, in the most signal manner, the vast importance of fortresses in war, and the vital consequence of such a barrier to arrest the course of military conquest. The surrender of the fortresses of Coni, Alexandria, and Tortona, by giving the

French a secure base for their operations, speedily made them masters of the whole of Lombardy, while the single fortress of Mantua arrested their victorious arms for six months, and gave time to Austria to collect no less than four powerful armies for its deliverance. No man understood this better than Napoléon; and accordingly, without troubling himself with the projects so earnestly pressed upon him of revolutionizing Piedmont, he grasped the fortresses and thereby laid the foundation for all his subsequent conquests. Without the surrender of the Piedmontese citadels, he would not have been able to push his advantages in Italy beyond the Po; but for the bastions of Mantua, he might have carried them, as in the succeeding campaign, to the Danube.

It is melancholy to reflect on the degraded state of the Italian powers during this terrible struggle. An invasion, which brought on all her people unheard-of calamities, which overspread her plains with bloodshed, and exposed her cities to rapine, was unable to excite the spirit of her pacific inhabitants; and neither of the contending powers deemed it worth their while to bestow a serious thought on the dispositions or assistance of the twenty millions of men who were to be the reward of the strife. The country of Cæsar and Scipio, of Cato and Brutus, beheld in silent dismay the protracted contest of two provinces of its ancient empire, and prepared to bow the neck in abject submission to either of its former vassals which might prove victorious in the strife. A division of the French army was sufficient to disperse the levies of the Roman people. Such is the consequence of political divisions and long-continued prosperity, even in the richest and most favoured countries; and of that fatal policy which withers the spirits of men, by habituating them to degrading occupations, and renders them incapable of asserting their national independence, by destroying the warlike spirit by which alone it can be permanently secured.

Unconquer-
able tenacity
of the
Austrians. Finally, this campaign evinced, in the most signal manner, the persevering character and patriotic spirit of the Austrian people, and the prodigious efforts of which its monarchy is capable, when roused by real danger to vigorous exertion. It is impossible to contemplate, without admiration, the vast armies which they successively sent into the field, and the unconquerable courage with which they returned to a contest where so many thousands of their countrymen had perished before them. Had they been guided by greater, or opposed by less ability, they unquestionably would have been successful; and even against the soldiers of the Italian army, and the genius of Napoléon, the scales of fortune repeatedly hung equal. A nation, capable of such sacrifices, can hardly ever be permanently subdued; a government, actuated by such steady principles, must ultimately be triumphant. Such, accordingly, has been the case in the present instance: aristocratic firmness in the end asserted its wonted superiority over democratic vigour; the dreams of Republican equality have been forgotten, but the Austrian government remains unchanged; the French eagles have retired over the Alps; and Italy, the theatre of so much bloodshed, has finally remained to the successors of the Cæsars.

CHAPTER XXI.

CAMPAIGN OF 1796 IN GERMANY.

ARGUMENT.

Great Difficulties of the French Government at the commencement of this year—But her Foreign Relations had signally improved—Triple Alliance of Austria, Russia, and England—Painful division of Opinion in England on the War—Violence of the parties in the close of 1795—Attack on the King when going to Parliament—Arguments of the Opposition on the War—Answer of the Government—Real objects in view by the different Parties—Supplies voted by Parliament—Bills against Public Meetings—Arguments against and for them—They pass into Laws—Reflections on these Statutes—Proposals for Peace by the British government, which are rejected by the Directory—Operations of Hoche in la Vendée—Previous Successes of Charette and Stofflet during the Winter—Death of Stofflet—Heroic conduct of Charette—But he is at length taken and Shot—His Death and Character—Fine Observations of Napoléon upon him—Termination of the war in la Vendée—Preparations of the Austrians—Archduke Charles put at the head of the Army in Germany—Forces of the contending Parties on the Rhine—Designs of the Aulic Council—Plan of the Republicans—They cross the Lower-Rhine, and gain some Success—But are driven back across that River by the Archduke—Operations of Moreau on the Upper-Rhine—His Origin and Character—Organization of his Army—Passage of the Rhine by Moreau—Admirable skill shown in that Operation—Cautious Movements of Moreau—He advances towards the Black Forest—The Archduke hastens to the scene of Danger—Indecisive Action on the Rhine—The French gain Success on the Imperial Right—The Archduke resolves to Retreat into Bavaria—Operations on the Lower-Rhine—Erroneous Plan of the Campaign by the Directory—Admirable Plan of the Archduke to counteract it—He retires through the Black Forest—Indecisive Action at Nereshcim—Operations of Jourdan—He advances into Franconia—The Archduke joins Wartensleben, and falls with their united Force on Jourdan—Who is defeated at Amberg—He is again routed near Wurtzburg—Great effects of this Victory—Continued and disastrous Retreat of Jourdan—Archduke again defeats him, and drives him across the Rhine—Severe struggle of Latour with Moreau on the Danube—Archduke threatens Moreau's retreat at Kehl—Moreau resolves to retreat, which he does in the most firm and methodical manner—Defeats Latour at Biberach—And retires leisurely through the Black Forest—Battle of Emmendingen, between Moreau and the Archduke—Retreat of Moreau—Austrians refuse an Armistice on the Rhine—Long and bloody siege of Kehl—Fall of the Tête-de-pont at Hungen—Reflections on this Campaign—Prodigious Contributions levied by the Republicans in Germany—Disgust consequently excited there—Noble and patriotic spirit of the Austrian people—New Convention between France and Prussia—Deplorable State of the French Marine—Successes of the English in the East and West Indies—Capture of Ceylon—General joy which these Conquests diffuse in England—Continued Deplorable State of St.—Domingo—Treaty of Alliance between France and Spain—Overtures for a General Peace made by Great-Britain—which prove unsuccessful—alarming State of Ireland—Designs of the Directory, and Hoche, against that Country—The Expedition sets Sail—It is dispersed by Tempests—And regains Brest—Reflections on the Failure of this Expedition—Death of the Empress Catharine—Her Character—Retirement of Washington from Public Life—His perfect Character, and admirable Valedictory Address to his Countrymen.

Great difficulties of the French Government at the commencement of this year. WHEN the Directory were called, by the suppression of the insurrection of the Sections, and the establishment of the new constitution, to the helm of the state, they found the Republic in a very critical situation, and its affairs externally and internally involved in almost insurmountable difficulties. The finances were in a state of increasing and inextricable confusion; the assignats, which had for long constituted the sole resource of government, had fallen almost to nothing; ten thousand francs in paper were hardly worth twenty francs in specie, and the

unbounded fall of that paper seemed to render the establishment of any other circulating medium of the same description impossible. The taxes for many years back had been so ill paid, that Ramel, the minister of finance, estimated the arrears in his department at fifteen hundred millions in specie, or above L.60,000,000 sterling. The armies, destitute of pay, ill equipped, worse clothed, were discontented, and the recent disasters on the Rhine had completely broken the susceptible spirit of the French soldiers. The artillery and cavalry were without horses; the infantry, depressed by suffering and dejected by defeat, were deserting in great numbers, and seeking a refuge in their homes from the toils and the miseries of war. The contest in la Vendée was still unextinguished; the Republican armies had been driven with disgrace behind the Rhine, and the troops in the Maritime Alps, worn out with privations, could not be relied on with certainty for offensive operations (1).

But her
foreign rela-
tions had
greatly im-
proved.

But, on the other hand, the external relations of the Republic had eminently improved, and the vast exertions of 1794, even though succeeded by the lassitude and weakness of 1795, had produced a most important effect on the relative situation of the belligerent powers. Spain, defeated and humiliated, had sued for peace; and the treaty of Bâle, by liberating the armies of the Eastern and Western Pyrenees, had both enabled the French government to reinforce the armies of la Vendée, and to afford means to the young Conqueror of the Sections, of carrying the Republican standards into the plains of Lombardy. Prussia had retired without either honour or advantage from the struggle; the Low Countries were not only subdued, but their resources turned against the Allied powers; and the whole weight of the contest on the Rhine, it was plain, must now fall on the Austrian monarchy. England, baffled and disgraced on the continent, was not likely to take any effective part in military warfare, and there seemed little doubt that the power which had recently defeated all the coalesced armies of Europe, would be able to subdue the brave but now unaided forces of the Imperialists.

27th Sept.
1795.

Triple al-
liance of
England,
Russia, and
Austria.

Aware of the coming danger, Mr. Pitt had in the September preceding, concluded a triple alliance between Great Britain, Austria, and Russia: but the forces of Russia were too far distant, and the danger to its possessions too remote, to permit any material aid to be early acquired from its immense resources. It was not till a later period, and till the fire had consumed its own vitals, that the might of this gigantic power was effectually roused, and the legions of the North brought to reassert their wonted superiority over the forces of Southern Europe (2).

Painful di-
vision of
opinion in
England on
the war.

The condition of England, in the close of 1795 and the beginning of 1796, was nearly as distracted, so far as opinion went, as that of France. The continued disasters of the war, the pressure of new and increasing taxation, the apparent hopelessness of continuing the struggle with a military power, whom all the armies of Europe had proved unable to subdue, not only gave new strength and vigour to the Whig party, who had all along opposed hostilities, but induced many thoughtful men, who had concurred at first in the necessity of combating the revolutionary mania, to hesitate as to any further continuance of the contest. So violent had party spirit become, and so completely had it usurped the place of patriotism or reason, that many of the popular leaders had come to wish anxiously for the triumph of their enemies. It was no longer a simple disapprobation of the

(1) Jom. viii. 22. Toul, vi. 9.

(2) Jom. viii. 4. Ann. Reg. 1796, 1798.

war which they felt, but a fervent desire that it might terminate to the disadvantage of their country, and that the Republican might triumph over the British arms. They thought that there was no chance of parliamentary reform being carried, or any considerable addition to democratic power acquired, unless the ministry was dispossessed; and to accomplish this object, they hesitated not to betray their wish for the success of this inveterate enemy of their country. These animosities produced their usual effect of rendering the moderate or rational equally odious to both parties; whoever deplored the war, was reputed a foe to his country (1); whoever pronounced it necessary, was deemed a conspirator against its liberty, and an abettor of arbitrary power.

These ill humours, which were afloat during the whole of the summer of 1793, broke out into acts of open violence in the autumn of that year. The associations for the purpose of obtaining parliamentary reform increased in boldness and activity: among them were many emissaries of the French government, and numbers of natives of this country, who had thrown off all connexion with it in their hearts, and were become its most violent and rancorous enemies. They deluded immense bodies of men by the seducing language of freedom which they used, and the alluring prospect of peace which they held forth; and, under the banner of reform, succeeded in assembling, in every quarter, all that ambition had which was reckless, with all that indigence could collect which was desperate. These causes of discontent were increased by the high price of provisions, the natural consequence of the increased consumption and enlarged circulating medium required in the war, but which the lower orders, under the instigation of their demagogues, ascribed entirely to the Ministry, and the crusade which they had undertaken against the liberties of mankind (2).

On occasion of the King's going to Parliament, at its opening, on 29th October, 1793, these discontents broke out into open outrages of the most disgraceful kind. The royal carriage was surrounded by an immense crowd of turbulent persons, loudly demanding peace, and the dismissal of Mr. Pitt. One of the windows was broken by a stone, or bullet from an air-gun; showers of stones were thrown at the state coach, both going and returning from Parliament; and the monarch narrowly escaped the fury of the populace, in his way from St.-James's Palace to Buckingham House. These outrages, however, tended only to strengthen the hands of government, by demonstrating to all reasonable men to what excesses the populace would speedily be driven, if not restrained by a firm hand, and how thin was the partition which separated this country from the horrors of the French Revolution.

In debating on the address, Mr. Fox maintained that the representations of ministers were flattering and delusive; that L.100,000,000 had already been added to the national debt, and L.4,000,000 a-year to the permanent taxes; that the coalition had been every where defeated, and the French were preparing to invade Italy with a powerful army; that the example of America proved how fallacious was the hope, that a nation resolved to be free could be reduced to extremity, by the mere failure of pecuniary resources; that the alleged danger of concluding peace with a revolutionary power had been surmounted by the despotic governments of Spain and Prussia, and if so, what peril could arise from it to the constitu-

(1) Ann. Reg. 1795-6-7.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1796, 1797.

tional monarchy of England? that we had in truth no allies, but a mere set of mercenary associates, who would leave our interests the moment that it suited their own conveniency; and that the severe scarcity, which now desolated all Europe, seemed to be the consequence of the obstacles to cultivation, which the ravages of war occasioned, and could not be expected to terminate while they continued (1).

Answer of
Govern-
ment.

On the other hand, it was urged by Mr. Pitt, that every consideration, both of justice and policy, called upon us for a vigorous prosecution of the contest; that notwithstanding his successes in the field, the enemy now began to feel his debility, and had in consequence evinced a disposition to accommodate, which he had never before done; that the French paper was now at little more than a hundredth part of its nominal value; and though the enormous sum of L.750,000,000 worth of assignats had been created, this quantity was hourly on the increase. That it was incredible that a nation reduced to such straits could long support a contest with the formidable enemies who were preparing to assail it by land and sea; and that the system of maintaining war by the heinous method of confiscations and a forced paper currency, however successful for the time, must lead in the end to ruin. That the numbers of the French armies, and the desperate spirit by which they were animated, arose from the misery of the country, the stagnation of industry, and the impossibility of finding subsistence in pacific employments; but that this system, however successful, when a war of invasion and plunder was carried on, could not be maintained for any length of time, when the French armies were repelled to their own frontiers, and compelled to subsist on their own resources. That now, therefore, was the time, when the enemy's breath was so evidently failing, to press him hard on every side, and reduce him to such a peace as might protect Europe from Gallic aggression, and England from Republican innovation (2).

Real objects
in view by
the different
parties.

Such were the arguments urged in public, both in the House of Lords and Commons, on the policy of continuing the war; and both Houses, by a great majority, supported the administration; the numbers being in the Lower House 240 to 59. But the real motives which influenced both sides were materially different. It was a domestic war which was really waged; it was the contest between aristocratic ascendancy and democratic ambition, which at bottom divided the country, and excited the fierce and implacable passions by which all classes were actuated. The popular party perceived that their chance of success was altogether nugatory, while the firm hand which now held the reins continued at the head of affairs, and that while the national spirit was excited by the war with France, the ascendancy of the conservative party might be looked upon as certain; while the adherents to ancient institutions felt that the continuance of the contest at any price was preferable to the flood of democracy with which they would be deluged at its close; and that, till the excitement created by the French Revolution had subsided, no passion but that for war could be relied on to counteract its effects. Thus, though the ground on which the parties engaged was the expedience of continuing the strife, the object which both parties had really in view was the form of domestic government, and the passions which actuated them, in truth, the same as those which distracted France and agitated Europe.

(1) Ann. Reg. 1796, 12. Parl. Hist. xxxii, 1012, 1016.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1796, 12. Parl. Hist. xxxii. 1030, 1048.

Supplies voted by Parliament. To enable government to carry on the war, Parliament voted supplies to the amount of L.27,500,000, exclusive of the interest of the debt; and in this was included the enormous sum of L.18,000,000 contracted by loan, the annual charge of which was L.1,100,000, which was provided for by a considerable addition to the assessed taxes. But the total expenditure of the year amounted to L.57,500,000, and the remainder was raised, in spring, 1796, by exchequer bills and annuities, to the amount of L.15,500,000, which made the total loan of that year L.51,500,000. Mr. Pitt stated it as a most remarkable circumstance, that in the fourth year of so expensive a war, this large loan was obtained at so low a rate as four and a-half per cent; and, without doubt, it was a signal proof of the profusion of capital and confidence in government which prevailed in Britain. But he forgot the ruinous terms on which the loan was contracted for future years; that a bond of L.100 was given for every L.60 advanced, and posterity saddled with the payment of an immense debt which the nation had never received. This observation, how obvious soever, was not then perceived by the ablest persons even of practical habits; no one looked forward to the repayment of the debt, and the nation reposed in fancied security on the moderate annual charge which the loan imposed on the country (1).

Bills against public meetings. Another matter of the highest importance gave rise to the most vehement debates both in the legislature and the country: this was the bills which government brought forward for additional security to the King's person, and the prevention of seditious meetings (2). No measure had been brought forward by government since the Revolution which excited such vehement opposition both in the legislature and the country as these celebrated statutes, which were stigmatized by the popular party as the Pitt and Grenville acts, in order that they might for ever be held in execration by the country. By the latter, it was required that notice should be given to the magistrate, of any public meeting to be held on political subjects; he was authorized to be present, and empowered to seize those guilty of sedition on the spot; and a second offence against the act was punishable with transportation. On the part of the Opposition it was urged, that meetings held under such restrictions, and with the dread of imprisonment hanging over the head of the speakers for any word which might escape from them in the heat of debate, could never be considered as the free and unbiassed meetings of Englishmen; that so violent an infringement had never been attempted on the liberties of the people since the days of the Tudors; that if the times were so far changed that Englishmen could no longer meet and deliberate on public affairs without endangering the state, it would be better at once to surrender their liberties, as in Denmark, into the hands of a despotic sovereign; that it was evident, however, that there really was no such danger as was apprehended, but the alarm for it was only a pretence to justify the adoption of arbitrary measures; that it was in vain to appeal to the example of France, as vindicating the necessity of such rigorous enactments; every body knew that the revolution in that country was not owing to Jacobin clubs, or the meetings of the people, but to the corruptions of the court, and the vices of the political system, and if this bill should pass, the people of this country, rendered desperate by the imposition of similar fetters, would, without all doubt, break, in their own defence, into similar excesses (3).

(1) Ann. Reg. 1796, 53, 64. App. 108.

(2) 36 Geo. III. c. 18 and 36.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1796, 22, 27. Parl. Hist. 1796, 24, 37.

On the other hand, it was argued by the Administration, that it was necessary to consider the bill attentively before representing it in such odious colours; that it imposed restrictions only on public assemblies, and left unfettered the press, the great palladium of liberty in every representative monarchy; that public meetings required to be narrowly watched in turbulent times, because it was in such great assemblages that the passions took fire, and men were precipitated, by mutual applause, into violent measures; that the great danger of such meetings was, that only one side was heard, and extravagant sentiments were always those which gained most applause; that the object of the meetings against which these enactments were levelled, was notorious, being nothing less than the overthrow of the monarchy, and the formation of a republican constitution similar to that established with such disastrous effects in France; that the proposed enactments were certainly a novelty in this country, but so also was the democratic spirit against which it was levelled, and extraordinary times required extraordinary remedies; and that no danger was to be apprehended to public freedom, as long as the press was unfettered, and juries regarded with so much jealousy, as they now did, all the measures which emanated from the authority of government. The bill passed the House of Commons by a majority of two hundred and fourteen to forty-two, and the House of Lords by sixty-six to seven (1).

Bills pass
into laws.

So exasperated were the Opposition with the success of Ministers on this occasion, that Mr. Fox, and a large part of the minority, withdrew altogether for a considerable time from the House; a ruinous measure, dictated by spite and disappointment, and which should never, on any similar occasion, be repeated by true patriots. The bill was limited in its duration to three years; and, after passing both Houses, received the royal assent (2).

Opposition
withdraw in
disgust.

On coolly reviewing the subject of such vehement contention in the Parliament and the nation, it is impossible to deny that it is beset with difficulties; and that nothing but the manifest danger of the times could have furnished an excuse for so wide a deviation from the principles of British freedom. At the same time, it is manifest that the bills, limited as they were in their duration, and partial in their operation, were not calculated to produce the mischiefs which their opponents so confidently predicted. The proof of this is decisive: the bills were passed, and the liberties of England not only remained entire, but have since that time continually gone on increasing. In truth, the management of a country which has become infected with the contagion of democratic ambition, is one of the most difficult matters in government, and of which the principles are only now beginning to be understood. It is always to be recollected, that the formidable thing in periods of agitation, and against which governments are, in an especial manner, called to oppose a barrier, is not the discontent arising from real grievance, but the passion springing from popular ambition. The first, being founded in reason and justice, is easily dealt with: it subsides with the removal of the causes from which it arose, and strong measures are never either required or justifiable for its suppression. The second, being a vehement passion, arising from no real evil, but awakened by the anticipation of power, is insatiable; it increases with every gratification it receives, and

Reflections
on these
statutes.

(1) Ann. Reg. 1796, 23, 32. Parl. Hist. xxxiii. 49, 62.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1796, 46.

conducts the nation, through blood and suffering, by a sure and rapid process, to military despotism. The same danger to freedom is to be apprehended from the prevention of the expression of real suffering, as from the concession of fuel to democratic ambition. Reform and redress are the remedies suited to the former; resistance and firmness the regimen adapted to the latter. In considering, therefore, whether the measures of Mr. Pitt at that period were justifiable or not, the question is, did the public discontents arise from the experience of real evils, or the contagion of democratic ambition? and when it is recollected from what example, in the neighbouring kingdom, these passions were excited, how much the liberties of England have subsequently augmented, and what a career of splendour and prosperity has since been opened, it is evident that no rational doubt can be entertained on the subject. And the event has proved, that more danger to freedom is to be apprehended from concession than resistance in such circumstances; for British liberty has since that time steadily increased, under all the coercion applied by a firm government to its excesses; while French enthusiasm has led to no practical protection of the people; and the nation has perpetually laboured under a succession of despots, in the vain endeavour to establish a chimerical equality.

8th March, 1796.
Proposals for peace by the British government—which are rejected by the Directory. Previous to the opening of the campaign of 1796, the British government, in order to bring the French Directory to the test, authorized their agent in Switzerland, Mr. Wickham, to make advances to their minister on the subject of a general peace. The Directory replied, that they could only treat on the footing of the constitution; in other words, that they must insist on retaining the Low-Countries. This at once brought matters to an issue, for neither Austria nor England was as yet sufficiently humbled to consent to such terms. The declaration of this resolution, however, on the part of the Directory, was of great service to the English cabinet, by demonstrating the impossibility of treating without abandoning all the objects of the war, and putting France permanently in possession of a salient angle, from which it threatened the liberties of all Europe, and which experience has proved cannot be left in its hands, without exposing them to imminent hazard. Mr. Pitt accordingly announced the resolution of the Directory to the British Parliament, and immediately obtained further supplies for carrying on the war,—an additional loan of L.7,500,000 was negotiated, upon as favourable terms as the former, and cheque bills, to the amount of L.6,000,000 more, put at the disposal of government, out of which L.5,000,000 was granted to Austria (1).

Operations of Hoche in la Vendée.
Feb. 15 and April 19, 1796. The first active operations of this memorable year took place in la Vendée, where the Republican general, Hoche, commanded an army of 100,000 men. This vast force, the greatest which the Republic had on foot, composed of all the troops in the west of France, and those drawn from Biscay and the western Pyrenees, was intrusted to a general of twenty-seven years of age, whose absolute power extended over all the insurgent provinces. He was every way qualified for the important but difficult duty with which he was charged. Endowed by nature with a clear judgment, an intrepid character, and an unconquerable resolution; firm, sagacious, and humane, he was eminently fitted for that mixture of gentleness and resolution which is necessary to heal the wounds and subdue the passions of civil war. This rare combination of civil and military qualities might have ren-

(1) Ann. Reg. 1796. App. 108. Th. viii. 200, 201. Jom. viii. 8.

dered him a formidable rival of Napoléon, and possibly endangered the public peace, had he not united to these shining parts a patriotic heart, and a love of liberty which rendered him superior to all temptation; and more likely, had he lived, to have followed the example of Washington, than the footsteps of Cæsar or Cromwell (1).

Hoche's plan, which was approved of by the Directory, was to reduce la Vendée, and all the provinces to the south of the Loire, before making any attempt upon Brittany, or the departments to the north of that river. All the towns in the insurgent district were declared in a state of siege; the Republican army was authorized to maintain itself in the country where hostilities were continued, and to levy the necessary requisitions from the peasantry; and the towns which fell into the possession of the Republicans were to be protected and provided for, like captured fortresses. Pardon was proclaimed to all the chiefs who should lay down their arms, while those who continued the contest were ordered to be shot (2).

Successes of
Charette
and Stofflet
during the
winter.

During the absence of Hoche at Paris, in the depth of winter, when arranging this plan with the Directory, the Royalist chiefs, in particular Charette and Stofflet, gained considerable successes; the project of disarming the insurgent provinces had made little progress; and the former of these chiefs, having broken through the line, had appeared in the rear of the Republicans. But the arrival of the general-in-chief restored vigour and unanimity to their operations. Charette was closely pursued by several columns, under the command of General Travot; while Stofflet, cut off from all communication with the other Royalists, was driven back upon the shores of the ocean. As a last resource, Charette collected all his forces, and attacked his antagonist at the passage of La Vie. The Royalists, seized with a sudden panic, did not combat with their accustomed vigour; their ranks were speedily broken; their artillery, ammunition, and sacred standard, all fell into the hands of the enemy; Charette himself with difficulty made his escape, with forty or fifty followers; and, wandering through forests and marshes, owed his safety to the incorruptible fidelity of the peasants of the Marais. In vain he endeavoured to elude his pursuers and join Stofflet; that intrepid chief, himself pressed by the forces of the Republic, after escaping a thousand perils, was betrayed by one of his followers at the farm of Pegrimaud, where he was seized, gagged, and conducted to Angers. He there met death with the same resolution which had distinguished his life (3).

Charette is
defeated.

Death of
Stofflet.

This great success was necessary to establish the credit of the young general, who, accused equally by both parties—by the Royalists of severity, and by the Republicans of moderation—was so beset with difficulties and so much disgusted with his situation, that he formally demanded his dismissal from the command. But Carnot, aware of his abilities, instead of accepting his resignation, confirmed him in his appointments; and, as a mark of the esteem of government, sent him two fine horses; a present not only highly acceptable, but absolutely necessary to the young general. For though at the head of one hundred thousand men, and master of a quarter of France, he was reduced to such straits by the fall of the paper in which the whole pay of the army was received, that he was absolutely without horses, or equipage of any kind, and was glad to supply his immediate necessities by taking half-a-

(1) Th. viii. 206.

(2) Th. viii. 207.

(3) Join. viii. 36. Th. viii. 212.

dozen bridles and saddles, and a few bottles of rum, from the stores left by the English in Quiberon bay (1).

Heroic conduct of Charette. Charette was now the only remaining obstacle to the entire subjugation of the country; for as long as he lived, it never could be considered as pacified. Anxious to get quit of so formidable an enemy on any terms, the Directory offered him a safe retreat into England with his family and such of his followers as he might select, and a million of francs for his own maintenance. Charette replied—"I am ready to die with arms in my hands; but not to fly and abandon my companions in misfortune. All the vessels of the Republic would not be sufficient to transport my brave soldiers in England. Far from fearing your menaces, I will myself come to seek you in your own camp." The Royalist officers, who perceived that further resistance had become hopeless, urged him to retire to Britain, and await a more favourable opportunity of renewing the contest at the head of the princes and nobility of France. "Gentlemen," said he, with a severe air, "I am not here to judge of the orders which my sovereign has given me: I know them; they are the same which I myself have solicited. Preserve towards them the same fidelity which I shall do; nothing shall shake me in the discharge of my duty (2)."

He is at length taken prisoner, and shot. This indomitable chief, however, could not long withstand the immense bodies which were now directed against him. His band was gradually reduced from seven hundred to fifty, and at last, ten followers. With this handful of heroes he long kept at bay the Republican forces; but at length, pursued on every side, and tracked out like a wild-beast by blood-hounds, he was seized, after a furious combat, and conducted, bleeding and mutilated, but unsubdued, to the Republican headquarters.

General Travot, with the consideration due to illustrious misfortune, treated him with respect and kindness, but could not avert his fate. He was conducted to Angers, where he was far from experiencing from others the generous treatment of this brave Republican general. Maltreated by the brutal soldiery, conducted along, yet dripping with blood from his wounds, before the populace of the town, weakened by loss of blood, he had need of all his fortitude of mind to sustain his courage; but, even in this extremity, his firmness never deserted him. On the 27th March he was removed from the prison of Angers to that of Nantes. He entered into the latter town, preceded by a numerous escort, closely guarded by gendarmes and generals glittering in gold and plumes; himself on foot, with his clothes torn and bloody, pale and extenuated; yet more an object of interest than all the splendid throng by whom he was surrounded. Such was his exhaustion from loss of blood, that the undaunted chief fainted on leaving the Quarter of Commerce; but no sooner was his strength revived by a glass of water, than he marched on, enduring for two hours, with heroic constancy, the abuse and imprecations of the populace. He was immediately conducted to the military commission. His examination lasted two hours; but his answers were all clear, consistent, and dignified; openly avowing his Royalist principles, and resolution to maintain them to the last. Upon hearing the sentence of death, he calmly asked for the succours of religion, which were granted him, and slept peacefully the night before his execution (3).

(1) Th. viii. 214.

(2) Lac. xiii. 73, 75.

(3) Beau. iv. 201, 202.

On the following morning he was brought out to the scaffold. The rolling of drums, the assembly of all the troops and national guard, a countless multitude of spectators, announced the great event which was approaching. At length the hero appeared, descended with a firm step the stairs of the prison, and walked to the Place des Agriculteurs (1), where the execution was to take place. A breathless silence prevailed. Charette advanced to the appointed place, bared his breast, took his yet bloody arm out of the scarf, and, without permitting his eyes to be bandaged, himself gave the command, uttering, with his last breath, the words—"Vive le Roi!"

His death
and character.

Thus perished Charette, the last and most indomitable of the Vendean chiefs. Though the early massacres which stained the Royalist cause at Machecoul were perpetrated without his orders, yet he had not the romantic generosity, or humane turn of mind, which formed the glorious characteristics of Lescure, Larochejaquelein, and Bonchamps. His mind, cast in a rougher mould, was steeped in deeper colours; and in the later stages of the contest, he executed, without scruple, all the severities which the terrible war in which he was engaged called forth on both sides. If his jealousy of others was sometimes injurious to the Royal cause, his unconquerable firmness prolonged it after every other chance of success was hopeless; his single arm supported the struggle when the bravest of his followers were sinking in despair; and he has left behind him the glorious reputation of being alike invincible in resolution, inexhaustible in resources, and unsubdued in disaster (2).

The death of Charette terminated the war in the west of France, and gave more joy to the Republicans than the most brilliant victory over the Austrians. The vast army of Hoche spread over the whole country from the Loire to the British Channel, gradually pressed upon the insurgent provinces, and drove the peasantry back towards the shores of the ocean. The policy pursued by the Republican general on this occasion was a model of wisdom; he took the utmost pains to conciliate the parish priests, who had so powerful an influence over the minds of the people; and as his columns advanced, seized the cattle and grain of the peasantry, leaving at their dwellings a notice that they would be restored to them when they gave up their weapons, but not till then. The consequence was, that the poor people, threatened with famine, if these their only resources were withheld, were compelled universally to surrender their arms. The army, advancing slowly, completed in this way the disarming of the peasantry as they proceeded, and left nothing in their rear from which danger was to be apprehended. At length they reached the ocean; and though the most resolute of the insurgent bands fought with the courage of despair when they found themselves

Termination
of the war in
la Vendée.

(1) Beau. 201, 202. Lac. xiii. 78, 79. Jom. viii. 39. Th. viii. 216.

(2) Th. viii. 217. Lac. xiii. 79. Beau. iv. 203.

Fine observations of Napoleon on him. The character of this illustrious chief cannot be better given than in the words of Napoleon:—"Charette," said he, "was a great character: the true hero of that interesting period of our Revolution, which, if it presents great misfortunes, has at least not injured our glory.—He left on me the impression of real grandeur of mind; the traces of no common energy and audacity, the sparks of genius, are apparent in his actions." Las Cases recounted an anecdote of him when in command of a small vessel early in life. Though regarded as a person of mere ordinary capacity, he, on one occasion, gave proof of the

native energy of his mind. While still a youth, he sailed from Brest in his cutter, which, having lost its mast, was exposed to the most imminent danger; the sailors, on their knees, were praying to the Virgin, and totally incapable of making any exertion, till Charette, by killing one, succeeded in bringing the others to a sense of their duty, and thereby saved the vessel. "There," said Napoleon, "the true character always appears in great circumstances; that was a spark which spoke the future hero of la Vendée. We must not always judge of a character from present appearances; there are slumberers whose rousing is terrible. Kleber was one of them; but his wakening was that of the lion." —LAS CASES, vii. 104, 105.

driven back to the sea-coast, yet the great work was at length accomplished, the country universally disarmed, and the soldiers put into cantonments in the conquered district. The people, weary of a contest from which no hope could now be entertained, at length every where surrendered their arms, and resumed their pacific occupations; the Republicans, cantoned in the villages, lived on terms of friendship with their former enemies, mutual exasperation subsided, the clergy communicated openly with a leader who had first treated them with sincerity and kindness, and before the end of the summer, Hoche, instead of requiring new troops, was able to send great reinforcements to the Directory for the support of the armies on the Rhine and in Italy (1).

Meanwhile, the cabinet of Vienna, encouraged by the brilliant achievements of Clairfait at the conclusion of the last campaign, and aware, from the incorporation of Flanders with the French Republic, that no accommodation was to be hoped for, was making the utmost efforts to prosecute the war with effect. A new levy of twenty-five thousand men took place in the hereditary states; the regiments were universally raised to their full complement; and every effort was made to turn to advantage the military spirit and numerous population of the newly acquired province of Galicia. Clairfait, the conqueror of the lines of Mayence, made a triumphal entry into Vienna with unprecedented splendour; but the Aulic Council rewarded his achievements by the appointment of the Archduke Charles to the command of the armies on the Rhine; a step which, however ill-deserved by his gallant predecessor, was soon justified by the great military abilities of the young prince (2).

The character of this illustrious chief cannot be better given than in the words of his great antagonist. "Prince Charles," said Napoléon, "is a man whose conduct can never attract blame. His soul belongs to the heroic age, but his heart to that of gold. More than all, he is a good man; and that includes every thing when said of a prince (3)."

The forces of the contending parties on the Rhine were nearly equal; but the Imperialists had a great superiority in the number and quality of their cavalry. On the Upper Rhine, Moreau commanded 71,000 infantry and 6,500 cavalry; while Wurmser, who was opposed to him, was at the head of 62,000 foot and 22,000 horse; but, before the campaign was far advanced, 50,000 men were detached from this army to reinforce the broken troops of Beaulieu in Italy. On the Lower Rhine, the Archduke was at the head of 71,000 infantry and 21,000 cavalry; while the army of the Sambre and Meuse, under Jourdan, numbered 63,000 of the former arm, and 11,000 of the latter. The disproportion between the numerical strength on the opposite sides, therefore, was not considerable; but the superiority of the Germans in the number and quality of their cavalry gave them a great advantage in an open country, both in profiting by success and arresting disaster. But, on the other hand, the French were in possession of the fortresses of Luxemburg, Thionville, Metz, and Sarelouis, which rendered the centre of their position almost unassailable; their right was covered by Huningen, new Brisach, and the fortresses of Alsace, and their left by Maestricht, Juliers, and the iron barrier of the Netherlands; while the Austrians had no fortified point whatever to support either of

(1) Th. viii. 218. Journ. viii. 41, 49.

(2) Journ. viii. 51. Th. viii. 307.

(3) D'Abr. iv. 384.

their wings. This want, in a war of invasion, is of incalculable importance (1); and the event soon proved, that the fortresses of the Rhine are as valuable as a base for offensive, as a barrier to support defensive operations.

Plans of the
Austrians.

The plan of the Aulic Council was, in the north to force the passage of the Moselle, carry the war into Flanders, and rescue that flourishing province from the grasp of the Republicans; and for this purpose they had brought the greater mass of their forces to the Lower Rhine. On the Upper, they proposed to lay siege to Landau, and, having driven the Republicans over the mountains on the west of the valley of the Rhine, blockade Strasburg. But for some reason which has never been divulged, they remained in a state of inactivity until the end of May, while Beaulieu with fifty thousand men was striving in vain to resist the torrent of Napoléon's conquests in Lombardy. The consequences of this delay proved fatal to the whole campaign. Hardly was the armistice denounced in the end of

31st May,
1796.

May, when an order arrived to Wurmser to detach twenty-five thousand of his best troops by the Tyrolese Alps into Italy; a deduction which, by necessarily reducing the Imperialists on the Upper Rhine to the defensive, rendered it hardly possible for the Archduke to push forward the other army towards the Moselle. There still remained, however, one hundred and fifty thousand Imperialists on the frontiers of Germany, including above forty thousand superb cavalry; a force which, if earlier brought into action, and placed under one leader, might have changed the fate of the war. The French inferiority in horse was compensated by a superiority of twenty thousand foot soldiers. The Austrians had the immense advantage of possessing two fortified places, Mayence and Manheim on the Rhine, which gave them the means of debouching with equal facility on either side of that stream (2), while the Republicans only held a *tête-de-pont* at Dusseldorf, so far removed to the north as to be of little service in commencing operations.

The events of this struggle demonstrate in the most striking manner the great importance of early success in war, and by what a necessary chain of consequences an inconsiderable advantage at first often determines the fate of a campaign. A single victory gained by the Austrians on the Sarre or the Moselle would have compelled the French armies to dissolve themselves in order to garrison the frontier towns; and the Directory, to defend its own territories, would have been obliged to arrest the career of Napoléon in the Italian plains; while, by taking the initiative, and carrying the war into Germany, they were enabled to leave their fortresses defenceless, and swell, by their garrisons, the invading force, which soon proved so perilous to the Austrian monarchy (3).

Plan of the
Republicans.

The plan of the Republicans was to move forward the army of the Sambre and Meuse by Dusseldorf, to the right bank of the Rhine, in order to threaten the communication of the Archduke with Germany, induce him to recross it, and facilitate the passage of the upper part of the stream by Moreau. In conformity with this design, Kleber, on the 30th May, crossed the Rhine at Dusseldorf, and, with twenty-five thousand men, began to press the Austrians on the Sieg, where the Archduke had only twenty thousand, the great bulk of his army, sixty thousand strong, being on the right bank, in front of Mayence. The Republicans succeeded in

(1) Archduke, ii. 10, 12. Jom. viii. 170. Th. viii. 306, 307.

(2) Archduke Charles, ii. 204.

(3) Jom. viii. 173.

June 4.
They cross
the Lower
Rhine and
gain some
success.

defeating the advanced posts of the Imperialists, crossed the Sieg, turned the position of Ukerath, and drove them back to Altenkirchen. There the Austrians stood firm, and a severe action took place. General NEY, with a body of light troops, turned their left, and threatened their communications; while Kleber, having advanced through the hills of Weyersbusch, assailed their front; and SOULT menaced their reserve at Kropach. The result of these movements was, that the Austrians were driven behind the Lahn at Limburg, with the loss of fifteen hundred prisoners, and twelve pieces of cannon (4).

This victory produced the desired effect, by drawing the Archduke, with the greater part of his forces, across the Rhine, to succour the menaced points. On the 10th, he passed that river with thirty-two battalions and eighty squadrons, arrived in the neighbourhood of Limburg four days after, and moved, with forty-five thousand infantry and eighteen thousand cavalry, against the

They are
driven back
across the
Rhine by
the Arch-
duke.

Republicans on the German side. Jourdan, upon this, leaving Marceau with twenty thousand men near Mayence, crossed the Rhine at Neuwied, with the bulk of his forces, to support Kleber. His intention was to cover the investment of Ehrenbreitzen, and, for

26th June.

this purpose, cross the Lahn and attack Wartensleben, who commanded the advanced guard of the Imperialists; but the Archduke, resolved to take the initiative, anticipated him by a day, and commenced an attack with all his forces. The position of the Republicans was in the highest degree critical, as they were compelled to fight with the Rhine on their right flank, and between them and France, which would have exposed them to utter ruin in case of a serious reverse. The Archduke judiciously brought the mass of his forces against the French left, and, having overwhelmed it, Jourdan was compelled to draw back all his troops, to avoid being driven into the river, and completely destroyed amidst its precipitous banks. He accordingly retired to Neuwied, and recrossed the Rhine, while Kleber, received orders to retire to Dusseldorf, and regain the left bank. Kray pursued him with the right wing of the Austrians, and a bloody and furious action ensued at Ukerath, which at length terminated to the disadvantage of the French, in consequence of the impetuous charges of the Imperial cavalry. Kleber indignantly continued his retreat, and regained the intrenched camp around the *tête-de-pont* at Dusseldorf (2).

Operations
of Moreau
on the Up-
per Rhine.
His origin
and charac-
ter.

Meanwhile the army on the Upper Rhine, under the command of MOREAU, had commenced offensive operations. This great general, born in 1763, at Morlaix in Brittany, had been originally bred to the bar, but, during the public dangers of 1793, having been called to the profession of arms, he rapidly rose to the rank of general of division. His talents, his virtues, and his misfortunes, have secured him a distinguished place in the page of history. Gifted with rare sagacity, an imperturbable coolness in presence of danger, and a rapid *coup d'œil* in the field of battle, he was eminently qualified for military success; but his modesty, moral indecision, and retiring habits, rendered him unfit to cope in political life with the energy and ambition of Napoléon. He was, accordingly, illustrious as a general, but unfortunate as a statesman; a sincere Republican, he disdained to accept elevation at the expense of the public freedom;

(4) Jom. viii. 182. and Pièces Just. No. 12. Th. viii. 308. Ney, i. 155, 177. Arch. Ch. ii. 64, 74.

(2) Arch. Ch. ii. 74, 92. Jom. viii. 185, 194. Th. viii. 309. Ney, 180, 197.

and, after vanquishing the Imperialists at Hohenlinden, sunk before the audacity and fortune of his younger and less scrupulous rival (1).

Organiza-
tion of his
army.

On arriving at the command, after the dismissal of Pichegru, he applied himself assiduously, with the aid of Regnier to reorganize and restore the army, whose spirit the disasters of the preceding campaign had considerably weakened. The French centre, thirty thousand strong, cantoned at the foot of the Vosges mountains, was placed under the orders of DESAIX (2); the left wing, under St.-CYR, had its headquarters at Deuxponts; while the right, under Moreau in person, occupied Strasburg and Huningen. The Austrians, in like manner, were in three divisions; the right wing, twenty-two thousand strong, was encamped in the neighbourhood of Kay-serslautern, and communicated with the Archduke Charles; the centre, under the orders of Starray, amounting to twenty-three thousand infantry and nine thousand horse, was at Muschbach and Manheim, while the left wing, comprehending twenty-four thousand infantry and seven thousand cavalry, extended along the course of the Rhine from Philipsburg to Bâle. Thus, notwithstanding all their misfortunes, the Imperialists still adhered to the ruinous system of extending their forces; a plan of operations destined to bring about all but the ruin of the monarchy (3).

Passage of
the Rhine
by Moreau.

Moreau resolved to pass the Rhine at Strasburg, as that powerful fortress was an excellent point of departure, while the numerous wooded islands which there interrupted the course of the river, afforded every facility for the concealment of the project. The fortress of Kehl on the opposite shore, being negligently guarded, lay open to surprise, and, once secured, promised the means of a safe passage to the whole army. The Austrians on the Upper Rhine were, from the very beginning of the campaign, reduced to the defensive, in consequence of the large detachment made under Wurmser to the Tyrol; while the invasion of Germany by the army of Jourdan, spread the belief that it was in that quarter that the serious attack of the Republicans was to be made. To mislead the Imperialists still further from his real design, Moreau made a general attack on their intrenchments at Manheim, which had the effect of inducing them to withdraw the greater part of their forces to the right bank, leaving only fifteen battalions to guard the *tête-de-pont* on the French side. Meanwhile, Wurmser having departed at the head of twenty-eight thousand choice troops for Italy, the command of both armies devolved on the Archduke. Moreau deemed this juncture favourable for the execution of his design upon Kehl, and accordingly, on 23d June, the evening of the 23d, the gates of Strasburg were suddenly closed, all intercourse with the German shore was rigidly prohibited, and columns of troops marched in all directions towards the point of embarkation (4).

The points selected for this hazardous operation were Gambsheim and Kehl. Twelve thousand men were collected at the first point, and sixteen thousand at the second, both detachments being under the orders of Desaix, while the forces of the Imperialists were so scattered, that they could not

(1) Th. viii. 307, 310, Jom. viii. 159, 193. Arch. Ch. ii. 19.

(2) "Of all the generals I ever had under me," said Napoléon, "Desaix and Kleber possessed the greatest talents, especially Desaix, as Kleber only loved war as it was the means of procuring him riches and pleasures, whereas Desaix loved glory for itself, and despised every thing else. Desaix was wholly wrapt up in war and glory. To him riches and pleasures were valueless, nor did he give them

a moment's thought. He despised comfort and convenience; wrapt in a cloak, he threw himself under a gun, and slept as contentedly as in a palace. Upright and honest in all his proceedings, he was called by the Arabs the Just Sultan. Kleber and Desaix were an irreparable loss to the French army." — O'MEARA, i. 237, 238.

(3) Arch. Ch. ii. 24. Jom. viii. 196, 197. St.-Cyr, iii. 33, 37.

(4) Th. viii. 310, 311. Jom. viii. 199, 206.

assemble above seventeen thousand men in forty-eight hours in any quarter that might be menaced. At midnight, the troops defiled in different columns and profound silence towards the stations of embarkation; while false attacks, attended with much noise and constant discharges of artillery, were

Admirable
skill shown
in the pas-
sage.

made at other places, to distract the attention of the enemy. At half-past one Desaix gave the signal for departure; two thousand five hundred men embarked in silence, and rowed across the arm of the Rhine to the island of Ehslar Rhin, which was occupied by the Imperialists. They fell, without firing a shot, with so much impetuosity upon their videttes, that the Germans fled in disorder to the right bank, without thinking of cutting the bridges of boats which connected the island with the shore. Thither they were speedily followed by the Republicans, who, although unsupported by cavalry or artillery, ventured to advance into the plain, and approach the ramparts of Kehl. With heroic resolution, but the most prudent in such circumstances, the commander sent back the boats instantly to the French side, to bring over reinforcements, leaving this little band alone and unsupported, in the midst of the enemy's army. Their advanced guard was speedily assailed by the Swabian contingent, greatly superior in numbers, which were encamped in that neighbourhood; but they were repulsed by the steadiness of the French infantry, supported by two pieces of artillery, which they had captured on first landing on the shore.

Before six o'clock in the morning, a new detachment of equal strength arrived, a flying bridge was established between the island and the left bank, and the Republicans found themselves in such strength, that they advanced to the attack of the intrenchments of Kehl, which were carried at the point of the bayonet, the troops of Swabia, intrusted with the defence, flying with such precipitation, that they lost thirteen pieces of cannon and seven hundred men (1). On the following day, a bridge of boats was established between Strasburg and Kehl, and the whole army passed over in safety.

Such was the passage of the Rhine at Kehl, which at the time was celebrated as an exploit of the most glorious character. Without doubt, the secrecy, rapidity, and decision with which it was carried into effect, merit the highest eulogium. But the weakness and dispersion of the enemy's forces rendered it an enterprise of comparatively little hazard; and it was greatly inferior, both in point of difficulty and danger, to the passage of the same river in the following campaign at Dursheim, or the passages of the Danube at Wagram, and of the Berezina at Studenki by Napoléon (2).

Cautious
movements
of Moreau.

Moreau had now the fairest opportunity of destroying the Austrian army on the Upper Rhine, by a series of diverging attacks, similar to those by which Napoléon had discomfited the army of Beaulieu in Piedmont. He had effected a passage, with a superior force, into the centre of the enemy's line; and, by rapid movements, might have struck right and left as weighty blows as that great captain dealt out at Dego and Montenotte. But the French general, however consummate a commander, had not the fire or energy by which his younger rival was actuated, and trusted for success rather to skilful combinations or methodical arrangements, than those master-strokes which are attended with peril, but frequently domineer over fortune by the intensity of the passions which they awaken among mankind (3).

(1) Th. viii. 342. Jom. viii. 209, 211. St.-Cyr, iii. 33, 46. Arch. Ch. ii. 102, 110.

(2) Jom. viii. 211. Th. viii. 313.

(3) St.-Cyr, iii. 54, 55. Th. viii. 314. Jom. viii. 212. Arch. Ch. ii. 121.

He advances towards the Black Forest. Having at length collected all his divisions on the right bank, Moreau, at the end of June, advanced to the foot of the mountains of the Black Forest, at the head of seventy-one thousand men. This celebrated chain forms a mass of rocky hills covered with fir, separating the valley of the Rhine from that of the Neckar. The Swabian contingent, ten thousand strong, was already posted at Renchen, once so famous in the wars of Turenne, occupying the entrance of the defiles which lead through the mountains. They were there attacked by the Republicans, and driven from their position with the loss of ten pieces of cannon, and eight hundred men (1).

Archduke hastens to the scene of danger. Meanwhile, the Imperialists were collecting their scattered forces with the utmost haste, to make head against the formidable enemy who had thus burst into the centre of their line. The Archduke Charles had no sooner received the intelligence, than he resolved to hasten in person, to arrest the advance of an army threatening to fall upon his line of communications, and possibly get the start of him on the Danube. For this purpose he set off on the 26th, with twenty-four battalions and thirty-nine squadrons, from the banks of the Lahn, and advanced by forced marches towards the Black Forest, while the scattered divisions of Wurmser's army were converging towards the menaced point (2).

Moreau's plan was to descend the valley of the Rhine, with his centre and left wing, under the command of Desaix and St.-Cyr, while his right, under Ferino, attacked and carried the defiles of the Black Forest, and pushed to the banks of the Neckar. The Austrians on the Upper Rhine and the Murg were about forty-eight thousand strong; while the Archduke was hastening with half that number to their support. Previous to advancing to the northward, Moreau detached some brigades from his centre to clear the right flank of the army, and drive the enemy from the heights of the Black Forest, which was successfully accomplished. Meanwhile, the left wing continuing to descend the valley of the Danube, through a broken country intersected with woods and ravines, approached the corps of Latour, who defended the banks of the Murg with twenty-seven thousand men. He was attacked there by the centre of the Republicans, with nearly the same force, the left under St.-Cyr, not having yet arrived, and after an indecisive engagement, the Austrians retired in the best order, covered by their numerous cavalry, leaving to their antagonists no other advantage but the possession of the field of battle. Important reinforcements speedily came up on both sides; the Archduke arrived with twenty-four thousand men to the support of the Imperialists, while Moreau counterbalanced the acquisition, by bringing up St.-Cyr, with his whole left wing, to his aid. The forces on the two sides were now nearly equal, amounting on either to about fifty thousand men; and their situation was nearly the same, both being at right angles to the Rhine, and extending from that stream through a marshy and wooded plain, to the mountains of the Black Forest (3).

The French gain success on the Imperial right. The Archduke, who felt the value of time, and was apprehensive of being speedily recalled to the defence of the Lower Rhine, resolved to commence the attack, and, in order to render his numerous cavalry of service, to engage as much as possible in the plain. For

(1) Jom. viii. 218. Th. viii. 315. Arch. Ch. ii. 116.

(2) Arch. Ch. ii. 125. St.-Cyr, iii. 50, 71. Jom. viii. 218.

(3) Th. viii. 318. Arch. Ch. ii. 134, 138. Jom. viii. 220, 225.

this purpose he advanced the Saxons on his left to turn the French right in the mountains, and threatened their rear, strengthened the plateau of Rothen-sol, where his left centre rested, advanced his centre to Malsch, and arranged his formidable cavalry, supported by ten battalions, so as to press the left of the Republicans in the plain of the Rhine. His attack was fixed for the 10th July; but Moreau, who deemed it hazardous to remain on the defensive, anticipated him by a general attack on the preceding day. Wisely judging that

9th July. it was of importance to avoid the plain, where the numerous cavalry of the Austrians promised to be of such advantage, he entirely drew back his own left, and directed the weight of his force by his right against the Austrian position in the mountains. St.-Cyr, who commanded the Republicans in that quarter, was charged with the assault of the plateau of the Rothensol, an elevated plain in the midst of the rocky ridges of the Black Forest, the approaches to which were entangled with shrubs, scaurs, and underwood, and which was occupied by six Austrian battalions. These brave troops repulsed successive attacks of the French columns; but, having on the defeat of the last, pursued the assailants into the rugged and woody ground on the declivity of the heights, their ranks became broken, and St.-Cyr, returning to the charge, routed the Imperialists, carried the position, and drove back their left towards Pforzheim. Meanwhile Desaix, with the French centre, commenced a furious attack on the village of Malsch, which, after being taken and retaken several times, finally remained in the power of the Austrians. Their numerous cavalry now deployed in the plain; but the French kept cautiously under cover of the woods and thickets with which the country abounded; and the Austrians, notwithstanding their great superiority in horse, were unable to obtain any further success than repulsing the attacks on their centre and right, towards the banks of the Rhine (1).

The Arch-
duke re-
solves to
retreat.

The relative situation of the contending parties was now very singular. Moreau had dislodged the Imperialists from the mountains, and by throwing forward his right, he had it in his power to cut them off from the line of communication with the Hereditary States, and menace their retreat to the valley of the Danube. On the other hand, by so doing, he was himself exposed to the danger of being separated from his base in the valley of the Rhine, seeing Desaix crushed by the victorious centre and numerous cavalry of the Austrians, and St.-Cyr isolated and endangered in the mountains. A general of Napoléon's resolution and ability would possibly have derived from this combination of circumstances, the means of achieving the most splendid successes; but the Archduke was prevented from following so energetic a course by the critical circumstances of the Austrian dominions, which lay exposed and unprotected to the attacks of the enemy, and the perilous situation in which he might be placed in case of disaster, with a hostile army on one side, and a great river lined with enemy's fortresses on the other. For these reasons he resolved to forego the splendid to pursue the prudent course; to retire from the frontier to the interior of Germany, and to regain by the valleys of the Maine and the Neckar the plain of the Danube, which river, supported by the fortresses of Ulm and Ratisbon, was the true frontier of Austria, and brought him as much nearer his own, as it withdrew the enemy from their resources. With this view he retired, by a forced march, in the evening, to Pforzheim, without being disquieted in his movement; and, after throwing garrisons into Philipsburg and Mannheim, prepared

(1) Tb, viii. 320. Jom. viii. 227, 233. Arch. Ch. ii. 138, 149. St.-Cyr, iii. 68, 69.

to abandon the valley of the Rhine, and retreat by the Neckar into the Bavarian plains (1).

14th to 26th July. Agreeably to this plan, the Imperialists broke up on the 14th from Pforzheim, and retired slowly and in the best order, towards Stuttgart and the right bank of the Neckar. By so doing, they drew nearer to the army of Wartensleben, and gained the great object of obtaining a central and interior line of communication, from which the Archduke soon derived the most brilliant advantages. Meanwhile Moreau advanced his right centre under St.-Cyr, through the mountains to Pforzheim, while the right wing, under Ferino, spread itself through the Black Forest to the frontiers of Switzerland. The result was, that by the middle of July, the Republican army covered a space fifty leagues broad, from Stuttgart to the Lake of Constance (2).

Operations on the Lower Rhine. 1st July. Meanwhile important operations had taken place on the Lower Rhine. No sooner was Jourdan informed of the passage of the Rhine at Kehl, and the departure of the Archduke to reinforce the army of Wurmser, than he hastened to recross the same river at Dusseldorf and Neuwied, advancing, as he had always before done, towards the Lahn, with a view to debouche into the valley of the Maine. The Imperialists, under Wartensleben, now consisted of only twenty-five thousand infantry and eleven thousand cavalry; a force totally inadequate to make head against the Republicans, who amounted, even after the necessary deductions to blockade Mayence, Cassel, and Ehrenbreitzen, to fifty thousand men. At the period of the passage of the river, the Austrian army was scattered over a long line, and might have been easily beaten in detail by an enterprising enemy; but Jourdan allowed them to concentrate their troops behind the Lahn, without 10th July. deriving any advantage from his superiority of force. After some inconsiderable skirmishing, the Republicans crossed that river; and the Austrians having stood firm in the position of Friedberg, a partial action ensued, which terminated to the disadvantage of the latter, who, after a vigorous resistance, finding their right flank turned by Lefebvre, retreated with the loss of two pieces of cannon and twelve hundred men. After this success, Jourdan advanced to the banks of the Maine, and by a bombardment of two days, compelled his adversaries to evacuate the great city of Frankfort, and retire altogether to the right bank of that river. The Austrians now drew all their disposable troops out of the fortress of Mayence, and raised their force under Wartensleben to thirty thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry, while Jourdan's army on the right bank of the Maine was swelled by the addition of some of the blockading corps to forty-six thousand of the former arm, and eight thousand of the latter (3).

Erroneous plan of the campaign by the Directory. The Directory, in prescribing the conduct of the campaign to the generals, were constantly influenced by the desire to turn at once both flanks of the enemy: an injudicious design, which, by giving an eccentric direction to their forces, and preventing them from communicating with or assisting each other, led to all the disasters which signalized the conclusion of the campaign; while the Archduke, by giving a concentric direction to his forces in their retreat, and ultimately arriving at a point where he could fall, with an overwhelming force, on either adversary, ably prepared all the triumphs which effaced its early disasters. In conformity

(1) Arch. Ch. ii. 148, 149. Jom. viii. 234. Th. viii. 322, 326. St.-Cyr, ii. 54, 59. (3) Tb. viii. 323. Jom. viii. 264, 278. Arch. Ch. ii. 150, 175. St.-Cyr, iii. 89, 92.

(2) Jom. viii. 237. Arch. Ch. ii. 175.

with these different plans—while Moreau was extending his right wing to the foot of the Alps, pressing through the defiles of the Albis and the Black Forest into the valley of the Danube, and Jourdan was slowly advancing up the shores of the Maine towards Bohemia—the Archduke regained the right bank of the Neckar, and Wartensleben the left bank of the Maine; movements which, by bringing them into close proximity with each other, rendered unavailing all the superiority of their enemies. In truth, nothing but this able direction of the retreating, and injudicious dispersion of the advancing force, could have enabled the Imperialists at all to make head against their enemies: for, independent of the deduction of twenty-eight thousand men dispatched under Wurmser into Italy, the Austrians were weakened by thirty thousand men, whom the Archduke was obliged to leave in the different garrisons on the Rhine; so that the force under his immediate command consisted only of forty thousand infantry, and eighteen thousand cavalry, while Moreau was at the head of sixty-five thousand of the former force, and six thousand of the latter. But the admirable plan of operations which that able general sketched out at Pforzheim, “to retreat slowly, and disputing every inch of ground, without hazarding a general engagement, until the two retiring armies were so near, that he could fall with a superior force upon one or other of his adversaries,” ultimately rendered abortive all this great superiority, and brought back the French forces with disgrace and disaster to the Rhine (1).

14th July. Having assembled all his parks of artillery, and thrown provisions into the fortresses, which were to be left to their own resources
 17th, 25th, and 27th July. during his short stay at Pforzheim, the Archduke commenced his retreat, during which his force was still further weakened by the withdrawing of the Saxon and Swabian contingents, amounting to ten thousand men, the government of whose states, alarmed by the advance of the Republicans, now hastened to make their separate submissions to the conquerors. By the 25th July, the Austrian forces were concentrated on the right bank of the Neckar, betwixt Cronstadt and Esslingen. They were there attacked, on the following morning, by Moreau, with his whole centre and left wing; and after an obstinate engagement, both parties remained on the field of battle. Next day, the Imperialists retired in two columns, under the Archduke and Hotze, through the mountains of Alb, which separate the valley of the Neckar from that of the Danube. The one followed the valley of the Rems and the route of Schorndorf, the other the valley of the Filz. Their united force did not now exceed twenty-five thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry. Moreau followed them nearly in a parallel march; and on the 25d debouched into the plains near the sources of the Danube, and the upper extremity of the valley of Rems (2).

The Archduke took a position at the top of the long ridge of Bœminkirch, with the design of falling upon the heads of the enemy's columns, as they issued from the valleys into the plain, and to gain time for the evacuation of the magazines of Ulm; and the formidable nature of his position, compelled Moreau to halt for several days to concentrate his forces. Six days afterwards, he resumed his retreat, which was continued with uncommon firmness, and in the best order till he reached the Danube, where he prepared to resume the offensive. He there found himself in communication with his left wing,

(1) Arch. Ch. ii. 176, 179. Jom. viii. 282, 283. St.-Cyr, iii. 93, 100.

(2) Jom. viii. 238, 241. Archduke, iii, 191 215. St.-Cyr, iii. 105, 113.

under Frœlich, which had retired through the Black Forest, and amounted to fourteen thousand infantry, and four thousand cavalry, while the corresponding wing of the Republicans, under Ferino, approached Moreau, and raised his force to fifty-eight thousand infantry and seven thousand horse. He advanced in order of battle to Neresheim, but the left wing, under Frœlich, did not arrive in time to take any part in the action which there ensued. His design in so doing, was to gain time for the evacuation of his magazines at Ulm, and be enabled to continue his retreat with more leisure towards Wartensleben, who was now falling back towards the Naab; but as he gave battle with his rear to the river, he ran the risk of total destruction in case of defeat. By a rapid movement, he succeeded in forcing back and turning the right of Moreau, and pressing forward with his left wing, got into his rear, and caused such an alarm, that all the parks of ammunition retreated in haste from the field of battle. But the centre, under St.-Cyr, stood firm; and the Austrian force being disseminated into several columns, over a space of ten leagues, the Archduke was unable to take advantage from his success, so as to gain a decisive victory. Meanwhile Moreau, nowise intimidated by the defeat of his right wing, or the alarm in his rear, strengthened his centre by his reserve, and vigorously repulsed all the attacks of the enemy; and at two o'clock in the afternoon the firing ceased at all points, without any decisive success having been gained by either party, both of whom had to lament a loss of three thousand men (1).

On the day following, the Imperialists recrossed the Danube without being disquieted by the enemy, and broke down all the bridges over that river as far as Donawerth. Meanwhile, Frœlich retreated through the Black Forest, followed by Ferino, between whose forces several bloody but indecisive actions took place (2). But more important events were now approaching, and those decisive strokes about to be struck, which saved Germany, and determined the fate of the campaign.

Journal, after having remained a few days at Frankfort, and levied a heavy contribution on that flourishing city, prepared to resume his march, in order to co-operate with Moreau in the advance into the empire. He commenced his march with forty-seven thousand men, up the valley of the Maine, on the great road to Wurtzbourg; while Wartensleben retired, with a force somewhat inferior, through the forest of Spessart, to the neighbourhood of that town. Wurtzbourg soon after surrendered to the invaders, and the latter general retired successively to Zeil, Bamberg and Forchheim, when a sharp action ensued between the cavalry of the two armies, in which the French honourably resisted a superior force. From thence he continued his retreat towards the Naab; and after bloody actions at Neukirchen, Sulzbach, and Wolfering, in which no decisive success was obtained by either party, crossed that river, and put a final period to his retrograde movement on the 10th August. The converging direction of the retiring columns of the two Austrian armies might have apprised so experienced an officer as Jourdan of the object of the Archduke, and the danger which he ran by continuing any further his advance; but he did not conceive himself at liberty to deviate from the orders of the Directory; and instead of interposing between their approaching armies, continued his eccentric movement to turn their outermost flank (3).

(1) Th. viii. 387. Arch. Ch. ii. 213, 279. Jom. viii. 220, 255. St.-Cyr, iii. 144, 174.

(2) Jom. viii. 359, 360. Arch. Ch. ii. 231.

(3) Arch. Ch. ii. 260, 265. Jom. viii. 283, 301. Jourdan, 50, 89.

The time had now arrived when the Archduke deemed it safe to put in practice his long meditated movement for the relief of Wartensleben. In the middle of August he set out from the environs of Neuburg on the Danube, with twenty-eight thousand men, and moved northward towards the Naab, leaving General Latour with thirty-five thousand to make head during his absence against Moreau. He arrived on that river on the 20th, and orders were immediately given for attacking the enemy. By the junction of the corps under the Archduke with that under Wartensleben, their united force was raised to sixty-three thousand men, while the troops of Jourdan's army opposed to them, did not exceed, after the losses it had sustained, above forty-five thousand. Thus this young prince had solved the most difficult and important problem in war, that of accumulating, with forces upon the whole inferior, a decided superiority at the decisive point (1).

Bernadotte, who commanded the advanced guard of Jourdan's army, which had crossed the ridge of hills which forms the northern boundary of the valley of the Danube, had taken post at Teining. He was there attacked by the Archduke, and after an obstinate resistance, driven back into the mountains he had recently passed, which separate the valley of the Maine from that of the Danube; while Hotze, who came up towards the close of the action, pursued his discomfited troops to the gates of Neumark. Early on the following morning the Austrians resumed the pursuit, and drove the Republicans from that town, so far back that they found themselves on the flank of Jourdan's army on the Naab, which was no sooner informed of these disasters, than it retired to Amberg. Leaving Hotze to pursue the remains of Bernadotte's army towards Altdorf, the Archduke turned with the bulk of his forces upon Jourdan; and having put himself in communication with Wartensleben, concerted with him a general attack upon the main body of the Republicans at Amberg. The Austrians, under the Archduke, advanced in three columns; and when the soldiers perceived, far distant on the horizon to the northward, the fire of Wartensleben's lines, the importance of whose co-operation the whole army understood, opening on the enemy's flank, nothing could restrain their impetuosity, and loud shouts announced the arrival of the long wished-for moment of victory. The French made but a feeble resistance; assailed at once in front and flank, they fell back to the plateau in the rear of their position, and owed their safety to the firmness with which General Ney sustained the attacks of the enemy with the rearguard (2).

The situation of Jourdan was now in the highest degree critical. By this success at Amberg, the Archduke had got upon his direct road to Nuremberg, through which his retreat necessarily lay, and he was in consequence compelled to fall back through the mountains which separate the Naab from the Maine by cross roads, with all his baggage and parks of artillery. During this critical operation, the firmness and discipline of the French troops alone saved them from the greatest disasters. Ney with the rearguard, continued to make head against the numerous cavalry of the enemy, and after a painful passage of six days, during which they were pressed with the utmost vigour, and incurred great dangers, they at length extricated themselves from the mountains, and reached Schweinfurt on the

(1) Arch. Ch. iii. 2, 23. Jom. ix. 11, 12.

(2) Arch. Ch. ii. 26, 43. Jom. ix. 16, 17. Jourdan, 90, 110.

1st Sept.

Maine, in the deepest dejection, at the end of August. Hotze passed that river on the 1st September, and soon after his advanced guard made itself master of Wurtzburg; while the Archduke conducted the bulk of his forces to the right bank of the river. Jourdan, deeming an action indispensable in order to obtain some respite for his retreating columns, prepared himself for a general attack on his pursuers, at the same time that the Archduke was collecting his forces for an action on his own part. The courage and vivacity of the Republican soldiers appeared again when they faced the enemy, and they prepared with the utmost alacrity to occupy all the positions which were deemed necessary before commencing the battle. On the 2d September both parties were engaged in completing this preparation, and on the third the engagement took place (1).

He is again
routed near
Wurzburg.

The French army was drawn up on the right bank of the Maine, from Wurtzburg to Schweinfurt; partly on a series of heights which formed the northern barrier of the valley, and partly on the plains which extended from their foot to the shores of the river. Jourdan imagined that he had only to contend with a part of the Austrian force, and that the Archduke had returned in person to make head against the Republicans on the Danube; but instead of that, he had rapidly brought his columns to the right bank, and was prepared to combat his antagonist with superior forces. A thick fog, which concealed the armies from each other, favoured the motions of the Imperialists, and when the sun broke through the clouds at eleven o'clock, it glittered on the numerous squadrons of the Austrians, drawn up in double lines on the meadows adjoining the river. The action commenced by Kray attacking the left flank of the French, while Lichtenstein spread himself out in the plain, followed by Wartensleben, who threw himself at the head of the cavalry into the river, and followed close after the infantry, who had defiled along the bridge. The French general, Grenier, who was stationed at the menaced point, made a vigorous resistance with the Republican cavalry and light infantry; but the reserve of the Austrian cuirassiers having been brought up, Jourdan was obliged to support the line by his reserve of cavalry; and a desperate charge of horse took place, in which the Imperialists were at first repulsed, but the reserve of Austrian cuirassiers having assailed the Republican squadrons, when disordered by success, they were broken, thrown into confusion, and driven behind the lines of their infantry. Meanwhile the grenadiers of Werneck, united to the corps under Starray, routed the French centre, and Kray drove the division of Grenier entirely off the field into the wood of Gramchatz. Victory declared for the Imperialists at all points; and Jourdan esteemed himself fortunate in being able to reach the forests which stretched from Gramchatz to Arnheim, without being broken by the redoubtable Austrian squadrons (2).

Great effects
of this
victory.

Such was the battle of Wurtzburg, which delivered Germany and determined the fate of the campaign. The trophies of the victors were by no means commensurate to these momentous results, amounting only to seven pieces of cannon, and a few prisoners. But it produced a most important effect upon the spirit of the two armies, elevating the Imperial as much as it depressed the Republican forces, and procuring for the Archduke the possession of the direct line of communication from the Maine to the Rhine. Disastrous as it was in its consequences, the battle itself was highly

(1) Th. viii. 390, 408. Arch. Ch. iii. 43, 106. (2) Jom. ix. 36. Arch. Ch. iii. 99, 116. Th. viii. Jourdan, 130, 146. Ney, i. 208, 239. Jom. ix. 19. 409, 410. Jourdan, 160, 172. Ney, i. 216.

honourable to the defeated army; for they had to contend with thirty thousand men of all arms, against thirty-one thousand infantry, and thirteen thousand splendid cavalry (1).

Continued and disastrous retreat of Jourdan. After this disaster, Jourdan had no alternative but to retire behind the Lahn, a position in which he might rally round his standards the force under Marceau, which blockaded Mayence, and the reinforcements which were expected from the north. In doing this, however, he was obliged to retreat through the mountains of Fulda, the roads of which are as bad as the country is rugged and inhospitable. At the same time, Marceau received orders to raise the blockade of Mayence, and make all haste to join the Republican commander-in-chief, behind the Lahn. The Archduke, nothing intimidated by the menacing advance of Moreau into Bavaria, wisely resolved to pursue his beaten enemy to the Rhine; but, instead of following him through the defiles of the mountains, where a resolute rearguard might have arrested an army, he determined to advance straight to the Lahn by the great road of Aschaffenburg. The losses sustained by the Republicans in their retreat were very great. The citadel of Wurtzburg soon surrendered with eight hundred men; 122 pieces of cannon, taken by them during their advance, were abandoned at Schweinfurt; sixty pieces, and an immense quantity of ammunition, at Freudenberg; and eighty-three pieces at Flushing. The peasants, supported by the Austrian light troops, who were detached in pursuit of the enemy, fell upon the flanks and rear of the retreating army, and cut off vast numbers of the stragglers who issued from their ranks (2).

The Republicans reached the Lahn in the most disorganized and miserable state on the 9th September, and four days afterwards they were joined by the blockading force from Mayence, under Marceau, fifteen thousand strong, and a division of ten thousand from the army of the north, which in some degree restored the balance of the two armies. The young prince, having concentrated his forces at Aschaffenburg, resolved to attack them in this position, and drive them behind the Rhine. The action took place on the 16th. The Austrians advanced in three columns, amounting to thirty-eight thousand infantry, and twelve thousand cavalry, having received some reinforcements from the garrison of Mayence.

Archduke again defeats them, and drives them across the Rhine. Under cover of a powerful fire of artillery, they forced the bridges of the Lahn, after an obstinate engagement, made themselves masters of Limburg and Dietz, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of heroism on the part of General Marceau, and defeated the enemy at all points. During the night, the Republicans beat a retreat, under cover of a thick fog, which long concealed their movements from the Imperialists; and when it cleared away on the following morning, they found all their positions abandoned. The pursuit was continued with the utmost vigour during the two following days; and, on the 19th, a serious engagement took place with the rearguard at Altenkirchen, where General Marceau was severely wounded, and fell into the hands of the Imperialists. The Archduke, who admired his great military qualities, paid him the most unremitting attention, but in spite of all his

(1) Arch. Ch. iii. 116. 117. Jom ix. 36, 37.

(2) Arch. Ch. iii. 128, 130. Hard iii. 467, 468. Jom ix. 37, 38. Jourdan, 187.

The French themselves admit that it was the hatred inspired by their exactions which occasioned this popular exasperation against them. "The animosity of the Germans," said Carnot, in his

confidential letter announcing these disasters to Napoleon, "and the unhappy consequences which have flowed from it, are a fresh and painful warning to us, how speedily the relaxation of discipline becomes fatal to an army." [Confid. Corresp. iii. 147.]—*Letter Confid. of 20th September.*

care he died a few days after, and was buried with military honours amidst the tears of his generous enemies (1).

Such was the demoralized and disjointed state of the Republican army, that notwithstanding the great reinforcements which they had received, they
20th Sept. were totally unable to make head against the enemy. They recrossed the Rhine on the 20th at Bonn and Neuwied, and were reduced to a state of total inactivity for the remainder of the campaign, having lost not less than twenty thousand men since they left the frontiers of Bohemia, by the sword, sickness, and desertion (2).

While the Austrian prince was pursuing this splendid career of
Severe struggle of Latour with Moreau on the Danube. mand of Latour to oppose Moreau, which did not exceed thirty-four thousand men of every arm, even including the detachment of Frœlich, was sustaining an unequal conflict on the banks of the Danube. Had the French general, the moment that he received intelligence of the departure of the Archduke, followed him with the bulk of his forces, the Imperialists, placed between two fires, would have been exposed to imminent danger, and the very catastrophe which they were most anxious to avert, viz. the junction of the Republican armies in the centre of Germany, been rendered inevitable. Fortunately for the Austrians, instead of adopting so decisive a course, he resolved to advance into Bavaria, hoping thereby to effect a diversion in favour of his colleague; a fatal resolution which, though in some degree justified by the order of the Directory to detach fifteen thousand men at the same time into the Tyrol, utterly ruined the campaign, by increasing the great distance which already separated the Republican armies. After remaining several days in a state of inactivity, he collected an imposing body, fifty-three thousand men, on the banks of the Lech, and forced the fords of

24th Aug. that river on the very day of the battle of Amberg. Latour, who had extended his small army too much, in his anxiety to cover a great extent

26th Aug. of country, found his rearguard assailed at Friedberg, and defeated, with the loss of seventeen hundred men, and fourteen pieces of cannon. After this disaster he retreated behind the Iser, in the direction of Landshut; his centre fell back to the neighbourhood of Munich, while the left wing stretched to the foot of the mountains of Tyrol. Moreau continued for three weeks occupied in inconsiderable movements in Bavaria; during which a severe combat took place at Langenberg, between four thousand Austrian horse and Desaix's division, in which, after the French troops had been at first broken, they ultimately succeeded by heroic efforts in repulsing the enemy. The Archduke was nothing moved by these disasters, but resolutely continued his pursuit of Jourdan. "Let Moreau advance to Vienna," said he, on parting with Latour; "it is of no moment, provided I beat Jourdan." — Memorable words! indicating at once the firmness of a great man, and the just eye of a consummate general (3).

This resolute conduct had the desired effect.—After the battle of Wurtzburg, the Archduke detached Murferd with a small division to join the garrison of Manheim, and combine an attack on the *tête-de-pont* at Kehl. The French were driven into the works, which were assaulted with great bravery by the Imperialists; and though the attack was repulsed,

(1) Jom. ix. 40, 166. Th. viii. 410. Arch. Ch. iii. 149, 173. Jourdan, 189, 210. Ney, i. 228, 229.

(2) Jom. ix. 45. Arch. Ch. iii. 178, 180. Jourdan, 212, 220.

(3) Arch. Ch. iii. 52, 59. Jom. ix. 50, 56. St. Cyr, iii. 188, 222.

it spread great consternation through the French army, who saw how nearly they had lost their principal communication with their own country. Moreau, who began to be apprehensive that he might be involved in disaster if he advanced further into Germany, proceeded with great circumspection, and 24th Sept. arrived on the Iser on the 24th September. Being there informed of the disasters of Jourdan, and that a part of Latour's corps, under Nauendorf, was advancing rapidly upon Ulm to turn his left flank, he halted his army, and next day began his retreat (1).

Moreau resolves to retreat. Moreau's situation was now in the highest degree critical. Advanced into the heart of Bavaria, with the defiles of the Black Forest in his rear, at the distance of 200 miles from the Rhine, with Latour with forty thousand men pressing the one flank, and the Archduke and Nauendorf with twenty-five thousand ready to fall on the other, he might anticipate even greater disasters than Jourdan before he regained the frontiers of the Republic. But on the other hand, he was at the head of a superb army of seventy thousand men, whose courage had not been weakened by any disaster, and who possessed the most unlimited confidence, both in their own strength and the resources of their commander. There was no force in Germany capable of arresting so great a mass. It is not with detached columns, or by menacing communications that the retreat of such a body is to be prevented (2).

Which he does in the most firm and methodical manner. Fully appreciating these great advantages, and aware that nothing is so likely to produce disaster in a retreat as any symptoms of apprehension of it in the general, he resolved to continue his retrograde movements with the utmost regularity, and to dispute every inch of ground with the enemy when they threatened to press upon his forces. The Austrian armies likely to assail him were as follows:—Nauendorf, with 9500 men, was on the Danube, ready to turn his left flank; Latour, with 24,000, in Bavaria, directly in his rear; Frœlich, with 14,000, on the Upper Iller and in Tyrol; while the Archduke, with 16,000 or 18,000, might be expected to abandon the Lahn, and hasten to the scene of decisive operations on the Upper Rhine. It was by maintaining a firm front, and keeping his forces together in masses, that the junction or co-operation of these considerable forces would alone be prevented (3).

Aware that the Archduke might probably block up the line of retreat by the Neckar, Moreau retired by the valley of the Danube and the Black Forest. Resting one of his wings on that stream, he sent forward his parks, his baggage, and his ammunition, before the army, and covering his retreat by a powerful rearguard, succeeded both in repulsing all the attacks of the enemy, and in enabling the body of his army to continue their march without fatigue or interruption. Want of concert in the Austrian generals at first eminently favoured his movements. Having retired behind the lake of Federsee, he found that Latour was isolated from Nauendorf, who was considerably in advance on the Danube, and the opportunity therefore appeared favourable for striking with superior forces a blow upon his weakened adversary. This was the more necessary, as he was approaching the entrance of the defiles of the Black Forest, which were occupied by the enemy, and it was of the last importance that his movement should not be impeded in 2d Oct. traversing those long and difficult passages. Turning, therefore fiercely upon his pursuers, he assailed Latour near Biberach. The Austrian

(1) Jom. ix. 63, 65. Arch. Ch. iii. 186, 208. St.-Cyr, iii. 222, 258.

(3) Jom. ix. 65. St.-Cyr, iii. 240, 258. Arch. Ch. iii. 213, 242.

(2) Th, viii. 412.

And defeats Latour at Biberach general, believing that a part only of the enemy's force was in the front, gave battle in a strong position, extending along a series of wooded heights, lined by a formidable artillery. The action was for a long time fiercely contested; but at length the superior forces and abler manœuvres of the Republicans prevailed (1). Desaix broke their right, while St.-Cyr turned their left, and a complete victory crowned the efforts of the French, which cost the Austrians four thousand prisoners, and eighteen pieces of cannon.

After this decisive blow, Moreau proceeded leisurely towards the Black Forest, directing his steps towards the Valley of Hell, in hopes of being able to debouche by Friburg, before the Archduke arrived to interrupt his progress. He had already passed the separation of the road by the Neckar, and Nauendorf occupied that which passes by the Valley of Kinzig. He therefore directed his centre towards the entrance of the Valley of Heli, under the command of St.-Cyr, while he stationed Desaix and Ferino on the right and left, to protect the motions of the principal body. The Austrian detachments in the mountains were too weak to oppose any effectual resistance to the passage of the French army. St.-Cyr speedily dissipated the clouds of light troops which infested the pine-clad mountains of the Valley of Hell, and Latour, rendered cautious by disaster, without attempting to harass his retreat, moved by Homberg to unite himself to the Archduke. So ably were the measures of the French general concerted, that he not only passed the defiles without either confusion or loss, but debouched into the valley of the Rhine, rather in the attitude of a conqueror than that of a fugitive (2).

Meanwhile the Archduke Charles being now assured of the direction which Moreau had taken, directed Latour and the detached parties to join him by the valley of Kinzig, while Nauendorf covered their movements by advancing between them and the French columns. The greater part of the Austrian forces were thus collected in the valley of the Rhine in the middle of October, and though still inferior to the enemy, he resolved to lose no time in attacking, and compelling them to recross that river. Moreau, on his part, was not less desirous of the combat, as he intended to advance to Kehl, and either maintain himself at the *tête-de-pont* there, or cross leisurely over to Strasbourg. The action took place at Emmendingen, on the slopes where the mountains melt into the plain; and afforded an example of the truth of the military principle, that in tactics, or the operations of actual combat, the possession of the mountains in general secures that of the valleys which lie at their feet. Waldkirch was felt by both parties to be the decisive point, from the command which it gave over the neighbouring valleys, and accordingly each general strove to reach it before his adversary; but the French, having the advantage of better roads, were the first to arrive. They were there attacked, however, by Nauendorf, who descended from the heights of the Black Forest, and after a bloody action drove St.-Cyr, who commanded the Republicans, out of the town with severe loss. Meanwhile the success of the Austrians was not less decisive at other points; the Austrian columns having at length surmounted the difficulties of the roads, attacked and carried the village of Matteringen, while their centre drove them back from Emmendingen, and at length

(1) Jem. ix. 71. Arch. Ch. iii. 216, 230. Th. viii. 414. St.-Cyr, iii. 259, 310.]

(2) Arch. Ch. iii. 240. Jem. ix. 74. St.-Cyr, iii. 311, 333.]

Moreau, defeated at all points, retired into the forest of Nemburg, behind the Elz, with the loss of two thousand men (1).

20th Oct. Retreat of Moreau. The Archduke made preparations on the following morning for re-establishing the bridges over the Elz, and renewing the combat; but Moreau retreated in the night, and commenced the passage of the Rhine, Desaix passed that river at Old Brisach, while the general-in-chief took post in the strong position of Schliengen, determined to accept battle, in order to gain time to defile in tranquillity by the bridge of Huningen. The valley of the Rhine is there cut at right angles by a barrier of rocky eminences, which stretches from the mountains of Hohenblau to the margin of the stream.

His last stand at Hohenblau; but is driven across the Rhine. It was on this formidable rampart that Moreau made his last stand, his left resting on the Rhine, his centre on a pile of almost inaccessible rocks, his right on the cliffs of Sizenkirch. The Archduke divided his army into four columns. The Prince of Condé on the right drove in the Republican advanced posts, but made no serious impression; but Latour in the centre, and Nauendorf on the left, gallantly scaled the precipices, drove the Republicans from their positions, and chasing them from height to height, from wood to wood, threw them before nightfall into such confusion, that nothing but the broken nature of the ground, which prevented cavalry from acting, and a violent storm which arose in the evening, saved them from a complete overthrow. Moreau retreated during the night, and on the following day commenced the passage of the Rhine, which was effected without molestation from the Imperialists (2).

After having thus effected the deliverance of Germany from both its invaders, the Archduke proposed to the Aulic Council to detach a powerful reinforcement by the Tyrol into Italy, in order to strengthen the army of Alvinzi, and effect the liberation of Wurmser in Mantua—a measure based on true military principles, and which, if adopted by the Imperial government, would probably have changed the fate of the campaign. Moreau, on his side, proposed an armistice to the Austrians, on condition that the Rhine should separate the two armies, and the Republicans retain the *tête-de-pont* of Huningen and Kehl; a proposal which the Archduke received with secret satisfaction, as it promised him the means of securely carrying into effect his meditated designs for the deliverance of Italy. But the Austrian government, intent upon the expulsion of the French from Germany, and deeming the forces put at the disposal of Alvinzi adequate for the relief of Mantua, declined both propositions, and sent positive orders for the immediate attack of the fortified posts possessed by the Republicans on the right bank of the Rhine (3).

Long and bloody siege of Kehl. The conduct of the siege of Kehl, during the depth of winter, and with an open communication between the besieged and the great army on the opposite bank, presented obstacles of no ordinary kind; but the perseverance and energy of the Austrians ultimately triumphed over all obstacles. Thirty thousand men, under the command of Desaix and St.-Cyr, were destined for the defence of the works, while a powerful reserve was stationed in the islands of the Rhine; and the troops engaged in the defence were changed every three days, to prevent their being overwhelmed with the fatigues of the service. Forty thousand Austrians, under Latour, formed the besieging force, while the remainder of the army was cantoned in the

(1) St.-Cyr, iv. 10, 26. Arch. Ch. iii. 248, 260. Jom. ix. 78, 80.

(2) Jom. ix. 84, 89. Arch. Ch. iii. 272, 280. St.-Cyr, iv. 27, 40.

(3) Arch. Ch. ii. 290. Jom. ix. 238.

valley of the Rhine. Though the fort was invested on the 9th October, no material progress was made in the siege, from the extreme difficulty of bringing up the battering train and heavy stores, till the end of November. This long delay gave time to the indefatigable Desaix to complete the works, which, when the Imperialists first sat down before the place, were in a very unfinished state. The trenches were opened on the 21st November; and about the same time a grand sortie was attempted, under the command of Moreau in person, to destroy the works, and gain possession of the Austrian park of artillery. This attack was at first successful: the Republicans carried the intrenchments of Sundheim, and had nearly penetrated to the magazines and parks; but the Archduke and Latour having come up with reinforcements to the menaced point, they were at length repulsed, with severe loss, carrying with them nine pieces of cannon, which they had captured during the affray, Moreau and Desaix exposed themselves to the hottest of the fire, and were both slightly wounded. After this repulse, the labours of the siege were continued without any other interruption, than that arising from the excessive severity of the weather, and the torrents of rain which, for weeks together, filled the trenches with water. On the night of January 1, the Imperialists carried by assault the first line of intrenchments round the Republican camp, and a few days afterwards the second line was also stormed after a bloody resistance. Kehl was now no longer defensible; above 100,000 cannon-balls, and 25,000 bombs, projected from forty batteries, had riddled all its defences. The Imperialists, masters of the intrenched camp, enveloped the fort on every side; and the Republicans, after a glorious defence, which does honour to the memory of Desaix and St.-Cyr, evacuated the place by capitulation on the 9th January (1).

Fall of the
tête-de-pont
at Huningen. During the siege of Kehl, the Imperialists remained in observation before the *tête-de-pont* of Huningen; but no sooner were they at liberty, by the surrender of the former place, than they prosecuted the siege of the latter with extraordinary vigour. Ferino had been left with the right wing of the French to superintend the defence of that important post, but notwithstanding all his exertions he was unable to retard their advances; the trenches were opened in form on the 25th of January, and a sortie having been repulsed on the night of the 31st, the place was evacuated by capitulation on the 1st of February, and the victors found themselves masters only of a heap of ruins (2).

Reflections
on this
campaign. This last success terminated the campaign of 1796 in Germany; the most remarkable, in a military point of view, which had occurred, with the exception of that of Napoléon in the same year in Italy, since the commencement of the war. The conquerors in both triumphed, by the application of the same principles, over superior forces—viz. the skilful use of a central position, and interior line of communication, and the rapid accumulation of superior forces against one of the assailing armies, at a time when it was so situated that it could not receive any assistance from the other. The movements of the Archduke between the armies of Moreau and Jourdan, and the skill with which, by bringing a preponderating force against the decisive point, he compelled their vast armies to undertake a disastrous retreat, are precisely parallel to the blows struck by Napoléon from the interior line of the Adige, on the converging forces of Quasdanowich and Wurm-

(1) Jom. ix. 215, 243. Arch. Ch. iii. 298, 310. St.-Cyr, iv. 86, 104, 120.

(2) Jom. ix. 221. Arch. Cl. iii. 315, 323. St. Cyr, iv. 127, 138.

ser on the opposite sides of the lake of Guarda; and of Alvinzi and Provera, on the plateau of Rivoli and the shores of the Mincio. The difference only lies in the superior energy and activity with which the Republican general flew from one menaced point to another, the accurate calculation of time on which he rested, and the greater difficulties with which he had to struggle from the closer proximity of the attacking forces to each other.

The results of this campaign proved the justice of the observation of Napoléon, that the decisive blows were to be struck against Austria in the Valley of the Danube; and that Carnot's plan of turning both flanks of the Imperialists at once, along the vast line from the Maine to the Alps, was essentially defective, and offered the fairest opportunity to an enterprising general, aware of the importance of time and rapid movement in war, to fall with a preponderating force first on the one and then on the other. If, instead of dispersing the invading host into two armies, separated from each other by above 100 miles, and acting without concert, he had united them into one mass, or moved them by converging lines towards Ulm, the catastrophe of 1805, to Austria, at that place, or of Leipsic, in 1815, to France, might have been anticipated with decisive effect upon the issue of the war. And after giving all due praise to the just views and intrepid conduct of the Austrian hero, the deliverer of Germany, it must be admitted that he did not carry his enlightened principles into practice with such vigour as might have been done; and that had Napoléon been in his place on the Murg and at Amberg, he would have struck as decisive blows as at Rivoli and Castiglione (1).

Prodigious
contribu-
tions levied
by the Re-
publicans in
Germany.

The unsuccessful irruption of the French into Germany was attended with one important consequence, from the effectual manner in which it withdrew the veil from the eyes of the lower classes as to the real nature of democratic ambition, and the consequences

with which it was attended to the inhabitants of the vanquished states. The Republicans, being destitute of every thing, and in an especial manner denuded of money, when they crossed the Rhine, immediately put in practice their established principle of making war support war, and oppressed the

Disgust
which it
excited in
Germany.

vanquished people by the most enormous contributions. The lesser

German states only purchased neutrality by the most enormous sacrifices (2). The people contrasted these cruel exactions with the seductive promises of war to the palace and peace to the cottage, and all learned at length, from bitter experience, the melancholy truth, that military violence, under whatever names it may be veiled, is the same in all ages; and that none are such inexorable tyrants to the poor as those who have recently revolted against authority in their own country. Although, therefore, the terror of the Republican arms at first superseded every other consideration, and detached all the states whose territory had been overrun from the Austrian alliance, yet this was merely the effect of necessity; the hearts of the people remained faithful to the cause of Germany, their exasperation broke out in unmeasured acts of violence against the retreating forces of

(1) Nap. iii. 314, 339. Th. viii. 419. Arch. Ch. iii. 313, 314.

(2) The Duke of Wirtemberg was assessed at 4,000,000 francs, or nearly L.200,000 sterling; the circle of Swabia, 12,000,000, or nearly L. 600,000. Besides 8000 horses, 5000 oxen, 150,000 quintals of corn, and 100,000 pairs of shoes. No less than 8,000,000 or L. 400,000, was demanded from the

circle of Franconia, besides 6000 horses; and immense contributions from Frankfort, Wurtzburg, Bamberg, Nuremburg, and all the towns through which they passed. These enormous exactions, which amounted in all to 25,000,000 francs (L. 1,000,000), 12,000 horses; 12,000 oxen, 500,000 quintals of wheat, and 200,000 pairs of shoes excited an universal alarm.

Jourdan, and they looked only for the first opportunity to resume their ancient attachment to the Imperial standards (1).

Noble and patriotic spirit of the Austrian people. The same causes which thus weakened the predilection of the lower orders in Germany for French principles, operated most powerfully in rousing the ancient and hereditary loyalty of the Austrian people to their own sovereigns. When the Republicans approached Bohemia, and had well-nigh penetrated through Bavaria to the hereditary States, the Emperor issued an animating appeal to his subjects in the threatened provinces, and, with the spirit of Maria Theresa, called on them to repel the renewed Gallic aggression. Austria, in this trying emergency, relied on the constant success which has so long attended its house through all the vicissitudes of fortune, and unsubdued by defeat, maintained that unconquerable spirit which has always characterised its race, and so often is found to triumph over the greatest reverses. The people nobly answered the appeal. The peasants flew to arms; new levies were speedily raised; contributions of stores of every kind were voted by the nobility (2); and from the first invasion of France may be dated the growth of that patriotic spirit which was destined ultimately to rescue Germany from foreign subjugation.

New Convention between France and Prussia. This year witnessed the still closer contracting of the unhappy bands which united Prussia to France, and so long perpetuated on the continent the overwhelming influence of Gallic power. Hardenberg and Haugwitz, who directed the cabinet of Berlin, and who, notwithstanding their differences on many other points, were cordially united in all measures calculated to augment the influence of Prussia in the north of Germany, had laboured assiduously all the summer to form a federal union for the protection of the states in that portion of the empire; and they had succeeded in obtaining a convocation of the circle of Lower Saxony and of Westphalia on the 20th June, to arrange the formation of a formidable army of observation, of which Prussia was the head, to cause their neutrality to be respected by the belligerent powers. The French minister at Berlin, artfully improving upon the terrors produced by Napoléon's successes in Italy, and Jourdan's irruption into Franconia, easily persuaded Haugwitz that the period had now arrived when the interests of Prussia indispensably required the breaking up of the old Germanic Empire, and the 5th Aug. recognition of the left bank of the Rhine to France; and in consequence, two conventions, one public, the other secret, were signed at Berlin on the 5th August. By the first, which alone at that time was published, the line of demarcation, beyond which hostilities were not to pass, was extended, and made to run from Wesel on the Rhine, following the frontiers of the mountains of Thuringia, extending along the North Sea, including the mouths of the Elbe, the Weser, and the Ems, and so round by the frontiers of Holland to Wesel again. Beyond this, in addition to the line already agreed to by the treaty of Bâle, the Directory agreed not to push their military operations. By the second, which was kept secret, Prussia recognised the extension of France to the Rhine; and the principle, that the dispossessed German princes were to be indemnified at the expense of the ecclesiastical princes of the empire. The third article provided an indemnity to the Prince of Orange, now evidently and apparently finally expelled from his dominions; and Prussia engaged to endeavour for this purpose to procure

(1) Ann. Reg. 1796, 135, 143. Hard. iii. 393.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1796, 131, 135.

the secularization of the Bishoprics of Bamberg and Wurtzburg. "Such was the Secret Convention," says Hardenberg, "which in a manner put the cabinet of Berlin at the mercy of France in the affairs of Germany (4)." It may be added, such was the commencement of that atrocious system of indemnifying the greater powers at the expense of the lesser; and providing for the rapacity of temporal powers by the sacrifice of the Church, which soon after not only shook to its foundation the constitution of the Germanic empire, but totally overturned the whole balance of power and system of public rights in Europe.

While these important transactions were in progress in the heart of Europe, events of another kind but not less important in their future effects upon the fate of the war, were preparing upon another element.

Three years of continued success had rendered the British flag omnipotent upon the ocean. Britannia literally ruled the waves; the French colonies successively fell beneath her strokes; and her fleets, blockaded in their harbours, were equally unable to protect the commerce of the Republic, or acquire the experience requisite for maritime success. The minister of the marine, Truguet, in proposing a new system for the regulation of the navy, gave a gloomy but faithful picture of its present condition. "The deplorable state of our marine," said he, "is well known to our enemies, who insult us in our very harbours. Our fleets are humiliated, defeated, blockaded in their ports; destitute of provisions and naval equipments; torn by internal faction, weakened by ignorance, ruined by desertion: such is the state in which the men to whom you have intrusted its direction, have found the French marine (2)."

The ruin of the French navy was not the consequence merely of the superior skill and experience of the English sailors; it arose necessarily from the confusion of finances, loss of colonies, and failure of resources, which was the result of the revolutionary convulsion. Fleets cannot be equipped without naval stores, nor navigated but by a body of experienced seamen; it is impossible, therefore, to become a powerful maritime state without a regular revenue and an extensive commerce, both of which had disappeared during the distractions of the revolution. Severe internal distress, by filling the ranks of the army, may form a formidable military power, and destitute battalions may issue from a revolutionary furnace, to plunder and oppress the adjoining states; but a similar system will never equip a fleet, nor enable a revolutionary to contend with a regular government on the ocean. From the very elements by which the contest was carried on, it was already evident, that, though France might defeat the land forces of Europe, England would acquire the dominion of the waves.

The hostilities carried on by the naval and military forces of Great Britain in the West and East Indies, were attended with the most decisive success. The Island of Grenada which had long been in a state of revolt, yielded to the perseverance and ability of General Nicols: St.-Lucie was reduced in May by General Abercromby, and Essequibo and Demerara by General White, while the French could only set off against these losses the destruction of the merchandise and shipping at Newfoundland by Admiral Richery. In the Indian seas, the successes of the British were still more important. A Dutch squadron of three ships of the line,

(1) Hard. iii. 374, 394, 398.

(2) Jom. ix. 225.

three frigates, and many vessels of inferior size, having on board two thousand land troops, destined to retake the Cape of Good Hope, was captured Aug. 1796. by Admiral Elphinstone in the Bay of Saldanha, while the Batavian settlements of Ceylon, the Malaccas, and Cochin, with the important harbour of Trincomalée, were, early in the year, taken possession of by the British forces (1).

General joy
which these
successes
diffused in
England.

These important successes, particularly the reduction of the Cape, Ceylon, and the Malaccas, diffused the most general joy through the British nation. It was justly observed, that the former was a half-way-house to India, and indispensable to the mighty empire which we had acquired in the plains of Hindostan, while the latter secured the emporium of the China trade, and opened up the vast commerce of the Indian Archipelago. The attention of the people, by these great acquisitions, began to be turned towards the probable result and final issue of the war: they looked to the conquests of the British at sea as likely to counterbalance the acquisitions of the Republicans at land: they observed that Rhodes long maintained a doubtful contest with Rome after its land forces had subdued Spain, Carthage, and part of Gaul; and that in a similar contest Great Britain would have incomparably greater chances of success than the Grecian commonwealth, from the superior internal strength which the population of its own islands afforded, and the far more extensive commerce which enriched it from every quarter of the globe. "Athens," said Xenophon, "would have prevailed over Lacedemon, if Attica had been an island inaccessible save by water to the land forces of its opponent;" and it was impossible not to see that nature had given that advantage to the European, which she had denied to the Grecian maritime power. The formation of a great colonial empire, embracing all the quarters of the globe, held together and united by the naval power of England, and enriching the parent state by their commerce, and the market they would open for its manufactures, began to engage the thoughts not only of statesmen, but of practical men, and the Cape and Ceylon to be spoken of as acquisitions which should never be abandoned (2).

Continued
deplorable
state of St.
Domingo.

St.-Domingo still continued in the distracted and unfortunate state into which it had been thrown by the visionary dreams of the French Republicans, and the frightful flames of a servile war which had been lighted up by their extravagant philanthropists. All the efforts, both of the French and English, to restore any thing like order to its furious and savage population, proved unsuccessful. The latter had never been in sufficient force to make any serious impression on its numerous and frantic inhabitants; and the former were hardly able to retain a scanty footing in the northern part of the island, without attempting to regain the splendid and prosperous colony which they had lost. The blacks, taught by experience, perfectly acquainted with the country, and comparatively inaccessible to its deadly climate, maintained a successful contest with European forces, who melted away more rapidly under its fatal evening gales, than either by the ravages of famine or the sword of the enemy. Toussaint had already risen to eminence in the command of these desultory forces, and was taken into the French service with the division he had organized (3), in the vain attempt to re-establish the sinking authority of the Republican commissioners.

Notwithstanding the disastrous state of her principal colony, and the great

(1) Ann. Reg. 1796, 194. *Jom.* ix. 240.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1796, 195, *Jom.* ix. 241.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1796, 192, 193. *Jom.* 230, 240.

Treaty of
alliance
between
France and
Spain.

losses which she had sustained in her maritime possessions, Great Britain showed herself disposed during this year to make great sacrifices to France to obtain a general peace. In truth, notwith-

standing her naval successes, the situation of England, from the disasters of her allies, had become sufficiently alarming. Spain, detached by the treaty of Bale from all connexion with the Allies, had lately fallen under the Republican influence, and given way to that jealousy of the British naval power, which is so easily excited among the European states. The Directory, artfully improving these advantages, had fanned the Spanish discontents into a flame, by holding out the hopes of some acquisitions in Italy, won by the sword of Napoléon, in case they joined the Republican alliance. Influenced by these considerations, the Spaniards fell into the snare, from which they were des-

19th Aug.
At St.-Ilde-
fonso.

tinued in future to experience such disastrous effects, and on the 19th August concluded a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive,

with France, on the footing of the family compact. By this treaty, the powers mutually guaranteed to each other their dominions both in the Old and the New World, and engaged to assist each other, in case of attack, with twenty-four thousand land troops, thirty ships of the line, and six frigates. This was

2d Oct.

followed, in the beginning of October, by a formal declaration of war on the part of Spain against Great Britain. Thus England, which had commenced the war with so many confederates, saw herself not only deprived of all her maritime allies, but the whole coasts of Europe, from the Texel to Gibraltar, arrayed in fierce hostility against her (1).

(1) Th. viii. 251, 352. Ann. Reg. 1797, 2.

5th Oct. Many grounds of complaint were assign-
1796. ed in the Spanish manifesto on this occasion; but they met with a decisive refutation from the British cabinet, in an able state paper, drawn by Mr. Canning. It was urged by the Spanish court that the conduct of the English during the war, but especially at the siege of Toulon, and in the expedition of Toulon, had determined the cabinet of Madrid to make peace with France as soon as it could be done with safety to the monarchy; that the bad faith of the English government further appeared in the treaty of 19th Nov. 1794, concluded, without regard to the rights of Spain, with the United States, in the injustice with which they seized the St Jago, at first taken by the French, but afterwards retaken by the English, which, by the subsisting convention, ought to have been restored, and in the intercepting of ammunition for the Spanish squadrons; that the crews of her ships had frequently landed on the coast of Chili, and carried on a contraband trade, as well as reconnoitered these valuable possessions, and had evinced a clear intention of seizing part of the Spanish colonial territories, by sending a considerable force to the Antilles and St Domingo, and her recent acquisition of the Dutch settlement of Demerara; that frequent insults and acts of violence had been committed by the English cruisers upon Spanish vessels in the Mediterranean; that the Spanish territory had been violated by descents of English ships on the coast of Galicia and at Trinidad; and, finally, that the majesty of Spain had been insulted by the decrees of a court in London, authorizing the arrest of its ambassador for a small sum. "By all these insults," it concluded, "equally deep and unparalleled, that nation has proved to the universe, that she recognises no other laws, than the aggrandizement of her commerce, and by her despotism, which has exhausted our patience and moderation, has rendered a declaration of war unavoidable." [Ann. Reg. xxxviii. 196. State Papers.]

To this manifesto, the acrimonious style of which

too clearly betrayed the quarter from which it had proceeded, it was replied by the British government, that "the unprovoked declaration of war on the part of Spain had at length compelled the King of England to take measures to assert the dignity of his crown; that a simple reference to the Spanish declaration, and a bare enumeration of the frivolous charges which it contains, must be sufficient to satisfy every reasonable and impartial person that no part of the conduct of Great Britain towards Spain has afforded the smallest ground of complaint. The acts of hostility attributed to England, consist either of matters perfectly innocent, or of imputed opinions and intentions, of which no proof is adduced, nor effect alleged, or of complaints of the misconduct of unauthorized individuals, concerning which his Majesty has always professed his willingness to institute enquiry, and grant redress, where it was really due. The charge of misconduct on the part of the British admiral at Toulon is unprecedented and absurd, and this is perhaps the first instance that it has been imputed as a crime to one of the commanding officers of two powers, acting in alliance, and making a common cause in war, that he did more than his proportion of mischief to the common enemy. The treaty with America did nothing more than what every independent power has a right to do, or than his Spanish Majesty has since that time himself done; and inflicted no injury whatever on the subjects of that monarchy. The claims of all parties in regard to the condemnation of the St-Jago, captured by his Majesty's forces, were fully heard before the only competent tribunal, and one whose impartiality is above all suspicion. The alleged misconduct of some merchant ships in landing their crews on the coasts of Chili and Peru, forms no legitimate ground of complaint against the British government; and even if some irregularities had been committed, they might have been punished on the spot, or the courts of London were always ready to receive and redress complaints of that description.

"In regard to the expedition to St Domingo and

Overture
for a gene-
ral peace
made by
Great-Bri-
tain.

Impressed with these dangers, and desirous also of disarming the numerous and powerful party in Great Britain who contended against the war, as both unnecessary and impolitic, Mr. Pitt, in the close of this year, made overtures for a general peace to the French government. Lord Malmesbury was dispatched to Paris to open the negotiations; but it is probable that no great hopes of their success were entertained, as nearly at the same time an alliance was concluded with Russia, for the aid of sixty thousand auxiliary troops to the Austrian forces (1). The British envoy arrived at Paris on the 22d October, amidst the acclamations of the inhabitants, and proposals of peace were immediately made by the

Which proves
unsuccessful.

English government. These were, the recognition of the Republic by the British government, and the restitution of all the colonies to France and Holland which had been conquered since the commencement of the war. In return for these concessions, they insisted that the French should restore the Low Countries to the Emperor, Holland to the Stadtholder, and evacuate all their conquests in Italy, but they were to retain Luxemburg, Namur, Nice, and Savoy (2). It was hardly to be expected that the Republican government, engaged in so dazzling a career of victory, and so entirely dependent on popular favour, would consent to these terms, or that they could have maintained their place at the head of affairs, if they had submitted to such reasonable propositions; and, accordingly, after the negotiations had been continued for two months, they were abruptly broken off, by the Directory ordering Lord Malmesbury to quit Paris in twenty-four

27th Dec.
1796.

hours, and he immediately returned to his own country (5). But it must ever be a matter of pride to the British historian, that the power which had been uniformly victorious on its own element should have offered to treat on terms of equality with that from which it had so little to dread, and that England, to procure favourable terms for her allies, was willing to have abandoned all her own acquisitions.

While these negotiations were yet pending, a measure was undertaken by the French government, which placed England in the utmost peril, and from which she was saved rather by the winds of heaven than any exertions of

Demerara, with all the regard which he feels to the rights of neutral powers, it is a new and unheard of extension of neutral rights which is to be restricted by no limits, and is to attach not to the territories of a neutral power itself, but to whatever may once have belonged to it, and to whatever may be situated in its neighbourhood, though in the actual possession of an enemy. The complaint in regard to St Domingo is peculiarly unfortunate, as the cession of part of that island by the recent treaty from Spain to France, is a breach of that solemn treaty under which alone the crown of Spain holds any part of its American possessions. Such an act would at once have justified any measures of retaliation on the part of the British government; but so earnest was their desire to maintain peace, that they repeatedly endeavoured to ascertain when the Spanish right to the ceded territory was to terminate. In order that their efforts might be directed against the French alone. Some irregularities in the course of so long and vast a contest may have been committed by the British cruisers in the exercise of the undoubted right of search enjoyed by every belligerent state; but to the readiness of the British government to grant redress in every case where an injury has been committed, even Spain herself can bear testimony. The complaint regarding the alleged decree against the Spanish ambassador, is, if possible, still more frivo-

lous, that being nothing more than a simple citation to answer for a debt demanded, the mistaken act of an individual who was immediately disavowed and prosecuted by the government, and made repeated but vain submissive applications to the Spanish ambassador for forgiveness, such as in all former cases had been deemed satisfactory.

"It will be plain to posterity, it is now notorious to Europe, that neither to the genuine wishes, nor even the mistaken policy of Spain, is her present conduct to be attributed; that not from enmity towards Great Britain, not from any resentment of past, or apprehension of future injuries, but from a blind subservience to the views of his Majesty's enemies; from the dominion usurped over her councils and actions by her new allies, she has been compelled to act in a quarrel, and for interests, not her own; to take up arms against one of those powers in whose cause she had professed to feel the strongest interest, and to menace with hostility another, against whom no cause of complaint is pretended, but an honourable adherence to its engagements."

—*Ann. Reg.* 1796, 147; *State Papers*.

(1) *Jom.* ix. 246.

(2) *Jom.* ix. 246. *Th.* viii. 482. *Ann. Reg.* 1796, 190, and *State Papers*, 147, 177. *Hard.* iv. 85, 86.

(3) *Jom.* ix. 149. *Ann. Reg.* 1796, 191, and *State Papers*, 176, 177. *Hard.* iv. 106, 110.

her own. It was the extravagant expectations they had formed of success from this operation, which led to the long delay and final rupture of the negotiation (1).

Alarming state of Ireland. Ireland, long the victim of oppressive government, and now of popular passion, was at this period in a state of unusual excitation. The successful issue of the French Revolution had stimulated the numerous needy and ardent characters in that distracted nation to project a similar revolt against the authority of England, and above two hundred thousand men, in all parts of the country, were engaged in a vast conspiracy for overturning the established government, and erecting a republic, after the model of France, in its stead. Overlooking the grinding misery which the convulsions of the Republic had occasioned to its inhabitants, without considering how an insular power, detached from the continent, was to maintain itself against the naval forces of England, the patriots of Ireland rushed blindly into the project, with that ardent but inconsiderate zeal for which the people of that generous country have always been distinguished. The malcontents were enrolled under generals, colonels, and officers, in all the counties; arms were secretly provided, and nothing was wanting but the arrival of the French troops to proclaim the insurrection in every part of the country. With such secrecy were the preparations made, that the British government had but an imperfect account of their danger, while the French Directory, accurately informed by their emissaries of what was going forward, were fully prepared to turn it to the best account (2).

(1) Hard. iv. 107.

(2) Hard. ii. 187, 189. Th. viii. 352, 486. Monre's Fitz-Gerald, i. 275. 300.

The intentions of the Irish revolutionists, and the length to which they had in secret carried their preparations for the formation of an Hibernian Republic, will be best understood from the following passages, in a memorial presented by Wolfe Tone, one of their principal leaders, to the French Directory.

"The Catholics of Ireland are 3,150,000, all trained from their infancy in an hereditary hatred and abhorrence of the English name. For these five years they have fixed their eyes most earnestly on France, whom they look upon, with great justice, as fighting their battles, as well as those of all mankind who are oppressed. Of this class, I will stake my head, there are 500,000 men, who would fly to the standard of the Republic, if they saw it once displayed in the cause of liberty and their country.

"The Republic may also rely with confidence on the support of the Dissenters, actuated by reason and reflection, as well as the Catholics, impelled by misery, and inflamed by detestation of the English name. In the year 1794, the Dissenters of Belfast first formed the club of United Irishmen, so called, because in that club, for the first time, Dissenters and Catholics were seen together in harmony and union. Corresponding clubs were rapidly formed, the object of which was to subvert the tyranny of England, establish the independence of Ireland, and frame a free Republic on the broad basis of liberty and equality. These clubs were rapidly filled and extended in June last over two-thirds of that province. Their members are all bound by an oath of secrecy, and could, I have not the smallest doubt, on a proper occasion, raise the entire force of the province of Ulster, the most populous, warlike, and best informed in the nation.

"The Catholics also have an organization commencing about the same time with the clubs last mentioned, but composed of Catholics only. Until within these few months this organization baffled

the utmost vigilance of the Irish government, unsuccessfully applied to discover its principles; and to this hour they are, I believe, unapprized of its extent. The fact is, that in June last, it embraced the whole peasantry of the provinces of Ulster, Leinster, and Connaught, three-fourths of the nation, and I have little doubt that it has since extended into Munster, the remaining province. These men, who are called defenders, are completely organized on a military plan, divided according to their respective districts, and officered by men chosen by themselves; the principle of their union is implicit obedience to the orders of those whom they have elected as their generals, and whose object is the emancipation of their country, the subvers on of English usurpation, and the bettering the condition of the wretched peasantry of Ireland. The eyes of this whole body, which may be said almost without a figure to be the people of Ireland, are turned with the most anxious expectation to France for assistance and support. The oath of their union recites, 'that they will be faithful to the united nations of France and Ireland,' and several of them have already sealed it with their blood. I suppose there is no conspiracy, if a whole people can be said to conspire, which has continued for so many years as this has done, where the secret has been so religiously kept, and where in so vast a number so few traitors are to be found.

"There is also a further organization of the Catholics, which is called the General Committee, a representative body chosen by the Catholics at large, which decides the movements of the City of Dublin, and possesses a very great influence on the minds of the Catholics throughout the nation. I can add, from my personal knowledge, that a great majority of the able and honest men who compose it are sincere Republicans, warmly attached to the cause of France, and as Irishmen, and as Catholics, doubly bound to detest the tyranny and domination of England, which has often deluged the country with their best blood.

"The militia are about eighteen thousand strong,

Hoche, at the head of a hundred thousand men, on the shores of the ocean, in la Vendée and Brittany, burned with the desire to eclipse the great exploits of Napoléon and Moreau against the Imperial forces, Ireland offered a theatre worthy of his army and his reputation, and by striking a decisive blow against the English power in that quarter, he had an opportunity of crippling the ancient rival of France, and achieving greater benefits for his country than either the victory of Fleurus or the triumphs of Rivoli. Truguet, the minister of marine, seconded him warmly with all his influence, and by their joint exertions an expedition was shortly prepared at Brest, more formidable than could have been anticipated from the dilapidated state of the French navy. It consisted of fifteen ships of the line, on board each of which were embarked six hundred soldiers, twelve frigates and six corvettes, each carrying two hundred and fifty men, and of transports and other vessels, conveying in all twenty-five thousand land forces. This armament was to be joined by seven ships of the line, under Richery, from the harbour of Rochefort. The troops were the best in Hoche's army; the general-in-chief was sanguine of success; and such were the hopes entertained of the result of the expedition, that the Directory transmitted orders for it to sail several weeks before Lord Malmesbury left Paris, and their expectations of its consequences were the principal motive for breaking off the negotiation (1).

To distract the attention of the enemy, the most inconsistent accounts were spread of the object of the expedition; sometimes, that it was destined for the West Indies; at others, for the shores of Portugal; but, notwithstanding these artifices, the British government readily discerned where the blow was really intended to be struck. Orders were transmitted to Ireland to have the militia in readiness; a vigilant watch kept up on the coasts; and, in the event of a descent being effected, all the cattle and provisions driven into the interior; precautions which in the end proved unnecessary, but were dictated by a prudent foresight, and gave the French government an idea of the species of resistance which they might expect in the event of such an invasion being really effected (2).

The expedition sets sail.
15th Dec.

The expedition set sail in the middle of December, two days before the negotiation was broken off at Paris; but it encountered disasters from the very moment of its leaving the harbour. A violent tempest arose immediately after its departure; and though the mist with

as fine men as any in Europe. Of these sixteen thousand are Catholics, and of those a very great proportion are sworn defenders, I have not a shadow of doubt that the militia would, in cases of emergency, to a man, join their countrymen in throwing off the yoke of England."—*First Memorial delivered to the French Directory, Feb. 1796, by Wolfe Tone.*

—WOLFE TONE, ii. 187-188-191.

"It would be just as easy, in a month's time, to have an army in Ireland of two hundred thousand men as ten thousand. The peasantry would flock to the Republican standard in such numbers as to embarrass the general-in-chief. A proclamation should instantly be issued, containing an invitation to the people to join the Republican standard, organize themselves, and form a National Convention for the purpose of framing a Government, and administering the affairs of Ireland till it was put in activity.

"The first act of the Convention thus constituted should be to declare themselves the Representatives of the Irish people, free and independent, and in that capacity to form an alliance, offensive and defen-

sive, with the French Republic, stipulating that neither party should make peace with England till the two Republics were acknowledged.

"The Convention should next publish a proclamation, notifying their independence and their alliance with the French Republic, forbidding all adherence to the British government under the penalty of high treason, ordering all taxes and contributions to be paid only to such persons as should be appointed by the provisional government. Another to the militia, recalling them to the standard of their country; and another to the Irishmen in the navy, recalling them directly from that service; and this should be followed by another, confiscating every shilling of English property in Ireland of every species, movable or fixed, and appropriating it to the national service."

—WOLFE TONE, *Second Memorial addressed to the French Directory*, ii. 197-201.

(1) Ann. Reg. 1796, 198. Th. viii. 253, 486, 487. Jom. ix. 250. Hard. iv. 107.

(2) Jom. ix. 253. Th. viii. 485. Ann. Reg. 1796, 198, 199.

which it was accompanied enabled the French admiral to elude the vigilance of the British squadron, yet one ship of the line struck on the rocks near the isle of Ushant and perished; several were damaged, and the fleet totally dispersed. This tempestuous weather continued the whole time the fleet was at sea. Hoche himself, who was on board a frigate, was separated from the remainder of his squadron; and after a stormy passage, a part of the expedition reached the point of rendezvous, in Bantry bay, eight days after its

24th Dec. departure from the French harbour. Admiral Bouvet, the second in command, resolved to land the troops, although only eight ships of the line, and some of the transports, were assembled, having on board six thousand sand land forces; but the violence of the tempest, and the prodigious swell of the sea on that iron-bound coast, rendered that impossible, and the crew of a boat, which was sent through the surf

to reconnoitre, were speedily made prisoners by the numerous bodies of armed men who appeared on the coast to oppose a landing. Dispirited by such a succession of disasters, unwilling to undertake the responsibility of hazarding a part only of the land forces in the absence of the general-in-chief, and apprehensive that provisions for the crews of the vessels would fail, from the long time that they had been at sea, Bouvet resolved to make the best of his way back to the French harbours. He set sail accordingly, and

31st Dec. had the good fortune to reach Brest on the last day of December, whither he was soon followed by the scattered divisions of his fleet, after two ships of the line, and three frigates, had been lost; one of the former by the violence of the elements, and the other by the attacks of the English. Hoche himself, after escaping a thousand perils, was landed on the island of Rhe; and the Directory, abandoning the expedition for the present, moved the greater part of his forces to the Rhine, to replace the losses of Jourdan's army, to the command of which they destined that able general (1).

Reflections
on the failure
of this
expedition.

Such was the issue of this expedition, which had so long kept Great Britain in suspense, and revealed to its enemies the vulnerable quarter in which it might be attacked with the greatest

chance of success. Its result was pregnant with important instructions to the rulers of both countries. To the French, as demonstrating the extraordinary risks which attend a maritime expedition in comparison with a land campaign; the small number of forces which can be embarked on board even a great fleet, and the unforeseen disasters which frequently on that element defeat the best concerted enterprises; to the English, as showing that the empire of the seas does not always afford security against invasion; that in the face of superior maritime forces, her possessions were for sixteen days at the mercy of the enemy, and that neither the skill of her sailors, nor the valour of her armies, but the fury of the elements, saved them from danger in the most vulnerable part of their dominions. While these considerations are fitted to abate the confidence of invasion, they are calculated at the same time to weaken an overweening confidence on naval superiority, and to demonstrate, that the only basis on which certain reliance can be placed, even by an armed power, is a well-disciplined army, and the patriotism of its own subjects.

It is a curious subject for speculation, what might have been the result had Hoche succeeded in landing with sixteen thousand of his best troops on the Irish shores. To those who consider, indeed, the patriotic spirit, indomi-

(1) Ann. Reg. 1796, 198. Th. viii, 489-490, Join. ix, 252.

table valor, and persevering character of the English people, and the complete command they had of the sea, the final issue of such a contest cannot appear doubtful; but it is equally evident that the addition of such a force, and so able a commander, to the numerous bodies of Irish malecontents, would have engendered a dreadful domestic war, and that the whole energies of the empire might for a very long period have been employed in saving itself from dismemberment. When it is considered, also, how widely the spirit of discontent was diffused even through the population of Great Britain at that period, in what a formidable manner it soon after broke out in the mutiny at the Nore, and what serious financial embarrassments were already pressing upon the treasury, and preparing the dreadful catastrophe which led to the suspension of cash payments in the following spring, it must be admitted that the nation then stood upon the edge of an abyss; and that, if ever Providence interferes in human affairs otherwise than by the energy which it infuses into the cause of justice, and the moral laws to which the deeds of free agents are rendered subservient, its protection never appeared in so remarkable a manner to the British islands since the winds dispersed the Spanish Armada.

10th Nov.
Death of the
Empress
Catharine. The close of this year was marked by the death of the Empress Catharine, and the accession of the Emperor Paul to the Russian throne; an event of no small importance to the future fate of the war and destiny of the world. Shortly before her death, she had by art and flattery contrived to add Courland to her immense dominions: She had recently made herself mistress of Derbent in Persia; and the alliance with Great Britain and Austria secured to her the concurrence of these powers in her favourite project of dismembering the Turkish dominions, and placing her youngest son on the throne of Constantine. She thus seemed to be fast approaching the grand object of her ambition, and might have lived to see the cross planted on the domes of St.-Sophia, when death interrupted all her schemes of ambition, in the sixty-seventh year of her age, and the thirty-sixth of her reign. Her latest project was the formation of a powerful confederacy for the defence of Europe against the French Republic; and she had given orders for the levy of 150,000 men, destined to take a part in the German campaigns; a design, which, if carried into effect by her firm and intrepid hand, might have accelerated by nearly twenty years the catastrophe which closed the war (1).

Her character. Few sovereigns will occupy a more conspicuous place in the page of history, or have left in their conduct on the throne a more exalted reputation. Prudent in council, and intrepid in conduct; cautious in forming resolutions, but vigorous in carrying them into execution; ambitious, but of great and splendid objects only; passionately fond of glory, without the alloy, at least in public affairs, of sordid or vulgar inclinations; discerning in the choice of her counsellors, and swayed in matters of state only by lofty intellects; munificent in public, liberal in private, firm in resolution, she dignified a despotic throne by the magnanimity and patriotism of a more virtuous age. But these great qualities were counterbalanced by as remarkable vices—and more truly perhaps of her than of the Virgin Queen of England, it might be said, in Burleigh's words, "that if to-day she was more than man, to-morrow she would be less than woman." Vehement, sensual, and capricious in private life, she seemed, as a woman, to live only for

the gratification of her passions; tyrannical, overbearing, and sometimes cruel in her administration, she filled her subjects with unbounded awe for her authority. In the lustre of her administration, however, the career of her victories, and the rapid progress of her subjects under so able a government, mankind overlooked her dissolute manners, the occasional elevation of unworthy favourites, frequent acts of tyranny, and the dark transaction which signalized her accession to the throne; they overlooked the frailties of the woman in the dignity of the princess; and paid to the abilities and splendour of the Semiramis of the North that involuntary homage which commanding qualities on the throne never fail to acquire, even when stained by irregularities in private life.

The end of the same year witnessed the resignation of the presidency of the United States of America by General Washington, and his voluntary retirement into private life. Modern history has not so spotless a character to commemorate. Invincible in resolution, firm in conduct, incorruptible in integrity, he brought to the helm of a victorious republic the simplicity and innocence of rural life; he was forced into greatness by circumstances, rather than led into it by inclination, and prevailed over his enemies rather by the wisdom of his designs, and the perseverance of his character, than any extraordinary genius for the art of war. A soldier from necessity and patriotism, rather than disposition, he was the first to recommend a return to pacific councils when the independence of his country was secured; and bequeathed to his countrymen an address on leaving their government, to which there is no composition of uninspired wisdom which can bear a comparison (1). He was modest without diffidence; sensible to the voice of fame without vanity; independent and dignified without either asperity or pride. He was a friend to liberty, but not licentiousness; not to the dreams of enthusiasts, but to those practical ideas which America had inherited from her English descent, and which were opposed to nothing so much as the extravagant love of power in the French democracy. Accordingly, after having signalized his life by

(1) See Ann. Reg. 1796. State Papers, 293.

This great man observes, in that admirable composition: "Towards the preservation of your government, and the permanence of your present happy state, it is requisite not only that you discountenance irregular oppositions to its acknowledged authority, but also that you resist with care the spirit of innovation upon its principles, however specious the pretexts. One method of assault may be to effect in the forms of the constitution alterations which will impair the energy of the system, and thus to undermine what cannot be directly overthrown. In all the changes to which you may be invited, remember that time and habit are at least as necessary to fix the true character of governments, as of other human institutions; that experiment is the surest standard by which to test the real tendency of the existing constitution of a country; that facility in changes, upon the mere credit of hypothesis and opinion, exposes to perpetual change, from the endless variety of hypothesis and opinion; and remember especially, that for the efficient management of your common interests, in a country so extensive as ours, a government of as much vigour as is consistent with the perfect security of liberty is indispensable. Liberty itself will find in such a government, with powers properly distributed and adjusted, its surest guardian. It is indeed little else than a name, where the government is too feeble to withstand the enterprises of faction, to confine each

member of the society within the limits prescribed by the laws, and to maintain all in the secure and tranquil enjoyment of the rights of person and property.

"Let me now warn you, in the most solemn manner, against the baneful effects of the spirit of party generally. It is unfortunately inseparable from our nature, having its roots in the strongest passions of the human mind. It exists under different shapes in all governments, more or less stifled, controlled, or oppressed, but in those of the popular form it is seen in its greatest rankness, and it is truly their worst enemy. The alternate dominion of one faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge natural to party dissension, which in different ages and countries has perpetrated the most horrid enormities, is itself a most horrid despotism. But this leads at length to a more formal and permanent despotism. The disorders and miseries which result, gradually incline the minds of men to seek security and repose in the absolute power of a single individual; and sooner or later the chief of some prevailing faction, more able, or more fortunate than his competitors, turns this despotism to the purposes of his own elevation, on the ruins of public liberty." What words, to be spoken by the founder of the American Republic, the refuser of the American crown, at a time when the career of Napoleon had hardly commenced in Europe!—See Ann. Reg. xxxviii. 298; State Papers.

successful resistance to English oppression, he closed it by the warmest advice to cultivate the friendship of Great Britain; and by his casting vote, shortly before his resignation, ratified a treaty of friendly and commercial intercourse between the mother country and its emancipated offspring. He was a Cromwell without his ambition; a Sylla without his crimes: and after having raised his country, by his exertions, to the rank of an independent state, closed his career by a voluntary relinquishment of the power which a grateful people had bestowed. If it is the highest glory of England to have given birth, even amidst Transatlantic wilds, to such a man; and if she cannot number him among those who have extended her provinces or augmented her dominions, she may at least feel a legitimate pride in the victories which he achieved, and the great qualities which he exhibited, in the contest with herself; and indulge with satisfaction in the reflection, that that vast empire which neither the ambition of Louis XIV nor the power of Napoléon, could dismember, received its first rude shock from the courage which she had communicated to her own offspring; and that, amidst the convulsions and revolutions of other states, real liberty has arisen in that country alone, which inherited in its veins the genuine principles of British freedom.

CHAPTER XXII.

- INTERNAL TRANSACTIONS AND NAVAL CAMPAIGN OF GREAT BRITAIN IN 1797.

ARGUMENT.

Gloomy Aspect of Public Affairs in England in the beginning of 1797—Crisis of the Bank—Important Order in Council suspending Cash Payments—Debates on the subject in Parliament—Bill perpetuating this Suspension brought in and carried by Mr. Pitt; at first temporary, then till the Conclusion of the War—Immense Consequence of this Change—Double Set of Causes which affect the Value of Government Paper—Parliamentary Reform is brought forward by Mr. Grey—His Plan of Reform, and Arguments in support of it—Arguments on the other side by Mr. Pitt—It is rejected by Parliament—Reflections on this Subject—Arguments for and against a Continuance of the War—Supplies voted for the Year—Naval Preparations of France and Spain—Mutiny in the Fleet—Origin of the Discontents in the Navy—First breaks out in the Channel Fleet—Perfect Order maintained by the Insurgents—The demands of the Fleet are granted by Government, and Lord Howe at length succeeds in restoring Discipline—Alarming Mutiny at the Nore—Dreadful Consternation in London—Firmness of the King and Government—Noble Conduct of Parliament—Bill against the Mutineers passes by a great majority—The Insurgents become divided—Patriotic Conduct of the Channel Fleet—The mutineers at length submit—Parker is tried and executed—Admirable Conduct of Mr. Pitt on the occasion—Glorious Firmness of Admiral Duncan at this Crisis—The Mutiny was totally unconnected with France—Battle of St. Vincent's—First appearance of Nelson and Collingwood—Great effect produced in Europe by this Victory—Birth and Parentage of Nelson—His Character—Battle of Camperdown—Immense Effect of this Victory—Honours bestowed on Admiral Duncan and Sir John Jarvis—Abortive descent in Pembroke Bay—Capture of Trinidad—Death of Mr. Burke—His Character.

ALTHOUGH the war had now continued four years, and it was obvious to all the world that England and France were the principals in the contest, yet these two states had not as yet come into immediate and violent collision. Inferior powers required to be struck down, weaker states to be removed from the combat, before the leaders of the fight dealt their blows at each other; like the champions of ehalvry, who were separated in the commencement of the affray by subordinate knights, and did not engage in mortal conflict till the field was cleared of the dead and the dying.

The period, however, was now approaching, when this could no longer continue, and the successes of France had been such as to compel Britain to fight, not merely for victory, but existence. All the allies with whom, and for whose protection she had engaged in the contest, were either struggling in the extremity of disaster, or openly arrayed under the banners of her enemies. Austria, after a desperate and heroic resistance in Italy, was preparing for the defence of her last barriers in the passes of the Alps. Holland was virtually incorporated with the conquering Republic. Spain had recently joined its forces; the whole continent, from the Texel to Gibraltar, was arrayed against Great Britain, and all men were sensible that, in spite of her maritime superiority, she had in the preceding winter narrowly escaped invasion in the most vulnerable quarter, and owed to the winds and the waves her exemption from the horrors of civil war.

The aspect of public affairs in Britain had never been so eluded since the commencement of the war, nor indeed during the whole of the 19th cen-

Gloomy aspect of public affairs in England in the beginning of 1797.

ture, as they were at the opening of the year 1797. The return of Lord Malmesbury from Paris had closed every hope of terminating a contest, in which the national burdens were daily increasing, while the prospect of success was continually diminishing. Party spirit raged with uncommon violence in every part of the empire. Insurrections prevailed in many districts of Ireland, discontents and suffering in all, commercial embarrassments were rapidly increasing, and the continued pressure on the bank threatened a total dissolution of public credit. The consequence of this accumulation of disasters was a rapid fall of the public securities; the three per cents were sold as low as 51, having fallen to that from 98, at which they stood at the commencement of the contest; petitions for a change of ministers and an alteration of government were presented from almost every city of note in the empire, and that general distrust and depression prevailed which is at once the cause and the effect of public misfortune (1).

Crisis of the Bank.

The first of these disasters was one which, in a despotic state unacquainted with the unlimited confidence in government that, in a free state, results from long-continued fidelity in the discharge of its engagements, would have proved fatal to the credit of government. For a long period the bank had experienced a pressure for money, owing partly to the demand for gold and silver, which resulted from the distresses of commerce, and partly to the great drains upon the specie of the country, which the extensive loans to the Imperial government had occasioned. So early as January 1795, the influence of these causes was so severely felt, that the bank directors informed the Chancellor of the Exchequer that it was their wish that he would so arrange his finances as not to depend on any further assistance from them; and during the whole of that and the following year the peril of the continued advances for the Imperial loans was strongly and earnestly represented to government. The pressure arising from these causes, severely experienced through the whole of 1796, was brought to a crisis in the close of that year, by the run upon the country banks, which arose from the dread of invasion, and the anxiety of every man to convert his paper into cash in the troubled times which seemed to be approaching. These banks, as the only means of averting bankruptcy, applied from all quarters to the bank of England; the panic speedily gained the metropolis, and such was the run upon that establishment that they were reduced to payment in sixpences, and were on the verge of insolvency, when an order in Council was interposed for their relief, suspending all payments in cash, until the sense of Parliament could be taken upon the best means of restoring the circulation, and supporting the public and commercial credit of the country (2).

Important Order in Council suspending cash payments 26th Feb. 1797.

Debates on this subject in Parliament.

This great and momentous measure, fraught with such lasting and important consequences to the prosperity and fabric of society in Great Britain, was immediately made the subject of anxious and vehement debate in both Houses of Parliament. On the one hand, it was urged that this suspension of credit was not owing to any temporary disasters, but to deep, progressive, and accumulating causes; which all thinking men had long deplored, and which had grown to a head under the unhappy confidence which the House had reposed in the King's ministers; that the real cause of this calamity was to be found in the excessive and extravagant expenditure in all departments of government, and the enormous loans to

(1) Ann. Reg. 1797, 118, 149.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1797, 179-180.

foreign states; that the consequences of this measure were certain, and might be seen as in a mirror in the adjoining Republic of France; a constant fall in the value of bank-notes, a rise in the price of all the articles of human consumption, augmented expenditure, and a continuance of the frantic and costly expeditions, from which both the national honour and security had already so severely suffered. On the other hand, it was contended by the friends of administration, that it never was the intention of government to make bank-notes a legal tender; that the measure adopted was not a permanent regulation, but a temporary expedient to enable the bank to gain time to meet the heavy demands which unexpected circumstances had brought upon it; that the bank was perfectly able ultimately to make good all its engagements, and so the public had already become convinced, in the short interval which had elapsed since the Order in Council was issued; that it was indispensable, however, that Parliament should be satisfied of this solvency, and the necessity which existed for the measure which was adopted, and therefore that the matter should be referred to a secret committee, to report on the funds and engagements of the bank of England, and the measures to be taken for its ultimate regulation(1).

Bill, perpetuating this suspension, at first temporary. This measure having been carried by Mr. Pitt, a committee was appointed, which reported shortly after that the funds of the Bank were L.17,597,000, while its debts were only L.15,770,000, leaving a balance of L.5,800,000 in favour of the establishment; but that it was necessary, for a limited time, to suspend the cash payments. Upon this, a bill for the restriction of payments in specie was introduced, which provided, that bank-notes should be received as a legal tender by the collectors of taxes, and have the effect of stopping the issuing of arrest on mesne process for payment of debt between man and man. The bill was limited in its operation to the 24th June; but it was afterwards renewed from time to time; and, in November 1797, continued till the conclusion of a general peace (2); and the obligation on the bank to pay in specie was never again imposed till Mr. Peel's act in 1849.

At length, till the conclusion of the war. Such was the commencement of the paper system in Great Britain, which ultimately produced such astonishing effects; which enabled the empire to carry on for so long a period so costly a war, and to maintain for years armaments greater than had been raised by the Roman people in the zenith of their power; which brought the struggle at length to a triumphant issue, and arrayed all the forces of Eastern Europe, in English pay, against France, on the banks of the Rhine. To the same system must be ascribed ultimate effects as disastrous, as the immediate were beneficial and glorious; the continued and progressive rise of rents, and fall in the value of money; increased expenditure, the growth of sanguine ideas and extravagant habits in all classes of society: unbounded speculation, prodigious profits, and frequent disasters among the commercial rich: increased wages, general prosperity, and occasional depression among the labouring poor: a vacillation of prices, unparalleled in any age of the world, a creation of property in some, and destruction of it in others, which equalled, in its ultimate consequences, all but the disasters of a revolution.

When government paper is made, either directly, or by implication, a legal tender in all the transactions of life, two different causes may conspire

(1) Parl. Hist. xxxiii. 294, 394.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1797, 192, 206. Parl. Hist. xxxiii. 294, 394, and 1028.

Double set
of causes
which affect
the value of
Government
paper.

to affect prices, tending to the same effect, but in very different degrees. The first is the general fall in the value of money, and consequent rise in the price of every article of life, which results from the unrestrained issue of paper; and this effect takes place without any distrust in government, from the mere increase in the circulating medium, when compared with the commodities in the general market of the nation which it represents, or is destined in its transmission from hand to hand to purchase. This change of prices proceeds on the same principles, and arises from the same causes, as the fall in the money price of grain or cattle, from an excess in the supply of these articles in the market. The second is the far greater, and sometimes unbounded depreciation, which arises from distrust in the ultimate solvency of government, or the means which the nation possesses of making good its engagements. To this fall no limits can be assigned, because government may not be deemed capable of discharging a hundredth part of its debts: whereas, the variation of prices arising from the former, seldom exceeds a duplication of their wonted amount: an effect, however, which is perfectly sufficient, if continued for any considerable time, to make one-half of the property of the kingdom change hands.

The true test of the former effect is to be found in a general rise in the prices of every commodity, but without any difference between the money value when paid in specie and when paid in paper; the mark of the latter is, not only a rise in prices, even when paid in gold or silver, but an extraordinary difference between prices when discharged in a paper and a metallic currency. Notwithstanding all that the spirit of party may have alleged, there does not appear to have ever been any traces of the latter effect in this country; or that at any period a higher price was exacted for articles when paid in bank-notes than in gold; whereas, in France, when the credit of government was almost extinct, a dinner which, when paid in gold, cost a louis (1), could only be discharged in assignats for twenty-eight thousand francs. But the former consequences prevailed long, and with the most wide-spread effects, in this country. Every article of life was speedily doubled in price, and continued above twenty years at that high standard; and, upon the recurrence to a metallic currency in 1819, the distress and suffering among the industrious classes long exceeded any thing ever before witnessed in our history.

Parliamentary Reform
brought forward by Mr.
Grey.

The Opposition deemed this a favourable opportunity to bring forward their favourite project of Parliamentary Reform; as the disasters of the war, the suspension of cash payments by the bank, the mutiny of the fleet, which will be immediately noticed, and the failure of the attempt to negotiate with France, had filled all men's minds with consternation, and disposed many true patriots to doubt the possibility of continuing the present system. On the 26th May, Mr., afterwards Earl, Grey, brought forward his promised motion for a change in the system of representation, which is chiefly remarkable as containing the outlines of that vast scheme which convulsed the nation when he was at the head of affairs in 1831, and subsequently made so great a change on the British constitution. He proposed that the qualification for county electors should remain as it was, but that the members they returned should be increased from 92 to 112; that the franchise should be extended to copyholders, and lease-holders holding leases for a certain dura-

His plan of
reform, and
arguments
in support
of it.

tion; and that the whole remainder of the members, 400 in number, should be returned by one description of persons alone, namely householders. He proposed further, that the elections should be taken over the whole kingdom at once, and a large portion of the smaller boroughs be disfranchised. By this scheme, he contended, the landowners, the merchants, and all the respectable classes of the community, would be adequately represented; and those only excluded whom no man would wish to see retain their place in the legislature, namely, the nominees of great families, who obtained seats not for the public good, but their private advantage. Mr. Erskine, who seconded the motion, further argued, in an eloquent speech, that, from the gradual and growing influence of the crown, the House of Commons had become perverted from its original office, which was that of watching with jealous care over the other branches of the legislature, into the ready instrument of their abuses and encroachments; that there was now a deep and wide-spread spirit of disaffection prevalent in the minds of the people, which rendered it absolutely indispensable that their just demands should be conceded in time; that further resistance would drive them into republicanism and revolution; that the head of the government itself had once declared, that no upright or useful administration could exist while the House was constituted as it then was; that the voice of complaint could not be silenced by a sullen refusal to remedy the grievance, and though this road might be pursued for a season, that the end of these things was death. "Give, on the other hand," said he, "to the people the blessings of the constitution, and they will join with ardour in its defence; and the power of the disaffected be permanently crippled, by severing from them all the rational and virtuous of the community."

Arguments against it by Mr. Pitt. On the other hand, it was contended by Mr. Pitt, that the real question was not whether some alteration in the system of representation might not be attended with advantage, but whether the degree of benefit was worth the chance of the mischief it might possibly, or would probably induce. That it was clearly not prudent to give an opening to principles which would never be satisfied with any concession, but would make every acquisition the means of demanding with greater effect still more extensive acquisitions; that the fortress of the constitution was now beleaguered on all sides, and to surrender the outworks would only render it soon impossible to maintain the defence of the body of the place; that he had himself at one period been a reformer, and he would have been so still, had men's minds been in a calm and settled state, and had he been secure that they would rest content with the redress of real grievances; but since the commencement of the French Revolution, it was too plain that this was very far indeed from being the case. That it was impossible to believe that the men who remained unmoved by the dismal spectacle which their principles had produced in a neighbouring state,—who, on the contrary, rose and fell with the success or decline of Jacobinism in every country of Europe,—were actuated by similar views with those who prosecuted the cause of reform as a practical advantage, and maintained it on constitutional views; and he could never give credit to the assertion, that the temper of moderate reformers would induce them to make common cause with the irreconcilable enemies of the constitution. That reform was only a disguise assumed to conceal the approaches of revolution; and that rapine, conflagration, and murder were the necessary attendants on any innovation since the era of the French Revolution, which had entirely altered the grounds on which the

It is rejected
by Parlia-
ment.

question of reform was rested, and the class of men by whom it was espoused. That these objections applied to any alteration of the government in the present heated state of men's minds; but, in addition to that, the specific plan, now brought forward, was both highly exceptionable in theory and unsupported by experience. On a division, Mr. Grey's motion was lost by a majority of 238 against 95 (1).

Reflections
on this
subject.

In deciding on the difficult question of Parliamentary Reform, which has so long divided, and still divides so many able men in the country, one important consideration, to be always kept in mind, is the double effect which any change in the constitution of government must always produce, and the opposite consequences with which, according to the temper of the times, it is likely to be followed. In so far as it remedies any experienced grievance, or supplies a practical defect, or concedes powers to the people essential to the preservation of freedom, it necessarily does good; in so far as it excites democratic ambition, confers inordinate power, and awakens or fosters passions inconsistent with public tranquillity, it necessarily does mischief, and may lead to the dissolution of society. The expedience of making any considerable change, therefore, depends on the proportions in which these opposite ingredients are mingled in the proposed measure, and on the temper of the people among whom it is to take place. If the real grievance is great, and the public disposition unruffled, save by its continuance, unalloyed good may be expected from its removal, and serious peril from a denial of change: if the evil is inconsiderable or imaginary, and the people in a state of excitement from other causes, concession to their demands will probably lead to nothing but increased confusion, and more extravagant expectations. Examples exist on both sides of the rule; the gradual relaxation of the fetters of feudal tyranny, and the emancipation of the boroughs, led to the glories of European civilisation; while the concession of Charles I, extorted by the vehemence of the Long Parliament, brought that unhappy monarch to the block; the submission of Louis to all the demands of the States-General, did not avert his tragic fate: and the granting of emancipation to the fierce outery of the Irish Catholics, instead of peace and tranquillity, brought only increased agitation and more vehement passions to the peopled shores of the Emerald Isle.

Applying these principles to the question of Parliamentary Reform, as it was then agitated, there seems no doubt that the changes which were so loudly demanded could not have redressed any considerable real grievance, or removed any prolific source of discontent; because they could not have diminished in any great degree the public burdens without stopping the war, and experience has proved in every age, that the most democratic states, so far from being pacific, are the most ambitious of military renown. From a greater infusion of popular power into the legislature, nothing but fiercer wars and additional expenses could have been anticipated. The concession, if granted, therefore, would neither have been to impatience of suffering, nor to the necessities of freedom, but to the desire of power in circumstances where it was not called for; and such a concession is only throwing fuel on the flame. And the event has proved the truth of these principles; reform was refused by the Commons in 1797, and so far from being either enslaved or thrown into confusion, the nation became daily freer and more united, and soon entered on a splendid and unrivalled career of glory; it was con-

(1) *Parl. Hist.* vol. xxxiii. 646, 734. May 26, 1797. *Ann. Reg.* 1797, 253, 264.

ceded by the Commons, in a period of comparative tranquillity, in 1831, and a century will not develop the ultimate effects of the change, which, hitherto at least, has done any thing rather than augment the securities of durable liberty. Still less was it called for as a safeguard to real freedom, because, though it was constantly refused for four-and-thirty years afterwards, the power of the people steadily increased during that period, and at length effected a great democratic alteration in the constitution.

Arguments for and against continuing the war. The question of continuing the war again occupied a prominent place in the debates of the British Parliament. On the side of the Opposition, it was contended that, after four years of war, the addition of 200,000,000 to the national debt, and 9,000,000 annually to the taxes, the nation was farther than ever from achieving the objects for which it had been undertaken; that Holland and Flanders had successively yielded to the arms of the Republic, which, like Antæus, had risen stronger from every fall; that all the predictions of failure in its resources had only been answered by increased conquests and more splendid victories; that the minister was not sincere in his desire for a negotiation, or he would have proposed very different terms from those actually offered, and to which it was impossible to expect that a victorious enemy would accede; that the real object, it was evident, was only to gain time, to put France apparently in the wrong, and throw upon its government the blame of continuing hostilities (1), which had been unfortunately gained through the diplomatic skill evinced by the British ministers in the course of a negotiation begun with the most hollow intentions.

Mr. Pitt lamented the sudden and unforeseen stop put to the negotiations, by which he had fondly hoped that a termination would be put to a contest into which we had been unwillingly dragged. This failure was a subject of regret and disappointment, but it was regret without despondency, and disappointment without despair. "We wish for peace," said he, "but on such terms as will secure its real blessings, and not serve as a cover merely to secret preparations for renewed hostilities; we may expect to see, as the result of the conduct we have pursued, England united and France divided; we have offered peace on the condition of giving up all our conquests to obtain better terms for our allies; but our offers have been rejected, our ambassador insulted, and not even the semblance of terms offered in return. In these circumstances, then, are we to persevere in the war with a spirit and energy worthy of the English name, or to prostrate ourselves at the feet of a haughty and supercilious republic, to do what they require, and submit to all they shall impose? I hope there is not a hand in his Majesty's councils which would sign the proposals, that there is not a heart in the House that would sanction the measure, nor an individual in the British dominions who would serve as courier on the occasion (2)."

Supplies voted for the year. Parliament having determined, by a great majority in both Houses, to continue the contest with vigour, supplies were voted proportioned to the magnitude of the armaments which were required. The sums for the expenses of the war, in two successive budgets, amounted, exclusive of the interest of the debt, to L.42,800,000. In this immense aggregate were included two loans, one of L.48,000,000 and another of L.16,000,000 besides an Imperial loan of L.2,500,000, guaranteed by the British govern-

(1) Parl. Hist. vol. xxxii. 30th Dec. 1796. Ann. Reg. 1797, 152.

(2) Parl. Hist. vol. xxxii. 1796. Dec. 30. Ann. Reg. 1797, 153.

ment. To defray the interest of these loans, new taxes, to the amount of £2,400,000, were imposed. The land forces voted for the year, were 195,000 men, of whom 61,000 were in the British islands, and the remainder in the colonial dependencies of the empire. The ships in commission were 124 of the line, eighteen of fifty guns, 180 frigates, and 184 sloops. This great force, however, being scattered over the whole globe, could hardly be assembled in considerable strength at any particular point; and hence, notwithstanding the magnitude of the British navy upon the whole, they were generally inferior to their enemies in every engagement (1).

Naval preparations of France and Spain.

On the other hand, the naval forces of France and her allies had now become very considerable. Nowise discouraged by the unfortunate issue of the previous attempt against Ireland, the indefatigable Truguet was combining the means of bringing an overwhelming force into the Channel. Twenty-seven ships of the line were to proceed from the Spanish shores, raise the blockade of all the French harbours, and unite with the Dutch fleet from the Texel, in the Channel, where they expected to assemble sixty-five or seventy ships of the line; a force much greater than any which England could oppose to them in that quarter. To frustrate these designs, she had only eighteen ships of the line, under Lord Bridport, in the Channel, fifteen under Admiral Jarvis, off Corunna, and sixteen under Admiral Duncan, off the Texel; in all forty-nine: a force greatly inferior to those of the enemy, if they had been all joined together, and sufficient to demonstrate by what a slender thread the naval supremacy of England was held, when the victories of France enabled her to combine against these islands all the maritime forces of Europe (2).

Mutiny in the fleet.

But great as this peril was, it was rendered incomparably more alarming, by a calamity of a kind and in a quarter where it was least expected. This was the famous *Mutiny in the Fleet*, which, at the very time that the enemies of England were most formidable, and her finances most embarrassed, threatened to deprive her of her most trusty defenders, and brought the state to the very verge of destruction (5).

Unknown to government, or at least without their having taken it into serious consideration, a feeling of discontent had for a very long period prevailed in the British navy. This was, no doubt, partly brought to maturity by the democratic and turbulent spirit which had spread from France through the adjoining states; but it had its origin in a variety of real grievances which existed, and must, if unredressed, have sooner or later, brought on an explosion. The sailors complained with reason, that while all the articles of life had more than doubled in price, their pay had not been augmented since the reign of Charles II; that prize-money was unequally distributed, and an undue proportion given to the officers; that discipline was maintained with excessive and undue severity, and that the conduct of the officers towards the men was harsh and revolting. These evils, long complained of, were rendered more exasperating by the inflammatory acts of a number of persons of superior station, whom the general distress arising from commercial embarrassment had driven into the navy, and who persuaded the sailors, that, by acting unanimously and decidedly, they would speedily obtain redress of their grievances. The influence of these new entrants appeared in the secrecy and ability with which the measures of the

Origin of the discontents in the navy.

(1) Ann. Reg. 1797, 128, 132. Chron. 3.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1797, 94, 95. Jom. x. 195.

(3) Ibid. Jom. x. 196, 197.

malcontents were taken, and the general extension of the conspiracy, before its existence was known to the officers of the fleet (1).

First breaks out in the Channel Fleet. The prevalence of these discontents was made known to Lord Howe and the Lords of the Admiralty, by a variety of anonymous communications, during the whole spring of 1797; but they met with no attention; and, upon enquiry at the captains of vessels, they all declared, that no mutinous disposition existed on board of their respective ships. Meanwhile, however, a vast conspiracy, unknown to them, was already organized, which was brought to maturity on the return of the Channel fleet to 5th April. port in the beginning of April; and on the signal being made from the Queen Charlotte, by Lord Bridport, to weigh anchor, on the 15th of that month, instead of obeying, its crew gave three cheers, which were returned by every vessel in the fleet, and the red flag of mutiny was hoisted on every masthead (2).

Perfect order maintained by the insurgents. In this perilous crisis, the officers of the fleet exerted themselves to the utmost to bring back their crews to a state of obedience, but all their efforts were in vain. Meanwhile, the fleet being completely in possession of the insurgents, they used their power firmly, but with humanity and moderation; order and discipline were universally observed; the most scrupulous attention was paid to the officers; those most obnoxious were sent ashore without molestation; delegates were appointed from all the ships to meet in Lord Howe's cabin, an oath to support the common cause administered to every man in the fleet, and ropes reeved to the yard-arm of every vessel as a signal of the punishment that would be inflicted on those 8th April. that betrayed it. Three days afterwards two petitions were forwarded, one to the Admiralty, and one to the House of Commons, drawn up in the most respectful, and even touching terms, declaring their unshaken loyalty to their king and country, but detailing the grievances of which they complained; that their pay had not been augmented since the reign of Charles II, though every article of life had advanced at least one-third in value; that the pensions of Chelsea were L.15, while those of Greenwich still remained at L.7; that their allowance of provisions was insufficient, and that the pay of wounded seamen was not continued till they were cured or discharged (3).

The demands of the fleet are granted by the government. This unexpected mutiny produced the utmost alarm both in the country and the government; and the Board of Admiralty was immediately transferred to Portsmouth to endeavour to appease it. Earl Spencer hastened to the spot, and after some negotiation, the demands of the fleet were acceded to by the Admiralty, it being agreed that the pay of able-bodied seamen should be raised to a shilling a-day; that of petty officers and ordinary seamen in the same proportion, and the Greenwich pension augmented to ten pounds. This, however, the seamen refused to 7th May. accept, unless it was ratified by royal proclamation and act of Parliament; the red flag, which had been struck, was rehoisted, and the fleet, after subordination had been in some degree restored, again broke out into open mutiny. Government, upon this, sent down Lord Howe to reassure the mutineers, and convince them of the good faith with which they were animated. The personal weight of this illustrious man, the many years he had commanded the Channel fleet, the recollection of his glorious victory at its

(1) Ann. Reg. 1797, 207, 208, 209. Join, x. 202.

(2) Ibid. 208, 209.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1797, 209.

And Lord Howe at length succeeds in restoring subordination.

head, all conspired to induce the sailors to listen to his representations; and in consequence of his assurance that government would faithfully keep its promises, and grant an unlimited amnesty for the past, the whole fleet returned to its duty, and a few days afterwards put to sea, amounting to twenty-one ships of the line, to resume the blockade of Brest harbour (1).

Alarming mutiny at the Nore. The bloodless termination of this revolt, and the concession to the seamen of what all felt to be their just demands, diffused a general joy throughout the nation; but this satisfaction was of short duration. On 22d May, the fleet at the Nore, forming part of Lord Duncan's

6th June. squadron, broke out into open mutiny, and on the 6th June they were joined by all the vessels of that fleet, from the blockading station off the Texel, excepting his own line-of-battle ship and two frigates. These ships drew themselves up in order of battle across the Thames, stopped all vessels going up or down the river, appointed delegates and a provisional government for the fleet, and compelled the ships, whose crews were thought to be wavering, to take their station in the middle of the formidable array. At the head of the insurrection was a man of the name of Parker, a seaman on board the Sandwich, who assumed the title of President of the Floating Republic, and was distinguished by undaunted resolution and no small share of ability. Their demands related chiefly to the unequal distribution of prize-money, which had been overlooked by the Channel mutineers (2); but they went so far in other respects, and were couched in such a menacing strain, as to be deemed totally inadmissible by government.

Dreadful consternation in London.

At the intelligence of this alarming insurrection, the utmost consternation seized all classes in the nation. Every thing seemed to be failing at once; their armies had been defeated, the bank had suspended payment, and now the fleet, the pride and glory of England, seemed on the point of deserting the national colours. The citizens of London dreaded a stoppage of the colliers, and all the usual supplies of the metropolis; the public creditors apprehended the speedy dissolution of government, and the cessation of their wonted payments from the treasury. Despair seized upon the firmest hearts; and such was the general panic, that the three per cents were sold as low as forty-five, after having been nearly 100 before the commencement of the war. Never, during the whole contest, was the consternation so great, and never was England placed so near the verge of destruction (3).

Firmness of the King and government.

Fortunately for Great Britain, and the cause of freedom throughout the world, a monarch was on the throne whose firmness no danger could shake, and a minister at the helm whose capacity was equal to any emergency. Perceiving that the success of the mutineers in the Channel fleet had augmented the audacity of the sailors, and given rise to the present formidable insurrection, and conscious that the chief real grievances had been redressed, government resolved to make a stand, and adopted the most energetic measures to face the danger. All the buoys at the mouth of the Thames were removed; Sheerness, which was menaced with a bombardment from the insurgent ships, was garrisoned with four thousand men; red-hot balls were kept in constant readiness; the fort of Tilbury was armed with 100 pieces of heavy cannon; and a chain of gun-boats sunk to debar the ae-

(1) Ann. Reg. 1797, 211. Jom. x. 203, 204.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1797, 214, 215. Jom. x. 205.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1797, 215, 217.

cess to the harbour. These energetic measures restored the public confidence; the nation rallied round a monarch and an administration who were not wanting to themselves in this extremity; and all the armed men, sailors, and merchants in London, voluntarily took an oath to stand by their country, in this eventful crisis (1).

Noble conduct of Parliament. The conduct of Parliament, on this trying occasion, was worthy of its glorious history. The revolt of the fleet was formally communicated to both Houses by the King on the 1st June, and immediately taken into consideration. The greater part of the Opposition, and especially Mr. Fox, at first held back, and seemed rather disposed to turn the public danger into the means of overturning the administration; but Mr. Sheridan came nobly forward, and threw the weight of his great name and thrilling eloquence into the balance in favour of his country. "Shall we yield," said he, "to mutinous sailors? Never, for in one moment we should extinguish three centuries of glory (2)." Awakened by this splendid example to more worthy feelings, the Opposition at length joined the administration, and a bill for the suppression of the mutiny passed by a great majority, through both Houses of Parliament. By this act, it was declared death for any person to hold communication with the sailors in mutiny after the revolt had been declared by proclamation; and all persons who should endeavour to seduce either soldiers or sailors from their duty were liable to the same punishment. This bill was opposed by Sir Francis Burdett, and a few of the most violent of the Opposition, upon the ground that conciliation and concession were the only course which could ensure speedy submission. But Mr. Pitt's reply,—that the tender feelings of these brave but misguided men were the sole avenue which remained open to recall them to their duty, and that a separation from their wives, their children, and their country, would probably induce the return to duty which could alone obtain a revival of these affections,—was justly deemed conclusive, and the bill accordingly passed (3).

Meanwhile a negotiation was conducted by the Admiralty, who repaired on the first alarm to Sheerness, and received a deputation from the mutineers; but their demands were so unreasonable, and urged in so threatening a manner, that they had the appearance of having been brought forward to exclude all accommodation, and justify, by their refusal, the immediate recurrence to extreme measures. These parleys,

The insurgents are divided. however, gave government time to sow dissension among the insurgents, by representing the hopeless nature of the contest with the whole nation in which they were engaged, and the unreasonable nature of the demands on which they insisted. By degrees they became sensible that they had engaged in a desperate enterprise; the whole sailors on board the Channel fleet gave a splendid proof of genuine patriotism, by reprobating their proceedings, and earnestly imploring them to return to their duty. This remonstrance, coupled with the energetic conduct of both Parliament and government, and the general disapprobation of the nation, gradually checked the spirit of insubordination. On the 9th June, two ships of the line slipped their cables and abandoned the insurgents, amidst a heavy fire from the whole line; on the 15th, three other sail of the line and two frigates openly left them, and

Patriotic conduct of the Channel fleet.

(1) Ann. Reg. 1797, 216, 217. Jom. x. 206.

(2) Parl. Debates, xxxiii. 802, 803.

(3) Parl. Deb. xxxiii. 816, 817. Ann. Reg. 218, 219.

took refuge under the cannon of Sheerness; on the following day, several others followed their example; and at length, on the 13th, the whole remaining ships struck the red flag of mutiny, and the communication between the ocean and the metropolis was restored. Parker, the leader of the insurrection, was seized on board his own ship, and, after a solemn trial, condemned to death; which he underwent with great firmness, acknowledging the justice of his sentence, and hoping only that mercy would be extended to his associates. Several of the other leaders of the revolt were found guilty and executed; but some escaped from on board the prison-ship, and got safe to Calais, and a large number, still under sentence of death, were pardoned, by royal proclamation, after the glorious victory of Camperdown (1).

The mutineers at length submit. Parker is tried and executed.

Admirable conduct of Mr. Pitt on this occasion.

The suppression of this dangerous revolt with so little bloodshed, and the extrication of the nation from the greatest peril in which it had been placed since the Spanish Armada, is the most glorious event in the reign of George III and in the administration of Pitt (2). The conduct adopted towards the insurgents may be regarded as a masterpiece of political wisdom; and the happiest example of that union of firmness and humanity, of justice and concession, which can alone bring a government safely through such a crisis. By at once conceding all the just demands of the Channel fleet, and proclaiming a general pardon for a revolt which had too much ground for its justification, they deprived the disaffected of all real causes of complaint, and detached from their cause all the patriotic portion of the navy; while by resolutely withstanding the audacious demands of the Nore mutineers, they checked the spirit of democracy which had arisen out of those very concessions themselves. For such is the singular combination of good and bad principles in human nature, and such the disposition of man, on the least opening being afforded, to run riot, that not only do our virtues border upon vices, but even from acts of justice the most deplorable consequences frequently flow; and unless a due display of firmness accompany concessions, dictated by a spirit of humanity, they too often are imputed to fear, and increase the very turbulent spirit they were intended to remove.

Glorious firmness of Admiral Duncan at this crisis.

Admiral Duncan's conduct at this critical juncture was above all praise. He was with his fleet, blockading the Texel, when intelligence of the insurrection was received, and immediately four ships of the line deserted to the mutineers, leaving him with an inferior force in presence of the enemy. They were speedily followed by several others; and at length the admiral, in his own ship, with two frigates, was left alone on the station. In this extremity his firmness did not forsake him: he called his crew on deck, and addressed them in one of those speeches of touching and manly eloquence, so well known in antiquity, which at once melts the human heart (3). His crew were dissolved in tears, and declared, in the

(1) Ann. Reg. 1797, 216, 217. Jom. x. 207, 208.

(2) The magnanimous conduct of the British government on this occasion was fully appreciated on the Continent. "Let us figure to ourselves," says Prince Hardenberg, "Richard Parker, a common sailor, the leader of the revolt, taking, at Sheerness, the title of Admiral of the Fleet, and the fleet itself, consisting of eleven sail of the line and four frigates, assuming the title of the Floating Republic; and, nevertheless, recollect, that the English, but recently recovered from a financial crisis, remained undaunted in presence of such a revolt, and did not withdraw one vessel from the blockade of Brest,

Cadiz, or the Texel! It was the firmness of ancient Rome."—HARD. iv. 432.

(3) "My Lads,—I once more call you together, with a sorrowful heart, from what I have lately seen of the disaffection of the fleets; I call it disaffection, for they have no grievances. To be deserted by my fleet, in the face of the enemy, is a disgrace which, I believe, never before happened to a British admiral, nor could I have supposed it possible. My greatest comfort, under God, is, that I have been supported by the officers, seamen, and marines of this ship, for which, with a heart overflowing with gratitude, I request you to accept my sincere thanks.

most energetic manner, their unshaken loyalty, and resolution to abide by him in life or death. Encouraged by this heroic conduct, he declared his determination to maintain the blockade, and, undismayed by the defection of so large a part of his squadron, remained off the Texel with his little but faithful remnant. By stationing one of the ships in the offing, and frequently making signals, as if to the remainder of the fleet, he succeeded in deceiving the Dutch admiral, who imagined that the vessels in sight were only the inshore squadron, and kept his station until the remainder of his ships joined him after the suppression of the insurrection (1).

The mutiny was totally unconnected with France. It was naturally imagined at the time that this formidable mutiny was instigated by the arts of the French government. But though they were naturally highly elated at this unexpected piece of good fortune, and anxious to turn it to the best advantage, and though the revolutionary spirit which was abroad was unquestionably one cause of the commotion, there is no reason to believe that it arose from the instigation of the Directory, or was at all connected with any treasonable or seditious projects. On the contrary, after the minutest investigation, it appeared that the grievances complained of were entirely of a domestic character, that the hearts of the sailors were throughout true to their country, and that, at the very time when they were blockading the Thames in so menacing a manner, they would have fought the French fleet with the same spirit, as was afterwards evinced in the glorious victory of Camperdown (2).

The ultimate consequences of this insurrection, as of most other popular commotions which originate in real grievances, and are candidly but firmly met by government, were highly beneficial. The attention of the cabinet was forcibly turned to the sources of discontent in the navy, and from that to the corresponding causes and grievances in the army, and the result was a series of changes which, in a very great degree, improved the condition of officers and men in both services. The pay of the common soldiers was raised to their present standard of a shilling a-day (3); and those admirable regulations were soon after adopted in regard to pensions, prize-money, and retired allowances, which have justly endeared the memory of the Duke of York and Lord Melville to the privates of the army and navy.

Battle of Cape St. Vincents. But whatever may have been the internal dissensions of the British fleet, never did it appear more terrible and irresistible to its foreign enemies than during this eventful year. Early in February, the Spanish fleet, consisting of twenty-seven ships of the line, and twelve frigates,

I flatter myself, much good may result from your example, by bringing those deluded people to a sense of their duty, which they owe not only to their king and country, but to themselves.

"The British navy has ever been the support of that liberty which has been handed down to us from our ancestors, and which, I trust, we shall maintain to the latest posterity; and that can only be done by unanimity and obedience. This ship's company, and others, who have distinguished themselves by their loyalty and good order, deserve to be, and doubtless will be, the favourites of a grateful nation. They will also have from their inward feelings a comfort which will be lasting, and not like the floating and false confidence of those who have swerved from their duty.

"It has been often my pride with you to look into the Texel, and see a foe which dreaded coming out to meet us. My pride is now humbled indeed!—my feelings cannot easily be expressed. Our eup

has overflowed, and made us wanton. The allwise Providence has given us this check as a warning, and I hope we shall improve by it. On Him, then, let us trust, where our only security is to be found. I find there are many good men among us: for my own part, I have had full confidence in all in this ship, and once more beg to express my approbation of your conduct.

May God, who has thus far conducted you, continue to do so; and may the British navy, the glory and support of our country, be restored to its wonted splendour, and be not only the bulwark of Britain, but the terror of the world. But this can only be effected by a strict adherence to our duty and obedience; and let us pray that the Almighty God may keep us all in the right way of thinking—God bless you all!"—*Ann. Reg.* 1797, 214.

(1) *Ann. Reg.* 1797, 214. *Jom.* x. 211.

(2) *Ibid.* 1797, 219, 221. *Jom.* x. 220.

(3) *Ann. Reg.* 1797, 222; and *State Papers*, 212.

put to sea, with the design of steering for Brest, raising the blockade of that harbour, forming a junction with the Dutch fleet, and clearing the Channel of the British squadron. This design, the same as that which Napoléon afterwards adopted in 1805, was defeated by one of the most memorable victories ever recorded even in the splendid annals of the English navy. Admiral Jarvis, who was stationed off the coast of Portugal, had by the greatest efforts, repaired various losses which his fleet had sustained during the storms of winter, and at this period lay in the Tagus with fifteen sail of the line, and six frigates. The moment he heard of the enemy's having sailed, he instantly put to sea, and was cruising off CAPE ST.-VINCENTS, when he received intelligence of their approach, and immediately prepared for battle.

He drew up his fleet in two lines, and bearing down before the wind, succeeded in engaging the enemy, who were very loosely scattered, and yet straggling in disorderly array, in close combat, before they had time to form in regular order of battle. Passing boldly through the centre of their fleet, the British admiral doubled with his whole force upon nine of the Spanish ships, and by a vigorous cannonade, drove them to leeward, so as to prevent their taking any part in the engagement which followed. The Spanish admiral upon this, endeavoured to regain the lost part of his fleet, and was wearing round the rear of the British lines, when Commodore NELSON, who was in the sternmost ship, perceiving his design, disregarded his orders, stood directly towards him, and precipitated himself into the very middle of the hostile squadron. Bravely seconded by Captains COLLINGWOOD and Troubridge, he ran his ship, the Captain, of seventy-four guns, between two Spanish three-deckers, the Santissima Trinidad, of 156 guns, commanded by Admiral Cordova, and the San Josef, of 112, and succeeded, by a tremendous fire to the right and left, in compelling the former to strike, although it escaped in consequence of Nelson not being able, in the confusion of so close a fight, to take possession of his noble prize. The action, on the part of these gallant men, continued for nearly an hour with the utmost fury against fearful odds, which were more than compensated by the skill of the British sailors and the rapidity of their fire. Meanwhile, Collingwood engaged the *Salvador del Mundo* of 112 guns; the action began when the two ships were not more than fifty yards apart, but such was the tremendous effect of the Englishman's broadsides, that in a quarter of an hour the Spanish three-decker struck her colours, and her firing ceased; upon which that noble officer, disdaining to take possession of beaten enemies, and seeing his old messmate, Nelson, a-head and hard pressed by greatly superior forces, passed on, and the *Salvador*, relieved from her antagonist, again hoisted her colours, and recommenced the action, but she was again compelled to strike, and finally taken possession of by one of the ships which followed (1). Collingwood immediately came alongside the *San Isidro*, seventy-four, so close, that a man might leap from the one to the other, the two vessels engaging thus at the muzzles of their guns. The combat was not of long duration; in ten minutes the Spaniard struck, and was taken possession of by the *Lively* frigate, to whom the Admiral made signal to secure the prize.

Though Collingwood had thus already forced two Spanish line-of-battle ships, one of which was a three-decker, to strike to him, with seventy-four

(1) Nelson's Narrative. Collingwood, i. 53. Collingwood's Mem. i. 47, 48. Brenton, i. 340, 341. Southey's Nelson, i. 170, 174.

guns only, yet he was not contented with his achievement, but pushed on to relieve Nelson, who was now engaged with the San Nicholas and San Josef on one side, and the Santissima Trinidad, a huge four-decker of 136 guns, on the other. So close did he approach the former of these vessels, that, to use his own words, you "could not put a bodkin between them," and the shot from the English ship passed through both the Spanish vessels, and actually struck Nelson's balls from the other side. After a short engagement, the Spaniard's fire ceased on that quarter; and Collingwood, seeing Nelson's ship effectually succoured, passed on, and engaged the Santissima Trinidad, which already had been assailed by several British ships in succession. No sooner was Nelson relieved by Collingwood's fire, than resuming his wonted energy, he boarded the San Nicholas, of seventy-four guns, and speedily hoisted the British colours on the poop; and finding that the prize was severely galled by a fire from the San Josef, of 112 guns, pushed on across it to its gigantic neighbour, himself leading the way, and exclaiming, "Westminster Abbey, or victory!" Nothing could resist such enthusiastic courage; the Spanish admiral speedily hauled down his colours, presenting his sword to Nelson on his own quarter-deck (1), while the English ship lay a perfect wreck beside its two noble prizes.

While Nelson and Collingwood were thus precipitating themselves with unexampled hardihood into the centre of the enemy's squadron on the larboard, the other column of the fleet, headed by Sir John Jarvis in the Victory of 100 guns was also engaged in the most gallant and successful manner; though from being the one on the starboard tack, by which the enemy's line was pierced, they were the rear on the larboard, where Nelson had begun his furious attack. The Victory, passing under the stern of the Salvador del Mundo, followed by the Barfleur, Admiral Waldgrave, poured the most destructive broadsides into that huge three decker; and passing on engaged in succession the Santissima Trinidad, whose tremendous fire from her four decks seemed to threaten destruction to every lesser opponent which approached her. At length, after having been most gallantly fought by Jarvis and Collingwood, she struck to Captain, now Lord de Saumarez, in the Orion; but that intrepid officer being intent on still greater achievements did not heave to, in order to take possession; but thinking it sufficient that she had hoisted the white flag on her quarter and the British union jack over it, passed it, leaving to the ship astern the easy task of taking possession. Unfortunately, in the smoke, this vessel did not perceive the token of surrender; but moved on a-head of the Santissima Trinidad after the admiral, so that the captured Spaniard was encouraged, though dismantled, to try to get off, and ultimately effected her escape. The remainder of the Spanish fleet now rapidly closed in and deprived Captain Saumarez of his magnificent prize (2): but the British squadron kept possession of the San Josef and Salvador, each of 112 guns, and the San Nicholas and San Isidro of 74 each. Towards evening the detached part of the Spanish fleet rejoined the main body, and thereby formed a force still greatly superior to the British squadron, yet such was the consternation produced by the losses they had experienced, and the imposing aspect of the English fleet, that they made no attempt to regain their lost vessels, but, after a distant cannonade, retreated in the night towards

(1) Nelson's Narrative. Collingwood, i, 53. Collingwood, i. 48, 49. Southey's Nelson, i. 170. James, ii. 46, 51.

(2) *Jom.* ii. 48, 64. *Ann. Reg.* 1797, 94, 95. *App.*

to *Chron.* 74. *Jom.* x. 198. Southey's Nelson, i. 170. 176. James, ii. 46, 63. De Saumarez's Life, i. 171, 175. Brenton, i. 341, 342.

Cadiz, whither they were immediately followed and blockaded by the victors.

This important victory, which delivered England from all fears of invasion, by preventing the threatened junction of the hostile fleets, was achieved with the loss of only three hundred men, of whom nearly one-half were on board Nelson's ship, while above five hundred were lost on board the Spanish ships which struck alone; a signal proof how much less bloody sea-fights are than those between land forces, and a striking example of the great effects which sometimes follow an inconsiderable expenditure of human life on that element, compared to the trifling results which attend fields of carnage in military warfare (1).

Great effect
produced by
this victory.

Admiral Jarvis followed the beaten fleet to Cadiz, whither they had retired in the deepest dejection, and with tarnished honour. The defeat of so great an armament by little more than half their number, and the evident superiority of skill and seamanship which it evinced in the British navy, filled all Europe with astonishment, and demonstrated on what doubtful grounds the Republicans rested their hopes of subduing this island. The decisive nature of the victory was speedily evinced by the bombardment of Cadiz on three different occasions, under the direction of Commodore Nelson (2); and although these attacks were more insulting than hurtful to the Spanish ships, yet they evinced the magnitude of the disaster which they had sustained, and inflicted a grievous wound on the pride of the Castilians.

Birth and
parentage
of Nelson.

Horatio Nelson, who bore so glorious a part in these engagements, and was destined to leave a name immortal in the rolls of fame, was born at Birnam Thorpe, in the county of Norfolk, on the 29th September, 1758. He early evinced so decided a partiality for a sea life, that, though of a feeble constitution, he was sent on shipboard at the age of thirteen. Subsequently he went on a voyage to the Greenland seas, and distinguished himself as a subaltern in various actions during the American war. Early in the revolutionary contest, he was employed in the siege of Bastia in the island of Corsica, which he reduced; a singular coincidence, that the greatest leaders both at land and sea in that struggle should have first signalized themselves on the same island. After the battle of St.-Vincent, and the bombardment of Cadiz, he was sent on an expedition against the island of Teneriffe; but though the attack, conducted with his wonted courage and skill, was at first successful, and the town for a short time was in the hands of the assailants, they were ultimately repulsed, with the loss of seven hundred men and Nelson's right arm (3).

His character. Gifted by nature with undaunted courage, indomitable resolution, and undecaying energy, Nelson was also possessed of the eagle glance, the quick determination, and coolness in danger, which constitute the rarest qualities of a consummate commander. Generous, open-hearted, and enthusiastic, the whole energies of his soul were concentrated in the love of his country; like the youth in Tacitus, he loved danger itself, not the rewards of courage; and was incessantly consumed by that passion for great achievements, that sacred fire, which is the invariable characteristic of heroic minds. His soul was constantly striving for great exploits; generosity and magnanimity in danger were so natural to him, that they arose unbidden on every occasion calculated to call them forth. On one occasion, during a violent

(1) James, ii. 63.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1797, 96. *Jom.* x. 200, July, 1797.

(3) Southey's Nelson, i. 195. *Ann. Reg.* 1797, 98.

storm off Minorca, Nelson's ship was disabled and Captain Ball took his vessel in tow. Nelson thought, however, that Ball's ship would be lost if she kept her hold, and deeming his own ease desperate, he seized the speaking trumpet, and with passionate threats ordered Ball to set him loose. But Ball took his own trumpet, and in a solemn voice replied, "I feel confident I can bring you in safe: I therefore must not, and, by the help of Almighty God, I will not leave you." What he promised he performed, and on arriving in harbour, Nelson embraced him as his deliverer, and commenced a friendship which continued for life (1).

His whole life was spent in the service of his country; his prejudices, and he had many, were all owing to the excess of patriotic feeling; he annihilated the French navy, by fearlessly following up the new system of tactics, plunging headlong into the enemy's fleet, and doubling upon a part of their line, in the same manner as Napoléon practised in battles at land. The history of the world has seldom characters so illustrious to exhibit, and few achievements as momentous to commemorate. But it is to his public conduct, and genius afloat, only, that this transcendent praise is due; on shore he appears in a less favourable light. Vain, undiscerning, impetuous, he was regardless of his domestic duties; an ardent lover, he was a faithless husband. He was perpetually liable to the delusion of art, and sometimes seduced by the fascination of wickedness. These weaknesses, indeed, were owing to the ardent temperament of his mind; they arose from passions nearly allied to virtue, and to which, heroic characters in all ages have, in a peculiar manner, been subject. In one unhappy instance, however, he was betrayed into more serious delinquencies. If a veil could be drawn over the transactions at Naples, history would dwell upon him as a spotless hero; but justice requires that cruelty should never be palliated, and the rival of Napoléon shielded from none of the obloquy consequent on the fascination of female wickedness.

Character of Lord St.-Vincet. Sir John Jarvis, afterwards created Earl St.-Vincet, one of the greatest and most renowned admirals that ever appeared in the British navy, possessed qualities which, if not so brilliant as those of his illustrious rival, were not less calculated for great and glorious achievements. He early distinguished himself in his profession, and was engaged with Wolfe in the glorious operations which terminated in the capture of Quebec in the Seven Year's War. An action which he soon after fought with the Foudroyant of eighty-four guns, was one of the most extraordinary displays of valour and skill even in that war so fertile in great exploits. The mutiny which broke out with such violence in the Channel fleet and at the Nore in 1797, had also its ramifications in the fleet under his command, off the Spanish coast: and by the mingled firmness and clemency of his conduct, he succeeded in reducing the most mutinous vessels to obedience with a singularly small effusion of human blood. A severe disciplinarian, strict in his own duties, rigorous in the exaction of them from others, he yet secured the affections both of his officers and men by the impartiality of his decisions, the energy of his conduct, and the perfect nautical skill which he was known to possess. It is doubtful if even Nelson should have been equal to the extraordinary exertion of vigour and capacity with which, in a period of time so short as to be deemed impossible by all but himself, he succeeded in fitting out his squadron from the Tagus in February 1797, in sufficient time to intercept

(1) Coleridge's French Essay, iv. iii. 249.

and defeat the Spanish fleet. In the high official duties as first Lord of the Admiralty, with which he was entrusted in 1802, he exhibited a most praiseworthy zeal and anxiety for the detection of abuses, and he succeeded in rooting out many lucrative corruptions which had fastened themselves upon that important branch of the public service; although he yielded with too much facility to that unhappy mania for reducing our establishments, which invariably seizes the English on the return of peace, and has so often exposed to the utmost danger the naval supremacy of Great Britain. But in nothing, perhaps, was his energy and disinterested character more clearly evinced than in his conduct in 1798, when he despatched Nelson to the Mediterranean at the head of the best ships in his own fleet, and furnished him with the means of striking a blow destined to eclipse even his own well earned fame. But these two great men had no jealousy of each other: their whole emulation consisted in mutual efforts to serve their country, and none was more willing to concede the highest meed of praise to each other. The mind of the historian, as it has been well observed, "weary with recounting the deeds of human baseness, and mortified with contemplating the frailty of illustrious men, gathers a soothing refreshment from such scenes as these; where kindred genius, exciting only mutual admiration and honest rivalry, gives birth to no feeling of jealousy or envy, and the character which stamps real greatness, is found in the genuine value of the man, as well as in the outward splendour of the deed; the highest talents sustained by the purest virtue; the capacity of the statesman, and the valour of the hero, outshone by the magnanimous heart which beats only to the measures of generosity and justice (1)."

Of Earl
Howe.

Differing in many essential particulars from both of these illustrious men, Earl Howe was one of the most distinguished men which the English navy ever produced. Of him, perhaps, more truly than any other of its illustrious chiefs may it be said, as of the Chevalier Bayard, that he lived without fear and without reproach. He had the enterprise and gallant bearing so general in all officers in the naval service of Great Britain; but these qualities in him were combined with coolness, firmness, and systematic arrangement, with an habitual self-command and humanity to others, almost unrivalled in those intrusted with supreme command. In early life he contracted an intimate friendship with general Wolfe, and was employed with him in the expedition against the Isle d'Aix in Basque Roads in 1757. "Their friendship," says Walpole, "was like the union of cannon and gunpowder. Howe strong in mind, solid in judgment, firm of purpose; Wolfe quick in conception, prompt in execution, impetuous in action." His coolness in danger may be judged of from one anecdote. When in command of the Channel fleet, after a dark and boisterous night, when the ships were in considerable danger of running foul, Lord Gardner, then third in command, a most intrepid officer, next day went on board the Queen Charlotte, and inquired of Howe, how he had slept, for that he himself had not been able to get any rest from anxiety of mind. Lord Howe replied that he had slept perfectly well, for as he had taken every possible precaution before it was dark, for the safety of the ship and crew, this conviction set his mind perfectly at ease. In person he was tall and well-proportioned, his countenance of a serious cast and dark, but relaxing at times into a sweet smile, which bespoke the mildness and humanity of his disposition. No one ever con-

(1) Lord Brougham's Sketches of Public Characters, 2d series.

ducted the stern duties of war with more consideration for the sufferings both of his own men and his adversaries, or mingled its heroic courage with a larger share of benevolent feeling. Disinterested in the extreme, his private charities were unbounded, and in 1798, when government received voluntary gifts for the expenses of the war, he sent his whole annual income, amounting to eighteen hundred pounds, to the bank, as his contribution. Such was his humanity and consideration for the seamen under his command, that it was more by the attachment which they bore to him, than by any exertion of authority, that he succeeded in suppressing, without effusion of blood, the formidable mutiny in the Channel fleet. He was the first of the great school of English admirals, and by his profound nautical skill, and long attention to the subject, he first succeeded in reducing to practice, that admirable system of tactics to which the unexampled triumphs of the war were afterwards owing. A disinterested lover of his country, he was entirely exempt from ambition of every kind, and received the rewards with which his Sovereign loaded him, with gratitude, but without desire (1): the only complaints he ever made, of Government, were for their neglect of the inferior naval officers who had served in his naval exploits.

Great preparations of the Dutch. The great victory of St.-Vincent's entirely disconcerted the well-conceived designs of Turguet for the naval campaign; but later in the season, another effort, with an inferior fleet, but more experienced seamen, was made by the Dutch Republic. For a very long period the naval preparations in Holland had been most extraordinary, and far surpassed any thing attempted by the United Provinces for above a century past. The stoppage of the commerce of the Republic had enabled the government to man their vessels with a choice selection both of officers and men; and from the well-known courage of the sailors, it was anticipated that the contest with the English fleet would be more obstinate and bloody than any which had yet occurred from the commencement of the war. De Winter, who commanded the armament, was a staunch Republican, and a man of tried courage and experience. Nevertheless, being encumbered with land forces, destined for the invasion of Ireland, he did not attempt to leave the Texel till the beginning of October, when the English fleet having been driven to Yarmouth roads by stress of weather, the Dutch Government gave orders for 9th Oct. the troops to be disembarked, and the fleet to set sail, and make the best of its way to the harbour of Brest, in order to co-operate in the long-projected expedition against that island, now fermenting with discontent, and containing at least two hundred thousand men, organized, and ready for immediate rebellion (2).

Battle of Camperdown. Admiral Duncan was no sooner apprized by the signals of his cruizers that the Dutch fleet was at sea, than he weighed anchor with all imaginable haste, and stretched across the German Ocean, with so much expedition, that he got near the hostile squadron before it was out of sight of the shore of Holland. The Dutch fleet consisted of fifteen ships of the line and eleven frigates; the English, of sixteen ships of the line and three frigates. Duncan's first care was to station his fleet in such a manner as to prevent the enemy from returning to the Texel; and having done this, he bore down upon his opponents, and hove in sight of them, on the following morning, drawn up in order of battle at the distance of nine miles from the

(1) Barrow's Life of Howe, chap. xii. 432.

(2) Vict. et Conq. viii. 271, 274. Wolfe Tone, ii. 197; 201.

coast between CAMPERDOWN and Egmont. With the same instinctive genius, which afterwards inspired a similar resolution to Nelson at Aboukir he gave the signal to break the line, and get between the enemy and the shore—a movement which was immediately and skilfully executed in two lines of attack, and proved the principal cause of the glorious success which followed, by preventing their withdrawing into the shallows, out of the reach of the British vessels, which, for the most part, drew more water than their antagonists. Admiral Onslow first broke the line, and commenced a close combat. As he approached the Dutch line, his captain observed, the enemy were lying so close that they could not penetrate. “The Monarch will make a passage,” replied Onslow, and held on undaunted. The Dutch ship opposite gave way to let him pass, and he entered the close-set line. In passing through, he poured one broadside with tremendous effect into the starboard ship’s stern, and the other with not less into the vice-admiral’s bows, whom he immediately lay alongside, and engaged at three yards’ distance. He was soon followed by Duncan himself, at the head of the second line (1), who pierced the centre and laid himself alongside of De Winter’s flag-ship, and shortly the action became general, each English ship engaging its adversary, but still between them and the lee-shore.

De Winter, perceiving the design of the enemy, gave the signal for his fleet to unite in close order; but from the thickness of the smoke, his order was not generally perceived, and but partially obeyed. Notwithstanding the utmost efforts of valour on the part of the Dutch, the superiority of English skill and discipline soon appeared in the engagement, yard-arm to yard-arm, which followed. For three hours, Admiral Duncan and De Winter fought within pistol-shot; but by degrees the Dutchman’s fire slackened; his masts fell one by one overboard, amidst the loud cheers of the British sailors; and at length he struck his flag, after half his crew were killed or wounded, and his ship incapable of making any farther resistance. De Winter was the only man on his quarter-deck who was not either killed or wounded; he lamented that, in the midst of the carnage which literally floated the deck of his noble ship, he alone should have been spared (2). The Dutch vice-admiral soon after struck to Admiral Onslow, and by four o’clock, eight ships of the line, two of fifty-six guns, and two frigates, were in the hands of the victors. Twelve sail of the line had struck their colours, but owing to the bad weather which succeeded, nine only were secured (3). No less skilful than brave, Admiral Duncan now gave the signal for the combat to cease, and the prizes to be secured, which was done with no little difficulty, as, during the battle, both fleets had drifted before a tempestuous wind to within five miles of the shore, and were now lying in nine fathoms water.

It was owing to this circumstance alone that any of the Dutch squadron escaped; but when the English withdrew into deeper water, Admiral Story collected the scattered remains of his fleet, and sought refuge in the Texel, while Duncan returned with his prizes to Yarmouth roads. The battle was seen distinctly from the shore, where a vast multitude was assembled, who beheld in silent despair the ruin of the armament on which the national

(1) Lord Duncan’s Act. 16th Oct. 1797. *Ann. Reg.* 1797, 100. *Jom. x.* 213, 214. *Brenton, i.* 347, 348. *James, ii.* 69, 70. *Vict. et Conq. viii.* 271, 275.

(2) De Winter and Admiral Duncan dined together in the latter’s ship on the day of the battle, in the most friendly manner. In the evening, they played a rubber at whist; and De Winter was the

loser—upon which he good-humouredly observed, it was rather hard to be beaten twice in one day by the same opponent.—*BRENTON, ut Supra, and Personal Knowledge.*

(3) *Ann. Reg.* 1797, 100, 101. *Jom. x.* 213, 214. *Toul. vi.* 242, 243. *James, ii.* 71, 73. *Brenton, i.* 348.

hopes had been so long rested. Towards the conclusion of the action the *Hercules*, one of the Dutch ships, was found to be on fire, but it was soon extinguished by the coolness and presence of mind of the crew on board the *Triumph*, to which she had struck. During the two days of tempestuous weather which ensued, two of the prizes mutinied against the English guard on board, and escaped into the *Texel*; and the *Delft*, a seventy-four, went down, astern of the ship which had her in tow. But eight line-of-battle ships, and two of fifty-six guns, were brought into Yarmouth roads, amidst the cheers of innumerable spectators, and the transports of a whole nation (1).

Immense effects of this victory. This action was one of the most important fought at sea during the revolutionary war, not only from the valour displayed on both sides during the engagement, but the important consequences with which it was attended. The Dutch fought with a courage worthy of the descendants of Van Tromp and De Ruyter, as was evinced by the loss on either part, which, in the British, was one thousand and forty men, and in the Batavian, one thousand one hundred and sixty, besides the crews of the prizes, who amounted to above six thousand. The appearance of the British ships, at the close of the action, was very different from what it usually is after naval engagements; no masts were down, little damage done to the sails or rigging; like their worthy adversaries, the Dutch fired at the hull of their enemies, which accounts for the great loss in killed and wounded in this well-fought engagement (2). The Dutch were all either dismasted, or so riddled with shot, as to be altogether unserviceable. On every side marks of a desperate conflict were visible. But the contest was no longer equal; England had quadrupled in strength since the days of Charles II, while the United Provinces had declined both in vigour and resources. Britain was now as equal to a contest with the united navies of Europe, as she was then to a war with the fleets of an inconsiderable Republic.

But the effects of this victory, both upon the security and the public spirit of Britain, were in the highest degree important. Achieved as it had been by the fleet which had recently struck such terror into every class by the mutiny at the *Nore*, and coming so soon after that formidable event, it both elevated the national spirit by the demonstration it afforded how true the patriotism of the seamen still was, and the deliverance from the immediate peril of invasion which it effected. A subscription was immediately entered into for the widows and orphans of those who had fallen in this battle, and it soon amounted to £52,000. The northern courts, whose conduct had been dubious previous to this great event, were struck with terror; and all thoughts of reviving the principles of the armed neutrality were laid aside. But great as were the external results, it was in its internal effects that the vast importance of this victory was chiefly made manifest. Despondency was no longer felt; the threatened invasion of Ireland was laid aside; Britain was secure. England now learned to regard without dismay the victories of the French at land, and, secure in her sea-girt isle, to trust in those defenders

“ Whose march is o’er the mountain wave,
Whose home is on the deep.”

The joy, accordingly, upon the intelligence of this victory, was heartfelt and unexampled, from the sovereign on the throne, to the beggar in the hovel. Bonfires and illuminations were universal; the enthusiasm spread to

(1) Brent. i. 354-5 James.

(2) James, ii, 70, 71. Ann. Reg. 1797, 401.

every breast; the fire gained every heart, and amidst the roar of artillery and the festive light of cities, faction disappeared, and discontents sunk into neglect. Numbers date from the rejoicings consequent on this achievement their first acquaintance with the events of life, among whom may be reckoned the author, then residing under his paternal roof, in a remote parish of Shropshire, whose earliest recollection is of the sheep-roasting and rural festivities which took place on the joyful intelligence being received in that secluded district.

Honours
bestowed on
Admirals
Duncan and
Sir John
Jarvis.

The national gratitude was liberally bestowed on the leaders in these glorious achievements. Sir John Jarvis received the title of Earl St.-Vincent; Admiral Duncan that of Viscount Duncan of Camperdown, and Commodore Nelson that of Sir Horatio Nelson.

From these victories may be dated the commencement of that concord among all classes, and that resolute British spirit, which never afterwards deserted this country. Her subsequent victories were for conquest, these were for existence; from the deepest dejection, and an unexampled accumulation of disasters, she arose at once into security and renown; the democratic spirit gradually subsided, from the excitation of new passions, and the force of more ennobling recollections; and the rising generation, who began to mingle in public affairs, now sensibly influenced national thought, by the display of the patriotic spirit which had been nursed amidst the dangers and the glories of their infant years.

Abortive
descent in
Pembroke
Bay.

The remaining maritime operations of this year are hardly deserving of notice. A descent of fourteen hundred men, chiefly composed of deserters and banditti, in the bay of Pembroke, in February, intended to distract the attention of the British government from Ireland, the real point of attack, met with the result which might have been anticipated, by all the party being taken prisoners. Early in spring, an expedition, under General Abercromby, captured the island of Trinidad, with a garrison of seventeen hundred men, and a ship of the line in the harbour; but two months after, the same force failed in an attack on Porto Rico; notwithstanding which, however, the superiority of the British over the navy of their combined enemies, was eminently conspicuous during the whole year, both in the Atlantic and Indian oceans (1).

13th Feb.
Capture of
Trinidad.

Death of
Mr. Burke.

It was just permitted to the illustrious statesman, to whose genius and foresight the development of the dauntless spirit which led to these glorious consequences is mainly, under Providence, to be ascribed, to witness its results. Mr. Burke, whose health had been irretrievably broken by the death of his son, and who had long laboured under severe and increasing weakness, at length breathed his last at his country-seat of Beaconsfield, on the 9th July, 1797. His counsels on English politics during his last eventful moments, were of the same direct, lofty, and uncompromising spirit which had made his voice sound as the note of a trumpet to the heart of England. His last work, the *Letters on a Regicidal Peace*, published a few months before his death, is distinguished by the same fervent eloquence, profound wisdom, and far-seeing sagacity, which characterised his earlier productions on the French Revolution. As his end approached, the vigour of his spirit, if possible, increased; and his prophetic eye anticipated, from the bed of death, those glorious triumphs which were destined to immortalize the close of the conflict. "Never," exclaimed he, in his last hours, "never suc-

cumb. It is a struggle for your existence as a nation. If you must die, die with the sword in your hand. But I have no fears whatever for the result. There is a salient living principle of energy in the public mind of England, which only requires proper direction to enable her to withstand this, or any other ferocious foe. Persevere, therefore, till this tyranny be overpast (1)."

His character.

Thus departed this life, if not in the maturity of years, at least in the fulness of glory, Edmund Burke. The history of England, prodigal as it is of great men, has no such philosophic statesman to boast; the annals of Ireland, graced though they be with splendid characters, have no such shining name to exhibit. His was not the mere force of intellect, the ardour of imagination, the richness of genius; it was a combination of the three, unrivalled, perhaps, in any other age or country. Endowed by nature with a powerful understanding, an inventive fancy, a burning eloquence, he exhibited the rare combination of these great qualities with deep thought, patient investigation, boundless research. His speeches in Parliament were not so impressive as those of Mirabeau in the National Assembly, only because they were more profound; he did not address himself with equal felicity to the prevailing feeling of the majority. He was ever in advance of his age, and left to posterity the difficult task of reaching, through pain and suffering, the elevation to which he was at once borne on the wings of prophetic genius. Great, accordingly, and deserved, as was his reputation in the age in which he lived, it was not so great as it has since become; and strongly as subsequent times have felt the truth of his principles, they are destined to rise into still more general celebrity in the future ages of mankind.

Like all men of a sound intellect, and ardent disposition, and a feeling heart, Mr. Burke was strongly attached to the principles of freedom, and, during the American war, when those principles appeared to be endangered by the conduct of the English government, he stood forth as an uncompromising leader of the Opposition in Parliament. He was, from the outset, however, the friend of freedom only in conjunction with its indispensable allies, order and property; and the severing of the United States from the British empire, and the establishment of a pure Republic beyond the Atlantic, appears to have given the first rude shock to his visions of the elevation and improvement of the species, and suggested the painful doubt, whether the cause of liberty might not, in the end, be more endangered by the extravagance of its supporters than by the efforts of its enemies. These doubts were confirmed by the first aspect of the French Revolution; and while many of the greatest men of his age were dazzled by the brightness of its morning light, he at once discerned, amidst the deceitful blaze, the small black cloud which was to cover the universe with darkness. With the characteristic ardour of his disposition, he instantly espoused the opposite side; and, in the prosecution of his efforts in defence of order, he was led to profounder principles of political wisdom than any intellect, save that of Bacon, had reached, and which are yet far in advance of the general understanding of mankind. His was not the instinctive horror at revolution which arises from the possession of power, the prejudices of birth, or the selfishness of wealth; on the contrary, he brought to the consideration of the great questions which then divided society, prepossessions only on the other side, a heart long

(1) *Regicide Peace, ad fin.*

warmed by the feelings of liberty, a disposition enthusiastic in its support, a lifetime spent in its service. He was led to combat the principles of Jacobinism from an early and clear perception of their consequences; from foreseeing that they would infallibly, if successful, destroy the elements of freedom; and, in the end, leave to society, bereft of all its bulwarks, only an old age of slavery and decline. It was not as the enemy, but the friend of liberty, that he was the determined opponent of the revolution; and such will ever be the foundation in character on which the most resolute, because the most enlightened and the least selfish, resistance to democratic ascendancy will be founded.

CHAPTER XXIII.

CAMPAIGN OF 1797—FALL OF VENICE.

ARGUMENT.

Russia recedes from the contemplated Measures of Catharine—Plans of the Directory—Bernadotte's and Delmas's Divisions join Napoléon—Disposition of his Forces—Preparations of the Imperialists—Great Spirit in the Hereditary States—Napoléon anticipates the Arrival of the Austrian Veterans—Danger of that Plan—Description of the Theatre of War—Its Roads and Rivers—Napoléon resolves to turn the Austrian left—His proclamation to his Soldiers—Great Interest excited in Europe by the approaching Contest—Operations of Masséna on the left—Passage of the Isonzo by Bernadotte—Masséna makes himself Master of the Col-de-Tarwis—Desperate Actions there—It is finally won by the Republicans—Bayalitch's Division is Surrounded, and made Prisoners—Napoléon crosses the Ridge of the Alps—Occupies Klagenfurth—Successful Operations of Joubert in the Tyrol—Desperate Action at the Pass of Clausen, which is at length carried—Joubert Advances to Sterzing—General Alarm in the Tyrol—He marches across to join Napoléon at Klagenfurth—Results of these Actions—Perilous Condition notwithstanding of Napoléon—He in consequence makes Proposals of Peace to the Archduke, and at the same time severely presses the retreating Imperialists—They are Defeated at the Gorge of Neumarkt—Napoléon pushes on to Judembourg, and the Archduke retires towards Vienna—Terror excited there by these Disasters—Preliminaries are agreed to at Leoben—Disastrous State of the French in Croatia and Tyrol—Extreme Danger of Napoléon—Conditions of the Preliminaries—Enormous Injustice of this Treaty as far as regards Venice—State of Venice at this period—Its long-continued Decline—Rapid Progress of Democratic Ideas in the Cities of the Venetian Territory, which are secretly encouraged by Napoléon—Democratic Insurrection breaks out in the Venetian Provinces, which soon spreads to all the chief Towns—Consternation at Venice—The Senate send Deputies to Napoléon—His Duplicity, and refusal to act against the Insurgents, or let the Venetians do so—Venetians at last resolve to crush the Insurrection—Hostilities break out between the two Parties—The Counter-Insurrection spreads immensely—Continued Indecision of the Venetian Senate in regard to France—Affected anger of Napoléon—Massacre at Verona, which is speedily suppressed by the French Troops—Massacre at Lido—Efforts of the Venetian Senate to avert the storm—Resources still at the command of Venice—War declared by Napoléon against Venice—Manifestoes on both sides—Universal Revolt of the Continental Towns of the Venetian Territory—Anarchy in Venice itself—The Senate abdicate their authority—The Populace still endeavour to resist the Subjugation of the State—But Venice falls—Joy of the Democratic Party—Treaty of 16th May between Napoléon and Venice—State of the Armies on the Rhine—Passage of that River at Diersheim, and Defeat of the Austrians—Operations cut short by the armistice of Leoben—Commencement of operations by Hoche on the Lower Rhine—Passage of that River forced at Neuwied—Defeat of the Austrians—Hostilities stopped by the armistice of Leoben—State of Prussia during this year—Its Policy—Death of the King—His Character—Accession of Frederick William III—His Character—Early Measures and Policy—Retrospect of the Astonishing Successes of Napoléon—Commencement of the Negotiations at Udina in Italy—Splendour of Napoléon's Court there—Revolution at Genoa brought about by the French—The Senate defeat the Insurgents—The French then Interfere—and vigorously support the Democratic Party—Senate upon this Submit—Violent Passions of the People—Rural Insurrection breaks out—which is suppressed—Deplorable Humiliation of Piedmont—Negotiations between England and France opened at Lisle—Moderation of England—They are broken off by the vehemence and arrogance of France—Progress of the Negotiations at Udina—Terms are at length agreed to—Simulated arrogance and real fears of Napoléon—His Secret Motives for Signing this Treaty—The Directory had forbid the Spoliation of Venice—Its Infamy rests exclusively on Napoléon—Terms of the Treaty of Campo Formio—Its Secret Articles—Horror excited at Venice by the Publication of the Treaty—Great Sensation excited by this event in Europe—Infamous Conduct of Napoléon in this transaction—Important light which it throws upon his Character—Atrocious Conduct of Austria—Weakness of the Venetian Aristocracy—Insanity of the Democratic Party—Striking Contrast exhibited at the same period by the Nobility and People of England.

The year 1797 was far from realizing the brilliant prospects which Mr. Pitt had formed for the campaign, and which the recent alliance with the

Russia
recedes from
the con-
templated
measures of
Catharine. Empress Catharine had rendered so likely to be fulfilled. The death of that great princess, who, alone with the British statesman, appreciated the full extent of the danger, and the necessity of vigorous measures to counteract it, dissolved all the projected armaments. The Emperor Paul, who succeeded her, countermanded the great levy of 150,000 men, which she had ordered for the French war; and so far from evincing any disposition to mingle in the contentions of Southern Europe, seemed absorbed only in the domestic concerns of his vast empire. Prussia was still neutral, and it was ascertained that a considerable time must elapse before the veterans of the Archduke could be drawn from the Upper Rhine to defend the Alpine frontier of the Hereditary States. Every thing, therefore, conspired to indicate, that by an early and vigorous effort, a fatal blow might be struck at the heart of the Austrian power, before the resources of the monarchy could be collected to repel it (1).

Plans of the
Directory. Aware of the necessity of commencing operations early in spring, Napoléon had in the beginning of the preceding winter urged the Directory to send him powerful reinforcements, and put forth the strength of the Republic in a quarter where the barriers of the Imperial dominions were already in a great measure overcome. Every thing indicated that that was the most vulnerable side on which the enemy could be assailed, but the jealousy of the government prevented them from placing the major part of their forces at the disposal of so ambitious and enterprising a general as the Italian conqueror. Obstinate adhering to the plan of Carnot, which all the disasters of the preceding campaign had not taught them to distrust, they directed Hoche to send his forces to the army of the Sambre and Meuse, of which he received the command, while large reinforcements were also dispatched to the army of the Rhine; the plan being to open the campaign with two armies of eighty thousand each in Germany, acting independent of each other, and on a parallel and far distant line of operations. The divisions of Bernadotte and Delmas, above twenty thousand strong, were sent from the Rhine to strengthen the Army of Italy. These brave men crossed the Alps in the depth of winter (2). In ascending Mont Cenis, a violent snow-storm arose, and the guides recommended a halt; but the officers ordered the drums to beat and the charge to sound, and they faced the tempest as they would have rushed upon the enemy.

Bernadotte
and Del-
mas's divi-
sions join
Napoléon. The arrival of these troops raised the army immediately under the command of Napoléon to sixty-one thousand men, independent of sixteen thousand who were scattered from Ancona to Milan, and employed in overawing the Pope, and securing the rear and communications of the army. Four divisions, destined for immediate operations, were assembled in the Trevisane March in the end of February; viz. that of Masséna at Bassano, Serrurier at Castelbranco, Augereau at Treviso, and Bernadotte at Padua. Joubert, with his own division, reinforced by those of Delmas and Baraguay D'Ililliers, was stationed in Tyrol, to make head against the formidable forces which the Imperialists were assembling in that warlike province (3).

Prepara-
tions of the
Imperialists. Meanwhile the Austrian government had been actively employed during the winter in taking measures to repair the losses of the campaign, and make head against the redoubtable enemy who threatened

(1) Th. ix. Jom. x. 12.

(2) Jom. x. 20, 24. Th. 49, 51.

(3) Jom. x. 26. Th. ix. 61.

them on the Carinthian frontiers. The great successes of the Archduke in Germany had filled them with the strongest hopes that the talents and influence of that youthful general would succeed in stemming the torrent of invasion from the Italian plains. As their veteran forces in Italy had almost all perished in the disastrous campaign of 1796, they resolved to bring thirty thousand men, under the Archduke in person, from the Upper Rhine, to oppose Napoléon, leaving only one corps there under Latour, and another under Werneck on the lower part of the river, to make head against the Republican armies. Fresh levies of men were made in Bohemia, Illyria, and Galicia; the contingents of Tyrol were quadrupled; and the Hungarian nobility, imitating the example of their ancestors in the time of Maria Theresa, voted twenty thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry, besides immense stores of provisions and forage, for the ensuing campaign. These forces, speedily raised, were animated with that firm and persevering spirit which has always characterised the Austrian nation; the enthusiasm of the people, awakened by the near approach of danger, rose to the highest pitch; and the recruits, hastily moved forward, soon filled the shattered battalions on the banks of the Tagliamento. But new levies, however brave, do not at once form soldiers; the young recruits were no match for the veterans of Napoléon; and by an inexplicable tardiness, attended with the most disastrous effects, the experienced soldiers from the army of the Rhine were not brought up till it was too late for them to be of any service in the issue of the campaign (1).

22d Nov.
Great spirit
in the He-
reditary
States. Anxious to strike a decisive blow before this great reinforcement arrived, Napoléon commenced operations on the 10th March, when the Archduke had only assembled thirty thousand men on the Tagliamento, and when three weeks must yet elapse before the like number of veteran troops could even begin to arrive from the Rhine. Nothing demonstrates more clearly the vital importance of time in war; to this fatal delay all the disasters of the campaign were immediately owing. What could the Archduke do with half the forces opposed to him in arresting the progress of the conqueror of Italy? The summits of the Alps were still resplendent with snow and ice, but this only inflamed the ambition of the youthful hero (2).

Dangers of
that plan. In commencing operations thus early, however, the French general incurred a fearful risk. The armies of the Republic on the Rhine were not in a condition to take the field for a month afterwards, and Napoléon was about to precipitate himself into the midst of the Austrian monarchy without any other support than what he could derive from his own forces. Had the Archduke been permitted to collect his army in the Tyrol, instead of Carinthia, there summoned to his standard the enthusiastic peasantry of that province, and fallen back, in case of need, on his reinforcements coming up from the Rhine, he would have covered Vienna just as effectually as on the direct road, accelerated by three weeks the junction with those forces, and probably totally changed the fate of the campaign. But it is hard to say whether the Aulic council or the Directory did most to ruin the designs of their victorious generals; for the former obliged the Archduke to assemble his army on the Tagliamento, instead of the Adige; while the latter refused to ratify the treaty with the King of Sardinia, by which Napoléon had calculated on a subsidiary force of ten thousand men, to protect the

(1) Jom. x. 9. 27, 28.

(2) Th. ix. 63, 65. Jom. x. 27. Nap. iv. 68.

rear and maintain the communications of his army. To compensate this loss, he had laboured all the winter to conclude an alliance with the Venetian republic; but its haughty, yet timid aristocracy, worn out with the French exactions, not only declined his overtures, but manifested some symptoms of alienation from the Republican interest, which obliged the French general to leave a considerable force in the neighbourhood of Verona, to overawe their vacillating councils. Thus Napoléon was left alone to hazard an irruption into the Austrian states, and scale the Noric and Julian Alps with sixty thousand men, leaving on his left the warlike province of Tyrol, by which his communications with the Adige might be cut off, and on his right Croatia and the Venetian states, the first of which was warmly attached to the house of Austria, while the last might be expected, on the least reverse, to join the same standard (1).

Description of the theatre of war. Three great roads lead from Verona across the Alps to Vienna; that of Tyrol, that of Carinthia, and that of Carniola. The first, following the line of the Adige by Bolzano and Brixen, crosses the ridge of the Brenner into the valley of the Inn, from whence it passes by Salzbουργ into that of the Danube, and descends to Vienna after passing the Ens. The second traverses the Vicentine and Trevisane Marches, crosses the Piave and the Tagliamento, surmounts the Alps by the Col-de-Tarwis, descends into Carinthia, crosses the Drave at Villach, and, by Klagenfurth and the course of the Muer, mounts the Simmering, from whence it descends into the plain of Vienna. The third by Carinthia, passes the Isonzo at Gradisca, goes through Laybach, crosses the Save and the Drave, enters Styria, passes Gratz, the capital of that province, and joins the immediately preceding road at Bruck. Five lateral roads lead from the chaussée of Tyrol to that of Carinthia; the first, branching off from Brixen, joins the other at Villach; the second, from Salzbουργ, leads to Spital; the third, from Lintz, traverses a lofty ridge to Judembourg; the fourth, from Ens, crosses to Leoben; the fifth, from Pollen, to Bruck. Three cross-roads unite the chaussée of Carinthia with that of Carniola; the first branches off from Gonzia, and following the course of the Isonzo, joins, at Tarwis, the route of Carinthia (2); the second connects Laybach and Klagenfurth; the third, setting out from Marburg, also terminates at Klagenfurth.

And rivers. The rivers which descend from this chain of mountains into the Adriatic sea, did not present any formidable obstacles. The Piave and the Tagliamento were hardly defensible; and although the line of the Isonzo was far stronger, yet it was susceptible of being turned by the Col-de-Tarwis. By accumulating the mass of his forces on his own left, and penetrating through the higher ridges, Napoléon perceived that he would overcome all the obstacles which nature had opposed to his advance, and turn all the Austrian positions by the Alps which commanded them. He directed Masséna, accordingly, to turn the right flank of the enemy with his powerful division, while the three others attacked them in front at the same time. Joubert, with seventeen thousand men, received orders to force the passes of the Italian Tyrol, and drive the enemy over the Brenner; and Victor, who was still on the Apennines, was destined to move forward with his division, which successive additions would raise to twenty thousand men, to the Adige, to keep in check the Venetian levies, and secure the com-

Napoléon resolves to turn the Austrian right.

(1) *Jom.* x. 28. *Nap.* iv. 69, 73. *Th.* ix. 63, 64.

(2) *Nap.* iv. 71, 72. *Jom.* x. 29, 30. *Th.* ix. 64, 65."

munications of the army. Thirty-five thousand of the Austrian forces, under the Archduke in person, were assembled on the left bank of the Tagliamento; the remainder of his army, fifteen thousand strong, were in Tyrol at Bolzano, while thirty thousand of his best troops were only beginning their march from the Upper Rhine (1).

Napoléon's
proclama-
tion to his
soldiers.

Napoléon moved his headquarters to Bassano on the 9th March, and addressed the following order of the day to his army: —“Soldiers! The fall of Mantua has terminated the war in Italy, which has given you eternal titles to the gratitude of your country. You have been victorious in fourteen pitched battles and seventy combats: you have made 100,000 prisoners, taken 500 pieces of field artillery, 2,000 of heavy calibre, and four sets of pontoons. The contributions you have levied on the vanquished countries have clothed, fed, and paid the army, and you have, besides, sent 50,000,000 of francs to the public treasury. You have enriched the Museum of Paris with 500 *chefs-d'œuvre* of art, the produce of thirty centuries. You have conquered the finest countries in Europe for the Republic; the Transpadane and Cispadane Republics owe to you their freedom. The French colours now fly, for the first time, on the shores of the Adriatic, in front, and within twenty-four hours sail of the country of Alexander! The Kings of Sardinia, of Naples, the Pope, the Duke of Parma, have been detached from the coalition. You have chased the English from Leghorn, Genoa, Corsica; and now still higher destinies await you: you will show yourselves worthy of them! of all the enemies who were leagued against the Republic, the Emperor alone maintains the contest; but he is blindly led by that perfidious cabinet, which, a stranger to the evils of war, smiles at the sufferings of the Continent. Peace can no longer be found but in the heart of the Hereditary States: in seeking it there, you will respect the religion, the manners, the property of a brave people: you will bring freedom to the valiant Hungarian nation (2).

Great inter-
est excited
in Europe
by the
approaching
contest.

The approaching contest between the Archduke Charles and Napoléon excited the utmost interest throughout Europe, both from the magnitude of the cause with they respectively bore upon their swords, and the great deeds which, on different theatres, they had severally achieved. The one appeared resplendent, from the conquest of Italy; the other illustrious, from the deliverance of Germany: the age of both was the same; their courage equal, their mutual respect reciprocal. But their dispositions were extremely different, and the resources on which they had to rely in the contest which was approaching, as various as the causes which they supported. The one was audacious and impetuous; the other, calm and judicious: the first was at the head of troops hitherto unconquered; the last, of soldiers dispirited by disaster: the former combated not with arms alone, but the newly-roused passions; the latter with the weapons only of the ancient faith: the Republican army was the more numerous; the Imperial the more fully equipped: on the victory of Napoléon depended the maintenance of the Republican sway in Italy; on the success of the Archduke, the existence of the empire of the Cæsars in Germany. On the other hand, the people of the provinces, around and behind the theatre of war, were attached to the Austrians, and hostile to the French; retreat, therefore, was the policy of the former, impetuous advance of the latter; victory by the one was to be won by rapidity of attack; success could be hoped

(1) Jom. x. 33. Nap. iv. 72, 73. Th. ix. 67.

(2) Nap. iv. 75.

for by the other only by protracting the contest. Great reinforcements were hastening to the Archduke from the Rhine, the Hereditary States, and Hungary, while his adversary could expect no assistance, beyond what he at first brought into action. Success at first, therefore, seemed within the grasp of Napoléon; but if the contest could be protracted, it might be expected to desert the Republican for the Imperial banners (1).

Passage of
the Taglia-
mento.

On the 10th March all the columns of the army were in motion, though the weather was still rigorous, and snow to the depth of several feet encumbered the higher passes of the mountains. Masséna's advanced guard first came into action; he set out from Bassano, crossed the Piave in the mountains, came up with the division of Lusignan, which he defeated, with the loss of 300 prisoners, among whom was that general himself. By pressing forward through the higher Alps, he compelled the Archduke, to avoid his right flank being turned, to fall back from the Piave to the Tagliamento, and concentrate his army behind the latter stream. On the 16th March, at nine o'clock in the morning, the three divisions of the French army, destined to act under Napoléon in person, were drawn up in front of the Austrian force, on the right bank of the Tagliamento. This stream, after descending from the mountains, separates into several branches, all of which are fordable, and covers the ground for a great extent between them with stones and gravel. The Imperial squadrons, numerous and magnificently appointed, were drawn up on the opposite shore, ready to fall on the French infantry the moment that they crossed the stream; and a vast array of artillery already scattered its balls among its numerous branches. Napoléon, seeing the enemy so well prepared, had recourse to a stratagem: he ordered the troops to retire without the reach of the enemy's fire, establish a bivouac, and begin to cook their victuals; the Archduke, conceiving all chance of attack over for the day, withdrew his forces into their camp in the rear. When all was quiet, the signal was given by the French general: the soldiers ran to arms, and, forming with inconceivable rapidity, advanced quickly in columns by echelon, flanking each other in the finest order, and precipitated themselves into the river. The precision, the beauty of the movements, resembled the exercise of a field-day; never did an army advance upon the enemy in a more majestic or imposing manner. The troops vied with each other in the regularity and firmness of their advance. "Soldiers of the Rhine," exclaimed Bernadotte, "the army of Italy is watching your conduct." The rival divisions reached the stream at the same time, and, fearlessly plunging into the water, soon gained the opposite shore. The Austrian cavalry, hastening to the spot, charged the French infantry on the edge of the water, but it was too late; they were already established in battle array on the left bank. Soon the firing became general along the whole line; but the Archduke, seeing the passage achieved, his flank turned, and being unwilling to engage in a decisive action before the arrival of his divisions from the Rhine, ordered a retreat; and the French light troops pursued him four miles from the field of battle. In this action the Imperialists lost six pieces of cannon and 300 men: and, what was of more importance, the *pres-tige* of a first success. In truth, the Archduke never regained the confidence of his soldiers in contending with the conqueror of Italy (2).

Operations
of Masséna
on the left.

Meanwhile Masséna, on the central road, had effected his passage at St.-Daniel. Soon after, he made himself master of Osopo, the key

(1) Bot. ii. 172. 173.

(2) Nap. iv. 76, 79. Th. ix. 67, 71, Jour. x. 33.

of the chaussée of the Ponteba, which was not occupied in force, pushed on to the Venetian chiusa, a narrow gorge, rudely fortified, which he also carried, and drove the Austrian division of Ocksay before him to the ridge of Tarwis (1).

The occupation of the Ponteba by Masséna, prevented the Archduke from continuing his retreat by the direct road to Carinthia; he resolved, therefore, to regain it by the cross-road, which follows the blue and glittering waters of the Isonzo, because the Carinthian road, being the most direct, was the one which Napoléon would probably follow in his advance upon Vienna. For this purpose he dispatched his parks of artillery, and the division of Bayalitch, by the Isonzo towards Tarwis, while the remainder of his forces retired by the

17th March

Lower Isonzo. The day after the battle of the Tagliamento, Napoléon occupied Palma Nuova, where he found immense magazines, and soon after pushed on to Gradisca, situated on the Lower Isonzo, and garrisoned by

19th March.

three thousand men. Bernadotte's division arrived first before the place, and instantly plunging into the torrent, which at that time was uncommonly low, notwithstanding a shower of balls from two thousand Croa-

Passage of

the Isonzo by

Bernadotte.

tians stationed on the opposite shore, succeeded in forcing the passage, from whence he rashly advanced to assault the place. A terrible fire of grape and musketry, which swept off 500 men, speedily repulsed this attack; but while the Imperialists were congratulating themselves upon their success, the division of Serrurier, which had crossed in another quarter, appeared on the heights in the rear, upon which they laid down their arms, in number 2000, with ten pieces of artillery, and eight standards. This success had most important consequences: the division of Bernadotte marched upon and took possession of Laybach, while a thousand horse occupied Trieste, the greatest harbour of the Austrian monarchy; and

22d March.

Serrurier ascended the course of the Isonzo, by Caporetto, and the Austrian chiusa, to regain at Tarwis the route of Carinthia (2).

Meanwhile Masséna, pursuing the broken remains of Ocksay's division, made himself master of the important Col-de-Tarwis, the crest of the Alps, commanding both the valleys descending to Carinthia and Dalmatia. The Archduke immediately foresaw the danger which the division of Bayalitch would incur, pressed in

rear by the victorious troops which followed it up the Isonzo, and blocked up in front by the division of Masséna, at the upper end of the defile, on the ridge of Tarwis. He resolved, therefore, at all hazards, to retake that important station; and for this purpose, hastened in person to Klagenfurth, on the northern side of the great chain of the Alps, and put himself at the head of a division of five thousand grenadiers, who had arrived at that place the day before from the Rhine, and with these veteran troops advanced to retake the passage. He was at first successful; and after a sharp action, established himself on the summit with the grenadiers and the division of Ocksay. But Masséna, who was well aware of the importance of this post, upon the possession of which the fate of the Austrian division coming up the Isonzo, and the issue of the campaign depended, made the most vigorous efforts to regain his ground. The troops on both sides fought with the utmost resolution, and both commanders exposed their persons like the meanest of the soldiers; the can-

22d March.

non thundered above the clouds; the cavalry charged on fields of

(1) Th. ix. 72. Nap. iv. 79.

(2) Nap. iv. 81, 83. Th. ix. 72, 73. Jcm. x. 39, 41.

ice; the infantry struggled through drifts of snow. At length the obstinate courage of Masséna prevailed over the persevering resolution of his adversary; and the Archduke, after having exhausted his last reserve, was compelled to give way, and yield the possession of the blood-stained snows of Tarwis to the Republican soldiers (1).

No sooner had the French general established himself on this important station, than he occupied in force both the defiles leading to Villach, whither the Archduke had retired, and those descending to the Austrian chiousa, where Bayalitch's division was expected soon to appear. Meanwhile, that general, encumbered with artillery and ammunition-waggons, was slowly ascending the vine-clad course of the Isonzo, and, having at length passed the gates of the Austrian chiousa, he deemed himself secure, under the shelter of that almost impregnable barrier. But nothing could withstand the attack of the French. The fourth regiment, surnamed "the Impetuous," scaled, with infinite difficulty, the rocks which overhung the left of the position, while a column of infantry assailed it in front; and the Austrian detachment, finding itself thus turned, laid down its arms. No resource now remained to Bayalitch; shut up in a narrow valley, between impassable mountains, he was pressed in rear by the victorious troops of Serurier, and in front found his advance stopped by the vanguard of Masséna on the slopes of the Tarwis. A number of Croats escaped over the mountains by throwing away their arms, but the greater part of the division, consisting of the general himself, 5300 men, twenty-five pieces of cannon, and 400 artillery or baggage-waggons, fell into the hands of the Republicans (2).

Napoléon had now gained the crest of the Alps; headquarters were successively transferred to Caporetto, Tarwis, Villach, and Klagenfurth; the army passed the Drave on the bridge of Villach, which the Imperialists had not time to burn; and found itself on the streams which descend to the Danube. The Alps were passed; the scenery, the manners, the houses, the cultivation, all bore the character of Germany. The soldiers admired the good-humour and honesty of the peasants, the invariable characteristic of the Gothic race; the quantity of vegetables, of horses and chariots, proved of the utmost service to the army. Klagenfurth, surrounded by a ruined rampart, was slightly defended: the French had no sooner made themselves masters of that town, than they restored the fortifications, and established magazines of stores and provisions; while the whole English merchandise found in Trieste, was, according to the usual custom of the Republicans, confiscated for their use (3).

While these important operations were going forward in Carinthia, Joubert had gained decisive successes in the Italian Tyrol. No sooner had the battle of the Tagliamento expelled the Imperialists from Italy, than that general received orders to avail himself of his numerical superiority, and drive the Austrians over the Brenner. He commenced the attack, accordingly, on the 20th March. The Imperialists were in two divisions, one under Kerpen, on the Lavis, in the valley of the Adige; the other under Laudon, in the mountains near Neumarkt. The former, encamped on the plateau of Cembra, on the river Lavis, were assailed by Joubert with superior forces, and, after a short action, driven back to Bolsano with the loss of two thousand five hundred prisoners, and seven pieces of cannon. The

20th March.
Successful
operations of
Joubert in
the Tyrol.

(1) Nap. iv. 80, 81. Th. ix. 74, 75.

(2) Nap. iv. 83, 84. Jom. x. 46, 47. Th. ix. 75.

(3) Nap. iv. 84, 86.

French, after this success, separated into two divisions; the first, under Baraguay D'Hilliers, pursued the broken remains of Kerpen's forces on the great road to Bolsano, while the second, composed of the *élite* of the troops under Joubert in person, advanced against Laudon, who had come up to Neumarkt, in the endeavour to re-establish his communication with Kerpen. The Imperialists, attacked by superior forces, were routed, with the loss of several pieces of cannon and a thousand prisoners; while, on the same day, the other division of the army entered Bolsano without opposition, and made itself master of all the magazines it contained (1).

Desperate action at the Pass of Clausen. Bolsano is situated at the junction of the valleys of the Adige and the Eisach. To command both, Joubert left Delmas, with five thousand men, in that town, and himself advanced in person with the remainder of his forces up the narrow and rocky defile which leads by the banks of the Eisach to Brixten. Kerpen awaited him in the position of Clausen—a romantic and seemingly impregnable pass, three miles above Bolsano, where the mountains approach each other so closely, as to leave only the bed of the stream and the breadth of the road between their frowning brows. An inaccessible precipice shuts in the pass on the southern side, while on the northern a succession of wooded and rocky peaks rises in wild variety from the raging torrent to the naked cliffs, three thousand feet above. 24th March. Early in the morning, the French presented themselves at the jaws of this formidable defile; but the Austrian and Tyrolean marksmen, perched on the cliffs and in the woods, kept up so terrible a fire upon the road, that column after column, which advanced to the attack, was swept away. For the whole day the action continued, without the Republicans gaining any Which is at length carried. advantage; but towards evening, their active light infantry succeeded in scaling the rocky heights on the right of the Imperialists, and rolled down great blocks of stone, which rendered the pass no longer tenable (2). Joubert, at the same time, charged rapidly in front, at the head of two regiments formed in close column; and the Austrians, unable to withstand this combined effort, fell back towards Brixen, which was soon after occupied by their indefatigable pursuers.

The invasion of Tyrol, so far from daunting, tended only to animate the spirit of the peasantry in that populous and warlike district. Kerpen, as he fell back, distributed numerous proclamations, which soon brought crowds 28th March. of expert and dauntless marksmen to his standard; and, reinforced by these, he took post at Mittenwald, hoping to cover both the great road over Mount Brenner, and the lateral one which ascended the Pusterthal. But he was attacked with such vigour by General Belliard, at the head of the French infantry in close column, that he was unable to maintain his ground, and driven from the castellated heights of Sterzing to take post on the summit of the Brenner, the last barrier of Innspruck, still covered with the snows of winter. The alarm spread through the whole of Tyrol; an attack on its capital was hourly expected; and it was thought the enemy intended to penetrate across the valley of the Inn, and join the invading force on the Rhine (3).

But Joubert, notwithstanding his successes, was now in a dangerous position. The accounts he received from Bolsano depicted in glowing colours the progress of the levy *en masse*; and although he was at the head of twelve

(1) Nap. iv. 89. Jom. x. 51, 52.

(2) Jom. x. 53. Nap. iv. 89, 90.

(3) Jom. x. 54, 55. Nap. iv. 89, 90. Th. ix. 76.

4th April.
He marches
across
to join
Napoléon at
Klagenfurth.

thousand men, it was evidently highly dangerous either to remain where he was, in the midst of a warlike province in a state of insurrection, or advance unsupported over the higher Alps into the valley of the Inn. There was no alternative, therefore, but to retrace his steps down the Adige, or join Napoléon by the cross-road from Brixen, through the Pusterthal, to Klagenfurth. He preferred the latter; brought up Delmas with his division from Bolsano, and, setting out in the beginning of April, joined the main army in Carinthia with all his forces and five thousand prisoners, leaving Servier to make head as he best could against the formidable force which Laudon was organizing in the valley of the Upper Adige (1).

Results
of these
actions.

Thus, in twenty days after the campaign opened, the army of the Archduke was driven over the Julian Alps; the French occupied Carniola, Carinthia, Trieste, Fiume, and the Italian Tyrol; and a formidable force of forty-five thousand men, flushed with victory, was on the northern declivity of the Alps, within sixty leagues of Vienna. On the other hand, the Austrians, dispirited by disaster, and weakened by defeat, had lost a fourth of their number in the different actions which had occurred, while the forces on the Rhine were at so great a distance as to be unable to take any part in the defence of the capital (2).

Perilous
condition,
notwith-
standing, of
Napoléon.

But notwithstanding all this, the situation of the Republican armies, in many respects, was highly perilous. An insurrection was breaking out in the Venetian provinces, which it was easy to see would ultimately involve that power in hostilities with the French government; Laudon was advancing by rapid strides in the valley of the Adige, with no adequate force to check his operation; and the armies of the Rhine were so far from being in a condition to afford any effectual assistance, that they had not yet crossed that frontier river. The French army could not descend unsupported into the valley of the Danube, for it had not cavalry sufficient to meet the numerous and powerful squadrons of the Imperialists; and what were forty-five thousand men in the heart of the Austrian empire? These considerations, which long had weighed with Napoléon, became doubly cogent, from a despatch received on the 31st March, at Klagenfurth, which announced that Moreau's troops could not enter upon the campaign for want of boats to cross the Rhine, and that the army of Italy must reckon upon no support from the other forces of the Republic. It is evident, notwithstanding the extreme pecuniary distress of the government, that there was something designed in this dilatory conduct, which endangered the bravest army and all the conquests of the Republic; but they had already conceived that jealousy of their victorious general, which subsequent events so fully justified, and apprehended less danger from a retreat before the Imperial forces, than a junction of their greatest armies under such an aspiring leader (3).

He, in con-
sequence,
makes pro-
posals of
peace to the
Archduke.

Deprived of all prospect of that co-operation on which he had relied in crossing the Alps, Napoléon wisely determined to forego all thoughts of dictating peace under the walls of Vienna, and contented himself with making the most of his recent successes, by obtaining advantageous terms from the Austrian government. A few hours, accordingly, after receiving the despatch of the Directory, he addressed to the Archduke Charles one of those memorable letters, which, almost as much as his campaigns, bear the stamp of his powerful and impassioned mind:

(1) Jom. x. Nap. iv. 90-91.

(2) Jom. x. 53. Nap. iv. 91.

(3) Nap. iv. 93, 94. Jom. x. 60, 61. Th. ix. 92.

31st March. —“General-in-chief,—Brave soldiers make war, and desire peace. Has not this war already continued six years? Have we not slain enough of our fellow-creatures, and inflicted a sufficiency of woes on suffering humanity? It demands repose on all sides. Europe, which took up arms against the French Republic, has laid them aside. Your nation alone remains, and yet blood is about to flow in as great profusion as ever. This sixth campaign has commenced with sinister omens; but whatever may be its issue, we shall kill, on one side and the other, many thousand men, and, nevertheless, at last come to an accommodation, for every thing has a termination, even the passions of hatred. The Directory has already evinced to the Imperial government its anxious wish to put a period to hostilities; the Court of London alone broke off the negotiation. But you, general-in-chief, who, by your birth, approach so near the throne, and are above all the little passions which too often govern ministers and governments, are you resolved to deserve the title of benefactor of humanity, and of the real saviour of Germany? Do not imagine, general, from this, that I conceive that you are not in a situation to save it by force of arms; but even in such an event, Germany will not be the less ravaged. As for myself, if the overture which I have the honour to make, shall be the means of saving a single life, I shall be more proud of the civic crown, which I shall be conscious of having deserved, than of the melancholy glory attending military success.” The Archduke returned
2d April. a polite and dignified answer, in these terms:—“In the duty which is assigned to me there is no power either to scrutinize the causes, nor terminate the duration of the war; and, as I am not invested with any powers in that respect, you will easily conceive that I can enter into no negotiation without express authority from the Imperial government.” It is remarkable how much more Napoléon, a Republican general, here assumed the language and exercised the power of an independent sovereign, than his illustrious opponent (1); a signal proof how early he contemplated that supreme authority which his extraordinary abilities so well qualified him to attain.

1st April. To support his negotiations, the French general pressed the Imperialists with all his might in their retreat. Early on the 1st April, Masséna came up with the Austrian rear-guard in advance of Freisach; they were instantly attacked, routed, and driven into the town pell-mell with the victors. Next day, Napoléon, continuing his march, found himself in presence of the Archduke in person, who had collected the greater part of his army, reinforced by four divisions recently arrived from the Rhine, to defend the gorge of Neumarkt. This terrific defile, which even a traveller can hardly traverse without a feeling of awe, offered the strongest position to a retreating army; and its mouth, with all the villages in the vicinity, was occupied in force by the Austrian grenadiers. The French general collected his forces; Masséna was directed to assemble all his division on the left of the chaussée; the division of Guieux was placed on the heights on the right, and Serrurier in reserve. At three in the afternoon the attack commenced at all points; the soldiers of the Rhine challenged the veterans of the Italian army to equal the swiftness of their advance; and the rival corps, eagerly watching each other's steps, precipitated themselves with irresistible force upon the enemy. The Austrians, after a short action, fell back in confusion; and the Archduke took advantage of the approach of night to retire to Hundsmark. In this affair the

They are
defeated at
the Gorge of
Neumarkt.

(1) Nap. iv. 96, 97.

Imperialists lost 1500 men, although the division of Masséna was alone seriously engaged. Napoléon instantly pushed on to Schussling, a military post of great importance, as it was situated at the junction of the cross-road from the Tyrol and the great chaussée to Vienna, which was carried after a rude combat; and on the following day he despatched Guieux down the rugged

3d April.

Napoléon pushes on to Judenberg, and the Archduke retires towards Vienna.

defiles of the Muer in pursuit of the column of Sporck, which, after a sharp action with the French advanced-guard, succeeded in joining the main army of the Imperialists by the route of Rastadt. Two days after, Napoléon pushed on to Judenberg, where headquarters were established on the 6th April, and then halted to collect his scattered forces, while the advanced-guard occupied the village of Leoben. The Archduke now resolved to leave the mountains, and concentrate all his divisions in the neighbourhood of Vienna, where the whole resources of the monarchy were to be collected, and the last battle fought for the independence of Germany (1).

Terror excited by these disasters.

This rapid advance excited the utmost consternation at the Austrian capital. In vain the Aulic Council strove to stem the torrent; in vain the lower orders surrounded the public offices, and demanded with loud cries to be enrolled for the defence of the country; the government yielded to the alarm, and terror froze every heart. The Danube was covered with boats conveying the archives and most precious articles beyond the reach of danger; the young archduke and archduchesses were sent to Hungary, amongst whom was MARIA LOUISA, then hardly six years of age, who afterwards became Empress of France. The old fortifications of Vienna, which had withstood the arms of the Turks, but had since fallen into decay, were hastily put into repair, and the militia directed to the intrenched camp of Marienhalf, to learn the art which might so soon be required for the defence of the capital (2).

7th April. Preliminaries agreed to at Leoben.

The Emperor, although endowed with more than ordinary firmness of mind, at length yielded to the torrent. On the 7th April, the Archduke's chief of the staff, Bellegarde, along with General Meerfeld, presented himself at the outposts, and a suspension of arms was agreed on at LEOBEN for five days. All the mountainous region, as far as the Simmring, was to be occupied by the French troops, as well as Gratz, the capital of Styria. On the 9th, the advanced posts established themselves on that ridge, the last of the Alps, before they sink into the Austrian plain, from whence, in a clear day, the steeples of the capital can be discerned; and on the same day headquarters were established at Leoben to conduct the negotiations. At the same time General Joubert arrived in the valley of the Drave, and Kerpen, by a circuitous route, joined the Archduke. The French army, which lately extended over the whole Alps, from Brixen to Trieste, was concentrated in cantonments in a small space, ready to debouche, in case of need, into the plain of Vienna (5).

Disastrous state of the French in Croatia and Tyrol.

15th April.

19th April.

While these decisive events were occurring in the Alps of Carinthia, the prospects of the French in Tyrol, Croatia, and Friuli were rapidly changing for the worse. An insurrection had taken place among the Croats. Fiume was wrested from the Republicans, and nothing but the suspension of arms prevented Trieste from falling into the hands of the insurgents. Such was the panic they occa-

(1) Nap. iv. 84, 100. Jom. x. 61, 65. Th. ix. 96, 97.

(3) Jom. x. 67. Th. ix. 98. Nap. iv. 102, 103.

(2) Jom. x. 64. Nap. iv. 92, 93.

sioned, that the detached parties of the French fled as far as Gorizia, on the Isonzo. Meanwhile Laudon, whose division was raised to twelve thousand by the insurrection in the Tyrol, descended the Adige, driving the inconsiderable division of Servier before him, who was soon compelled to take refuge within the walls of Verona. Thus, at the moment that the French centre, far advanced in the mountains, was about to bear the whole weight of the Austrian monarchy, its two wings were exposed, and an insurrection in progress, which threatened to cut off the remaining communications in its rear (1).

Extreme danger of Napoleon. The perilous situation of the French army cannot be better represented than in the words of Napoléon, in his despatch to the Directory, enclosing the preliminaries of Leoben. "The court had evacuated Vienna: the Archduke and his army were falling back on that of the Rhine; the people of Hungary, and of all the Hereditary States, were rising in mass, and at this moment the heads of their columns are on our flanks. The Rhine is not yet passed by our soldiers; the moment it is, the Emperor will put himself at the head of his armies, and although, if they stood their ground, I would, without doubt, have beat them, yet they could still have fallen back on the armies of the Rhine and overwhelmed me. In such a case retreat would have been difficult, and the loss of the army of Italy would have drawn after it that of the Republic. Impressed with these ideas, I had resolved to levy a contribution in the suburbs of Vienna, and attempt nothing more. I have not four thousand cavalry, and instead of the forty thousand infantry I was to have received, I have never got twenty. Had I insisted, in the commencement of the campaign, upon entering Turin, I would never have crossed the Po; had I agreed to the project of going to Rome, I would have lost the Milanese; had I persisted in advancing to Vienna, I would probably have ruined the Republic (2)."

When such were the views of the victorious party, the negotiation could not be long in coming to a conclusion. Napoléon, though not furnished with any powers to that effect from the Directory, took upon himself to act in the conferences like an independent sovereign. The Austrians attached great importance to the etiquette of the proceedings, and offered to recognise the French Republic if they were allowed the precedence; but Napoléon ordered that article to be withdrawn, "Efface that," said he: "the Republic is like the sun, which shines with its own light; the blind alone cannot see it. In truth," he adds, "such a condition was worse than useless; because, if one day the French people should wish to create a monarchy, the Emperor might object that he had recognised a Republic;" a striking proof how early the ambition of the young general had been fixed upon the throne (3).

Conditions of the preliminaries, 9th April, at Judenberg. As the French plenipotentiaries had not arrived, Napoléon, of his own authority, signed the treaty. Its principal articles were, 1. The cession of Flanders to the Republic, and the extension of its frontier to the Rhine, on condition of a suitable indemnity being provided to the Emperor in some other quarter. 2. The cession of Savoy to the same power, and the extension of its territory to the summit of the Piedmontese Alps. 3. The establishment of the Cisalpine Republic, including Lombardy, with the states of Modena, Cremona, and the Bergamasque. 4. The Oglio was fixed on as the boundary of the Austrian possessions in Italy. 5. The Emperor was to receive, in return for so many sacrifices, the *whole*

(1) Th. ix. 114. Jom. x. 60. Nap. iv. 104.

(2) Jom. x. 462. Pièces Just.

(3) Th. ix. 100. Nap. iv. 106.

continental states of Venice, including Illiria, Istria, Friuli, and the Upper Italy, as far as the Oglio. 6. Venice was to obtain, in return for the loss of its continental possessions, Romagna, Ferrara, and Bologna (1), which the French had wrested from the Pope. 7. The important fortresses of Mantua, Peschiera, Porto-Legnago, and Palma-Nuova, were to be restored to the Emperor, on the conclusion of a general peace, with the city and castles of Verona.

Enormous
injustice of
this treaty,
as far as
regards
Venice.

With truth does Napoléon confess, that these arrangements were made “in hatred of Venice (2).” Thus did that daring leader, and the Austrian government, take upon themselves, without any declaration of war, or any actual hostilities with the Venetian government, to partition out the territories of that neutral Republic, for no other reason, than because they lay conveniently for one of the contracting powers, and afforded a plausible pretext for an enormous acquisition of territory by the other. The page of history, stained as it is with acts of oppression and violence, has nothing more iniquitous to present. It is darker in atrocity than the partition of Poland, and has only excited less indignation in subsequent years, because it was attended with no heroism or dignity in the vanquished. It reveals the melancholy truth, that small states have never so much reason to tremble for their independence, as when large ones in their neighbourhood are arranging the terms of peace; nor is it easy to say, whether the injustice of the proceeding is most apparent on the first statement of the spoliation, or on a review of the previous transactions which are referred to in its defence.

Venice, the queen of the Adriatic, seated on her throne of waters, had long sought to veil the weakened strength, and diminished courage of age, under a cautious and reserved neutrality. The oldest state in existence, having survived for nearly fourteen centuries, she had felt the weakness and timidity of declining years, before any serious reverse had been sustained in her fortunes, and was incapable of resisting the slightest attack, while as yet her external aspect exhibited no symptoms of decay. The traveller, as he glided through the palaces, which still rose, in undecaying beauty, from the waters of the Adriatic, no longer wondered at the astonishment with which the stern Crusaders of the north gazed at her marble piles, and felt the rapture of the Roman Emperor, when he approached where, “Venice sat in state, throned on her hundred isles;” but in the weak and pusillanimous crowd which he beheld on all sides, he looked in vain for the descendants of those brave men, who leaped from their galleys on the towers of Constantinople, and stood forth as the bulwark of Christendom against the Ottoman power; and still less, amidst the misery and dejection with which he was surrounded, could he go back in imagination to those days of liberty and valour,

—“when Venice once was dear,
The pleasant place of all Festivity;
The Revel of the Earth, the Mask of Italy.”

Its long-
continued
decline.

In truth, Venice exhibits one of the most curious and instructive instances which is to be found in modern history, of the decline of a state without any rude external shock, from the mere force of internal corruption, and the long-continued direction of the passions to selfish objects.

(1) Jom. x. 68, 69. Nap. iv. 106, 107. Th. ix. 104, 105. (2) Nap. iv. 107.

The league of Cambray, indeed, had shaken its power; the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope had dried up part of its resources, and the augmentation of the strength of the Transalpine monarchies had diminished its relative importance; but still its wealth and population were such as to entitle it to a respectable rank among the European states, and if directed by energy and courage, would have given it a preponderating weight in the issue of this campaign. But centuries of peace had dissolved the courage of the higher orders; ages of corruption had extinguished the patriotism of the people, and the continued pursuits of selfish gratification had rendered all classes incapable of the sacrifices which exertions for their country required. The arsenals were empty; the fortifications decayed; the fleet, which once ruled the Adriatic, was rotting in the Lagunæ; and the army, which formerly faced the banded strength of Europe in the league of Cambray, was drawn entirely from the semi-harbarous provinces on the Turkish frontier (1). With such a population, nothing grand or generous could be attempted; but it was hardly to be expected that the country of Dandolo and Carmagnola should yield without a struggle, and the eldest born of the European commonwealths sink upitied into the grave of nations.

Rapid
progress of
democratic
ideas in the
cities of the
Venetian
territory.

The proximity of the Venetian continental provinces to those which had recently been revolutionized by the Republican arms, and the sojourning of the French armies among the ardent youth of its principal cities, naturally and inevitably led to the rapid pro-

pagation of democratic principles among their inhabitants. This took place more particularly, after the victories of Rivoli and the fall of Mantua had dispelled all dread of the return of the Austrian forces. Every where revolutionary clubs and committees were formed in the towns, who corresponded with the Republican authorities at Milan, and openly expressed a wish to throw off the yoke of the Venetian oligarchy. During the whole winter of 1796, the democratic party, in all the continental states of Venice, were in a state of unceasing agitation; and although Napoléon was far from desirous of involving his rear in hostilities, when actively engaged in the defiles of the Noric Alps, yet he felt anxious to establish a party able to counteract the efforts of the Venetian government, which already began to take umbrage at the menacing language and avowed sedition of their disaffected subjects. For this purpose, he secretly enjoined Captain Landrieux, chief of the staff to the cavalry, to correspond with the malcontents, and give unity and effect to their operations; while, to preserve the appearance of neutrality, he gave orders to General Kelmaine to direct all the officers and soldiers under his command to give neither counsel nor assistance to the disaffected (2).

Landrieux undertook a double part: while, on the one hand, in obedience to Napoléon's commands, and in conjunction with the ardent democrats of the Italian towns, he excited the people to revolt, and organized the means of their resistance; on the other, he entered into a secret correspondence with the Venetian government, and dispatched his agent, Stephani, to Ottolini, the chief magistrate of Bergamo, to detail the nature and extent of the conspiracy which was on foot, and inform him that it went to separate entirely its continental possessions from the Venetian Republic (5). By this

(1) Jom. x. 115.

(2) *Corresp. Confid. de Nap.* iv. 289. Jom. x. 120, 121. Botta, ii. 189, 190, 191. *Nap.* iv. 129.

(3) "Landrieux," said Napoléon, in his Secret Despatch to the Directory, "instigated the revolt in

Bergamo and Brescia, and was paid for it; at the same time he revealed the plot to the Venetian Government, and was paid for that also by them."

—*Corresp. confid.* iv. 289.

double perfidy did this hypocritical chief of the staff render inevitable a rupture between France and Venice; for while, on the one hand, he excited the democratic party against the government; on the other, he gave the government too good reason to adopt measures of coercion against the democratic party and their French allies (1).

It is an easy matter to excite the passions of democracy; but it is rarely that the authors of the flame can make it stop short at the point which they desire. The vehement language and enthusiastic conduct of the French soldiers, brought on an explosion in the Venetian territories sooner than was expedient for the interests either of the general or the army. Napoléon's constant object was, by the terror of an insurrection in their continental possessions, to induce the government to unite cordially in a league with France, and make the desired concessions to the popular party; but having failed in his endeavours, he marched for the Tagliamento, leaving the seeds of an insurrection ready to explode in all the provinces in his rear. On the morn-

Democratic
insurrection
breaks out
in the
Venetian
provinces.

ing of the 12th March, the revolt broke out at Bergamo, in consequence of the arrest of the leaders of the insurrection; the insurgents declared openly that they were supported by the French, and dispatched couriers to Milan and the principal towns of Lombardy to obtain succour, and besought the Republican commander of the castle to support them with his forces, but he declined to interfere ostensibly in their behalf, though he countenanced their projected union with the Cisalpine Republic. A provisional government was immediately established, which instantly announced to the Cispadane Republic that Bergamo had recovered its liberty, and their desire to be united with that state, and concluded with these words: "Let us live, let us fight, and, if necessary, die together; thus should all free people do; let us then for ever remain united; you, the French, and ourselves (2)."

Which soon
spreads to
all the chief
towns.

The example speedily spread to other towns. Brescia, under the instigation of Landrieux, openly threw off its allegiance, and disarmed the Venetian troops, in presence of the French soldiers, who neither checked nor supported the insurrection. At Crema, the insurgents were introduced into the gates by a body of French cavalry, and speedily overturned the Venetian authorities, and proclaimed their union with the Cispadane Republic (3).

Consterna-
tion at
Venice.

These alarming revolts excited the utmost consternation at Venice; and the Senate, not daring to act openly against insurgents who declared themselves supported by the Republican commanders, wrote to the Directory, and dispatched Pesaro to the headquarters of Napoléon, to complain of the countenance given by his troops to the revolt of their subjects.

Venetians
send depu-
ties to Na-
poléon. His
duplicity,

The Venetian deputies came up with the French general at Gorizia; he feigned surprise at the intelligence, but endeavoured to take advantage of the terror of the Republic to induce them to submit to increased exactions. They represented that the French armies had occupied the principal fortresses and castles of the Republic, and that, having thus obtained the vantage-ground, they were bound either to take some steps to show that they disapproved of the revolt, which was organized in their name, or to cede these places to the Republic, and permit them to exert their own strength in restoring order in their dominions. Napoléon positively declined

(1) Des. Conf. de Nap. Conf. Corr, iv. 289. Hard. iv. 226, 228.

(2) Jom. x. 122. Th. ix. 79, 80. Nap. iv. 130—131. Bott. ii. 192, 194.

(3) Jom. x. 122, 123. Bott. ii. 199, 200.

to do either of these things; but constantly urged the deputies to throw themselves into the arms of France. "That I should arm against our friends, against those who have received us kindly, and wish to defend us, in favour of our enemies, against those who hate and seek to ruin us, is impossible. Never will I turn my arms against the principles of the Revolution; to them I owe in part all my success. But I offer you, in perfect sincerity, my friendship and my counsels: unite yourselves cordially to France; make the requisite changes in your constitution; and, without employing force with the Italian people, I will induce them to yield to order and peace." They passed from that to the contributions for the use of the army. Hitherto Venice had furnished supplies to the French army, as she had previously done to the Imperial. The Venetian deputies insisted that Napoléon, having now entered the Hereditary States, should cease to be any longer a burden on their resources. This was far from being the French general's intention; for he was desirous of levying no requisitions on the Austrian territories, for fear of rousing a national war among the inhabitants. The commissaries, whom the Venetian government had secretly commissioned to furnish supplies to the French army, had ceased their contributions, and they had, in consequence commenced requisitions in the Venetian territories. "That is a bad mode of proceeding," said Napoléon; "it vexes the inhabitants, and opens the door to innumerable abuses. Give me a *million a-month* as long as the campaign lasts; the Republic will account to you for it, and you will receive more than a million's worth in the cessation of pillage. You have nourished my enemies, you must do the same to me." The envoys answered that their treasury was exhausted. "If you have no money," said he, "take it from the Duke of Modena, or levy it on the property of the Russians, Austrians, and English, which are lying in your dépôts. But beware of proceeding to hostilities. If, while I am engaged in a distant campaign, you light the flames of war in my rear, you have sealed your own ruin. That which might have been overlooked when I was in Italy, becomes an unpardonable offence when I am in Germany." Such was the violence with which this haughty conqueror treated a nation which was not only neutral, but had for nine months furnished gratuitously all the supplies for his army; and such the degradation which this ancient Republic prepared for itself, by the timid policy which hoped to avoid danger by declining to face it (1).

Venetians at last resolve to act against the insurgents. The Venetian government at length saw that they could no longer delay taking a decided part. A formidable insurrection, organized in the name and under the sanction of the Republican authorities, was rapidly spreading in their continental possessions, great part of which had already joined the Cisalpine Republic; and the general-in-chief, instead of taking any steps to quench the flame, had only demanded fresh contributions from a state already exhausted by his exactions. They resolved, therefore, by a large majority, to act vigorously against the insurgents, but without venturing to engage in hostilities with the French forces; an ill-judged step, the result of timidity and irresolution, which exposed them to all the perils of war, without any of its favourable chances; which irritated without endangering the enemy, and allowed the French general to select his own time for wreaking upon the state, alone and unbefriended, the whole weight of Republican vengeance (2).

(1) Journ. x. 124, 125. Bott. ii. 201. Th. ix. 85— (2) Bott. ii. 210, 211, Journ. x. 125.
87. Nap. iv. 87.

Hostilities break out between the two parties. The retreat of the French from the valley of the Adige, and the irruptions of the Croats into Friuli, encouraged the Venetian government to commence hostilities on their refractory subjects. But before that took place tumults and bloodshed had arisen spontaneously and about the same time, in many different parts of the territory, in consequence of the furious passions which were roused by the collision of the aristocracy on the one hand, and the populace on the other. Matters also were precipitated by an unworthy fraud, perpetrated by the Republican agents at Milan. This was the preparation and publishing of an address, purporting to be from Battaglia, Governor of Verona, calling upon the citizens faithful to Venice to rise in arms, to murder the insurgents, and chase the French soldiers from the Venetian territory. This fabrication, which was written at Milan, by a person in the French interest, of the name of Salvador, was extensively diffused by Landrieux, the secret agent of the French general; and though it bore such absurdity on its face as might have detected the forgery, yet, in the agitated state of the country, a spark was sufficient to fire the train; and hostilities, from the excited condition of men's minds, would, in all probability, have been commenced even without this unworthy device. The mountaineers and the inhabitants of the Alpine valleys flew to arms, large bodies of the peasantry collected together, and every thing was prepared for the irruption of a considerable force into the plains of Brescia (1).

The counter insurrection spreads immensely. 1st April. The democrats in Brescia, instigated by French agents (2) resolved instantly to commence hostilities. A body of twelve hundred men issued from their gates, accompanied by four pieces of cannon, served by French gunners, to attack Salò, a fortified town, occupied by Venetians, on the western bank of the lake of Guarda. The expedition reached the town, and was about to take possession of it, when they were suddenly attacked and routed by a body of mountaineers, who made prisoners two hundred Poles, of the legion of Dombrowski, and so completely surprised the French, that they narrowly escaped the same fate. This success contributed immensely to excite the movements; large bodies of peasants issued from the valleys, and soon ten thousand armed men appeared before the gates of Brescia. The inhabitants, however, prepared for their defence, and 4th April. soon a severe cannonade commenced on both sides. General Kilmaine, upon this, collected a body of fifteen hundred men, chiefly Poles, under General Lahoz, attacked and defeated the mountaineers, and drove them back to their mountains; they were soon after followed by the French flotilla and land forces, and Salò was taken and sacked (5).

Continued indecision of the Senate in regard to France. The intelligence of these events excited the utmost indignation at Venice. The part taken by the French troops in supporting the revolt could no longer be concealed; and the advance of Laudon, at the same time, in Tyrol, produced such apparently well-founded hopes of the approaching downfall of the Republicans, that nothing but the vicinity of Victor's corps prevented the Senate from openly declaring against the French. The Austrian general spread, in the vicinity of Verona, the most extravagant intelligence; that he was advancing at the head of sixty thousand men; that Napoléon had been defeated in the Noric Alps, and that the junction of the corps in his rear would speedily compel him to surrender. These reports excited the most vehement agitation at Verona, where the

(1) Jom. 126. x. Bot. ii. 211, 215. Th. ix, 116.

(2) Corresp. Confid. de Nap. iv. 289.

(3) Jom. x. 126, 129. Bott. ii. 200. Th. ix. 90.

patrician party, from their proximity to the revolutionary cities, were in imminent danger, and a popular insurrection might hourly be expected. The government, however, deeming it too hazardous to come to an open rupture with the French, continued their temporizing policy (1); they even agreed to give the million a-month which the Republican general demanded, and contented themselves with redoubling the vigilance of the police, and arresting such of their own subjects as were most suspected of seditious practices.

Meanwhile Napoléon, having received intelligence of the steps which the Venetian government had adopted to crush the insurrection in their dominions, and the check which the Republican troops, in aiding them, had received at Salò, affected the most violent indignation. Having already concluded his armistice at Leoben, and agreed to abandon the whole continental possessions of Venice to Austria, he foresaw in these events the means of satisfying the avidity of the Imperialists, and procuring advantageous terms

10th April.

Affected
anger of
Napoléon.

for the Republic, at the expense of the helpless state of Venice. He therefore sent his aide-de-camp, Junot, with a menacing letter to the Senate, in which he threatened them with the whole weight of the Republican vengeance, if they did not instantly liberate the Polish and French prisoners, surrender to him the authors of the hostilities, and disband all their armaments. Junot was received by the Senate, to whom he read the thundering letter of Napoléon; but they prevailed on him to suspend his threats, and dispatched two senators to the Republican headquarters, to endeavour to bring matters to an accommodation (2).

Massacre at
Verona.

But the very day after the deputies set out from Venice for Leoben, an explosion took place on the Adige, which gave the French general too fair a pretext to break off the negotiation. The levy *en masse* of the peasants, to the number of twenty thousand, had assembled in the neighbourhood of Verona; three thousand Venetian troops had been sent into that town by the Senate, and the near approach of the Austrians from the Tyrol promised

17th April.

effectual support. The tocsin sounded; the people flew to arms, and put to death in cold blood four hundred wounded French in the hospitals. Indignant at these atrocious cruelties, General Balland, who commanded the French garrison in the forts, fired on the city with red-hot balls. Conflagrations soon broke out in several quarters, and although various attempts at accommodation were made, they were all rendered abortive by the furious passions of the multitude. The cannonade continued on both sides, the forts were closely invested, the city in many parts was in flames, the French already began to feel the pressure of hunger, and the garrison of Fort Chiusa, which capitulated from want of provisions, was inhumanly put to death, to revenge the ravages of the bombardment (3).

But the hour of retribution was at hand; and a terrible reverse awaited the sanguinary excesses of the Venetian insurrection. The day after hostilities commenced, the intelligence of the armistice was received, and the Austrian troops retired into the Tyrol; two days after, the columns of General Chabran appeared round the town, and invested its walls; while, to complete their misfortunes, on the 25d, accounts of the signature of the preliminaries of Leoben arrived. The multitude immediately passed from the highest exaltation to the deepest dejection; and

18th April.

Which is
speedily sup-
pressed by
the French
troops.

(1) Th. ix. 112. Nap. iv. 139. Bott. ii. 211.

(2) Bott. ii. 217, 218. Th. ix. 113. Jom. x. 131.

(3) Jom. x. 132, 135. Th. ix. 120. Balland and

Kilmaine's Account. Confid. Corresp. de Nap. iii. 124, 167.

they now sought only to deprecate the wrath of the conqueror, to whom
 28th April. they had given so much cause of hostility. Submission was immediately made; the authors of the cruelties shot; a general disarming affected among the peasantry; and a contribution of 1,100,000 francs levied on the city. The plains were speedily covered with French troops; the united divisions of Victor and Kilmaine occupied successively Vicenza and Padua, and soon the French standards were discovered from the steeples of Venice on the shores of their Lagunæ (4).

These excesses were the work of popular passion, equally sanguinary and inconstant, when not rightly directed, in all ages and countries; but an event
 23d April. of the same kind stained the last days of the Venetian government itself. A French vessel of four guns approached the entrance of the harbour of Lido, in opposition to a rule of the Venetian Senate, to which all nations, not excepting the English themselves, were in use to yield obedience. A cannonade ensued between the batteries on shore and the vessel, and
 Massacre at Lido. the French ship having been captured by the galleys on the station, the captain and four of the crew were massacred, and eleven wounded. Immediately after, a decree of the Senate publicly applauded this cruel and unnecessary act (2).

These sanguinary proceedings sufficiently verify the old observation, that pusillanimity and cruelty are allied to each other; and that none are so truly humane as the brave and the free. They do not in the slightest degree palliate the treachery of the French, or the rapacity of the Imperialists, the former of whom had instigated the revolt of the Venetian democrats, and signed the partition of Venice *before* either of these events took place (5); but they go far to diminish the regret which otherwise would be felt at the success of unprincipled ambition, and the fall of the oldest Republic of the Christian world.

Efforts of the Venetian Senate to avert the storm. The Venetian Senate, thunderstruck with the intelligence they had received, did their utmost to appease the wrath of the victors. Their situation had become to the last degree perilous, for they were precipitated into hostilities with the victorious Republic, at the very time when Austria, discomfited, was retiring from the strife, and when their own dominions had become a prey to the most furious discord. The democratic party, following the French standards, had revolted at Vicenza, Treviso, Padua, and all the continental cities, while a vehement faction in the capital itself was threatening with overthrow the constitution of the state. A deputation was sent to Gratz to endeavour to pacify the conqueror, and another to Paris, with ample funds at the command of both, to corrupt

(1) Nap. iv. 141. Jom. x. 140. Bott. ii. 232. Kilmaine's Report. Conf. Corresp. iii. 155, 167.

(2) Bott. ii. 242, 243. Jom. x. 139.

(3) The Massacre at Verona took place on the 17th April, that at Lido on the 23d, while the preliminaries of Leoben, which assigned the whole of the continental Venetian territories to Austria, were agreed to on the 9th, at Judenberg, while the formal treaty was drawn up on the 16th, and signed on the 18th, in Carinthia, before even the first of these events had occurred. Napoléon has given the clearest proof of his sense of the unjustifiable nature of this aggression, by having, in his memoirs on this subject, entirely kept out of view the dates, and made it appear as if his menacing letter by Junot to the Senate was the consequence of the massacre of April 17, at Verona, when, in fact, it was dated the 9th April, at Judenberg, at a time

when, so far from the Venetian Government having given any cause of complaint to the French, they had only suffered aggressions at their hands, in the assistance openly lent to the democratic rebels, and the attack by the Republican forces on Salo. Conflicts, indeed, had taken place between the Venetian insurgents, stimulated by the French, and the aristocratic adherents; but the Government had committed no act of hostility, the monthly supplies were in a course of regular payment, and the French ambassador was still at Venice.—See *Napoléon*, iv. 142. By not attending minutely to this matter, Sir W. Scott has totally misrepresented the transactions which led to the fall of Venice, and drawn them in far too favourable colours for the hero whose life he has so ably delineated.—See Scott's *Napoléon*, iii. 315, 316.

the sources of influence at these places. They succeeded, by the distribution of a very large sum, in gaining over the Directory (1); but all their efforts with Napoléon were fruitless. He was not only a character totally inaccessible to that species of corruption, but was too deeply implicated in the partition of the Venetian territories, which he had just signed, to forego so fortunate a pretext for vindicating it as these excesses had afforded (2).

Resources
still at the
command
Venice.

Venice had still at its command most formidable means of defence, if the spirit of the inhabitants had been equal to the emergency. They had within the city 8000 seamen and 14,000 regular

troops, thirty-seven galleys and 160 gun-boats, carrying 800 cannon for the defence of the Lagunæ; and all the approaches to the capital were commanded by powerful batteries. Provisions existed for eight months; fresh water for two, the nearest islands were beyond the reach of cannon-shot from the shore, and with the assistance of the fleets of England, they might have bid defiance to all the armies of France (3). The circumstances of the Republic were not nearly so desperate as they had been in former times, when they extricated themselves with glory from their difficulties; when the league of Cambray had wrested from them all their territorial possessions, or when the Genoese fleet had seized the gates of the Lagunæ and blockaded their fleet at Malmocco. But the men were no longer the same; the poison of democracy had extinguished every feeling of patriotism in the middling, the enjoyments of luxury every desire for independence among the senatorial, classes; ages of prosperity had corrupted the sources of virtue, and the insane passion for equality vainly rose like a passing meteor to illuminate the ruins of a falling state.

On the 3d May, Napoléon published from Palma Nuova his declaration of war against Venice. He there complained that the Senate had taken advantage of the holy week to organize a furious war against France; that vast bodies of peasantry were armed and disciplined by troops sent out of the capital; that a crusade against the French was preached in all the churches; their detached bodies murdered, and the sick in the hospitals massacred; the crew of a French galley slain under the eyes of the Senate, and the authors of the tragedy publicly rewarded for the atrocious act. To this manifesto the Venetians replied, that the massacres complained of were not the work of government, but of individuals whom they could not control; that the popular passions had been excited by the ungovernable insolence of the Republican soldiery, and of the democratic party whom they had roused to open rebellion; that the first acts of aggression were committed by the French commanders, by publicly assisting the rebels in various encounters with the Venetian forces, long before the massacres complained of were committed; and that the only fault which they had really committed, consisted in their not having earlier divined the ambitious designs of the French general, and joined all their forces to the Austrian armies when combating for a cause which must sooner or later be that of every independent state (4).

The French general was not long of following up his menaces, and preparing the execution of that unjustifiable partition which had been decided upon between him and the Imperial cabinet. The French troops, in pursuance of

(1) Two hundred thousand crowns, as a private bribe, were placed at the disposal of Barras.—See HARDENBERG, v. 19, and *Napoléon in O'MEARA*, ii. 171.

(2) Nap. iv. 144. Join. x. 142. Bott. ii. 223, 224.

(3) Th. ix. 128.

(4) Bott. ii. 255. Nap. iv. 147, 149.

the treaty of Leoben, rapidly evacuated Carinthia, and returning by forced marches on their steps, soon appeared on the confines of the Lagunæ, within sight of the tower of St.-Mark. As they advanced, the Republic became a prey to the passions, and torn by the factions, which are the general fore-runners of national ruin. At the news of the proclamation of war, all the towns of the continental possessions of Venice revolted against the capital. Every city proclaimed its independence, and appointed a provisional government; Bergamo, Brescia, Padua, Vicenza, Bassano, Udina, constituted so many separate republics, who organized themselves after the model of the French Republic, suppressed the convents, and confiscated their property, abolished all feudal rights, established national guards, and hoisted the tricolor flag (1).

Universal revolt of all the continental towns of the Venetian territory. Meanwhile Venice, itself a prey to the most vehement faction, was in a cruel state of perplexity. The senators met at the doge's palace, and endeavoured by untimely concessions, to satisfy the demands and revive the patriotism of the popular party; a vain expedient, founded upon utter ignorance of democratic ambition, which concessions, dictated by fear, can never satisfy, but which, in such a successful course, rushes forward, like an individual plunged in the career of passion, upon its own destruction. The patricians found themselves deprived of all the resources of government; a furious rabble filled the streets, demanding with loud cries the abdication of the Senate, the immediate admission of the French troops, and the establishment of a government formed on a highly democratic basis; a revolutionary committee, formed of the most active of the middling orders, was in open communication with the French army, and rose in audacity with every concession from the government: the sailors of the fleet had manifested symptoms of insubordination; and the fidelity of the Slavonians, who constituted the strength of the garrison, could not, it was ascertained, be relied on. These elements of anarchy, sufficient to have shaken the courage of the Roman senate, were too powerful for the weak and vacillating councils of the Venetian oligarchy. Yielding to the tempest which they could not withstand, they assembled in mournful silence on the 12th May, and after passing in review the exhausted resources and distracted state of the Republic, voted, amidst the tears of all friends to their country, by a majority of five hundred and twelve to fourteen voices, the abdication of their authority.

1st and 3d May. Shouts from the giddy multitude rent the sky; the tree of liberty was hoisted on the place of St.-Mark; the democrats entered, amidst bloodshed and plunder, upon the exercise of their new-born sovereignty; and the revolutionary party fondly imagined they were launched into a boundless career of glory. But the real patriots, the men of sense and firmness, lamented the decision of the Senate, and retiring in silence to their homes, exclaimed, with tears, "Venice is no more; St.-Mark has fallen (2)."

12th May. The Senate abdicate their authority. While the revolutionists were thus bartering their country for the vain chimera of democratic equality, and the unworthy descendants of Dandolo and Morosini were surrendering without a struggle the glories and the independence of a thousand years, more generous sentiments burst forth among the labouring classes, often the last depositaries, in a corrupted age, of public virtue. No sooner was the mournful act communicated to the people, than they flocked together from all quarters, and

(1) Nap. iv. 151, 152. Jom. x. 144.

(2) Solikowski's report to Napoléon. Conf. Corr. iii. 235, 241. Bott. ii. 273, 275. Th. ix. 138.

with loud cries demanded the restoration of the standard of St.-Mark, and arms to combat for the independence of their country. Several bloody contests ensued between them and the revolutionary party; but the populace, however ardent, cannot maintain a contest for any length of time when destitute of leaders. The cannon of the republicans dispersed the frantic assemblages; and, amidst the shouts of the insane revolutionists, the French troops were conducted by Venetian boats to the place of St.-Mark, where a foreign standard had not been seen for fifteen hundred years, but where the colours of independence were never again destined to wave (1).

The French troops were not long of securing to themselves the spoils of their revolutionary allies. The Golden Book, the record of the Senators of Venice, was burnt at the foot of the tree of liberty; and while the democrats were exulting over the destruction of this emblem of their ancient subjection, their allies were depriving them of all the means of future independence. The treasures of the Republic were instantly seized by the French generals; but instead of the vast sums they expected, 1,800,000 francs, belonging to the Duke of Modena, were all that fell into their hands. All that remained in the celebrated harbour of St.-Mark's was made prize; but such was its dilapidated condition, that they with difficulty fitted out two sixty-four gun-ships, and a few frigates, out of the arsenal of the Queen of the Adriatic. The remainder of the fleet, consisting of five sail of the line, six frigates, and eleven galleys, were not in a condition to keep the sea; and Admiral Brueys received orders from the Directory to set sail to secure the fruit of republican fraternization. In the middle of July he arrived at Venice, where his fleet was paid, equipped, and fed at the expense of the infant Republic; a burden which began to open the eyes of the revolutionary party, when too late, to the consequences of their conduct. The bitter fruits of republican alliance were still more poignantly felt when the conditions of the treaty of Milan, signed by Napoléon with the new government of Venice, became known, which stipulated the abolition of the aristocracy; the formation of a popular government; the introduction of a division of French troops into the capital; a contribution of three millions in money, three millions of naval stores, and the surrender of three ships of the line and two frigates; with many illustrious works of art (2). Among the rest, the famous horses, brought in the car of victory from Corinth to Rome, thence to Constantinople, and thence to Venice, were carried off in triumph by the conquering Republic (3).

While these memorable events were going forward on the southern side of the Alps, the war languished on the frontier of the Rhine. Latour commanded the Imperial army on the Upper Rhine; his forces, after the departure of the veteran bands, under the Archduke, did not exceed thirty-four thousand infantry and six thousand horse; while those under the orders of Werneck, in the Lower Rhine, were about thirty thousand, and

(1) Bott ii. 276, 278. Th. ix. 138, 139. Jom. x. 150. Solkowski's report to Napoléon. Conf. Corr. iii. 235, 241.

(2) Jom. x. 152. Bott. ii. 277, 279. Th. ix. 140. See the secret articles in Corresp. Confid. de Nap. iii. 178.

(3) The seizure of these horses was an act of pure robbery. The Venetians, in the secret articles, agreed to surrender "twenty pictures and five hundred manuscripts," but no statues. Nevertheless, the French carried off the horses, from the place of St.-Mark, and put them on the triumphal

arch in the Tuileries. In like manner, the secret articles only bound the Venetians to furnish three millions' worth of naval stores; but Napoléon ordered the French admiral, Brueys, who was sent to superintend the spoliation, to carry off the whole stores to Toulon; and the Directory wrote to Berthier, in these terms: "Que toute l'artillerie, tous les magasins de guerre et de bouche, qui se trouvent à Venise, soient transportés à Corfou, Ancône et Ferrare, de manière que vous rendiez Venise sans une seule pièce de canon."—See Corresp. Secrète de Napoléon, iii. 170, and iv. 427.

twenty thousand were shut up within the fortresses on that stream. The French forces were much more numerous; the army of the Rhine and Moselle, under Moreau, being sixty thousand strong; while that of the Sambre and Meuse, cantoned between Dusseldorf and Coblenz, amounted to nearly seventy thousand. The latter was under the command of Hoche, whose vigour and abilities gave every promise of success in the ensuing campaign, while the possession of the *têtes-de-pont* at Dusseldorf and Neuwied afforded a facility for commencing operations, which those on the upper branch of the river did not possess since the loss of Kehl and the *tête-de-pont* at Huningen (1).

The rapidity and energy with which Napoléon commenced operations on the banks of the Tagliamento before the middle of March, inflamed the rivalry of the generals on the Rhine; while the interests of the Republic imperiously required that the campaign should simultaneously be commenced in both quarters, in order that the army most advanced should not find itself engaged alone with the strength of the Austrian monarchy. Nevertheless, such was the exhausted state of the treasury, from the total ruin of the paper system, and the dilapidation of the public revenues during the convulsions of the Revolution, that the Directory was unable to furnish Moreau with the equipage necessary for crossing the Rhine; and he was obliged to go in person to Paris, in the beginning of April, and pledge his private fortune to procure that necessary part of his equipments (2). At length, the obstacles having been overcome, he returned to the Rhine, and completed his preparations for crossing that river.

Passage of that river at Diersheim. The point selected for this important enterprise was Diersheim; the preparations of the enemy in the neighbourhood of Strasburg rendering hazardous any attempt to cross near that town. Seventy barks were collected in the Ill, a small stream which falls into the Rhine, and directed to Diersheim on the night of the 19th April, while two false attacks above and below that place were prepared, to distract the attention of the enemy. 20th April. Delays unavoidable in the collection of the flotilla having retarded the embarkation of the advanced-guard till six o'clock on the following morning, it was evident that a surprise was impossible, the Austrians having taken the alarm, and appearing in considerable force on the opposite shore. The boats, however, pulled gallantly across the stream, till they came within reach of the grape-shot from the enemy's cannon, when the shower of balls forced them to take shelter behind an island, where they landed, and made prisoners three hundred Croats, who composed its garrison. From this they forded the narrow branch of the Rhine which separates the island from the German shore, and made themselves masters of Diersheim. Towards noon, they were there attacked by the Austrians, who had received a reinforcement of four thousand men from a neighbouring camp, but the attack was gallantly repulsed by Desaix and Davoust, who there gave earnest of that cool intrepidity and sagacious foresight by which his future career was so eminently distinguished. During the whole day, the Imperialists renewed their attacks with great intrepidity, and, in the end, with twelve thousand men; but they were constantly repulsed by the obstinate valour of the Republican infantry. 21st April. On the following day, the attack was renewed with increased forces, but no better success; and the bridge having, in the meantime, been established, Moreau began to

(1) Jom. x. 71. Th. ix. 110.

(2) Th. ix. 110. Jom. x. 74.

debouche in great strength, upon which the Austrians commenced their retreat; during which they sustained considerable loss from the And defeat of the
Austrians. Republican cavalry. Thus, by a bold and able exertion was the passage of the Rhine secured, and all the fruits of the bloody sieges of Kehl and Huningen lost to the Imperialists. In these actions the loss of the Austrians was 3000 prisoners and twenty pieces of cannon, besides 2000 killed and wounded (1). When it is recollected that this passage was gained not by stratagem but main force, in presence of a considerable part of the Austrian army, and that it undid at once all the advantages gained by them in the preceding winter, it must ever be regarded as a glorious deed of arms, and one of the most memorable military achievements of the revolutionary war.

Operations cut short by the armistice of Leoben. Taught by the disasters of the preceding campaign, Moreau resolved to push the corps of Starray with vigour, and prevent that methodical retreat which had proved so beneficial to the Imperialists in the previous year. For this purpose he pushed his advanced-guard across the Renchen the very day after the passage was completed; and was in the high-road to farther successes, when he was interrupted by the intelligence of the armistice of Leoben which terminated the campaign in that quarter (2).

The campaign was in like manner cut short in the midst of opening success on the Lower-Rhine. The army, put there at the disposition of Hoche, was one of the most numerous and well appointed which the Republic ever sent into the field, and particularly remarkable for the numbers and fine condition of the cavalry and artillery. Hoche resolved to effect the

Operations of Hoche on the Lower Rhine. passage, with the bulk of his forces, from Neuwied, and to facilitate that purpose by a simultaneous movement at Dusseldorf.

The Austrians were so far deceived by these movements, that they advanced with the greater part of their forces to Altenkirchen, in order to stop the progress of the troops from Dusseldorf, leaving only a small body in front of Neuwied. No sooner did he perceive they had fallen into the snare, than Hoche debouched rapidly from the *tête-de-pont* at that place at the head of thirty-six thousand men. Kray commanded the Imperialists in that quarter; and his position, blocking up the roads leading from the bridge, was strongly fortified, and covered with powerful batteries. The attack of the Republicans was impetuous; but the resistance of the Imperialists, though greatly inferior in number, was not less vigorous, and no advantage was gained by the assailants till the fortified village of Hulsendorf was carried by a concentric attack from several of the French masses, after which the other redoubts, taken in flank, were successively stormed, and the Austrians driven back, with the loss of five thousand men in killed, wounded, and prisoners, twenty-seven pieces of cannon, and sixty caissons. At the same time the left wing of the army crossed the Sieg, advanced to Ukerath and Altenkirchen, which were abandoned as soon as it was known that the bulk of the enemy's forces was advancing from Neuwied, and on the following night they effected their junction with the victors on the field of battle (3).

18th April. Passage of the Rhine forced at Neuwied.

19th April. After this disaster, Werneck retired to Neukirchen, and united the two divisions of his army; but, finding that he was unable to make head

(1) Jom. x. 77, 85. Th. ix. 111. St.-Cyr, iv. 165, 183.

(3) Jom. x. 95, 96. Th. ix. 110. Ney, i. 271, 276.

(2) Jom. x. 86. Th. ix. 111. St.-Cyr, iv. 184, 190.

against the immense forces of his opponent, which were nearly double his own, fell back behind the Lahn. Thither he was immediately followed by the victorious general; and the Imperialists having continued their retreat towards the Maine, Hoche conceived the design of cutting them off before they crossed that river. For this purpose, he pushed forward his right wing, under Lefebvre, to Frankfort, while the centre and left continued to press the enemy on the high-road, by which they continued their retreat. The advanced-guard of Lefebvre was at the gates of that opulent city, when hostilities were suspended, by the intelligence of the preliminaries of Leoben, to the infinite mortification of the French general, who saw himself thus interrupted, by his more fortunate rival, in a career of success, from which the most glorious effects might have been anticipated to the Republic (1).

21st April.
Hostilities
stopped
by the
armistice
of Leoben.

State of
Prussia
during this
year. Its
policy.

Death of
the King.
16th Nov.
1797.

Prussia, during this eventful year, adhered steadily to the system of armed neutrality, inclining rather to France, and supporting the protection of the associated states within the prescribed line, which was begun by the treaty of Bâle in 1793, and consolidated by the convention of 5th August 1796. The health of the King had for long been visibly declining, and he at length expired at Berlin, on the 16th November; having, as his last act, bestowed the decoration of the order of the Black Eagle on his favourite minister Haugwitz (2).

His charac-
ter.

Though neither endowed with shining civil nor remarkable military talents, few monarchs have conferred greater benefits on their country than this sovereign (3). Among the many and valuable territorial acquisitions which he made, is to be reckoned the important commercial city and fortress of Dantzig, which commands the navigation of the Vistula, and holds the keys of Poland. The army also, during his reign, was increased by 25,000 men; and, like his great predecessor, he ever considered that arm as the main foundation of the public strength. Much of this increase is doubtless to be ascribed to a fortunate combination of extraneous things; and it chiefly arose from the monstrous partition of Poland. Yet something also must be admitted to have arisen from the wisdom of the cabinet, which skilfully turned these circumstances to its own advantage, and contrived to reap nothing but profit from a stormy period, deeply chequered to other states by disaster (4). But in the close of his reign, the national jealousy of Austria, and partiality for France, were carried an unreasonable length; and in the unwise desertion of the cause of Europe by this important monarchy, is to be found one of the principal causes of the disasters which subsequently befell itself.

He was simple and unostentatious in his habits; addicted to conviviality, but rather on account of the pleasures of the table, than any capacity to appreciate the refinements of conversation; good-humoured in general, but subject to occasional and ungovernable fits of passion. Hardly adequate to the consideration of important subjects of policy himself, he at least had the sense to intrust the administration of public affairs to able ministers. He was fond of music, and distinguished by a marked predilection for architecture,

(1) Join. x. 96, 106. Th. ix. 110.

(2) Hard. v. 33.

(3) During his reign, the territory of the monarchy was augmented by 2200 square (German) miles, and its population by 2,500,000 souls. He

received from his uncle, the Great Frederick, 3600 square miles, and 6,000,000 of inhabitants; and left to his successor 5800 square miles, and 8,500,000 inhabitants.

(4) Hard. v. 35.

which caused his reign to be illustrated by the construction of several noble and imposing edifices. But his facility and passions led him into several irregularities in private life; and the court during his latter years was scandalized by the great ascendancy obtained by his profuse and rapacious mistress, the Countess Lichtenau; who was called to a severe account for her malversations, by his successor (1).

Accession of Frederick William III. His character. Very different was the character of the youthful sovereign, who now ascended the throne; **FREDERICK WILLIAM III**, afterwards called to such important destinies on the theatre of Europe. Born on the 5d August 1770, he was twenty-seven years of age when he succeeded to the crown; and his character and habits already presaged the immortal glories of his reign. Severe and regular in private life, he had lived, amidst a dissolute court, a pattern of every domestic virtue; married early to a beautiful and high-spirited princess, he bore to her that faithful attachment which her captivating qualities were so well fitted to excite, and which afterwards attracted the admiration, though they could not relax the policy or melt the sternness, or excite a spark of chivalry in the cold and intellectual breast of Napoléon (2). He entertained a sincere, though undeserved, distrust of his own capacity in judging of state affairs, which, at first, threw him, to an unreasonable degree, under the government of his ministers, but was gradually removed during the difficulties and necessities of the later periods of his reign (3).

Early measures and policy. His first acts were in the highest degree popular. On the day of his accession, he wrote a circular to the constituted authorities, informing them that he was aware of the abuses which had crept into various branches of the public service, and was resolved to rectify them; and at the same time, gave an earnest of his sincerity, by abolishing the monopoly of tobacco, which his father had re-established. The public indignation, rather than his own wishes, rendered the trial of the Countess Lichtenau unavoidably necessary: her wealth was known to be enormous, and many of the crown jewels were found in her possession. She was obliged to surrender the greater part of her ill-gotten treasures, and assigned a pension of 15,000 francs; the remainder of her great fortune being settled on the hospital of Berlin. At the same time, the King, under the directions of Hardenberg, declared, in a circular addressed to all the states in the north of Germany, his resolution to continue those measures for the security of that part of the empire which his father had commenced; and in a holograph letter to the Directory, his wish to cultivate the good understanding with the French Republic, which ultimately led to such disastrous effects to Prussia and Europe (4).

Retrospect of the astonishing successes of Napoléon. In concluding the survey of these memorable contests, it is impossible to refuse to the genius of Napoléon that tribute which is justly due to it, not only for the triumphs in Italy, but for those in Germany. When he began his immortal campaign upon the summit of the Maritime Alps, the Imperialists, greatly superior to their antagonists, were preparing to cross the Rhine, and carry the war into the territory of the Republic. It was his brilliant victories in Piedmont and Lombardy, which compelled the Aulic Council to detach Wurmser with thirty thousand men from the Upper Rhine to the valley of the Adige; and thus not only reduced the Austrians to the defensive in Germany, but enabled the Republicans to carry

(1) Hard. v. 34, 37.

(2) Napoléon in Las Cases, ii. 228.

(3) Hard. v. 36.

(4) Hard. v. 36, 43.

the war into the centre of that country. Subsequently, the desperate conflicts round the walls of Mantua, drew off the whole resources of the Austrian monarchy into that quarter, and the advance into the Alps of Carinthia, compelled the draft of thirty thousand of the best troops from Swabia, to defend the Hereditary States. Thus, with an army which, though frequently reinforced, never at one time amounted to sixty thousand men, he not only vanquished six successive armies in Italy and the Julian Alps, but drew upon himself great part of the weight of the German war, and finally, without any other aid than that derived from the valour of his own soldiers, carried hostilities into the Hereditary States, and dictated a glorious peace within sight of the steeples of Vienna.

Commence-
ment of
negotiations
at Udina,
near Milan.
Splendour of
Napoléon's
court there.

Meanwhile Napoléon, sheathing, for a time, his victorious sword, established himself at the chateau of Montebello, near Milan; a beautiful summer residence, which overlooked great part of the plain of Lombardy. Negotiations for a final peace were there immediately commenced; before the end of May, the powers of the plenipotentiaries had been verified, and the work of treaties was in progress. There the future Emperor of the West held his court in more than regal splendour; the ambassadors of the Emperor of Germany, of the Pope, of Genoa, Venice, Naples, Piedmont, and the Swiss Republic, assembled to examine the claims of these several states which were the subject of discussion; and there weightier matters were to be determined, and dearer interests were at stake, than had ever been submitted to European diplomacy, since the iron crown was placed on the brows of Charlemagne. Joséphine Bonaparte there received the homage due to the transcendent glories of her youthful husband; Pauline displayed those brilliant charms which afterwards shone with so much lustre at the court of the Tuileries; and the ladies of Italy, captivated by the splendour of the spectacle, hastened to swell the illustrious train, and vied with each other for the admiration of those warriors whose deeds had filled the world with their renown. Already Napoléon acted as a sovereign prince; his power exceeded that of any living monarch; and he had entered on that dazzling existence which afterwards entranced and subdued the world (1).

Revolution
at Genoa
brought
about by
the French.

The establishment of a republic on a democratic basis on both sides of the Po, the fermentation in the Venetian states, and the general belief of the irresistible power of the French armies, soon excited an extraordinary degree of enthusiasm at Genoa. The government there was vested in an aristocracy, which, although less jealous and exclusive than at Venice, was far more resolute and determined. As in all other old popular constitutions, the influence in the state had, in the progress of time, and from the gradual decay of public spirit, become vested in an inconsiderable number of families; but the principle of government was by no means exclusive, and many plebeians had recently been inscribed in the Golden Book, who had raised themselves to a rank worthy of that distinction. But these gradual changes were far from being sufficient for the fervent spirit of the age. The democratic party, under the secret influence of the French, had long been in activity; and it was calculated by the friends of revolution, that the resistance of the aristocratic senators could not possibly be prolonged beyond the end of August (2).

(1) Th. ix. 144, 145. Nap. iv. 155. Bour. i. 289.

(2) Sismondi, Rep. Ital. Jom. x. 160, 167. Th. ix. 143. Nap. iv. 160.

A treaty had been concluded with the French Directory, by which Genoa purchased its neutrality by the payment of two millions of francs, a loan to the same amount, and the recall of the families exiled for their political opinions. But the vehemence of the revolutionary club, which met at the house of an apothecary of the name of Morandi, soon insisted on far greater concessions. Secretly stimulated by Napoléon, and the numerous agents of the French army (1), they openly announced the assistance and protection of the Directory, and insisted for the immediate formation of the constitution on a new and highly democratic basis; while the Senate, irresolute and divided, did not possess either the moral energy or physical strength to combat the forces with which they were assailed. The arrest of two of the popular party, who had proceeded to acts of sedition, brought matters to a crisis, and the intervention of the French minister, Faypoult, was sought, to procure

22d May. their liberation, and prevent the effusion of blood. Instead of calming, he rather increased the effervescence; and the consequence was, that on the following day a general insurrection took place. The troops of the line wavered, the burgher guard could not be trusted, and the senators, reduced to their own resources, were pursued and massacred, and at length took refuge with the French minister, as the only means of appeasing the tumult. Upon this some of the patrician families, finding themselves deserted by their natural leaders, and seeing the dagger at their throats, put themselves at the head of their followers, with loud cries demanded arms from the Senate, and brought in their faithful followers from the country, to

The Senate defeat the insurgents. endeavour to stem the torrent. They soon prevailed over their revolutionary antagonists. The posts, which had been seized in the first bursts of the tumult, were regained, the club Morandi dispersed, the 23d April. Genoese colours again floated on the city, and the tricolor flag, which the democrats had assumed, was torn down from the walls. The firmness of the aristocracy, supported by the courage of the rural population, had prevailed over the fumes of democracy, and the independence of Genoa, but for foreign interference, was preserved (2).

French then interfere, But it was foreign to the system of Republican ambition to allow the revolutionary party to be subdued in any country which the arms of France could reach. In the course of these struggles, some Frenchmen and citizens of the Cisalpine republic, who had taken an active part with the popular side, were wounded, and made prisoners; and Napoléon instantly made this a pretext for throwing the weight of his authority into the scale, in favour of the democracy. The French minister peremptorily demanded their instant liberation; and Napoléon sent his aide-de-camp, Lavallette, to the city to compel the enlargement of the prisoners, the disarming of the counter-revolutionists, and the arrest of all the nobles who had instigated any resistance to the innovators. To support these demands, the French troops advanced to Tortona, while Admiral Brueys, with two sail of the line and two frigates, appeared in the bay. The democratic party, encouraged by this powerful protection, now resumed the ascendancy. In vain the Senate endeavoured, by half measures, to preserve

(1) Bott. ii. 285. Jom. x. 167. Corresp. Secrète de Nap. iii. 170.

"Genoa," said Napoléon, in his confidential despatch to the Directory, on 19th May, 1797, "loudly demands democracy; the Senate has sent deputies to me to sound my intentions. It is more than probable, that, in ten days, the aristocracy of

Genoa will undergo the fate of that of Venice. Then would there be three democratic republics in the north of Italy, which may hereafter be united into one."—*Confid. Despatch, 19th May, 1797, Confid. Corresp. iii. 170.*

(2) Jom. x. 170, 174. Th. ix. 143, 144. Nap. iv. 160, 164. Bot. ii. 284, 292.

in part the constitution of their country; they found that the revolutionists were insatiable, and the minister of France demanded his passports, if the whole demands of the Republican general and his adherents in Genoa, were not instantly conceded. Terrified by the menaces of the populace, and the threats of their formidable allies, the senators at length yielded to necessity, and nominated a deputation, who were empowered to submit without reserve to the demands of the conqueror. They signed, on the 6th June, a convention at Montebello, which effected a revolution in the government, and put an end to the constitution of Doria. By this deed, the supreme legislative authority was vested in two councils, one of three hundred, the other of one hundred and fifty, members, chosen by all the citizens; the executive in a senate of twelve, elected by the councils (1).

Senate upon this sub-mits. 6th June. This prodigious change immediately excited the usual passions of democracy. The people assembled in menacing crowds, burnt the Golden Book, and destroyed the statue of Andrea Doria, the restorer of the freedom of Genoa, and greatest hero of its history. This outrage to the memory of so illustrious a man, while it proved how ignorant the people were of the glory of their country, and how unfit to be intrusted with its government, greatly displeased Napoléon, who already began to feel that hatred at democratic principles, by which he was ever after so remarkably distinguished (2). Subsequently, the nobles and priests, finding that they were excluded from all share in the administration of affairs, according to the mode of election which was adopted for carrying the constitution into effect, excited a revolt in the rural districts of the Republic. Many parishes refused to adopt the new constitution; the tocsin was sounded in the valleys, and ten thousand armed peasants assaulted and carried the line and fortified heights which form the exterior defence of Genoa. General Duphot, however, who commanded the newly organized forces of the infant Republic, having assembled three thousand regular troops, attacked and defeated the insurgents; movable columns penetrated and exacted hostages from the hostile valleys; and the new constitution was put in force in the territory of Genoa, which thenceforward lost even the shadow of independence, and became a mere outwork of the French Republic (5).

Rural insurrection, which is suppressed. 3d Sept.

6th Sept.

Deplorable humiliation of Piedmont.

The kingdom of Piedmont, during the course of this summer, experienced the bitter humiliations to which it was subjected from the forced alliance in which it was held by the conqueror of Italy. The Directory, from ulterior views as to the revolutionizing of these dominions, had refused to ratify the treaty of alliance which Napoléon had formed with its sovereign: its fortified places were either demolished or in the hands of the French; the feelings of the nobility and the rural population were outraged by the increasing vehemence of the popular party in the towns; and the King, exhausted by humiliation, was already beginning to look to Sardinia as the only refuge for the crown, amidst the troubles by which it was surrounded (4).

4th July. Negotiations between France and England opened at Lisle. The British government made another attempt this summer to open negotiations for peace with the French Directory. Early in July, Lord Malmesbury was sent to Lisle, to renew the attempts at pacification which had failed the year before at Paris; and as the

(1) Bot. ii. 290, 305. Jom. x. 175, 180. Nap. iv. 164, 166.

(2) Nap. iv. 169.

(3) Bot. ii. 305, 320. Jom. x. 180, 183. Nap. iv. 169, 170.

(4) Nap. iv. 179, 189. Bot. ii. 322, 328.

abandonment of the Low Countries by Austria at Leoben, had removed the principal obstacle to an accommodation, sanguine hopes were entertained of success. The moderation of the demands made by England on this occasion was such as to call forth the commendations even of its adversaries.

Moderation of England. They proposed to surrender all their conquests, reserving only Trinidad from the Spaniards, and the Cape of Good Hope, with Ceylon and its dependencies, from the Dutch. Such proposals, coming from a power which had been uniformly victorious at sea, and had wrested from its enemies almost all their colonial possessions, were an unequivocal proof of moderation, more especially when, by the separate treaty which Austria had made for itself, they were relieved from the necessity of demanding any equivalent in their turn for their continental allies (1). The French plenipotentiaries insisted that the Republic should be recognised, and the title of King of France renounced by the English monarch: a vain formality which had been retained by them since it was first assumed by Edward III. These obstacles would probably have been overcome, and the negotiations might have terminated in a general pacification, had it not been for the revolution of the 18th Fructidor (4th September), to be immediately noticed, and the consequent accession of violence and presumption which it brought to the French government. Immediately after that event, the former plenipotentiaries were recalled and replaced by Treillard and Bonnier, two furious republicans, who, from the very outset, assumed such a tone, that it was evident any accommodation was out of the question. Their first step was to demand from Lord Malmesbury production of authority from the British government to him to surrender all the conquests made by Great Britain during the war, without any equivalent, accompanied by an intimation, that if this was not acceded to within twenty-four hours, he must leave Lisle. This insolent demand, which proved that the new Republican government were as ignorant of the forms of diplomacy, as of their situation in the war with England, was received as it deserved: Lord Malmesbury demanded his passports, and returned to this island, "leaving Europe," says Jomini, "convinced that on this occasion at least, the cabinet of St.-James's had evinced more moderation than a Directory whose proceedings were worthy of the days of Robespierre (2)."

16th Sept.
Broken off
by the vehemence and
arrogance of
France.

Progress of
the negotia-
tions at
Udina.

Meanwhile the negotiations for a final treaty at Montebello slowly advanced towards their accomplishment. The cabinet of Vienna, aware of the reaction which was going forward in France, and which was only prevented from overturning the Revolutionary government by the events of the 18th Fructidor, took advantage of every circumstance to protract the conferences, in the hopes of a more moderate party obtaining the ascendant in that country, and more reasonable terms of accommodation being in consequence obtained. But when these hopes were annihilated by the result of that disastrous revolution, the negotiations proceeded with greater rapidity, and the destruction of neighbouring states was commenced without mercy. The French had at first flattered the Venetian commissioners that they should obtain Ferrara, Romagna, and perhaps Ancona, as a compensation for the territories which were taken from the state; but ultimately they ceded these provinces to the Cisalpine Republic. The republicans

(1) Ann. Reg. 1798, p. 67, Jom. x. 191.

(2) Jom. x. 248, 249. Ann. Reg. 1798, 12. Parl. Hist. xxxiii, 1003, 1012.

of Venice, in despair, endeavoured to effect a junction with that infant state; but this proposal was instantly rejected. It became evident, in the course of the negotiations, that the high contracting parties had forgot their mutual animosities, and were occupied with no other object but that of arranging their differences at the expense of their neighbours. Exchanges, or rather spoliations, of foreign territories, were proposed without hesitation and accepted without compunction: provinces were offered and demanded, to which the contracting parties had no sort of right: the value of cessions alone was considered, not their legality (1).

But though France and Austria had no sort of difficulty in agreeing upon the spoliation of their neighbours, they found it not so easy a matter to arrange the division of their respective acquisitions in the plain of Lombardy. Mantua, justly regarded as the bulwark of Italy, was the great subject of dispute; the republicans contending for it as the frontier of the Cisalpine Republic, the Imperialists as the bulwark of their German possessions. To support their respective pretensions, great preparations were made on both sides. Thirty regiments, and 200 pieces of cannon, reached the Isonzo from Vienna; while the French added above fifteen thousand men to their armies in Italy. At length Napoléon, irritated by the interminable aspect of the negotiations, declared, that if the ultimatum of the Directory was not signed in twelve hours, he would denounce the truce to the Archduke Charles. The period having expired, he took a vase of porcelain in his hands, which the Austrian ambassador highly valued, as the gift of the Empress Catharine, and said, "The die is then cast, the truce is broken, and war declared: but, mark my words, before the end of autumn, I will break in pieces your monarchy, as I now destroy this porcelain;" and with that he dashed it in pieces on the ground. Bowing then to the ministers, he retired, mounted his carriage, and dispatched, on the spot, a courier to the Archduke to announce that the negotiations were broken off, and he would commence hostilities in twenty-four hours. The Austrian plenipotentiary, thunder-struck, forthwith agreed to the ultimatum of the Directory, and the treaty of CAMPO FORMIO was signed on the following day, at five o'clock (2).

But though Napoléon assumed this arrogant manner to the Austrian ambassadors, he was very far indeed from himself feeling any confidence in the result of hostilities, if actually resumed: and he had on the contrary, the day before, written to the Directory, that "the enemy had, on the frontiers of Carinthia, 90,000 infantry, and 10,000 horse, besides 18,000 Hungarian volunteers, while he had only 48,000 infantry, and 4000 cavalry; and that if they resumed the offensive, every thing would become doubtful." "The war," he adds, "which was national and popular when the enemy was on our frontiers, is now foreign to the French people; it has become a war of governments. In the end, we should necessarily be overthrown (3)." In truth, his resolution to sign the treaty was accelerated from his having observed, when he looked out from his windows, on the 15th October, the summits of the Alps covered with snow; a symptom which too plainly told him that the season for active operations, that year was drawing to a close, and he had no confidence in the ability of France to resume the contest on the following spring. He then shut himself up in his cabinet; and after reviewing his forces, said—"Here are eighty thousand

(1) Daru, *Hist. de Venise*, v. 428. Jom. iv. 248. Nap. iv. 248.

(3) Sec. Des. 18th Sept. and 18th Oct. 1797, iv. 166, 212.

(2) Nap. iv. 264. Daru, v. 430, 432.

effective men; but I shall not have above sixty thousand in the field. Even if I gain the victory, I shall have twenty thousand killed and wounded; and how, with forty thousand, can I withstand the whole forces of the Austrian monarchy, who will advance to the relief of Vienna? The armies of the Rhine could not arrive to my succour before the middle of November, and before that time arrives, the Alps will be impassable from snow. It is all over; I will sign the peace! *Venice shall pay the expenses of the war* and the extension of France to the Rhine; let the government and the lawyers say what they choose (1)."

Napoléon's
secret
reasons for
signing this
treaty.

But, in addition to these state reasons, Napoléon had other secret motives for agreeing to the spoliation of Venice, and being desirous of coming to an accommodation with the Imperialists. Although

Carnot and a majority of the Directory had at first approved of the destruction of that Republic, and given it a conditional sanction in the June preceding (2), yet after the revolution of 18th Fructidor, they had come to the resolution of not acquiescing in that disgraceful seizure of an independent state, and had sent their ultimatum to Napoléon, enjoining him not to admit its surrender to the Emperor; and declaring that rather than have any share in such a perfidious act,

they would see their armies driven over the Alps, and all their Italian conquests wrested from the Republic (3). At the same time, they had declared their intention, in the event of hostilities being resumed, of sending commissioners to relieve Napoléon of his diplomatic cares, and allow him to attend exclusively to his military duties (4). Napoléon, whose jealousy of the revolutionary government, established at Paris by the revolution of 18th Fructidor, had been much increased by the appointment of Augereau in the room of Hoche to the command of the army on the Rhine, was so much disgusted by these restrictions on his authority, that he wrote to Paris on the 25th September, offering to resign the command (5). The Directory, on the 29th September, returned an answer, positively forbidding the cession of Venice to Austria (6); upon which, Napoléon, seeing his authority slipping from his

(1) Bour. i. 310.

(2) Conf. Corr. iv. 229.

(3) Conf. Corr. iv. 233, 234.

(4) Conf. Corr. iv. 233. Hard, iv. 587.

25th Sept. (5) "It is evident," said he in that letter, 1797. "that the government resolved to act to me as they did to Pichegru. I beseech you, citizen, to appoint a successor to me, and accept my resignation. No power on earth shall make me continue to serve a government which has given me such a scandalous proof of ingratitude, which I was far indeed from expecting." [Confid. Despatch. 25th Sept. iv. 169.]

(6) The resolution of the Directory, after the 18th Fructidor, not to spoliage Venice, was repeatedly and strongly expressed. Barras wrote in Napoléon on 8th September: "Conclude a peace, but let it be an honourable one; let Mantua fall to the Cisalpine Republic, but Venice not go to the Emperor. That is the wish of the Directory, and of all true Republicans, and what the glory of the Republic requires." [Barras's Secret Despatch, 8th Sept. 1797.] Napoléon answered, on the 18th September, "If your ultimatum is not to cede Venice to the Emperor, I much fear peace will be impracticable, and yet Venice is the city of Italy most worthy of freedom, and hostilities will be resumed in the course of October." [Secret Despatch, 18th Sept. iv. 164.] The Directory replied, "The government now is desirous

of tracing out to you with precision its ultimatum. Austria has long desired to swallow up Italy, and to acquire maritime power. It is the interest of France to prevent both these designs. It is evident that, if the Emperor acquires Venice, with its territorial possessions, he will secure an entrance into the whole of Lombardy. We should be treating as if we had been conquered, independent of the disgrace of abandoning Venice, which you describe as worthy of being free. What would posterity say of us if we surrender that great city with its naval arsenals to the Emperor. Better a hundred times restore to him Lombardy than pay such a price for it. Let us take the worst view of matters; let us suppose, what your genius and the valour of your army forbid us to fear, that we are conquered and driven out of Italy. In such a case, yielding only to force, our honour at least will be safe; we shall still have remained faithful to the true interests of France, and not incurred the disgrace of a perfidy without excuse, as it will induce consequences more disastrous than the most unfavourable results of war. We feel the force of your objection, that you may not be able to resist the forces of the Emperor; but consider that your army would be still less so some months after the peace, so imprudently and shamefully signed. Then would Austria, placed by our own hands in the centre of Italy, indeed take us at a disadvantage.

hands, and a doubtful campaign about to begin, without hesitation violated his instructions, and signed the treaty fatal to Venice on the 18th October. The whole infamy, therefore, of that proceeding, rests on his head; the French Directory is entirely blameless, except in not having had the courage to disown the treaty to which his signature was affixed (1).

Terms of
the treaty
of Campo
-Formio.

By this treaty the Emperor ceded to France, Flanders, and the line of the Rhine; he agreed to the territory of the Republic being extended to the summit of the Maritime Alps; he consented to the establishment of the Cisalpine Republic, comprehending Lombardy, the duchies of Reggio, Modena, Mirandola, Bologna, Ferrara, Romagna, the Valtelline, and the Venetian states, as far as the Adige, comprising the territory of Bergamo, Brescia, Crema, and the Polesine (2). The Ionian Islands, part of the Venetian territory, were ceded to France, which acquired Mantua, on the frontiers of the Imperial states in Italy, and Mayence, the bulwark of the empire on the Rhine.

On the other hand, the Republic ceded to the Emperor, in exchange for the states of Flanders, Istria, Dalmatia, the Venetian isles in the Adriatic, the mouths of the Cattaro, the city of Venice, and its continental possessions as far as the eastern shore of the lake of Guarda, the line of the Adige, and that of the Po. By this arrangement, Verona, Peschiera, and Porto Legnago, fell into the hands of the Austrians, who lost in Flanders and Lombardy provinces, rich, indeed, but distant, inhabited by 3,500,000 souls, and received in the Venetian states a territory of equal riches, with a great seaport, and 3,400,000 souls, lying close to the Hereditary States (3), besides an acquisition of nearly the same amount which they had made during the war, on the side of Poland. The advantages of the treaty, therefore, how great soever to the conquerors, were in some degree, also extended to the vanquished.

Secret articles
of the
treaty.

Besides these public, the treaty contained many secret articles of nearly equal importance. The most material of these regarded the cession of Salzburg, with its romantic territory, to Austria, with the important towns of Inviertel and Wasseburg on the Inn, from Bavaria; the free navigation of the Rhine and the Meuse, the abandonment of the Frickthal by Austria to Switzerland, and the providing equivalents to the dispossessed princes on the left bank of the Rhine, on the right of that river. But it was expressly provided that "no acquisition should be proposed to the advantage of Prussia." For the arrangement of these complicated objects, a convention was appointed to meet at Rastadt to settle the affairs of the empire. Finally, it was agreed, "that if either of the contracting powers should make acquisitions in Germany, the other should receive equivalents to the same amount (4)."

Thus terminated the Italian campaigns of Napoléon—the most memorable of his military career, and which contributed so powerfully to fix his destinies and immortalize his name. The sufferings of Italy in these contests were extreme, and deeply did its people rue the fatal precipitance with which they had thrown themselves into the arms of Republican ambition (5). Its territory

The whole question comes to this: Shall we give up Italy to the Austrians? The French government neither can nor will do so: it would in preference incur all the hazards of war."—See *Confid. Corresp. de Napoléon*, iv. 233, 235.

(1) Hard. iv. 529, 586, 890.

(2) Nap. iv. 235, 266. Daru, v. 432.

(3) Jnm. ix. 254, 256. Nap. iv. 266. Daru, v. 432, 433.

(4) Jnm. x. 254, 255. Nap. iv. 266, 267. Hard. iv. 591.

(5) The enormous sum of 120,000,000 francs, or

about L. 5,000,000 sterling, was levied on its territory by the conqueror, in specie, in little more than twelve months; a sum equal to L. 12,000,000 in Great Britain; and the total amount extracted from the peninsula, in contributions and supplies, during the two years the war lasted, was no less than 400,000,000 francs, or L. 16,000,000 sterling. This immense burden fell almost exclusively on the states to the north of the Tiber, whose republican ardour had been most decided. [Jnm. *Vie de Nap.* i. 256. Nap. iv. 231. Hard. v. 11.]

was partitioned; its independence ruined; its galleries pillaged; the trophies of art had followed the car of Victory; and the works of immortal genius, which no wealth could purchase, had been torn from their native seats, and violently transplanted into a foreign soil (1).

Horror in Venice at the publication of that treaty. No words can paint the horror and consternation which the promulgation of this treaty excited in Venice. The democratic party, in particular, who had allied themselves with the French, compelled the government to abdicate in order to make way for a republican *régime*, and received a French garrison within their walls, broke out into the most vehement invectives against their former allies, and discovered, with tears of unavailing anguish, that those who join a foreigner to effect changes in the constitution of their country, hardly ever escape sacrificing its independence. But, whatever may have been the unanimity of feeling which this union of imperial rapacity with republican treachery awakened among the Venetians, it was too late; with their own hands they had brought the serpent into their bosom, and they were doomed to perish from the effects of their own revolutionary passions. With speechless sorrow they beheld the French, who occupied Venice, lower the standard of St.-Mark, demolish the Bucentaur, pillage the arsenal, remove every vestige of independence, and take down the splendid bronze horses, which, for six hundred years, had stood over the portico of the church of St.-Mark, to commemorate the capture of Constantinople by the Venetian crusaders. When the last Doge appeared before the

18th Jan. 1798. Austrian commissioner to take the oath of homage to the Emperor, his emotion was such that he fell insensible to the ground; honouring thus, by the extremity of grief, the last act of national independence (2). Yet even in this catastrophe, the fury of party appeared manifest, and a large portion of the people celebrated with transports of joy the victory over the democratic faction, though it was obtained at the expense of the existence of their country.

Great sensation excited by this event in Europe. The fall of the oldest commonwealth in Europe excited a general feeling of commiseration throughout the civilized world. Many voices were raised, even in the legislative body of France, against this flagrant violation of the law of nations. Independently of the feelings of jealousy, which were naturally awakened by the aggrandizement of two bel-

(1) It is remarkable how strongly, even at this early period, the mind of Napoleon was set upon two objects, which formed such memorable features in his future life, the expedition to Egypt, and interminable hostility to Great Britain.

"Why," said he, in his letter to the Directory, of 13th September, 1797, "do we not lay hold of Malta? Admiral Brueys could easily make himself master of it: 400 knights, and, at the utmost, 500 men, compose the whole garrison of La Valette. The inhabitants, who amount to 100,000, are already well disposed towards us, for I have confiscated all the possessions of the order in Italy, and they are dying of famine. With Malta and Corfu, we should soon be masters of the Mediterranean.

"Should we, on making peace with England, be compelled to give up the Cape of Good Hope, it will be absolutely necessary to take possession of Egypt. That country never belonged to any European power; the Venetians even there had only a precarious authority. We might embark from hence, with 25,000 men, escorted by eight or ten ships of the line, or frigates, and take possession of it. Egypt does not belong to the Grand Seigneur."—*Letter Confid.* 13th Sept. 1797—*Corresp. Confid.* iv. 175.

His inveterate hostility to England was equally early and strongly expressed. In enumerating the reasons which induced him to sign the treaty of Campo Formio, he concludes:—"Finally, we are still at war with England; that enemy is great enough, without adding another. The Austrians are heavy and avaricious; no people on earth are less active or dangerous, with a view to our military affairs, than they are; the English on the contrary, are generous, intriguing, enterprising. It is indispensable for our government to destroy the English monarchy; or it will infallibly be overturned by the intrigues, and the corruption of these active islanders. The present moment offers to our hands a noble enterprise. Let us concentrate all our activity on the marine, and destroy England; that done, Europe is at our feet"—*Letter Confid.* to the Directory, dated Passeriano, 18th October, 1797—*Confid. Corresp. de Napoléon*, iv. 212.

In reality, it was his desire to acquire the harbour and naval resources of Venice, for his projected expedition against Egypt and Great Britain, that was one main inducement with Napoleon to treat with such unexampled severity that unhappy republic.

(2) Daru, v. 442, 443.

ligerent powers at the expense of a neutral state, it was impossible to contemplate without emotion the overthrow of that illustrious Republic, which had contributed in so powerful a manner to the return of civilisation in Europe. No modern state, from so feeble an origin, had risen to such eminence, nor with such limited resources made so glorious a stand against the tide of barbaric invasion. Without enquiring what right either France or Austria had to partition its territories, men contemplated only its long existence, its illustrious deeds, its constancy in misfortune; they beheld its annihilation with a mingled feeling of terror and pity; and sympathized with the sufferings of a people, who, after fourteen hundred years of independence, were doomed to pass irrevocably under a stranger's yoke (1).

In contemplating this memorable event, it is difficult to say whether most indignation is to be felt at the perfidy of France, the cupidity of Austria, the weakness of the Venetian aristocracy, or the insanity of the Venetian people.

For the conduct of Napoléon no possible apology can be found (2). He first

(1) Daru, v. 436, 437.

(2) The French entered the Venetian territory with the declaration—"The French army, to follow the wreck of the Austrian army, must pass over the Republic of Venice; but it will never forget, that ancient friendship unites the two Republics. Religion, government, customs, and property, will be respected. The general-in-chief engages the government to make known these sentiments to the people, in order that confidence may cement that friendship which has so long united the two nations." [Parl. Deb. xxxiv. 1338.] On the 10th March, 1797, after the democratic revolt had broken out in Brescia, Napoléon wrote to the Venetian governor of Verona: "I am truly grieved at the disturbances which have occurred at Verona, but trust that, through the wisdom of your measures, no blood will be shed. The Senate of Venice need be under no sort of inquietude, as they must be thoroughly persuaded of the loyalty and good faith of the French government, and the desire which we have to live in good friendship with your Republic." [Cor. Conf. ii. 475.] On the 24th March, 1797, he wrote to the Directory, after giving an account of the civil war in the Venetian states, "M. Pisaro, chief sage of the Republic of Venice, has just been here, regarding the events in Brescia and Bergamo, the people of which towns have disarmed the Venetian garrisons, and overturned their authorities. I had need of all my prudence; for it is not when we require the whole succours of Friuli, and of the good-will of the Venetian government, to supply us with provisions in the Alpine defiles, that it is expedient to come to a rupture. I told Pisaro, that the Directory would never forget that the Republic of Venice was the ancient ally of France, and that our desire was fixed to protect it to the utmost of our power. I only besought him to spare the effusion of blood. We parted the best of friends. He appeared perfectly satisfied with my reception. *The great point in all this affair is to gain time.*" [Corr. Conf. ii. 549.] On the 5th April, he wrote again to Pisaro: "The French Republic does not pretend to interfere in the internal dissensions of Venice; but the safety of the army requires that I should not overlook any enterprises hostile to its interests." [Ibid. iii. 30.]

Having thus, to the very last moment, kept up the pretended system of friendship for Venice, Napoléon no sooner found himself relieved by the armistice of Leoben, on 8th April, from the weight of the Austrian war, than he threw off the mask. On the day after the armistice was signed, he issued a proclamation to the people of the continental pos-

sessions of Venice, in which he said,—"The government of Venice offers you no security either for persons or property; and it has, by indifference to your fate, provoked the just indignation of the French government. If the Venetians rule you by the right of conquest, I will free you; if by usurpation, I will restore your rights." [Ibid. iii. 37.] And having thus roused the whole population of the cities of Venetian *terra firma* to revolt, he next proceeded to hand over all these towns to Austria, by the third clause of the preliminaries of Leoben, which assigned to the Emperor of Austria "the whole Venetian territory situated between the Mincio, the Po, and the Austrian States." [Ibid. iii. 559.]

Nor did the duplicity of Napoléon rest here. On the 16th May, he concluded the treaty with the Venetian Republic, already mentioned, the first article of which was:—"There shall be henceforth peace and good understanding between France and the Venetian Republic." [Cnr. Conf. iii. 176.] The object of Napoléon, in signing this treaty, is unfolded in his Secret Despatch to the Directory three days afterwards. "You will receive," says he, "herewith the treaty which I have concluded with the Republic of Venice, in virtue of which, General Baraguay-d'Hilliers, with 16,000 men, has taken possession of the city. I have had several objects in view in concluding this treaty. 1. To enter into the town without difficulty, and be in a situation to extract from it whatever we desire, under pretence of executing the secret articles. 2. To be in a situation, if the treaty with the Emperor should not finally be ratified, to apply to our purposes all the resources of the city. 3. To avoid every species of odium in violating the preliminaries relative to the Venetian territory, and, at the same time, to gain pretexts which may facilitate their execution. 4. To calm all that may be said in Europe, since it will appear that our occupation of Venice is but a momentary operation, solicited by the Venetians themselves. The Pope is eighty-three, and alarmingly ill. The moment I heard of that, I pushed forward all the Poles in the army to Bologna, from whence I shall advance them to Ancona." [Conf. Des. iii. 169. 19th May 1797.] His intentions towards Venice were further summed up in these words, in his despatch to the Directory of 25th May:—"Venice must fall to those to whom we give the Italian continent; but meanwhile, we will take its vessels, strip its arsenals, destroy its bank, and keep Corfu and Ancona." [Ibid. 25th May, 1797.]

Still keeping up the feigned appearance of pro-

excited the revolutionary spirit to such a degree in all the Italian possessions of the Republic, at the very time that they were fed and clothed by the bounty of its government, that disturbances became unavoidable, and then aided the rebels, and made the efforts of the government to crush the insurrection the pretext for declaring war against the state. He then excited to the uttermost the democratic spirit in the capital, took advantage of it to paralyse the defences and overturn the government of the country; established a new constitution on a highly popular basis, and signed a treaty on the 16th May at Milan, by which, on payment of a heavy ransom, he agreed to maintain the independence of Venice under its new and Revolu-

Infamous
conduct of
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tion to Venice, Napoléon wrote to the municipality of that town, on the 26th May. "The treaty concluded at Milan may, in the mean time, be signed by the municipality, and the secret articles by three members." In every circumstance, I shall do what lies in my power to give you proofs of my desire to consolidate your liberties, and to see unhappy Italy at length assume the place to which it is entitled in the theatre of the world, free and independent of all strangers." [Ibid. iii. 294.] Soon after, he wrote to General Baraguay-d'Hilliers, 13th June:—"You will, upon the receipt of this, present yourself to the provisional government of Venice, and represent to them, that, in conformity to the principles which now unite the Republic of France to that of Venice, and the immediate protection which the Republic of France gives to that of Venice, it is indispensable that the maritime forces of the Republic be put on a respectable footing. Under this pretext you will take possession of every thing; taking care, at the same time, to live in good intelligence with the Venetians, and to engage in our service all the sailors of the Republic, making use constantly of the Venetian name. In short, you must manage so as to transport all the naval stores and vessels in the harbour of Venice to Toulon. By a secret article of the treaty, the Venetians are bound to furnish to the French Republic three millions worth of stores for the marine of Toulon; but my intention is, to take possession, for the French Republic, of all the Venetian vessels, and all the naval stores, for the use of Toulon." [Conf. Des. iii. 305.]

These orders were too faithfully executed; and when every article of naval and military stores had been swept away from Venice, Napoléon, without hesitation, assigned away his revolutionary allied republic, which he had engaged to defend, to the aristocratic power of Austria. The history of the world contains no blacker page of perfidy and dissimulation.

It is in vain to allege, that the spoliation of Venice was occasioned, and justified, by their attack on the rear of the French army at Verona. The whole continental possessions of the Republic were assigned to Austria by Napoléon at Leoben, four days before that event took place, and when nothing had occurred in the Venetian states, but the contests between the aristocratic and democratic factions, which had been stirred up by the secret emissaries of Napoléon himself.

His conduct throughout this transaction appears to have been governed by one principle, and that was, to secure such pretexts for a rupture with Venice, as might afford a decent ground for making its territories the hulocaust which would, at any time, bribe Austria into a peace, and extricate the French army from any peril into which it might have fallen. Twice did the glittering prize answer this purpose; once, when it brought about the armistice of Leoben, and saved Napoléon from the ruin which otherwise must have befallen him, and again at Campo-Formio,

by relieving him from a war, to which he himself confesses his forces were unequal.

When M. Villetort, the secretary of the French legation at Venice, remonstrated with Napoléon upon the abandonment of that Republic, he replied, in words containing, it is to be feared, too faithful a picture of the degradation of modern Italy. "The French Republic is bound by no treaty to sacrifice our interests and advantages to those of Venice. Never has France adopted the maxim of making war for the sake of other nations. I should like to see the principle of philosophy or morality which should command us to sacrifice forty thousand French, contrary alike to the declared wishes of France and its obvious interests. I know well, that it costs nothing to a handful of declaimers, whom I cannot better characterise than by calling them madmen, to rave about the establishment of Republics every where. I wish these gentlemen would make a winter campaign. Besides, the Venetian nation no longer exists. [Letter, 26th Oct. 1797, Conf. Cor. v. 405.] Divided into as many separate interests as it contains cities, effeminated and corrupted, not less cowardly than hypocritical, the people of Italy, but especially the Venetians, are totally unfit for freedom."

The same idea is expressed in a letter about the same period in Talleyrand, "You little know the people of Italy; they are not worth the sacrifice of forty thousand Frenchmen. I see by your letters that you are constantly labouring under a delusion. You suppose that liberty can do great things to a base, cowardly, and superstitious people. You wish me to perform miracles; I have not the art of doing so. Since coming into Italy I have derived little if any support from the love of the Italian people for liberty and equality. I have not in my army a single Italian, excepting fifteen hundred rascals, swept from the streets of its towns, who are good for nothing but pillage. Every thing, excepting what you must say in proclamations and public speeches, is here mere romance."—*Letter to Talleyrand, Passeriano, 7th Oct. 1797; Corresp. Confid. iv. 206.*

It only remains to add to this painful narrative of Italian duplicity, that having no further occasion for the services of Landrieux, whom he had employed to stir up the revolt in the Italian cities, and having discovered evidence that he had been in correspondence with the Venetian government, Napoléon himself denounced him to the Directory. Authentic evidence had been discovered of the double part which he acted in that disgraceful transaction, by the French commissioners, who examined the Venetian Archives, and Napoleon in consequence, on the 15th November, wrote to the Directory,—"*Landrieux excited the revolt in Brescia and Bergamo, and was paid for it; but, at the same time, he privately informed the Venetian government of what was going on, and was paid by them too. Perhaps you will think it right to make an example of such a rascal; and, at all events, not to employ him again.*" [Letter, 15th Nov. 1797. Conf. Cor. iv. 289.]

tionary government. Having thus committed all his supporters in the state irrevocably in the cause of freedom, and got possession of the capital, as that of an allied and friendly power, he plundered it of every thing valuable it possessed; and then united with Austria in partitioning the Republic (1), took possession of one-half of its territories for France and the Cisalpine Republic; and handed over the other half, with the capital, and its burning democrats, to the most aristocratic government in Europe.

These transactions throw as important a light upon the moral as the intellectual character of Napoléon. To find a parallel to the dissimulation and rapacity by which his conduct to Venice was characterised, we must search the annals of Italian treachery; the history of the nations to the north of the Alps abounding as it does in deeds of atrocity, is stained by no similar act of combined duplicity and violence. This opens a new and hitherto unobserved feature in his character, which is in the highest degree important. The French Republican writers uniformly represent his Italian campaigns as the most pure and glorious period of his history, and portray his character, at first almost perfect, as gradually deteriorated by the ambition and passions consequent on the attainment of supreme power. This was in some respects true; but in others the reverse; his character never again appears so perfidious as during his earlier years; and, contrary to the usual case, it was in some particulars improved by the possession of regal power, and to the last moment of his life was progressively throwing off many of the unworthy qualities by which it was at first stained. Extraordinary as this may appear, abundant evidence of it will be found in the sequel of this work. It was the same with Augustus, whose early life, disgraced by the proscriptions and horrors of the triumvirate, was almost overlooked in the wisdom and beneficence of his imperial rule. Nor is it difficult to perceive in what principle of our nature the foundation is laid for so singular an inversion of the causes which usually debase the human mind. It is the terrible effect of revolution, as Madame de Staël has well observed, to obliterate altogether the ideas of right and wrong, and instead of the eternal distinctions of morality and religion, to apply no other test in general estimation to public actions but success (2). It was out of this corrupted atmosphere that the mind of Napoléon, like that of Augustus, at first arose, and it was then tainted by the revolutionary profligacy of the times; but with the possession of supreme power he was called to nobler employments, relieved from the necessity of committing iniquity for the sake of advancement, and brought into contact with men professing and acting on more elevated principles; and in the discharge of such duties, he cast off many of the stains of his early career. This observation is no impeachment of the character of Napoléon; on the contrary, it is its best vindication. His virtues and talents were his own; his vices, in part at least, the fatal bequest of the Revolution.

And of Austria. The conduct of Austria, if less perfidious, was not less a violation of every principle of public right. Venice, though long wavering and irresolute, was at length committed in open hostilities with the French Republic. She had secretly nourished the Imperial as well as the Republican forces; she had given no cause of offence to the Allied powers; she had been dragged, late indeed and unwillingly, but irrevocably, into a contest with the Republican forces; and if she had committed any fault, it was in favour of the cause in which Austria was engaged (3). Generosity in such circum-

(1) Parl. Hist. xxxiv, 1338.

(2) *Rév. Franç.* ii. 264.

(3) Proclamation of the Senate of Venice, 12th April, 1798.

stances would have prompted a noble power to throw the weight of its influence in favour of its unfortunate neighbour. Justice forbade that it should do any thing to aggravate its fate; but to share in its spoliation, to seize upon its capital, and extinguish its existence, is an act of rapacity for which no apology can be offered, and which must for ever form a foul stain on the Austrian annals.

Weakness of the Venetian Aristocracy. Nor can the aristocracy of Venice be absolved from their full share of the blame consequent on the destruction of their country. It was clearly pointed out to them; and they might have known, that the contest in which Europe was engaged with France, was one of such a kind as to admit of no neutrality or compromise; that those who were not with the democratic party were against them; that their exclusive and ancient aristocracy was, in an especial manner, the object of Republican jealousy; and that, if they were fortunate enough to escape destruction at the hands of the French armies, they certainly could not hope to avoid it from their own revolutionary subjects. Often, during the course of the struggle, they held the balance of power in their hands, and might have interposed with decisive effect in behalf of the cause which was ultimately to be their own. Had they put their armies on a war footing, and joined the Austrians when the scales of war hung even at Castiglione, Arcola, or Rivoli, they might have rolled back the tide of revolutionary conquest, and secured to themselves and their country an honoured and independent existence. They did not do so; they pursued that timid policy which is ever the most perilous in presence of danger; they shrunk from a contest which honour and duty alike required, and were, in consequence, assailed by the revolutionary tempest when they had no longer the power to resist it, and doomed to destruction amidst the maledictions of their countrymen, and the contempt of their enemies.

Insanity of the Democratic party Last in the catalogue of political delinquency, the popular party are answerable for the indulgence of that insane and unpatriotic spirit of faction which never fails, in the end, to bring ruin upon those who indulge it. Following the phantom of democratic ambition; forgetting all the ties of kindred and country in the pursuit of popular exaltation, they leagued with the stranger against their native land, and paralysed the state in the moment of its utmost peril, by the fatal passions which they introduced into its bosom. With their own hands they tore down the venerable ensign of St.-Mark; with their own oars they ferried the invaders across the Lagunæ; which no enemy had passed for fourteen hundred years (1); with their own arms they subjugated the Senate of their country, and compelled, in the last extremity, a perilous and disgraceful submission to the enemy. They received in consequence the natural and appropriate reward of such conduct, the contempt of their enemies, the hatred of their friends; the robbery of their trophies, the partition of their territory, the extinction of their liberties, and the annihilation of their country.

What a contrast to this timid and vacillating conduct in the rulers, and these flagitious passions in the people of Venice, does the firmness of the British government, and the spirit of the British people, afford at this juncture! They, too, were counselled to temporize in danger, or yield to the tempter; they,

(1) The last occasion on which the place of St.-Mark had seen the Transalpine soldiers, was when the French crusaders knelt to the Venetian people to implore succour from that opulent republic, in the last crusade, against the infidels in the Holy Land. The unanimous shout of approbation in the as-

sembled multitude—"It is the will of God! It is the will of God!" led to that cordial union of these two powers which overturned the throne of Constantinople.—"Maximus," says Bacon, "innovator tempus,"—See GIBBON, Chap. lx.

Striking
contrast
exhibited at
the same
period by
the nobility
and people
of England.

too, were shaken in credit and paralysed by revolt; they, too, were assailed by democratic ambition, and urged to conciliate and yield as the only means of salvation. The Venetian aristocracy did what the British aristocracy were urged to do. They cautiously abstained from hostilities with the revolutionary power; they did nothing to coerce the spirit of disaffection in their own dominions; they yielded at length to the demands of the populace, and admitted a sudden and portentous change in the internal structure of the constitution. Had the British government done the same, they might have expected similar results to those which there took place; to see the revolutionary spirit acquire irresistible force, the means of national resistance prostrated by the divisions of those who should wield them, and the state become an easy prey to the ambition of those neighbouring powers who had fomented its passions to profit by its weakness. From the glorious result of the firmness of the one, and the miserable consequences of the pusillanimity of the other, a memorable lesson may be learned both by rulers and nations; that courage in danger is often the most prudent as well as the most honourable course; that periods of foreign peril are never those in which considerable internal changes can with safety be adopted; and that, whatever may be the defects of government, they are the worst enemies of their country who league with foreign nations for their redress.

CHAPTER XXIV.

INTERNAL GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE, FROM THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DIRECTORY
TO THE REVOLUTION OF 18th FRUCTIDOR.

ARGUMENT.

Retrospect of the previous changes of the Revolution—Maximum of Freedom, with Minimum of Democracy, the great object of Civil Government—Provision of Nature against the Evil of Democratic Anarchy—State of the Public Mind and Manners in France in the beginning of 1796—First Proceedings of the New Legislature—Choice of the Directory—Barras, Rewbell, Laréveillière Lépaux—Letourneur—First Measure of the Directory—Extreme Difficulties of their Situation—Liberation of the Duchesse d'Angoulême, who is exchanged for the Deputies delivered up by Dumouricz—Successful Efforts of the Directory to restore order in France—But Irreligion continues triumphant—Theophilanthropists—Singular character, tenets, and worship of this Sect—Renewed Efforts of the Jacobins—Babœuf, his extreme Revolutionary Principles—But they fail now in rousing the People—Renewed Efforts of the Revolutionists—Plans of the Conspirators—The Conspiracy is discovered, and Babœuf arrested—His Partisans break out at Grenelle—But are Defeated and Executed—Trial of the Leaders previously arrested—Abortive attempt of the Royalists—Singular Manners at this period in France—But the Result of the Elections is preparing a Catastrophe—The Royalists prevail in the New Elections—Earthélemy is chosen a Director in lieu of Letourneur, and joins Carnot—Club of Clichy, the great centre of the Royalists—Club of Salm, of the Republicans—General Reaction in favour of Royalist Principles—Measures of the Directory to avert the danger—Camille-Jourdan's Efforts in favour of Religion—General return of the Emigrants and Clergy—Great alarm of the Directory—The Republican majority of the Directory resolve on Decisive Measures—They change all the Ministers, and collect Troops round Paris—Measures of Napoléon—He resolves to Support the Democratic Party, and for that purpose sends Lavalette to Paris in Spring 1797—And Augereau in July—His Proclamation to his Soldiers on 14th July—The Army strongly support the Directory—Extravagant Addresses to them from the Soldiers—Strength of the opposite party consisted only in their Talents and Eloquence—Their defensive Measures, but they decline to commence Hostilities—Slender Military Force at their Command—Re-organization of the National Guard decreed by the Councils—Violent Measures of the Directory—They surround the Tuileries with Troops—And the Guard there join Augereau—Revolution of 18th Fructidor—Passive submission of the People—Address of the Directory to the Councils—Tyrannical Measures of the minority of the Councils—Extinction of the Liberty of the Press—Transportation of the most illustrious Citizens of France—Cruel fate of the Exiles—Escape of Pichegru from Guiana—Vigorous and despotic measures of the Directory—This Revolution had been previously concerted with Napoléon—But he is disgusted with the severe use they make of their Victory—This is the true commencement of Military Despotism in France—Reflections on these Events.

Retrospect of the previous changes of the Revolution. THE different eras of the Revolution, which have hitherto been traced, show the progress of the principles of democracy through their natural stages of public transports, moneyed insecurity, financial embarrassment, arbitrary confiscation, general distress, plebeian insurrection, sanguinary oppression, civil warfare, and military despotism. It remains to examine its progress during the receding tide; to trace the declining and enfeebled efforts of Republican fury during the period when its desolating effects had become generally known, and the public strength refused to lend its aid to the ambition and the illusion of individuals. During this period it is evident that the chief desire of the human mind is for repose; the contentions, the miseries of former years rise up in fearful remembrance to all classes of citizens; the chimera of equality can no longer

seduce—the illusion of power no longer mislead; and men, bitterly suffering under the consequences of former error, eagerly range themselves under any government which promises to save them from “the worst of tyrannies, the tyranny of a multitude of tyrants (1).”

Maximum of freedom, with minimum of democracy, the great object of government. To effect the maximum of freedom, with the minimum of democracy, is the great problem of civil government; just as the chief object of war is to attain the greatest possible national security, at the smallest expenditure of human life. The democratic passion is frequently necessary to sustain the conflicts of freedom, just as the military spirit is often necessary to purchase national independence, and always essential to its security; but it is not a less evil in itself, if not kept under due restraint, than the savage passion for the destruction of the species. When too vehemently excited, it often becomes an evil incomparably greater than the political grievances which awakened its fury. Great national objects sometimes cannot be achieved without the excitation of this passion, because it is desire, and not reason, which ever governs the masses of mankind; but when it becomes the ruling power, the last extremities of suffering are at hand. Like all other passions, however, whether in the individual or society, it cannot be indulged to excess, without inducing evils which speedily terminate its ascendancy, and punish the delinquencies to which it has given rise. The democratic passion is to nations what the desire of licentious freedom is to the individual: it bears the same relation to the principle of genuine liberty, as the chastened attachment of marriage, which “peoples heaven,” does to the wild excesses of lust, which finds inmates for hell. The fleeting enjoyments of guilt are speedily lost in its lasting pains; the extravagance of democratic ambition, if it obtains unresisted sway, invariably terminates, before the expiry of a few years, in universal suffering.

Provision of Nature against the evil of democratic anarchy. Nature never intended that the great body of mankind should be immediately concerned in government, because their intellects and information are unequal to, and their situation inconsistent with, the task. Useful and necessary as a check upon the government of others, they bring about the greatest calamities when they become the governors themselves;—respectable, virtuous, and useful when employed in their proper sphere, they become dangerous and irrational when called to the exercise of duties which do not belong to them. As political passions cannot be indulged by a large portion of mankind, without destroying both their usefulness and their felicity, she has wisely provided for their speedy and effectual extinction, in the necessary consequence of the effects which they produce. The insecurity, privations, and suffering which they induce, unavoidably lead to military despotism. Some democratic states, as Milan, Florence, and Sienna, to terminate their dissensions, have voluntarily submitted to the yoke of a military leader; others have fallen under his dominion at the close of a sanguinary period of domestic strife; all have, in one way or other, expelled the deadly venom from the system; and to shun the horrors of anarchy, shielded themselves under the lasting government of the sword.

State of the public mind and manners in France in the beginning of 1796. The illusions of republicanism were now dispelled in France; men had passed through so many vicissitudes, and lived so long in a few years, that all their pristine ideas were overturned. The rule of the middling class, and of the multitude, had successively passed like a rapid and bloody phantasmagoria. The age was far removed from France

of the 14th July, 1789, with its enthusiastic feelings, its high resolves, its ardent aspirations, its popular magistrates, and its buoyant population; it was still further removed from France of the 10th August, when a single class had usurped the whole authority of the state, and borne to the seat of government its vulgar manners and sanguinary ideas—its distrust of all above, and its severity to all beneath itself. Society emerged, weakened and disjoined, from the chaos of revolution; and in despair of effecting any real amelioration in the social system, all classes rushed with unbounded vehemence into the enjoyments of private life. The elegancies of opulence, long suspended, were resumed with unprecedented alacrity; balls, festivities, and theatres, frequented with more avidity than in the most corrupted era of the monarchy; it seemed as if the nation, long famished, was quenching its thirst in the enjoyments of existence. Public affairs had an air of tranquillity which singularly contrasted with the disasters of former years: the emigrants returned in crowds, with a confidence which afterwards proved fatal to them. All women were in transports at the auspicious change. Horror at the Jacobins restored the sway of the rich; the recollection of the clubs, the influence of the saloons; female charms resumed their ascendancy with the return of pacific ideas, and the passion for enjoyment, freed from the dread of death and the restraints of religion, was indulged without control. Manners never were more corrupted than under the rule of the Directory—luxury never more prodigal—passion never more unrestrained; society resumed its wonted order, not by repentance for crime, but a change of its direction. This is the natural termination of popular effervescence; the transition is easy from the extravagance of democracy to the corruptions of sensuality, because both proceed from the indulgence of individual passion; it is extremely difficult from either to the love of genuine freedom, because that implies a sacrifice of both to patriotic feeling. The age of Nero soon succeeded the strife of Gracchus; but ages revolved, and a different race of mankind was established before that of Fabricius was restored (1).

First proceedings of the legislature. The deputies were regarded with the utmost solicitude by all parties upon the completion of the elections. The third part, who were newly chosen, according to the provision of the constitution, represented with tolerable fidelity the opinions and wishes of the people who had now become influential in France. They consisted not of those extraordinary and intrepid men who shine in the outset of the revolutionary tempest; but of those more moderate characters who, in politics equally as the fine arts, succeed to the vehemence of early passion; who take warning by past error, and are disposed only to turn the existing state of things to the best account for their individual advantage. But their influence was inconsiderable compared with that of the two-thirds who remained from the old Assembly, and who, both from their habits of business and acquired celebrity, continued to have the principal direction of public affairs (2).

Choice of the Directory. The whole deputies having assembled, according to the directions of the constitution, chose by ballot 250 of their number, all above forty, and married, to form the Council of the Ancients. They afterwards proceeded to the important task of choosing the Directors; and after some hesitation, the choice fell on Barras, Rewbell, Laréveillière-Lépaux, Letourneur, and Siéyes; but upon the last declining the proffered honour,

(1) Mignet, ii. 401. Th. viii. 67, 75. D'Abr. ii. 86, 94, 158, 164.

(2) Th. viii. 76, 77. Mig. ii. 400.

Carnot was chosen in his stead. These five individuals immediately proceeded to the exercise of their new sovereignty (1).

Though placed at the head of so great a state, the situation of the Directors was at first surrounded with difficulties. When they took possession of their apartments in the Luxembourg, they found scarce any furniture in the rooms (2); a single table, an inkstand and paper, and four straw chairs, constituted the whole establishment of those who were about to enter on the management of the greatest Republic in existence. The incredible embarrassment of the finances, the critical state of the armies, the increasing discontents of the people, did not deter them from undertaking the discharge of their perilous duties. They resolved unanimously that they would make head against all the difficulties in which the state was involved, or perish in the attempt.

Barras. His
character.

Barras was the one of the Directory who was most qualified by his character and previous services to take the lead in the government.

Naturally indolent, haughty, and voluptuous; accessible to corruption, profligate, and extravagant; ill qualified for the fatigues and the exertion of ordinary business, he was yet possessed of the firmness, decision, and audacity which fitted him to be a leader of importance in perilous emergencies. His lofty stature, commanding air, and insinuating manners, were calculated to impose upon the vulgar, often ready to be governed in civil dissensions as much by personal qualities as mental superiority; while the eminent services which he had rendered to the Thermidorien party, on the fall of Robespierre, and his distinguished conduct and decisive success on the revolt of the sections, gave him considerable influence with more rational politicians.

Rewbell.

Rewbell, an Alsacian by birth, and a lawyer by profession, was destitute of either firmness or eloquence; but he owed his elevation to his habits of business, his knowledge of forms, and the pertinacity with which he represented the feelings of the multitude, often in the close of revolutionary convulsions envious of distinguished ability.

Larévillière.
Lépaux.

Larévillière Lépaux, a sincere Republican, who had joined the Girondists on the day of their fall, and preserved, under the proscription of the Jacobins, the same principles which he had embraced during their ascendancy, was blessed by nature with a mild and gentle disposition, which fitted him to be the ornament of private society; but he was weak and irresolute in public conduct, totally destitute of the qualities requisite in a statesman, strongly tinged with the irreligious fanaticism of the age, and perpetually dreaming of establishing the authority of natural religion on the ruins of the Christian faith. Letourneur, an old officer of artillery, had latterly supplied the place of Carnot in the Committee of Public Safety, but without possessing his abilities; and when Carnot came in place of Siéyes, he received the department of the marine and the colonies (5).

First measures
of the
Directory.

The first object of the Directory was to calm the passions, the fury of which had so long desolated France. This was no easy task; the more especially as, with the exception of Carnot, there was not one of them either a man of genius or of any considerable reputation; the cruel effect of a revolution which in a few years had cut off whole generations of ability, and swept away all, save in the military career, that could either command respect or ensure success. Their principles were republican, and

(1) Th. viii. 78.

(2) Bailleur, ii. 275. 281. Examen de Mad. de Staël, sur la Rév. Franç. Mig. i. 404.

(3) Mign. ii. 404, 405, 417. Nap. in Las Cas. iv. 143, 145. Lac. xiii. 4, 5. Th. viii. 78, 79.

they had all voted for the death of the King in the Convention, and consequently their elevation gave great joy to the Democratic party, who had conceived great disquietude from the recent formidable insurrection, and still menacing language of the Royalists. The leaders of that party, defeated, but not humbled, had great influence in the metropolis, and their followers seemed rather proud of the perils they had incurred, than subdued by the defeat they had sustained (1).

Extreme
difficulties
of their
situation.

Within and without, they were surrounded by difficulties. The Revolution had left every thing in the most miserable situation. The treasury was empty; the people starving; the armies destitute; the generals discouraged. The progress of the public disorders had induced that extreme abuse of paper money, which seems the engine employed by nature, in revolutionary disorders, to bring salutary suffering home to every individual, even of the humblest rank in society. The revenue had almost ceased to be collected, and the public necessities were provided for merely by a daily issue of paper, which every morning was sent forth from the public treasury, still dripping wet from the manufactory of the preceding night. The sale of all kinds of commodities had ceased from the effect of the law of the maximum and forced contributions; and the subsistence of Paris and the other great towns was obtained merely by compulsory requisitions, for which the unfortunate peasants received only paper, worth not a thousandth part of the value at which they were compelled to accept it. Finally, the armies, destitute of every thing, and unfortunate at the close of the campaign, were discontented and dejected (2).

The brilliant successes by which Napoléon restored the military affairs of the Republic, have been already considered (3). But in the course of their labours, they were successively assailed by the different factions whose strife had brought the country to this miserable condition; and they owed their victory over both, only to the public torpor which recent experience of the suffering they had endured had produced (4).

Liberation
of the
Duchesse
d'Angou-
lême.

One of their first acts was a deed of humanity; the liberation of the daughter of Louis XVI from the melancholy prison where she had been confined since her parents' death. This illustrious princess, interesting alike for her unparalleled misfortunes, and the resignation with which she bore them, after having discharged, as long as the barbarity of her persecutors would permit, every filial and sisterly duty,—after having seen her father, her mother, her aunt, and her brother, successively torn from her arms, to be consigned to destruction,—had been detained in solitary confinement since the fall of Robespierre, and was still ignorant of the fate of those she had so tenderly loved. The Directory, yielding at length to the feelings of humanity, agreed to exchange her for the deputies who had been delivered up by Dumouriez to the Imperialists; and on the 19th December, 1795, this remnant of the royal captives left the prison where she had been detained since the 10th August, 1792, and proceeded by rapid journeys to Basle, where she was exchanged for the republican commissioners, and received by the Austrians with the honour due to her rank. Her subsequent restoration and second banishment, will form an interesting episode in the concluding part of this work (5).

The first measure of the Directory for the relief of the finances, was to

(1) Th. viii. 84, 85.

(2) Th. viii. 85. Mign. ii. 402, 403.

(3) 20th and 22d chapters.

(4) Mign. ii. 410.

(5) Th. viii. 125. Lac. xii. 388.

Who is ex-
changed for
the Deputies
delivered up
by Dumouriez.
19th Decem-
ber, 1795.

Cessation of the distribution of food. obtain a decree authorizing the cessation of the distribution of rations to the people, which were thenceforward to be continued only to the most necessitous classes. This great measure, the first symptom of emancipation from the tyranny of the mob of the metropolis, was boldly adopted; and though the discontents to which it gave rise appeared in the conspiracy of Babœuf, it was successfully carried into effect (1).

Territorial mandates. After various ineffectual attempts to return to a metallic circulation, the government found itself obliged to continue the issue of assignats. The quantity in circulation at length rose in January, 1796 to forty-five milliards, or about L.2,000,000,000 sterling; and the depreciation became so excessive, that a milliard, or a thousand million of francs, produced only a million in metallic currency: in other words, the paper money had fallen to a *thousandth* part of its nominal value. To stop this enormous evil, the government adopted the plan of issuing a new kind of paper money, to be called *territorial mandates*, which were intended to retire the assignats at the rate of thirty for one. This was in truth creating a new kind of assignats, with an inferior denomination, and was meant to conceal from the public the enormous depreciation which the first had undergone. It was immediately acted upon; mandates were declared the currency of the Republic, and became by law a legal tender; the national domains were forthwith exposed to sale, and assigned over to the holder of a mandate without any other formality than a simple *procès verbal*. At the same time the most violent measures were adopted to give this new paper a forced circulation; all payments by and to the government were ordered to be made in it alone; severe penalties were enacted against selling the mandate for less than its nominal value in gold or silver, and, to prevent all speculation on their value, the public exchange was closed (2).

Their transient success, The only advantage possessed by the mandates over the old assignats was, that they entitled the holder to a more summary and effectual process for getting his paper exchanged for land. As soon as this became generally understood, it procured for them an ephemeral degree of public favour; a mandate for 100 francs, rose, soon after it was issued, from fifteen to eighty francs, and their success procured for government a momentary resource: but this relief was of short duration. Two milliards four hundred millions of mandates were issued, secured over an extent of land supposed to be of the same value: but before many months had elapsed they began to decline, and were soon nearly at as great a discount in proportion to their value as the old assignats. By no possible measure of finance could paper money, worth nothing in foreign states, from a distrust of its security, and redundant at home from its excessive issue, be maintained at any thing like an equality with gold and silver. The mandates were, in truth, a reduction of assignats to a thirtieth part of their value; but to be on a par with the precious metals, they should have been issued at one two hundred-and-fiftieth part, being the rate of discount to which the original paper had now fallen (3).

And ultimate fall. Government, therefore, and all the persons who received payment from it, including the public creditors, the army, and the civil servants, were still suffering the most severe privation; but the crisis had passed with the great bulk of individuals in the state. The fall in the value of the assignats had been so excessive, that no one would take either them or

(1) Mig. ii. 406. Th. viii. 162.

(2) Th. viii. 185, 188, 189. Mig. ii. 407.

(3) Th. viii. 33, 191, 335. Mig. ii. 407. Lac. viii. 40.

their successors in change. Barter, and the actual interchange of one commodity with another, had usurped the place of sale; and all those possessed of any fortune, realized it in the form of the luxuries of life, which were likely to procure a ready sale in the market. The most opulent houses were converted into vast magazines for the storing of silks, velvets, and luxuries of every description, which were retailed sometimes at a profit, and sometimes at a loss, and by which the higher classes were enabled to maintain their families. From the general prevalence of this rude inter-
Recourse in
despair had
to barter. change, internal trade and manufactures regained, to a certain degree, their former activity; and though the former opulent quarters were deserted, the Boulevards and Chaussée d'Antin began to exhibit that splendour for which they afterwards became so celebrated under the empire. As the victories of the Republic increased, and gold and silver were obtained from the conquest of Flanders, Italy, and the German states, the government paper entirely ceased to be a medium of exchange; transfers of every description were effected by barter or exchange for the precious metals, and the territorial mandates were nowhere to be seen but in the hands of speculators, who bought them for a twentieth part of their nominal value, and sold them at a small advance to the purchasers of the national domains (1).

But while all other classes were thus emerging from this terrible financial crisis, the servants of government, and the public creditors, still paid in mandates at par, were literally dying of famine.
Starvation
of the fund-
holders and
all the pub-
lic func-
tionaries. Employment from government, instead of being solicited, was universally shunned; the persons in every kind of service sent in their resignations; and the soldiers deserted from the armies in as great crowds as they had flocked to it during the Reign of Terror. While the armies of Pichegru and Napoléon, paid in the coin they extracted from the conquered states, were living in luxurious affluence, those on the soil of the Republic, and paid in its depreciated paper, were starving. But most of all, the public creditors, the *rentiers*, were overwhelmed by unprecedented distress. The opulent capitalists who had fanned the first triumphs of the Revolution, the annuitants who had swelled the multitude of its votaries, were now equally crushed under its wheels. Then was seen the unutterable bitterness of private distress, which inevitably follows such a convulsion. The prospect of famine produced many more suicides among that unhappy class, than all the horrors of the Reign of Terror. Many, driven to extremities, had recourse, late in life, to daily labour for their subsistence; others, unable to endure its fatigues, subsisted upon the charity which they obtained from the more fortunate survivors of the Revolution. Under the shadow of night they were to be seen crowding round the doors of the opera and other places of public amusement, of which they had formerly been the principal supporters, and in a disguised voice, or with an averted head, imploring charity from crowds, among whom they were fearful of discovering a former acquaintance or dependant (2).

The situation of the armies in the interior was not less deplorable.
Deplorable
state of the
armies from
the same
cause. Officers and soldiers, alike unable to procure any thing for their pay, were maintained only by the forced requisitions which, under the law of necessity, were still continued in the departments. The detachments were dispersed, and deserted on the road; even the hospitals were shut up, and the unhappy soldiers who filled them turned adrift upon the

(1) Th. viii. 337. Lac. xiii. 33, 36.

(2) Th. viii. 337. 338. Mig. ii. 402. Lac. xiii. 40.

world, from utter inability to procure them either medicines or provisions. The gendarmerie, or mounted police, were dissolved: the soldiers who composed it, unable to maintain their horses, sold them, and left the service; and the high-roads, infested by numerous brigands, the natural result of the dissolution of society, became the theatre of unheard-of atrocities (1).

Great speculations of foreigners from the public distress.

Stangers profited by the general distress of France to carry on a commerce with its suffering inhabitants, which contributed in a considerable degree to restore the precious metals to circulation.

The Germans, the Swiss, the Russians, and the English, seized the moment when the assignats were lowest, to fall with all the power of metallic riches upon the scattered but splendid movables of France. Wines of the most costly description were bought up by speculators, and sold cheaper at Hamburg than Paris; diamonds and precious stones, concealed during the Reign of Terror, left their place of concealment, and procured for their ruined possessors a transitory relief; and pictures, statues, and furniture of every description, were eagerly purchased for the Russian and English palaces, and by their general dispersion effected a change in the taste for the fine arts over all Europe. A band of speculators, called *la bande Noire*, purchased up an immense number of public and private edifices; which were sold for almost nothing, and reimbursed themselves by selling a part of the materials; and numerous families, whose estates had escaped confiscation, retired to the country, and inhabited the buildings formerly tenanted by their servants, where they lived in seclusion and rustic plenty on the produce of a portion of their estates (2).

16th July, 1796. Open abandonment of the paper system.

The excessive fall of the paper, at length made all classes perceive that it was in vain to pursue the chimera of upholding its value. On the 16th July, 1796, the measure, amounting to an open confession of a bankruptcy, which had long existed, was adopted. It was declared that all persons were to be at liberty to transact business in the money which they chose; that the mandates should be taken at their current value, which should be published every day at the Treasury; and that the taxes should be received either in coin or mandates at that rate, with the exception of the department bordering on the seat of war, in which it should still be received in kind.

The publication of the fall of the mandates, rendered it indispensable to make some change as to the purchase of the national domains; for where the mandate had fallen from one hundred francs to five francs, it was impossible that the holder could be allowed to obtain in exchange for it land worth one hundred francs in 1790, and still, notwithstanding the fall of its value, from the insecure tenure of all possessions, deemed worth thirty-five francs (3). It was in consequence determined, on the 18th July, that the undisposed of national domains should be sold for mandates at their current value.

Prodigious transference of fortunes which it had occasioned.

Such was the end of the system of paper credit, six years after it had been originally commenced, and after it had effected a greater change in the fortunes of individuals, than had perhaps ever been accomplished in the same time by any measure of govern-

(1) Th. viii. 338.

(2) Lac. xiii. 37.

(3) Míg. viii. 339. Th. viii. 346, 347. July 18, 1796.

ment. It did more to overthrow the existing wealth, to transfer movable fortunes from one hand to another, than even the confiscation of the emigrant and church estates. All debts were in fact annihilated by the elusory form in which it permitted payment to be made. In its later stages, a debtor with one franc could force a discharge of a debt of two hundred; the public creditors, the government servants, in fact, all the classes who formerly were opulent, were reduced to the last stage of misery. On the other hand, the debtors throughout the whole country found themselves liberated from their engagements; the national domains were purchased almost for nothing by the holders of government paper; and the land, infinitely subdivided, required little of the expenditure of capital (1), and became daily more productive from the number and energy of its new cultivators.

Deprived of the extraordinary resource of issuing paper, the Directory was compelled to calculate their real revenue, and endeavour to accommodate their expenditure to that standard. They estimated the revenue for 1796 at 1,100,000,000 or L.50,000,000, including an arrear of 500,000,000, or L.15,000,000, of the forced loans, which had never yet been recovered. But the event soon proved that this calculation was fallacious; the revenue proved greatly less, and the expenditure much greater, than had been expected. The land tax had produced only 200 millions, instead of 250; and the 200 millions expected from the sale of the remainder of the national domains had not been half realized, and all the other sources of revenue had failed in the same proportion. Meanwhile, the armies of the Rhine, of the Sambre and Meuse, and of the Interior, were in the most extreme state of penury, and all the national establishments on the point of ruin. In these circumstances, it was no longer possible to avoid a bankruptcy (2).

The public creditors, as usual in all such extremities, were the first to be sacrificed. After exhausting every expedient of delay and procrastination with the *rentiers*, the Directory at length paid them only a fourth in money, and three-fourths in bills, dischargeable on the national domains, called *Bons des trois Quarts*. The annual charge of the debt was 248 millions of francs, or about L.11,000,000 sterling; so that, by this expedient, the burden was reduced to 62 millions, or L.2,400,000. The bills received for the three-fourths were from the first at a ruinous discount, and soon became altogether unsaleable; and the disorders and partiality consequent on this mode of payment speedily became so excessive, that it could no longer be continued. The income of 1797 was estimated at 616,000,000 francs, or about L.27,000,000, but the expenditure could not be reduced to this, without taking a decisive step in regard to the debt. It was therefore finally resolved to continue the payment of a third only of the debt in specie; and the remaining two-thirds were to be discharged by the payment of a capital in bills, secured on the national domains, at the rate of twenty years' purchase. These bills, like the *Bons des Trois Quarts*, immediately fell to a sixth of their value, and shortly after dwindled away to almost nothing, from the quantity simultaneously thrown into the market. As the great majority of the public creditors were in such circumstances that they could not take land, this was, to all intents, a national bankruptcy, which cut off at one blow two-thirds of their property (3).

(1) Th. viii. 343. Lac. xiii. 38.

(2) Th. viii. 343, 344; ix. 177.

(3) Th. ix. 177, 319, 326. Bris. Hist. Fin. ii. 321. 327, Lac. xiv. 105.

Successful efforts of the Directory to restore order in France. These attempts of the Directory, though long unsuccessful, to restore order to the distracted chaos of revolutionary France, were seconded by the efforts of the great majority of the people, to whom a termination of political contests had become the most imperious of necessities. Such, in truth, is the disposition to right themselves in human affairs when the fever of passion has subsided, that men fall insensibly into order, under any government which saves them from the desolating effect of their own passions. Within a few months after the establishment of the new government, the most frightful evils entailed on France by the revolutionary *régime*, had been removed or alleviated. The odious law of the maximum, which compelled the industry of the country to pay tribute to the idleness of towns, was abolished; the commerce of grain in the interior was free: the assignats were replaced, without any convulsion, by a metallic currency: the press had resumed its independence; the elections had taken place without violence; the guillotine no longer shed the noblest blood in France; the roads were secure; the ancient proprietors lived in peace beside the purchasers of the national domains. Whatever faults they may have afterwards committed, France owes to the Directory, during the first year, the immense obligation of having reconstructed the elements of society out of the fusion of the revolutionary crucible (1).

But irreligion continues still triumphant.

In one particular alone, the Directory made no approach towards improvement. Religion still remained prostrated as it had been by the strokes of the Decemvirs; the churches were closed; Sunday abolished; baptism and communion unknown; the priests in exile, or in hiding under the roofs of the faithful remnant of the Christian flock. The youth of both sexes were brought up without the slightest knowledge of the faith of their fathers; a generation was ushered into the world, destitute of the first elements of religious instruction. Subsequently, the immense importance of this deficiency appeared in the clearest manner; it has left a chasm in the social institutions of France, which all the genius of Napoléon, and all the glories of the empire, have not been able to repair; and which, it is to be feared, is destined to prevent the growth of any thing like rational or steady freedom in that distracted country. In vain Laréveillière endeavoured to establish a system of *Theophilanthropy*, and opened temples, published chants, and promulgated a species of liturgy; all these endeavours to supersede the doctrines of revelation speedily failed (2): and Deism alone remained in the few of the revolutionary party who bestowed any thought on religious concerns (3).

Theophilanthropists.

(1) De Staël, ii. 162. Mign. ii. 406.

(2) Mign. ii. 406. Lac. xiii. 2. Lavalette, i. 323, 324.

(3) The tenets and ideas of this singular sect were one of the most curious results of the Revolution. Their principles were, for the most part, contained in the following paragraph:—

Singular character, tenets, and worship of this sect. “We believe in the existence of God, character, and the immortality of the soul. Worship the Deity; cherish your equals; render yourself useful to your country. Every thing is good which tends to preserve and bring to perfection the human race; every thing which has an opposite tendency is the reverse. Children, honour your fathers and mothers; obey them with affection, support their declining years. Fathers and mothers, instruct your children. Women, behold in your husbands the heads of your houses; husbands, be-

hold in women the mothers of your children, and reciprocally study each other's happiness.”

When men flatter themselves that they are laying the foundations of a new religion, they are, in truth, only dressing up, in a somewhat varied form, the morality of the gospel.

The worship of this sect was very singular. Laréveillière-Lepaux was their high priest; they had four temples in Paris, and on appointed days service was performed. In the middle of the congregation, an immense basket, filled with the most beautiful flowers of the season, was placed, as the symbol of the creation. The high-priest pronounced a discourse, enforcing the moral virtues; “in which,” says the Duchess of Abrantes, “there was frequently so much truth and feeling, that if the Evangelists had not said the same thing much better 1800 years before them, one might have been tempted to em-

too profound, for society to relapse, without further convulsions, into a state of repose. It was from the Jacobins that the first efforts proceeded; and the principles of their leaders at this juncture are singularly instructive as to the extremities to which the doctrines of democracy are necessarily pushed, when they take a deep hold of the body of the people.

Renewed efforts of the Jacobins. This terrible faction had never ceased to mourn in secret the ninth Thermidor as the commencement of their bondage. They still hoped to establish absolute equality, notwithstanding the variety of human character; and complete democracy, in spite of the institutions of modern civilisation. They had been driven from the government by the fall of Robespierre; and from all influence in the metropolis by the defeat and disarming of the faubourgs. But the necessities of government, on occasion of the revolt of the sections on the thirteenth Vendémiaire, had compelled it to invoke the aid of their desperate bands, to resist the efforts of the Royalists, and the character of the Directors inspired them with hopes of regaining their influence at the helm of affairs. Flattered by these prospects, the broken faction re-assembled. They instituted a new club, under the splendid dome of the Panthéon, which they trusted would rival the far-famed assemblage of the Jacobins; and there instituted a species of idolatrous worship of Marat and Robespierre, whom they still upheld as objects of imitation to their followers (4).

Babœuf. His extreme revolutionary principles. The head of this party was Babœuf, surnamed Gracchus, who aspired to become the chief of the fanatical band. His leading principle was, that the friends of freedom had hitherto failed because they had not ventured to make that use of their power which could alone ensure its lasting success. "Robespierre fell," said he, "because he did not venture to pronounce the word 'Agrarian Law.' He effected the spoliation of a few rich, but without benefiting the poor. The *sans-culottes*, guided by too timid leaders, piqued themselves on their foolish determination to abstain from enriching themselves at others' expense. Real aristocracy consists in the possession of riches, and it matters not whether they are in the hands of a Villiers, a Laborde, a Danton, a Barras, or a Rewbell. Under different names, it is ever the same aristocracy which oppresses the poor, and keeps

brace their opinions." [D'Ab. vi. 37, 38.] This sect, like all others founded upon mere Deism and the inculcation of the moral virtues, was short-lived, and never embraced any considerable body of the people.

Napoléon viewed these enthusiasts, some of whom were still to be found in Paris when he seized the helm of affairs in 1799, in their true light. "They are good actors," said he.—"What!" answered one of the most enthusiastic of their number, "is it in such terms that you stigmatize those whose chiefs are among the most virtuous men in Paris, and whose tenets inculcate only universal benevolence and the moral virtues?"—"What do you mean by that?" replied the First Consul; "all systems of morality are fine. Apart from certain dogmas, more or less absurd, which were necessary to suit the capacity of the people to whom they were addressed, what do you see in the Widham, the Koran, the Old Testament, or Confucius? Every where pure morality; that is to say, a system inculcating protection to the weak, respect to the laws, gratitude to God. The gospel alone has exhibited a complete assemblage of the principles of morality divested of absurdity. That is what is truly admirable, and not a few commonplace sentences put into bad verse. Do you wish to see what is truly sublime? Repeat

the Lord's Prayer. You and your friends would willingly become martyrs: I shall do them no such honour. No strokes but those of ridicule shall fall upon them; and if I know any thing of the French, they will speedily prove effectual." Napoleon's views soon proved correct. The sect lingered on five years; and two of its members had even the courage to publish short works in its defence, which speedily died a natural death. Their number gradually declined; and they were at length so inconsiderable, that when a decree of government, on the 4th October, 1801, prohibited them from meeting in the four churches which they had hitherto occupied as their temples, they were unable to raise money enough to hire a room to carry on their worship. The extinction of this sect was not owing merely to the irreligious spirit of the French metropolis; it would have undergone the same fate in any other age or country. It is not by flowers and verses, declamations on the beauty of Spring and the goodness of the Deity, that a permanent impression is to be made on a being exposed to the temptations, liable to the misfortunes, and filled with the desires, incident to the human race.—See DUCHESSE D'ABRANTÈS, vi. 38, 41.

(1) Lac. xiii. 13. Mign. ii. 411.

them perpetually in the condition of the Spartan Helots. The people are excluded from the chief share in the property of France; nevertheless, the people who constitute the whole strength of the state, should be alone invested with it, and that too in equal shares. There is no real equality without an equality of riches. All the great of former times should, in their turn, be reduced to the condition of Helots; without that the Revolution is stopped where it should begin. These are the principles which Lycurgus or Gracchus would have applied to Revolutionary or Republican France; and without their adoption, the benefits of the Revolution are a mere chimera (1)."

But they
fail now in
rousing the
people.

There was a time when plausible doctrines such as these, so well calculated to excite the passions of the squalid multitude in great cities, would in all probability have produced a great effect on the Parisian populace; but time extinguishes passion, and discovers illusions, to a generation as well as an individual. The people were no longer to be deceived by these high-sounding expressions; they knew, by dear-bought experience, that the equality of democracy is only an equality of subjection, and the equal division of property only a pretence for enriching the popular rulers. The lowest of the populace alone, accordingly, were moved by the efforts of the Jacobins; and the Directory, finding their government firmly established 27th Feb. 1796. in the opinions of the better classes, closed the Club at the Panthéon, and seized several numbers of Babœuf's Journal, containing passages tending to overthrow the constitution. To avert the further encroachments of the Jacobin party, they endeavoured to introduce a restriction on the liberty of the press; but the two Councils, after a solemn discussion, refused to sanction any such attempts (2).

Renewed
efforts of
the Revolu-
tionists.

Defeated in this attempt, the Jacobins formed an Insurrectional Committee of Public Safety, which communicated, by means of twelve confidential agents, with affiliated societies in every part of Paris. Babœuf was at their head; the chiefs assembled in a place called the *Temple of Reason*, where they sung songs, deploring the death of Robespierre and the slavery of the people. They had some communication with the troops in the camp at Grenelle, and admitted to their secret meetings a captain in that force, named Grizel, whom they considered one of their most important adherents. Their design was to establish the "Public Good," and for that end to divide property of every description, and put at the head of affairs a government, consisting of "true, pure, and absolute democrats." It was unanimously agreed to murder the Directors, disperse the Councils, and put to death their leading members, and erect the sovereignty of the people; but to whom to intrust the supreme authority of the executive, after this was achieved, was a matter of anxious and difficult deliberation. At length they fixed on sixty-eight persons who were esteemed the most pure and absolute democrats, in whom the powers of the state were to be invested until the complete democratic *régime* was established. The day for commencing the

(1) Lac. xiii. 14.

These doctrines of Babœuf, which were nothing more than the maxims of the Revolution pushed to their legitimate consequences, instead of being stopped short when they had served the purpose of a particular party, show how correctly Mr. Burke had, long before, characterised the real Jacobin principles. "Jacobinism" says he, "is the revolt of the enterprising talents of a country against its property. When private men form themselves into associations for the purpose of destroying the laws and institutions of their country; when they secure to themselves an army, by dividing among the

people of no property the estates of the ancient and lawful proprietors; when the state recognises those acts; when it does not make confiscation for crimes, but crimes for confiscations; when it has its principal strength, and all its resources in such a violation of property; when it stands chiefly upon such violation, in assassinating, by judgments or otherwise, those who make any struggle for their old legal government, and their old legal possessions—I call this Jacobinism by establishment."—*Thoughts on a Regicide Peace*, 97.

(2) Th. viii. 179. Mign. ii. 411. Lac. xiii. 15.

insurrection was fixed, and all the means of carrying it into effect arranged. It was to take place on the 21st May. Placards and banners were prepared, bearing the words, "Liberty, Equality, Constitution of 1793, Common Good;" and others having the inscription, "Those who usurp the sovereignty of the people should be put to death by freemen." The conspirators were to march from different quarters to attack the Directors and the Councils, and make themselves masters of the Luxembourg, the treasury, the telegraph, and the arsenal of artillery at Meudon; a correspondence had been opened with the Jacobins in other quarters, so that the revolt would break out simultaneously in all parts of France. To induce the lower classes to take part in the proceedings, proclamations were immediately to be issued, requiring every citizen of any property to lodge and maintain a man who had joined in the insurrection; and the bakers, butchers, and wine-merchants were to be obliged to furnish the articles in which they dealt to the citizens, at a low price fixed by the government. All soldiers who should join the people were to receive instantly a large sum in money, and their discharge; or, if they preferred remaining by their colours, they were to get the houses of the Royalists to pillage (1).

These desperate and extreme measures, worthy of Catiline's conspirators, the natural result of a long-continued revolutionary strife, indicated a perfect knowledge of human nature, and might, at an earlier period, have roused the most vehement democratic passions. But, coming as they did at a time when such opinions inspired all men of any property with horror, they failed in producing any considerable effect. The designs of the conspirators were divulged to government by Grizel; and, on the 20th May, the day before the plot was to have been carried into execution, Babœuf, and all the leaders of the enterprise, were seized at their place of assembly, and with them the documents which indicated the extent of the conspiracy.

Babœuf, though in captivity, abated nothing of his haughty bearing, and would only condescend to negotiate with the government on a footing of perfect equality. "Do you consider it beneath you," said he to the Directory, "to treat with me as an independent power? You see of what a vast party I am the centre; you see that it nearly balances your own; you see what immense ramifications it contains. I am well assured that the discovery must have made you tremble. It is nothing to have arrested the chiefs of the conspiracy; it will revive in other bosoms, if theirs are extinct. Abandon the idea of shedding blood in vain; you have not hitherto made much noise about the affair; make no more; treat with the patriots; they recollect that you were once sincere Republicans; they will pardon you, if you concur with them in measures calculated to effect the salvation of the Republic." Instead of acceding to this extravagant proposal, the Directory published the letter, and ordered the trial of the conspirators before the High Court at Vendôme. This act of vigour contributed more than any thing they had yet done, to consolidate the authority of Government (2).

The partisans of Babœuf, however, were not discouraged. Some months afterwards, and before the trial of the chiefs had come on, they marched in the night, to the number of six or seven hundred, armed with sabres and pistols, to the camp at Grenelle. They were received by a regiment of dragoons, which, instead of fraternizing with them as they expected, charged and dispersed the motley array. Great numbers were cut

(1) Th. viii. 193, 196; Mign. ii. 412, 413.

(2) Th. viii. 197, 198. Mign. ii. 413.

But are de-
feated and
executed.

down in the fight. Of the prisoners taken, thirty-one were condemned and executed by a military commission, and thirty transported. This severe blow extinguished, for a long period, the hopes of the revolutionary party, by cutting off all their leaders of resolution and ability; and though it still inspired terror by the recollection of its former excesses, it ceased from this time forward to have any real power to disturb the tranquillity of the state. Despotism is never so secure as after the miseries of anarchy have been recently experienced (1).

Trial of the
leaders pre-
viously ar-
rested.

The Directory followed up this success by the trial of Babœuf, Amar, Vadier, Darthé, and the other leaders taken on the 29th May, before the Court of Vendôme. Their behaviour on this occasion was that of men who neither feared death, nor were ashamed of the cause in which they were to die. At the commencement and conclusion of each day's proceedings, they sung the Marseillaise hymn; their wives attended them to the court; and Babœuf, at the conclusion of his defence, turned towards them, and said, "that they should follow them to Mount Calvary, because they had no reason to blush for the cause for which they suffered." They were all acquitted except Babœuf and Darthé, who were condemned to death. On hearing the sentence, they mutually stabbed each other with a poniard, and died with the stoicism of ancient Rome (2).

The terror excited by these repeated efforts of the Jacobins was extreme, and totally disproportioned to the real danger with which they were attended. It is the remembrance of the danger which is past, not that which is present, that ever affects the generality of mankind. This feeling encouraged the Royalists to make an effort to regain their ascendancy, in the hope that the troops in the camp at Grenelle, who had so firmly resisted the seductions of the democratic, might be more inclined to aid the exertions of the monarchical, party. Their conspiracy, however, destitute of any aid in the legislative bodies, though numerous supported by the population of Paris, proved abortive.

Abortive at-
tempt of the
Royalists.

Its leaders were Brottier, an old counsellor in parliament, Laville-Heurnois, and Dunan. They made advances to Malo the captain of dragoons, who had resisted the seductions of the Jacobins; but he was equally inaccessible to the offers of the Royalists, and delivered up their leaders to the Directory. They were handed over to the civil tribunal, who being unwilling to renew the reign of blood, humanely suffered them to escape with a short imprisonment (3).

Singular
manners of
this period
in France.

The manners of 1795 and 1796 were different from any which had yet prevailed in France, and exhibited a singular specimen of the love of order and the spirit of elegance regaining their ascendant over a nation which had lost its nobility, its religion, and its morals. The total destruction of fortunes of every description during the Revolution, and the complete ruin of paper money, reduced every one to the necessity of doing something for himself, and restored commerce to its pristine form of barter. The saloons of fashion were converted into magazines of stuffs, where ladies of the highest rank engaged, during the day, in the drudgery of trade, to maintain their families or relations, while in the evening the reign of pleasure and amusement was resumed. In the midst of the wreck of ancient opulence, modern wealth began to display its luxury; the faubourg St.-Antoine, the seat of manufactures, the faubourg St.-Germain, the abode of

(1) Th. viii. 349. Mign. ii. 414.
(2) Mign. ii. 415. Th. ix. 35.

(3) Mig. ii. 416. Th. ix. 23.

rank, remained deserted, but in the quarter of the chaussée d'Antin, and in the Boulevard des Italiens, the riches of the bankers, and of those who had made fortunes in the Revolution, began to shine with unprecedented lustre. Splendid hotels, sumptuously furnished in the Grecian taste, which had now become the fashion, were embellished by magnificent *fêtes*, where all that was left of elegance in France by the Revolution, assembled to indulge the new-born passion for enjoyment. The dresses of the women were carried to extravagance, in the Grecian style; and the excessive nudity which they exhibited, while it proved fatal to many persons of youth and beauty, contributed, by the novel aspect of the charms which were presented to the public eye, to increase the general enchantment. The assemblies of Barras, in particular, were remarkable for their magnificence; but, in the general confusion of ranks and characters which they presented, afforded too clear an indication of the universal destruction of the ancient landmarks, in morals as well as society, which the Revolution had effected (1).

In these assemblies were to be seen the elements out of which the Imperial court was afterwards formed. The young officers who had risen to eminence in the Republican armies, began here to break through the rigid circle of aristocratic etiquette; and the mixture of characters and ideas which the Revolution had produced, rendered the style of conversation incomparably more varied and animating than any thing which had been known under the ancient *régime*. In a few years the world had lived through centuries of knowledge. There was to be seen Hoche, not yet twenty-seven years of age, who had recently extinguished the war in la Vendée, and whose handsome figure, brilliant talents, and rising glory, rendered him the idol of women even of aristocratic habits; while the thoughtful air, energetic conversation, and eagle eye of Napoléon, already, to persons of discernment, foretold no ordinary destinies. The beauty of Madame Tallien was still in its zenith; while the grace of Madame Beauharnais, and the genius of Madame de Staël, threw a lustre over the reviving society of the capital, which had been unknown since the fall of the monarchy. The illustrious men of the age, for the most part, at this period selected their partners for life from the brilliant circle by which they were surrounded; and never did such destinies depend on the decision or caprice of the moment. Madame Permon, a lady of rank and singular attractions, from Corsica, in whose family Napoléon had from infancy been intimate, and whose daughter afterwards became Duchess of Abrantes, refused in one morning the hand of Napoléon for herself, that of his brother Joseph for her daughter, and that of his sister Pauline for her son. She little thought that she was declining for herself the throne of Charlemagne; for her daughter, that of Charles V, and for her son, the most beautiful princess in Europe (2).

But the result of the elections is preparing a catastrophe.

But the passions raised were too violent, the wounds inflicted too profound, for society to relapse, without further convulsions, into a state of repose; and France was again destined to undergo the horrors of Jacobin rule, before she settled down under the despotism of the sword. The Directory was essentially democratic; but the first elections having taken place during the excitement produced by the suppression of the revolt of the Sections at Paris, and two-thirds of the Councils being composed of the members of the old Convention, the legislature was, in that

(1) Th. viii. 180. Lac. xiii. 34, 35. D'Abr. ii. (2) D'Abr. ii. 44, 48 Th. viii. 181, 182.

respect, in harmony with the executive. But the elections of the year 1797, when one-third of both were changed, produced a total alteration in the balance of parties in the state. These elections, for the most part, turned out favourable to the Royalist interest; and, so far did the members of that party carry hostility to the Jacobins, that they questioned all the candidates in many of the provinces as to whether they were holders of the national domains, or had ever been engaged in the Revolution, or in any of the public journals, and instantly rejected all who answered affirmatively to any of these questions. The reaction against the Revolution was soon extremely powerful over the whole departments. The Royalists, perceiving from the turn of the elections that they would acquire a majority, soon gained the energy of victory. The multitude, ever ready to follow the victorious party, ranged themselves on their side, while a hundred journals thundered forth their declamations against the Government, without its venturing to invoke the aid of the sanguinary law, which affixed the punishment of death against all offences tending towards a restoration of royalty. The avowed corruption, profligacy, and unmeasured ambition of Barras, and the majority of the Directory, strongly contributed to increase the reaction throughout the country. The result of the elections was such, that a great majority in both Councils was in the Royalist or anti-conventional interest; and the strength of the republican party lay solely in the Directory and the army (1).

Barthélemy is chosen a Director in lieu of Letourneur, and joins Carnot. The first act of the new Assembly, or rather of the Assembly with its new third of members, was to choose a successor to the director Letourneur, upon whom the lot had fallen of retiring from the government. The choice fell on Barthélemy, the minister who had concluded the peace with Prussia and Spain; a respectable man, of Royalist principles. Pichegru, deputy of the Jura, was, amidst loud acclamations, appointed president of the Council of Five Hundred: Barbé-Marbois, also a Royalist, president of the Council of the Ancients. Almost all the ministry were changed, and the Directory was openly divided into two parties; the majority consisting of Rewbell, Barras, and Laréveillière; the minority, of Barthélemy and Carnot (2).

Club of Clichy. The chief strength of the Royalist party lay in the club of Clichy, which acquired as preponderating an influence at this epoch, as that of the Jacobins had done at an earlier stage of the Revolution. Few among their number were in direct communication with the Royalists, but they were all animated with hatred at the Jacobins, and an anxious desire to prevent their regaining their ascendancy in the government. The opposite side assembled at the Club of Salm, where was arrayed the strength of the Republicans, the Directory, and the army. Carnot though a steady Republican, was inclined to join the Royalist party from his love of freedom, and his rooted aversion to violent measures. Steadily pursuing what he conceived to be the public good, he had, during the crisis of the Reign of Terror, supported the dictatorial; and now, when the danger to freedom from foreign subjugation was over, he strove to regain the regal *ré-gime*. The opposite factions soon became so exasperated, that they mutually aimed at supplanting each other by means of a revolution; a neutral party, headed by Thibaudeau, strove to prevent matters coming to extremities (3);

(1) Mign. ii. 421, 422. Lac. xiv. 16. Nap. iv. 216. Th. ix. 36. D'Abr. i. 120. (3) Mign. ii. 425. Nap. iv. 217, 218. Th. ix. 165, 166.

(2) Th. ix. 165. Nap. iv. 216.

but, as usual in such circumstances, was unsuccessful, and shared in the ruin of the vanquished.

General reaction in favour of Royalist principles. The reaction in favour of Royalist principles at this juncture was so strong, that out of seventy periodical journals which appeared at Paris, only three or four supported the cause of the Revolution. Lacretelle, the future historian of the Revolution, the Abbé Morellet, La Harpe, Sicard, and all the literary men of the capital, wrote periodically on the Royalist side. Michaud, destined to illustrate and beautify the History of the Crusades, went so far as to publish a direct *éloge* on the princes of the exiled family; an offence which, by the subsisting laws, was punishable with death. He was indicted for the offence, but acquitted by the jury, amidst the general applause of the people. The majority in the Councils supported the liberty of the press, from which their party were reaping such advantages, and, pursuing a cautious but incessant attack upon government, brought them into obloquy by continually exposing the confusion of the finances, which was becoming inextricable, and dwelling on the continuance of the war, which appeared interminable (1).

At this epoch, by a singular but not unnatural train of events, the partisans of royalty were the strongest supporters of the liberty of the press; while the Jacobin government did every thing in their power to stifle its voice. This is the natural course of things when parties have changed places, and the executive authority is in the hands of the popular leaders. Freedom of discussion is the natural resource of liberty, whether menaced by regal, republican, or military violence; it is the insurrection of thought against physical force (2). It may frequently mislead and blind the people, and for years perpetuate the most fatal delusions; but still it is the polar star of freedom, and it alone can restore the light of truth to the generation it has misled. The press is not to be feared in any country where the balance of power is properly maintained, and opposing parties divide the state, because their opposite interests and passions call forth contradictory statements and arguments, which at length extricate truth from their collision: the period of danger from its abuse commences when it is in great part turned to one side either by despotic power, democratic violence, or purely republican institutions. France under Napoléon was an example of the first; Great Britain during the Reform fever in 1831, of the second; America of the third. Wherever one power in the state is overbearing, whether it be that of a sovereign or of the multitude, the press generally becomes the instrument of the most debasing tyranny (3).

Measures of the Directory to avert the danger. To ward off the attacks, the Directory proposed a law for restricting the liberty of the press, and substituting graduated penalties for the odious punishment which the subsisting law authorized, but which could not be carried into effect from its severity. It passed the Five Hundred, but was thrown out in the Ancients, amidst transports of joy in the Royalist party. Encouraged by this success, they attempted to undo the worst parts of the revolutionary fabric: the punishment of imprisonment or transportation, to which the clergy were liable by the revolutionary laws, was repealed, and a proposal made to permit the open use of the ancient worship, allow the use of bells in the churches, the cross on the graves of such as chose to place that emblem there, and relieve the priests

(1) Mign. ii. 422. Lac. xiv. 16, 18.

(2) Mad. de Staël, ii. 183.

(3) Mad. de Staël, ii. 263.

from the necessity of taking the republican oaths. On this occasion Camille-Jordan, deputy from Lyon, whose religious and royalist principles had been strongly confirmed by the atrocities of the Jacobins in that unfortunate city, made an eloquent and powerful speech, which produced a great sensation. He pleaded strongly the great cause of religious toleration, and exposed the iniquity of those laws, which, professing to remove the restrictions on subjects of faith, imposed fetters severer than had ever been known to Catholic superstition. The Council, tired of the faded extravagances on the subject of freedom, were entranced for the moment by a species of eloquence for years unheard in the Assembly, and by the revival of feelings long strangers to their breasts, and listened to the declamations of the young enthusiast as they would have done to the preaching of Peter the Hermit. But the attempt was premature; the principles of infidelity were too deeply seated, to be shaken by transient bursts of genius; and the Council ultimately rejected the proposal by such a majority, as showed that ages of suffering must yet be endured before that fatal poison could be expelled from the social body (1).

General return of the emigrants and clergy

Encouraged by this state of opinion in the capital, the emigrants and the banished priests assembled in crowds from every part of Europe. Fictitious passports were transmitted from Paris to Hamburg and other towns, where they were eagerly purchased by those who longed ardently to revisit their native land. The clergy returned in still greater numbers, and were received with transports of joy by their faithful flocks, especially in the western departments, who for four years had been deprived of all the ordinances and consolations of religion; the infants were anew baptised; the sick visited; the nuptial benediction pronounced by consecrated lips; and the last rites performed over the remains of the faithful. On this, as on other occasions, however, the energy of the Royalists consisted rather in words than in actions; they avowed too openly the extent of their hopes, not to awaken the vigilance of the revolutionary party; and spoke themselves into the belief that their strength was irresistible, while their adversaries were silently preparing the means of overturning it (2).

Great alarm of the Directory.

In effect, the rapid march of the Councils, and the declamations of the Royalists, both in the tribune, in the club of Clichy, and in the public journals, awakened an extreme alarm among that numerous body of men, who, from having been implicated in the crimes of the Revolution, or gainers from its excesses, had the strongest interest to prevent its principles from receding. The Directory became alarmed for their own existence, by reason of the decided majority of their antagonists in both Councils, and the certainty that the approaching election of a third would almost totally ruin the Republican party. It had already been ascertained that 190 of the deputies were engaged to restore the exiled family, while the Directory could only reckon upon the support of 150; and the Ancients had resolved, by a large majority, to transfer the seat of the legislature to Rouen, on account of its proximity to the western provinces, whose Royalist principles had always been so decided. The next election, it was expected, would nearly extinguish the Revolutionary party; and the Directory were aware that the transition was easy for regicides, as the greater part of them were, from the Luxembourg to the scaffold (3).

(1) Lac. xiv. 20, 54. Mign. ii. 422, 423. Th. ix. 174.

(2) Th. ix. 191. Mign. ii. 424.

(3) Thibaudau Mém. ii. 321. Lac xiv. 61. Th. ix. 192.

The Republican majority of the Directory resolve on decisive measures.

In this extremity, the majority of the Directory, consisting of Barras, Rewbell, and Laréveillière-Lépaux, resolved upon decisive measures. They could reckon with confidence upon the support of the army, which having been raised during the revolutionary fervour of 1795, and constantly habituated to the intoxication of Republican triumphs, was strongly imbued with democratic principles. This, in the existing state of affairs, was an assistance of immense importance. They, therefore, drew towards Paris a number of regiments, twelve thousand strong, from the army of the Sambre and Meuse, which were known to be most republican in their feelings; and these troops were brought within the circle of twelve leagues round the legislative body, which the constitution forbade the armed force to cross. Barras wrote to Hoche, who was in Holland superintending the preparations for the invasion of Ireland, informing him of the dangers of the Government; and he readily undertook to support them with all his authority. The ministers were changed: Bénézech, minister of the interior; Cochon, minister of police; Petiet, minister of war; Lacroix, minister of foreign affairs; and Truguet, of marine; who were all suspected of inclining to the party of the Councils, were suddenly dismissed. In their place were substituted François de Neufchâteau, in the ministry of the interior; Hoche, in that of war; Lenoir Laroche, in that of the police; and Talleyrand, in that of foreign affairs. The strong sagacity of this last politician, led him to incline, in all the changes of the Revolution, to what was about to prove the victorious side; and his accepting office under the Directory at this crisis, was strongly symptomatic of the chances which were accumulated in their favour (1). Carnot, from this moment, became convinced that his ruin had been determined on by his colleagues. Barras and Laréveillière had long borne him a secret grudge, which sprung from his having signed the warrant, during the Reign of Terror, for the arrest of Danton, who was the leader of their party.

Measures of Napoléon. He resolves to support the Republicans, and for that purpose sends Lavalette to Paris.

Barras and Hoche kept up an active correspondence with Napoléon, whose co-operation was of so much importance to secure the success of their enterprise. He was strongly urged by the Directory to come to Paris and support the Government; while, on the other hand, his intimate friends advised him to proceed there, and proclaim himself Dictator, as he afterwards did on his return from Egypt. That he hesitated whether he should not, even at that period, follow the footsteps of Cæsar, is avowed by himself; but he judged, probably wisely, that the period was not yet arrived for putting such a design in execution, and that the miseries of a republic had not yet been sufficiently experienced to ensure the success of an enterprise destined for its overthrow. He was resolved, however, to support the Directory, both because he was aware that the opposite party had determined upon his dismissal, from an apprehension of the dangers which he might occasion to public freedom, and because their principles, being those of moderation and peace, were little likely to favour his ambitious projects. Early, therefore, in spring 1797, he sent his aide-de-camp, Lavalette, who afterwards acquired a painful celebrity in the history of the restoration, to Paris, to observe the motions of the parties, and communicate to him the earliest intelligence; and afterwards dispatched Augereau, a general of decided character, and known revolutionary principles, to that city to support the Government. He declined coming to the

March, 1797.

25th July, 1797.

(1) Carnot, 89, et seq. Lac. xiv, 61, 67. Th. ix, 309, 210. Mign. i. 424.

capital himself, being unwilling to sully his hands, and risk his reputation, by a second victory over its inhabitants; but he had made his arrangements so, that, in the event of the Directory being defeated, he should, five days after receiving intelligence of the disaster, make his entry into Lyon at the head of twenty thousand men, and, rallying the Republicans every where to his standard, advance to Paris, passing thus, like another Cæsar, the Rubicon at the head of the popular party (1).

To awaken the republican ardour of his soldiers, Napoléon celebrated the anniversary of the taking of the Bastille on July 14th, by a *fête*, on which occasion he addressed the following order of the day to his troops:—"Soldiers! This is the anniversary of the 14th July. You see before you the names of your companions in arms, who have died on the field of battle for the liberty of their country; they have given you an example; you owe yourselves to your country; you are devoted to the prosperity of thirty millions of Frenchmen, to the glory of that name which has received such additional lustre from your victories. I know that you are profoundly affected at the misfortunes which threaten your country; but it is not in any real danger. The same men who have caused it to triumph over Europe in arms, are ready. Mountains separate us from France. You will cross them with the rapidity of the eagle, if it be necessary, to maintain the constitution, to defend liberty, to protect the government of the Republicans. Soldiers! the Government watches over the sacred deposit of the laws which it has received. From the instant that the Royalists show themselves, they have ceased to exist (2). Have no fears of the result; and swear by the manes of the heroes who have died amongst us in defence of freedom, swear on our standards, eternal war to the enemies of the Republic and of the constitution."

His Proclamation to his soldiers on 14th July.

This proclamation proved extremely serviceable to the Directory. The flame spread from rank to rank; addresses, breathing the most vehement republican spirit, were voted by all the regiments and squadrons of the army, and transmitted to the Directory and the Councils with the signatures attached to them. Many of these productions breathed the whole rancour of the Jacobin spirit. That of the 29th demi-brigade commenced with these words:—"Of all the animals produced by the caprice of nature, the vilest is a king, the most cowardly is a courtier, the worst is a priest. If the scoundrels who disturb France are not crushed by the forces you possess, call to your aid the 29th demi-brigade, it will soon discomfit all your enemies; Chouans, English, all will take to flight. We will pursue our unworthy citizens even into the chambers of their worthy patron George III, and the Club of Clichy will undergo the fate of that of Reney." Augereau brought with him the address of the soldiers of the Italian army. "Tremble, Royalists!" said they; "from the Adige to the Seine is but a step—tremble! Your iniquities are numbered, and their reward is at the point of our bayonets." "It is with indignation," said the staff of the Italian army, "that we have seen the intrigues of royalty menace the fabric of liberty. We have sworn, by the manes of the heroes who died for their country, an implacable war to royalty and royalists. These are our sentiments, these are yours; these are those of the country. Let the Royalists show themselves; they have ceased to live." Other ad-

The army strongly supports the Directory.

Extravagant addresses from the soldiers.

(1) Nap. iv. 226, 227. Bour. i. 223, 232. Las Cas. iv. 157. Lav. i. 272.

(2) Nap. iv. 525.

dresses, in a similar strain, flowed in from the armies of the Rhine and the Moselle; it was soon evident that the people had chosen for themselves their masters, and that under the name of freedom, a military despotism was about to be established. The Directory encouraged and published all these addresses, which produced a powerful impression on the public mind. The Councils loudly exclaimed against these menacing deliberations by armed men; but government, as their only reply, drew still nearer to Paris the twelve thousand men who had been brought from Hoche's army, and placed them at Versailles, Meudon, and Vincennes (1).

Strength of
the opposite
party con-
sisted only
in talent and
eloquence.

The party against whom these formidable preparations were directed, was strong in numbers and powerful in eloquence, but totally destitute of that reckless hardihood and fearless vigour, which in civil convulsions is usually found to command success.

Tronçon-Ducoudray, in the Council of the Ancients, drew, in strong and sombre colours, a picture of the consequences which would ensue to the Directory themselves, their friends, and the people of France, from this blind stifling of the public voice by the threats of the armies. In prophetic strains he announced the commencement of a reign of blood, which would be closed by the despotism of the sword. This discourse, pronounced in an intrepid accent, recalled to mind those periods of feudal tyranny, when the victims of oppression appealed from the kings or pontiffs, who were about to stifle their voice, to the justice of God, and summoned their accusers to answer at

Their defen-
sive mea-
sures: but
decline to
commence
hostilities.

that dread tribunal for their earthly injustice. At the Club of Clichy, Jordan, Vaublanc, and Willot, strongly urged the necessity of adopting decisive measures. They proposed to decree the arrest of

Barras, Rewbell, and Laréveillière; to summon Carnot and Barthélemy to the legislative body; and if they refused to obey, sound the tocsin, march at the head of the old sectionaries against the Directory, and appoint Pichegru the commander of that legal insurrection. That great general supported this energetic course by his weight and authority; but the majority, overborne, as the friends of order and freedom often are in revolutionary convulsions, by their scruples of conscience, decided against taking the lead in acts of violence, and resolved only to decree the immediate organization of the national guard under the command of Pichegru. "Let us leave to the Directory," said they, "all the odium of beginning violence." Sage advice, if they had been combating an enemy capable of being swayed by considerations of justice, but fatal in presence of enterprising ambition, supported by the weight of military power (2).

Slender mi-
litary force
at their com-
mand.

The actual force at the command of the Councils was extremely small. Their body guard consisted only of fifteen hundred grenadiers, who could not be relied on, as the event soon proved, in a contest with their brethren in arms; the national guard were disbanded, and without a rallying point; the Royalists, scattered, and destitute of organization. They had placed the guard under the orders of their own officers; and on the 17th Fructidor, when both Councils had decreed the organization of the national guard under Pichegru, this was to have been followed on the next day, by a decree, directing the removal of the troops from the neighbourhood of Paris. But a sense of their weakness, in such a strife, filled every breast with gloomy pre-

17th Fructi-
dor, Sept. 3.
Re-organiza-
tion of the
National
Guard de-
creed by the
Councils.

(1) Mign. ii. 427. Nap. iv. 225. Lac. xiv. 83, 85.

(2) Mig. ii, 427. Lac. xiv. 85, 86.

sentiments. Pichegru alone retained his wonted firmness and serenity of mind (1).

Violent measures of the Directory. The Directory, on the other hand, had recourse to immediate violence. They appointed Augereau, remarkable for his democratic principles, decision of character, and rudeness of manners, to the command of the 17th military division, comprehending the environs of Paris, and that city. In the night of the 17th Fructidor (September 5), they moved all the troops in the neighbourhood into the capital, and the inhabitants at midnight beheld, with breathless anxiety, twelve thousand armed men defile in silence over the bridges, with forty pieces of cannon, and occupy all the avenues to the Tuileries (2). Not a sound was to be heard but the marching of the men, and the rolling of the artillery, till the Tuileries were surrounded, when a signal gun was discharged, which made every heart that heard it beat with agitation. Instantly the troops approached the gates, and commanded them to be thrown open. Murmurs arose among the guards of the Councils: "We are not Swiss," exclaimed some; "We were wounded by the Royalists on the 13th Vendémiaire," rejoined others. Ramel, their faithful commander, who had received intelligence of the *coup d'état* which was approaching, had eight hundred men stationed at all the entrances of the palace, and the remainder in order of battle in the court; the railings were closed, and every preparation made for resistance. But no sooner did the staff of Augereau appear at the gates, than the soldiers of Ramel exclaimed, "Vive Augereau! Vive le Directoire!" and seizing their commander, delivered him over to the assailants. Augereau now traversed the garden of the Tuileries, surrounded the hall of the Councils, arrested Pichegru, Willot, and twelve other leaders of the Legislative Assemblies, and conducted them to the Temple.

They surround the Tuileries with troops.

And the troops then join Augereau.

Revolution of the 18th Fructidor.

The members of the Councils, who hurried in confusion to the spot, were seized and imprisoned by the soldiers. Those who were previously aware of the plot, met by appointment in the Odéon and the school of Medicine, near the Luxembourg, where they gave themselves out, though a small minority, for the Legislative Assemblies of France. Barthélemy was at the same time arrested by a body of troops dispatched by Augereau, and Carnot narrowly avoided the same fate by making his escape, almost without clothing, by a back door. By six o'clock in the morning all was concluded. Several hundred of the most powerful of the party of the Councils were in prison; and the people, wakening from their sleep, found the streets filled with troops, the walls covered with proclamations, and military despotism established (3).

The first object of the Directory was, to produce an impression on the public mind unfavourable to the majority of the Councils whom they had overturned. For this purpose, they covered the streets of Paris early in the morning with proclamations, in which they announced the discovery and defeat of a Royalist plot, the treason of Pichegru, and many members of the Councils, and that the Luxembourg had been attacked by them during the night. At the same time, they published a letter of General Moreau, in which the correspondence of Pichegru with the emigrant princes was detailed, and a letter from the Prince of Condé to Imbert, one of the Ancients. The streets were filled with crowds, who read in silence the proclamations.

Passive submission of the people.

Mere spectators of a strife in which they had taken no part, they testified neither joy nor sorrow at the event. A few detached

(1) Lac. xiv. 88, 91. Mig. ii. 427.

(2) Mad. de Staël, *Rév. Franç.* ii. 184, 185.

(3) Migu. ii. 428, 429. Lac. xiv. 90, 93. Th. ix. 290, 293. Bour. i. 230, 245.

groups, issuing from the faubourgs, traversed the streets, exclaiming (1), "Vive la République! A bas les Aristocrates!" But the people, in general, were as passive as in a despotic state.

The minority of the Councils, who were in the interest of the Directory, continued their meetings in the Odéon and the School of Medicine; but their inconsiderable numbers demonstrated so clearly the violence done to the constitution, that they did not venture on any resolution at their first sitting, but one authorizing the continuance of the troops in Paris. On the following day, the Directory sent them a message in these terms:—"The 18th Fruc-

Address of
the Direc-
tory to the
Councils.

tidor should have saved the Republic and its real representatives. Have you not observed yesterday the tranquillity of the people, and their joy? This is the 19th, and the people ask, Where is the Republic; and what has the legislative body done to consolidate it? The eyes of the country are fixed upon you; the decisive moment has come. If you hesitate in the measures you are to adopt, if you delay a minute in declaring yourselves, it is all over both with yourselves and the Republic. The conspirators have watched while you were slumbering; your silence restored their audacity; they misled public opinion by infamous libels, while the journalists of the Bourbons and London never ceased to distribute their poisons. The conspirators already speak of punishing the Republicans for the triumph which they have commenced; and can you hesitate to purge the soil of France of that small body of Royalists, who are only waiting for the moment to tear in pieces the Republic, and to devour yourselves. You are on the edge of a volcano; it is about to swallow you up; you have it in your power to close it, and yet you deliberate! To-morrow it will be too late: the slightest indecision would now ruin the Republic. You will be told of principles, of delays, of the pity due to individuals; but how false would be the principles, how ruinous the delays, how misplaced the pity which should mislead the legislative body from its duty to the Republic! The Directory have devoted themselves to put in your hands the means of saving France; but it was entitled to expect that you would not hesitate to seize them. They believed that you were sincerely attached to freedom and the Republic, and that you would not be afraid of the consequences of that first step. If the friends of kings find in you their protectors,—if slaves excite your sympathy—if you delay an instant—it is all over with the liberty of France; the constitution is overturned, and you may at once proclaim to the friends of their country that the hour of royalty has struck. But if, as they believe, you recoil with horror from that idea, seize the passing moment, become the liberators of your country, and secure for ever its prosperity and glory." This pressing message sufficiently demonstrates the need which the Directory had of some legislative authority to sanction their dictatorial proceedings. The remnant of the Councils yielded to necessity; a council of five was appointed, with instructions to prepare a law of *public safety*; and that proved a decree of ostracism, which condemned to transportation almost all the noblest citizens of France (2).

Tyrannical
measures of
the minority
of the Coun-
cils.

Following the recommendation of that committee, the Councils, by a stretch of power, annulled the elections of forty-eight departments, which formed a majority of the legislative bodies, and condemned to transportation to Guiana, Carnot, Barthélemy, Pichegru, Camille-

(1) Th. ix. 295. Mign. ii. 429, 430. Lac. xiv. 94, 95.

(2) Th. ix. 298. Lac. xiv. 94, 99. Mign. ii. 430.

Jordan, Tronçon-Ducoudray, Henry Larivière, Imbert, Boissy-d'Anglas, Willot, Cochon, Ramel, Miranda, and fifty other members of the legislative body. Merlin and François de Neufchâteau, were named Directors, in lieu of those who were exiled. The Directory carried on the government thereafter by the mere force of military power, without even the shadow of legal authority; the places of the expelled deputies were not filled up, but the assemblies left in their mutilated state, without either consideration or independence. Three men, without the aid of historical recollections, without the lustre of victory, took upon themselves to govern France on their own account, without either the support of the law, or the concurrence of legal assemblies (1).

Their public acts soon became as violent as the origin of their power had been illegal. The revolutionary laws against the priests and the emigrants were revived, and ere long the whole of those persons who had ruled in the departments since the fall of Robespierre, were either banished or dispossessed of their authority. The Revolution of the 18th Fructidor, was not, like the victory of the 13th Vendémiaire, confined to the capital; it extended to the whole departments, revived every where the Jacobin ascendancy, and subjected the people over all France to the rule of the army, and the revolutionary leaders (2).

Extinction of the liberty of the press. The next step of the dictators was to extinguish the liberty of the press. For this purpose a second proscription was published, which included the authors, editors, printers, and contributors to forty-two journals. As eight or ten persons were included in the devoted number for each journal, this act of despotism embraced nearly four hundred individuals, among whom were to be found all the literary genius of France. La Harpe, Fontanes, and Sicard, though spared by the assassins of the 2d September, were struck by this despotic act, as were Michaud and Lacretelle, the latter of whom composed, during a captivity of two years, his admirable history of the religious wars in France. At the same time, the press was subjected to the censorship of the police; while the punishment of exiled priests found in the territory of France, was extended to transportation to Guiana; a penalty worse than death itself (3).

Transportation of the most illustrious citizens of France. From the multitude of their captives, the Directory at first selected fifteen, upon whom the full rigour of transportation should be inflicted. These were Barthélemy, Pichegru and Willot, Rovère, Aubry, Bourdon de l'Oise, Murinais, De Larue, Ramel, Dossonville, Tronçon-Ducoudray, Barbé-Marbois, Lafond-Ladebat (though the three last were sincere Republicans), Brottier, and Laville-Heurnois; their number was augmented to sixteen by the devotion of Letellier, servant of Barthélemy, who insisted upon following his master. Carnot was only saved from the same fate, by having escaped to Geneva. "In the Directory," says he, "I had contributed to save the Republic from many dangers; the proscription of the 18th Fructidor was my reward. I knew well that republics were ungrateful; but I did not know, till I learned it from my own experience, that republicans were so much so as they proved to me (4)."

Cruel fate of the exiles. The transported victims were conveyed, amidst the execrations of the Jacobin mob, to Rochefort, from whence they were sent to Guiana. Before enbarking, they received a touching proof of sympathy in the gift of 80,000 francs, by the widow of an illustrious scientific character,

(1) Nap. iv. 235.

(2) Mign. ii. 432. Th. ix. 230, 299, Lac. xiv.

(3) Lac. xiv. 103. Mign. ii. 432.

(4) Carnot's Memoirs, 212. Lav. 14, 70.

who had been one of the earliest victims of the Revolution. On the road they were lodged in the jails as common felons. During the voyage they underwent every species of horror; cooped up in the hold of a small vessel, under a tropical sun, they experienced all the sufferings of a slave-ship. No sooner were they landed, than they were almost all seized with the fevers of the climate, and owed their lives to the heroic devotion of the Sisters of Charity, who, on that pestilential shore, exercised the never-failing beneficence of their religion. Murinais, one of the Council of the Ancients, died shortly after arriving at the place of their settlement at Sinimari. Tronçon-Ducoudray pronounced a funeral oration over his remains, which his fellow-exiles interred with their own hands, from the words, "By the waters of Babylon we sat down and wept." Soon after, the eloquent panegyrist himself expired. He calmly breathed his last, rejoicing on that distant shore that he had been faithful in his duty to the royal family. "It is nothing new to me," said he, "to see suffering, and learn how it can be borne. I have seen the Queen at the Conciergerie." The hardships of the life to which they were there subjected, the diseases of that pestilential climate, and heats of a tropical sun speedily proved fatal to the greater number of the unhappy exiles. Pichegru survived the dangers, and was placed in a hut adjoining that of Billaud-Varennes and Collot-d'Herbois, whom, after the fall of Robespierre, he had arrested by orders of the Convention; a singular instance of the instability of fortune amidst revolutionary changes (1).

Pichegru, Willot, Barthélemy, Aubry, Ramel, and Dossonville, with the faithful Letellier, their voluntary companion in exile, contrived, some months after, to make their escape; and after undergoing extreme hardships, and traversing almost impervious forests, succeeded in reaching the beach, from whence they were conveyed to Surinam in an open canoe. Aubry and Letellier perished, but the remainder reached England in safety. The Abbé Brottier, Bourdon de l'Oise, and Rovère, both illustrious from their services on the 9th Thermidor, sunk under their sufferings at Sinamari. The wife of the latter, a young and beautiful woman, who had signalized herself, like Madame Tallien, by her generous efforts at the fall of Robespierre in behalf of humanity, solicited and obtained from the Directory, permission to join her husband in exile; but before she landed on that pestilential region, he had breathed his last. Several hundreds of the clergy, victims of their fidelity to the faith of their fathers, arrived in these regions of death, but they almost all perished within a few months after their landing, exhibiting the constancy of martyrs on that distant shore; while the hymns of the new worship were sung in France by crowds of abandoned women, and the satellites of Jacobin ferocity. The strong minds and robust frames of Barbé-Marbois, and Lafond-Ladebat, alone survived the sufferings of two years; and these, with eight of the transported priests, were all who were recalled to France by the humane interposition of Napoléon when he assumed the reins of power (2).

Meanwhile the Directory pursued with vigour despotic measures in France. A large proportion of the judges in the supreme courts were dismissed; the institution of juries abolished; and a new and more rigorous law provided for the banishment of the nobles and priests. It was proposed that those who disobeyed or evaded its enactment, should become liable to transportation to Guiana; the wives and daughters of the no-

Escape of
Pichegru
from Gui-
ana.

Vigorous
and despotic
measures of
the Direc-
tory.

(1) Lac, xiv. 104, 105, 118, 121. Th. ix. 306.

(2) Lac, xiv. 121, 126. Th. ix. 306.

bles who were married were not exempted from this enactment, unless they divorced their husbands, and married citizens of plebeian birth. But a more lenient law, which only subjected them to additional penalties if they remained, was adopted by the Councils. Two hundred thousand persons at once fell under the lash of these severe enactments; their effect upon France was to the last degree disastrous. The miserable emigrants fled a second time in crowds from the country, of which they were beginning to taste the sweets; and society, which was reviving from the horrors of the Jacobin sway, was again prostrated under its fury. They carried with them to foreign lands that strong and inextinguishable hatred at republican cruelty which their own wrongs had excited, and mingling in society every where, both on the continent and in the British isles, counteracted in the most powerful manner the enthusiasm in favour of democratic principles, and contributed not a little to the formation of that powerful league which ultimately led to their overthrow. Finally, the Councils openly avowed a national bankruptcy; they cut off for ever two-thirds of the national debt of France; closing thus a sanguinary revolution by the extinction of freedom, the banishment of virtue, and the violation of public faith (1).

This revolution was previously concerted with Napoléon.

The Revolution of the 18th Fructidor had been concerted between Napoléon and Barras long before it took place; the former was the real author of this catastrophe, and this is admitted even by his warmest admirers (2). Augereau informed him, a month before, that he had opened to the Directory the designs of the revolutionary party; that he had been named Governor of Paris; and that the dismissal of all the civil and military authorities was fixed. Lavalette made him acquainted daily with the progress of the intrigue in the capital. The former was sent by him to carry it into execution (3). He was accordingly transported with joy when

(1) D'Abr. iii. 324. De Staël, ii. 187. Lac. xiv. 105, 107. Bard. iv. 523, 524. Th. ix. 321.

(2) D'Abr. ii. 148.

(3) See the letters in Bour. i. 234, 263.

On the 24th June, 1797, the majority of the Directory wrote to Napoléon, unknown to Barthélemy and Carnot:—"We have received, citizen-general, with extreme satisfaction, the marked proofs of devotion to the cause of freedom which you have recently given. You may rely on the most entire reciprocity on our parts. We accept with pleasure the offers you have made to fly to the support of the Republic." On the 22d July, Lavalette wrote to Napoléon, "This morning I have seen Barras. He appeared strongly excited at what has passed. He made no attempt to conceal the division in the Directory. 'We shall hold firm,' said he to me; 'and if we are denounced by the Councils, then we shall mount on horseback.' He frequently repeated that, in their present crisis, money would be of incalculable importance. I made to him your proposition, which he accepted with transport." Barras, on his part, on the 23d July, wrote to Napoléon,—"No delay. Consider well, that it is by the aid of money alone that I can accomplish your generous intentions." Lavalette wrote on the same day to Napoléon, "Your proposition has been brought on the tapis between Barras, Rewbell, and La Réveillière. All are agreed that without money we cannot surmount the crisis. They confidently hope that you will send large sums." On the 28th July, Lavalette again wrote to him, "The minority of the Directory still cling to hopes of an accommodation; the majority will perish rather than make any further concessions. It sees clearly the abyss which is opening beneath its feet. Such, however, is the

fatal destiny of Carnot, or the weakness of his character, that he has now become one of the pillars of the monarchical party, as he was of the Jacobins. He wishes to temporize." On the 3d August, "Every thing here remains in the same state: Great preparations for an attack by the Council of Five Hundred; corresponding measures of defence by the Directory. Barras says openly, 'I am only waiting for the decree of accusation to mount on horseback, and speedily their heads will roll in the gutter.'" On the 16th August, Lavalette wrote to Napoleon these remarkable words: "At last I have torn away the veil this morning from the Directory. Only attend to what Barras told me yesterday evening. The subject was the negotiations in Italy. Carnot pretended that Napoléon was in too advantageous a situation, when he signed the preliminaries, to be obliged to agree to conditions by which he could not abide in the end. Barras defended Bonaparte, and said to Carnot: 'You are nothing but a vile miscreant; you have sold the Republic, and you wish to murder those who defend it, infamous scoundrel!' Carnot answered, with an embarrassed air—'I despise your insinuations, but one day I shall answer them.'"

Augereau wrote on the 12th August to Napoléon:—"Things remain much in the same state; the Clichians have resumed their vacillating and uncertain policy; they do not count so much as heretofore on Carnot, and openly complain of the weakness of Pichegru. The agitation of these gentlemen is extreme; for my part, I observe them, and keep incessantly stimulating the Directory, for the decisive moment has evidently arrived, and they see that as well as I do. Nothing is more certain, than that, if the public mind is not esseu-

he received intelligence of the success of the enterprise. But these feelings were speedily changed into discontent at the accounts of the use which the government made of their victory. He easily perceived that the excessive severity which they employed, and the indulgence of private spleen which appeared in the choice of their victims, would alienate public opinion, and run an imminent risk of bringing back the odious Jacobin rule. He has expressed in his Memoirs the strongest opinion on this subject. "It might have been

But he is
disgusted
with the
severe use
they make
of their
victory.

right," says he, "to deprive Carnot, Barthélemy, and the fifty deputies, of their appointment, and put them under surveillance in some cities in the interior; Pichegru, Willot, Imbert, Colonne, and one or two others, might justly have expiated their treason on the scaffold; but to see men of great talent, such as Portalis, Tronçon-Ducoudray, Fontanes; tried patriots, such as Boissy-d'Anglas, Dumolard, Murinais; supreme magistrates, such as Carnot and Barthélemy, condemned, without either trial or accusation, to perish in the marshes of Sinamari, was frightful. What! to punish with transportation a number of writers of pamphlets, who deserved only contempt and a trifling correction, was to renew the proscriptions of the Roman triumvirs; it was to act more cruelly than Fouquier-Tinville, since he at least put the accused on their trial, and condemned them only to death. All the armies, all the people, were for a Republic; state necessity could not be alleged in favour of so revolting an injustice, so flagrant a violation of the laws and the rights of the citizens (4)."

Independently of the instability of any government which succeeds to so stormy a period as that of the Revolution, the constitution of France under the Directory contained an inherent defect, which must sooner or later have occasioned its fall. This was ably pointed out from its very commencement by Necker (2), and consisted in the complete separation of the executive from the legislative power. In constitutional monarchies, when a difference of opinion on any vital subject arises between the executive and the legislature, the obvious mode of arranging it is by a dissolution of the latter, and a new appeal to the people; and whichever party the electors incline to, becomes victorious in the strife. But the French Councils, being altogether independent of the Directory, and undergoing a change every two years of a third of their members, became shortly at variance with the executive; and the latter, being composed of ambitious men, unwilling to resign the power they had acquired, had no alternative but to invoke military violence for its support. This is a matter of vital importance, and lying at the very foundation of a mixed government: unless the executive possess the power of dissolving, by legal means, the legislature, the time must inevitably come, when it will disperse them by force. This is in an especial manner, to be looked for when a nation is emerging from revolutionary convulsions; as so many in-

tially changed before the approaching elections, every thing is lost, and a civil war remains as our last resource." On the 31st August, Lavalette informed him, "At length the movement, so long expected, is about to take place. To-morrow night the Directory will arrest fifteen or twenty deputies; I presume there will be no resistance." And on the 3d September, Augereau wrote to him,—"At last, general, *my mission is accomplished!* the promises of the army of Italy have been kept last night. The Directory was at length induced to act with vigour. At midnight I put all the troops in motion; before daybreak all the bridges and principal points in the city were occupied, the legislature surrounded, and the members, whose names are enclosed, arrested

and sent to the Temple. Carnot has disappeared. Paris regards the crisis only as a *fête*; the robust patriotic workmen of the faubourgs loudly proclaim the salvation of the Republic." Finally, on the 23d September, 1797, Napoléon wrote in the following terms to Augereau: "The whole army applauds the wisdom and energy which you have displayed in this crisis, and has rejoiced sincerely at the success of the patriots. It is only to be hoped now that moderation and wisdom will guide your steps; that is the most ardent wish of my heart."—BOURRIENNE, i. 235, 250, 266, and HARDY, iv. 503, 518.

(1) Nap. iv. 233, 234. Bour. i. 235.

(2) Necker, *Histoire de la Révolution*, iv. 232. Mad. de Staël, ii. 170, 173.

dividuals are there implicated by their crimes in supporting the revolutionary *régime*, and a return to moderate or legal measures is so much dreaded, from the retribution which they may occasion to past delinquents.

Though France suffered extremely from the usurpation which overthrew its electoral government, and substituted the empire of force for the chimeras of democracy, there seems no reason to believe that a more just or equitable government could at that period have been substituted in its room. The party of the Councils, though formidable from its union and its abilities, was composed of such heterogeneous materials, that it could not by possibility have held together if the external danger of the Directory had been removed. Pichegru, Imbert, Brottier, and others, were in constant correspondence with the exiled princes, and aimed at the restoration of a constitutional throne (1). Carnot, Rovère, Bourdon de l'Oise, and the majority of the Club of Clichy, were sincerely attached to Republican institutions. Dissension was inevitable between parties of such opposite principles, when they had once prevailed over their immediate enemies. The nation was not then in the state to settle down under a constitutional monarchy; it required to be drained of its fiery spirits by bloody wars, and humbled in its pride by national disaster, before it could submit to the coercion of passion, and follow the regular occupations essential to the duration of real freedom.

This is the true commencement of military despotism in France.

The 18th Fructidor is the true era of the commencement of military despotism in France, and as such, it is singularly instructive as to the natural tendency and just punishment of revolutionary passions. The subsequent government of the country was but a succession of illegal usurpations on the part of the depositaries of power, in which the people had no share, and by which their rights were equally invaded, until tranquillity was restored by the vigorous hand of Napoléon (2). The French have not the excuse, in the loss even of the name of freedom to their country, that they yielded to the ascendancy of an extraordinary man, and bent beneath the car which banded Europe was unable to arrest. They were subjected to tyranny in its worst and most degrading form; they yielded, not to the genius of Napoléon, but to the violence of Augereau; they submitted in silence to proscriptions as odious and arbitrary as those of the Roman triumvirate; they bowed for years to the despotism of men so ignoble that history has hardly preserved their names. Such is the consequence, and the never-failing consequence, of the undue ascendancy of democratic power.

The French people did not fall under this penalty from any peculiar fickleness or inconstancy of their own; they incurred it in consequence of the general law of Providence, that guilty passion brings upon itself its own punishment. They fell under the edge of the sword, from the same cause which subjected Rome to the arms of Cæsar, and England to those of Cromwell. "Legal government," says the Republican historian, "is a chimaera, at the conclusion of a revolution such as that of France. It is not under shelter of legal authority, that parties whose passions have been so violently excited, can arrange themselves and repose; a more vigorous power is required to restrain them, to fuse their still burning elements, and protect them against foreign violence. That power is the empire of the sword (3)."

A long and terrible retribution awaited the sins of this great and guilty

(1) See Jour. i. Append.

(2) *Mad. de Staël*, ii. 221, *Nap.* iv. 235.

(3) *Tb.* ix. 308.

country. Its own passions were made the ministers of the justice of Heaven; its own desires the means of bringing upon itself a righteous punishment. Contemporaneous with the military despotism established by the victory of Augereau, sprang up the foreign conquests of Napoléon :—His triumphant car rolled over the world, crushing generations beneath its wheels; ploughing, like the chariot of Juggernaut, through human flesh; exhausting, in the pursuit of glory, the energies of Republican ambition. France was decimated for its cruelty; the snows of Russia, and the hospitals of Germany, became the winding-sheet and the grave of its blood-stained Revolution. Infidelity may discern in this terrific progress the march of fatalism and the inevitable course of human affairs: let us discover in it the government of an overruling Providence, punishing the sins of a guilty age, extending to nations with severe, but merciful hand, the consequences of their transgression, and preparing in the chastisement of present iniquity, the future amelioration of the species.

CHAPTER XXV.

EXPEDITION TO EGYPT.

ARGUMENT.

Great Political and Commercial importance of Egypt—Its advantages of Situation—and Importance early perceived by Leibnitz—Alexander the Great and Napoléon equally appreciated its value—His ideas are matured at Passeriano—Napoléon's Parting Address to the Italians—His triumphant Journey across Switzerland to Rastadt and Paris—Political Objects of this Journey—Its ominous character for Switzerland—His retired manner of Life at Paris—His Public Reception by the Directory—Talleyrand's Speech—Napoléon's Answer—Successive *Fêtes* given by other Public Bodies—His Private Views in regard to his Future Life—Secret Views of the Directory—Their desire to get quit of Napoléon—Preparations for a Descent on England—Pompous Speech of Barras on giving him the command of the Army destined for its Invasion—Real Views of both Parties—Napoléon's growing Horror at the Revolutionary System—His Journey to the coasts of the Channel—Reasons which determined him against the English Expedition—Defensive Preparations of the British Government—Meanwhile Napoléon persuades the Directory to undertake the Egyptian Enterprise—His Prodigious activity in preparing for that Expedition—The Treasure taken at Berne is sent to Toulon by his orders—Magnificent Preparations for the Expedition—Napoléon is driven to it by necessity—He takes the Command—His first Proclamation to his Soldiers—His last Act in Europe is one of Humanity—At length the Expedition sails—Arrives off Malta, which Capitulates without firing a shot—Its prodigious strength—Napoléon's Conversation during the remainder of the Voyage—Movements of Nelson, who misses the French Fleet—Egypt is Discovered—Napoléon lands, and advances against Alexandria, which is taken—His first Proclamation to his Troops—Description of Egypt—Astonishing Effects of the Inundation of the Nile—Productions of the Country—Its Foreign Commerce—Decay of its Population since Ancient Times—Importance of Alexandria—Account of the Inhabitants of the Country—Mamelukes—Janizaries, or Turks—Arabs, Copts—Ibrahim Bey and Mourad Bey divided the Country between them—Policy of Napoléon on invading Egypt—His Proclamation to the Egyptians—His Arrangements for advancing to Cairo—March of the Advanced-Guard across the Desert—Their Sufferings—Arrive on the Nile—Actions with the Mamelukes—Combat at Chebriss—The army advances towards Cairo—They arrive within sight of the Mameluke forces—Battle of the Pyramids—Lateral Movement of Napoléon—Furious charge of Mourad Bey—He is totally defeated—Ibrahim Bey retires to Syria—Mourad Bey to Upper Egypt—Napoléon enters Cairo—His Pacific Measures—and able and impartial Civil Government—He affects the Mussulman Faith—Growing discontents of the Army—Calumnious Expedition to Salahieh, on the Syrian Frontier—Ibrahim Bey retires across the Desert into Syria—Intrigues of Napoléon with Ali Pacha—Treachery of France towards Turkey—Its Manifesto of War—Naval Operations—Movements of Nelson—He arrives at Alexandria—Brueys' Position—Nelson's Plan of Attack—Relative Forces on the two sides—Battle of the Nile—Dreadful nature of the Action—The L'Orient blows up—Glorious Victory in which it terminates—Wound of Nelson—Heroic Deeds on board the French Squadron—Great Results of this Victory—Terrible traces of the Action on shore—Honours bestowed on Nelson—Napoléon's Correspondence with Brueys, as to getting the Fleet into Alexandria—Disastrous consequences of this blow to the French Army—Courage of Napoléon and Kleber—Despair of the inferior Officers and Soldiers—It at once brings on a War between France and Turkey—Passage of the Hellespont by the Russian Fleet—Critical situation of the French Army—Vast Efforts of Napoléon—Expedition of Desaix to Upper Egypt—Bloody Suppression of a Revolt at Cairo—Expedition of Napoléon to the Shores of the Red Sea—He resolves to penetrate into Syria—His vast Designs—Limited extent of his Forces—Passage of the Syrian Desert—Storming of Jaffa—Four Thousand of the Garrison capitulate—Massacre of these Prisoners—Unpardonable Atrocity of this Act—The French advance to Acre—Description of that Fortress—Sir Sidney Smith's preparations for its Defence—Commencement of the Siege—Desperate Conflicts on the Breach—The Ottomans collect Forces for its Relief—The French advance to meet them—Battle of Mount Thabor—Renewal of the Siege of Acre—Desperate Assaults on the Town—Napoléon at length Retreats—Vast Designs which this Defeat frustrated—Disastrous Retreat of the Troops to Egypt—Poisoning of the Sick at Jaffa

—Reflections on that Act—Army regains Egypt—Contests in Egypt during Napoléon's absence—The Angel El Mody—Conquest of Upper Egypt by Desaix—Great Discontents of the Army—Landing of the Turks in Aboukir Bay—Force of the Invaders—Position which the Turks occupied—Napoléon's Dispositions for an Attack—First Line carried—Second Line also forced, after a desperate struggle—Total destruction of the Turks—Napoléon is made acquainted with the Disasters of the Republic in Europe—He secretly sets sail for Europe from Alexandria—And stretches along the Coast of Africa to Sardinia—He lands at Ajaccio in Corsica—Sets sail, and avoids the English Fleet—Proof which the Egyptian Expedition affords of the Superiority of the Arms of Civilisation to those of Savage Life—General Reflections on the probable fate of an Eastern Empire under Napoléon.

“By seizing the isthmus of Darien,” said Sir Walter Raleigh, “you will wrest the keys of the world from Spain.” The observation, worthy of his reach of thought, is still more applicable to the isthmus of Suez and the country of Egypt. It is remarkable that its importance has never been duly appreciated, but by the greatest conquerors of ancient and modern times, Alexander the Great and Napoléon Bonaparte.

Great political and commercial importance of Egypt. The geographical position of this celebrated country has destined it to be the great emporium of the commerce of the world. Placed in the centre between Europe and Asia, on the confines of Eastern wealth and Western civilisation; at the extremity of the African continent, and on the shores of the Mediterranean sea, it is fitted to become the central point of communication for the varied productions of these different regions of the globe. The waters of the Mediterranean bring to it all the fabrics of Europe; the Red Sea wafts to its shores the riches of India and China; while the Nile floats down to its bosom the produce of the vast and unknown regions of Africa. Though it were not one of the most fertile countries in the world,—though the inundations of the Nile did not annually cover its fields with riches, it would still be, from its situation, one of the most favoured spots on the earth. The greatest and most durable monuments of human industry accordingly, the earliest efforts of civilisation, the sublimest works of genius have been raised in this primeval seat of mankind. The temples of Rome have decayed, the arts of Athens have perished; but the Pyramids “still stand erect and unshaken above the floods of the Nile (1).” When, in the revolution of ages, civilisation shall have returned to its ancient cradle, Its importance and situation. —when the desolation of Mahometan rule shall have ceased, and the light of religion illumined the land of its birth, Egypt will again become one of the great centres of human industry; the invention of steam will restore the communication with the East to its original channel; and the nation which shall revive the canal of Suez, and open a direct communication between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, will pour into its bosom those streams of wealth, which in every age have constituted the principal sources of European opulence.

Its importance early perceived by Leibnitz. The great Leibnitz, in the time of Louis XIV, addressed to the French monarch a memorial, which is one of the noblest monuments of political foresight. “Sire,” said he, “it is not at home that you will succeed in subduing the Dutch: you will not cross their dykes, and you will rouse Europe to their assistance. It is in Egypt that the real blow is to be struck. There you will find the true commercial route to India; you will wrest that lucrative commerce from Holland, you will secure the eternal dominion of France in the Levant, you will fill Christianity with joy (2).” These ideas, however, were beyond the age, and they lay dormant till revived by the genius of Napoléon.

(1) Gibbon.

(2) Th. ix. 63.

Alexander
the Great
and Napo-
léon equally
appreciated
its value.

The eagle eye of Alexander the Great, which fitted him to have been as great a benefactor as he was a scourge of the species, early discerned the vast capabilities of this country; and to him was owing the foundation of that city, the rival of Memphis and Thebes, which once boasted of three millions of inhabitants, and rivalled Rome in the plenitude of its power, and still bears, amidst ruins and decay, the name of the conqueror of the East. Napoléon was hardly launched into the career of conquest before he perceived the importance of the same situation; and when still struggling in the plains of Italy with the armies of Austria, he was meditating an expedition into those Eastern regions, where alone, in his apprehension, great things could be achieved; where kingdoms lay open to private adventure; and fame, rivalling that of the heroes of antiquity, was to be obtained. From his earliest years he had been influenced by an ardent desire to effect a revolution in the East: he was literally haunted by the idea of the glory which had been there acquired, and firmly convinced that the power of England could never be effectually humbled but by a blow at its Indian possessions. "The Persians," said he, "have blocked up the route of Tamerlane; I will discover another (1)."

It was his favourite opinion through life, that Egypt was the true line of communication with India; that it was there that the English power could alone be seriously affected; that its possession would ensure the dominion of the Mediterranean, and convert that sea into a "French Lake." From that central point armaments might be detached down the Red Sea, to attack the British possessions in India; and an entrepôt established, which would soon turn the commerce of the East into the channels which nature had formed for its reception—the Mediterranean and the Red Sea (2).

His ideas were matured at Passeriano. It was at Passeriano, however, after the campaign was concluded, and when his energetic mind turned abroad for the theatre of fresh exploits, that the conception of an expedition to Egypt first seriously occupied his thoughts. During his long evening walks in the magnificent park of his mansion, he spoke without intermission of the celebrity of those countries, and the illustrious empires which have there disappeared, after overturning each other, but the memory of which still lives in the recollections of mankind. "Europe," said he, "is no field for glorious exploits; no great empires or revolutions are to be found but in the East, where there are six hundred millions of men." Egypt at once presented itself to his imagination as the point where a decisive impression was to be made; the weak point of the line where a breach could be effected and a permanent lodgment secured, and a path opened to those Eastern regions, where the British power was to be destroyed and immortal renown acquired. So completely had this idea taken possession of his mind, that all the books brought from the Ambrosian library to Paris, after the peace of Campo Formio, which related to Egypt, were submitted for his examination, and many bore extensive marginal notes in his own handwriting, indicating the powerful grasp and indefatigable activity of his mind (3); and in his correspondence with the Directory he had already, more than once, suggested both the importance of an expedition to the banks of the Nile, and the amount of force requisite to insure its success (4).

Before leaving Italy, after the treaty of Campo Formio, he put the last

(1) D'Abr. iv. 263. Bour. ii. 411.

(2) Th. ix. 62.

(3) James's Naval History, ii. 216. Bour. ii. 44.

(4) Corresp. Conf. de Nap. iv. 176. *Vide ante*, iii. p. 155.

hand to the affairs of the Cisalpine Republic. Venice was delivered over, amidst the tears of all its patriotic citizens, to Austria; the French auxiliary force in the new republic was fixed at thirty thousand men, under the orders of Berthier, to be maintained at the expense of the allied state; and all the republican organization of a directory, legislative assemblies, national guards, and troops of the line, put in full activity. "You are the first people in history," said he, in his parting address to them, "who have become free without factions, without revolutions, without convulsions. We have given you freedom; it is your part to preserve it. You are, after France, the richest, the most populous republic in the world. Your position calls you to take a leading part in the politics of Europe. To be worthy of your destiny, make no laws but what are wise and moderate; but execute them with force and energy (1)." The wealth and population of the beautiful provinces which compose this Republic, embracing 3,500,000 souls, the fortress of Mantua, and the plains of Lombardy, indeed formed the elements of a powerful state; but had Napoléon looked into the book of history, or considered the human mind, he would have perceived that, of all human blessings, liberty is the one which is of the slowest growth; that it must be won, and cannot be conferred; and that the institutions which are suddenly transferred from one country to another, perish as rapidly as the full-grown tree, which is transplanted from the soil of its birth to a distant land.

Napoléon's journey from Italy to Paris was a continual triumph. The Italians, whose national spirit had been in some degree revived by his victories, beheld with regret the disappearance of that brilliant apparition. Every thing he did and said was calculated to increase the public enthusiasm. At Mantua, he combined with a *fête* in honour of Virgil a military procession on the death of General Hoche, who had recently died, after a short illness, in France; and about the same time formed that friendship with Desaix, who had come from the army of the Rhine to visit that of Italy, which mutual esteem was so well calculated to inspire, but which was destined to terminate prematurely on the field of Marengo. The towns of Switzerland received him with transport; triumphal arches and garlands of flowers every where awaited his approach; he passed the fortresses amidst discharges of cannon; and crowds from the neighbouring countries lined the roads to get a glimpse of the hero who had filled the world with his renown (2). His progress, however, was rapid: he lingered on the field of Morat to examine the scene of the terrible defeat of the Burgundian chivalry by the Swiss peasantry. Passing Basle, he arrived at Rastadt, where the congress was established; but, foreseeing nothing worthy of his genius in the minute matters of diplomacy which were there the subject of discussion, he proceeded to Paris, where the public anxiety had arisen to the highest pitch for his return (3).

The successive arrival of Napoléon's lieutenants at Paris with the standards taken from the enemy in his memorable campaigns, the vast conquests he had achieved, the brief but eloquent language of his proclamations, and the immense benefits which had accrued to the Republic from his triumphs, had

(1) Nap. iv. 271.

(2) His words, though few, were all such as were calculated to produce revolution. At Geneva, he boasted that he would democratize England in three months; and that there were, in truth, but two Re-

publics in Switzerland; Geneva, without laws or government; Basle, converted into the workshop of revolution.—HARD. v. 308.

(3) Bour. ii. 5, 9. Th. ix. 363. Nap. ii. 268. Hard. v. 57, 58.

Napoléon's
parting ad-
dress to the
Italians.

His trium-
phal journey
across Swit-
zerland to
Rastadt and
Paris.

Political ob-
jects of this
journey. Its
ominous
character for
Switzerland.

5th Dec. 1797.

His retired
manner of
life at Paris.

raised to the very highest pitch the enthusiasm of the people. The public anxiety, accordingly, to see him was indescribable; but he knew enough of mankind to feel the importance of enhancing the general wish by avoiding its gratification. He lived in his own house in the rue Chantierine, in the most retired manner, went seldom into public, and surrounded himself only by scientific characters, or generals of cultivated minds. He wore the costume of the Institute, of which he had recently been elected a member; associated constantly with its leading characters, such as Monge, Berthold, Laplace, Lagrange, and admitted to his intimate society only Berthier, Desaix, Lefebvre, Caffarelli, Kléber, and a few of the deputies. On occasion of being presented to Talleyrand, minister of foreign affairs, he singled out, amidst the splendid *cortége* of public characters by which he was surrounded, M. Bougainville, and conversed with him on the celebrated voyage which he had performed (1). Such was the profound nature of his ambition through life, that on every occasion he looked rather to the impression his conduct was to produce on men's minds in future, than the gratification he was to receive from their admiration of the past. He literally "deemed nothing done, while any thing remained to do (2)." Even in the assumption of the dress, and the choice of the society of the Institute, he was guided by motives of ambition, and a profound knowledge of the human heart. "Mankind," said he, "are in the end governed always by superiority of intellectual qualities, and none are more sensible of this than the military profession. When on my return from Italy I assumed the dress of the Institute, I knew what I was doing. I was sure of not being misunderstood by the lowest drummer of the army (3)."

His reception
in state
by the Directory.

Shortly after his arrival he was received in state by the Directory, in their now magnificent court of the Luxembourg. The public anxiety was wound up to the highest pitch for this imposing ceremony, on which occasion Joubert was to present the standard of the army of Italy, inscribed with all the great actions it had performed; and the youthful conqueror himself was to lay at the feet of Government the treaty of Campo Formio. Vast galleries were prepared for the accommodation of the public, which were early filled with all that was distinguished in rank, character, and beauty in Paris. He made his entry, accompanied by M. Talleyrand, who was to present him to the Directory as the bearer of the treaty. The aspect of the hero, his thin but graceful figure, the Roman cast of his features, and fire of his eye, excited universal admiration; the court rang with applause. Talleyrand introduced him in an eloquent speech, in which, after extolling

Talleyrand's
speech.

his great actions, he concluded: "For a moment I did feel on his account that disquietude, which, in an infant republic, arises from every thing which seems to destroy the equality of the citizens. But I was wrong; individual grandeur, far from being dangerous to equality, is its highest triumph; and on this occasion, every Frenchman must feel himself elevated by the hero of his country. And when I reflect on all that he has done to shroud from envy that light of glory; on that ancient love of simplicity which distinguishes him in his favourite studies; his love for the abstract sciences; on his admiration for that sublime Ossian which seems to detach him from the world; on his well-known contempt for luxury, for pomp, for all that constitutes the pride of ignoble minds, I am convinced that, far from

(1) Th. ix. 363, 364. Nap. iv. 280, 283.

(2) Tacitus.

(3) Thihaudean Consulat, 78.

dreading his ambition, we shall one day have occasion to rouse it anew to allure him from the sweets of studious retirement; France will never lose its freedom; but perhaps he will not for ever preserve his own (1)."

Napoléon's answer. Napoléon replied in these words: "The French people, to attain their freedom, had kings to combat; to secure a constitution founded on reason, they had eighteen hundred years of prejudices to overcome. Religion, feudality, despotism, have, in their turns, governed Europe; but from the peace now concluded, dates the era of representative governments. You have succeeded in organizing the great nation, whose territory is not circumscribed but because nature herself has imposed its limits. I lay at your feet the treaty of Campo Formio, ratified by the Emperor (2). As soon as the happiness of France is secured by the best *organic laws*, the whole of Europe will be free." The Directory, by the voice of Barras, returned an inflated reply, in which they invited him to strive for the acquisition of fresh laurels, and pointed to the shores of Great Britain as the place where they were to be gathered (3).

Successive fêtes given by other public bodies. On this occasion, General Joubert, and the chief of the staff, Andreossi, bore the magnificent standard which the Directory had given to the Army of Italy, and which contained an enumeration of triumphs so wonderful, that it would have passed for fabulous in any other age (4). It was sufficient to intoxicate all the youth of France with the passion for military glory. This *fête* was followed by others, given by the legislative body and the minister of foreign affairs. Napoléon appeared at all these, but they were foreign to his disposition; and he retired, as soon as politeness would permit, to his own house. At that given by M. Talleyrand, which was distinguished by the good taste and elegance which prevailed, he was asked by Madame de Staël, in presence of a numerous circle, who was, in his opinion, the greatest woman that ever existed. "She," he replied, "who has had the greatest number of children;" an answer very different from what she anticipated, and singularly characteristic of his opinions on female influence. At the Institute, he was to be seen always seated between Lagrange and Laplace, wholly occupied in appearance with the abstract sciences. To a deputation of that learned body, he returned an answer:—"I am highly honoured with the approbation of the distinguished men who compose the Institute. I know well that I must long be their scholar before I become their equal. The true conquests, the only ones which do not cause a tear, are those which are gained over ignorance. The most honourable, as well as the most useful, occupation of men is, to contribute to the extension of ideas. The true power of the French Republic should henceforth consist

(1) Bour. ii. 24.

(2) Napoléon had added these words in this place:—"That peace secures the liberty, the prosperity, and glory of the Republic;" but these words were struck out by order of the Directory: a sufficient proof of their disapproval of his conduct in signing it, and one of the many inducements which led him to turn his face to the East.—See HARR. v. 74.

(3) Th. ix. 368. Nap. iv. 283 384.

(4) It bore these words:—"The army of Italy has made 150,000 prisoners; it has taken 170 standards, 500 pieces of heavy artillery, 600 field pieces, 5 pontoon trains, 9 ships of the line, 12 frigates, 12 corvettes, 18 galleys. Armistice with the Kings of Sardinia, Naples, the Dukes of Parma, Modena, and the Pope. Preliminaries of Leoben; Convention of Montebello with Genoa. Treaty of Tolentino. Treaty

of Campo-Formio. It has given freedom to the people of Bologna, Ferrara, Modena, Massa-Carrara, Romagna, Lombardy, Brescia, Bergamo, Mantua, Cremona, a part of the Veronese, Chiavenna, Bormio, and the Valtelline; to the people of Genoa, the Imperial Fiefs, Corcyra, and Ithaca. Sent to Paris the *chefs-d'œuvre* of Michael Angelo, Guercino, Titian, Paul Veronese, Correggio, Albano, the Carraccis, Raphael, Leonardo da Vinci, etc. Triumphed in 18 pitched battles; Montenotte, Millesimo, Mondovi, Lodi, Borghetta, Lonato, Castiglione, Roveredo, Bassano, St. George's, Fontana Viva, Caldiero, Arcola, Rivoli, La Favorite, the Tagliamento, Tarvis, Newmarket; and then followed the names of 67 combats or lesser engagements." [Th. ix. 369.] The legions of Caesar had not, in so short a time, so splendid a roll of achievements, to exhibit.

in this, that not a single new idea should exist which does not owe its birth to their exertions." But it was only for the approbation of these illustrious men that he appeared solicitous; he was never seen in the streets; went only to a concealed box in the opera (1); and when he assumed the reins of power, after his return from Egypt, his appearance was still unknown to the greater part of the inhabitants of Paris.

Napoléon's
private
views in re-
gard to his
future life.

But Napoléon's was not a disposition to remain satisfied with past glory: the future—yet higher, achievements filled his mind. He knew well the ephemeral nature of popular applause, and how necessary mystery or a succession of great actions is, to prolong its transports. "They do not long preserve at Paris," said he to his intimate friends, "the remembrance of any thing. If I remain long unemployed, I am undone. The renown of one in this great Babylon speedily supplants that of another. If I am seen three times at the opera, I will no longer be an object of curiosity. You need not talk of the desire of the citizens to see me: crowds at least as great would go to see me led out to the scaffold." He made an effort to obtain a dispensation with the law which required the age of forty for one of the Directory; but failing in that attempt, his whole thoughts and passions centered in the East, the original theatre of his visions of glory. "Bourrienne," said he, "I am determined not to remain in Paris; there is nothing here to be done. It is impossible to fix the attention of the people. If I remain longer inactive, I am undone. Every thing here passes away; my glory is already declining; this little corner of Europe is too small to supply it. We must go to the East; all the great men of the world have there acquired their celebrity. Nevertheless, I am willing to make a tour to the coasts with yourself, Lannes, and Solkowsky. Should the expedition to Britain prove, as I much fear it will, too hazardous, the army of England will become the army of the East, and we will go to Egypt." These words give a just idea of the character of Napoléon. Glory was his ruling passion; nothing appeared impossible where it was to be won. The great names of Alexander, Cæsar, and Hannibal, haunted his imagination; disregarding the lapse of two thousand years, he fixed his rivalry on those classical heroes, whose exploits have shed so imperishable a lustre over the annals of antiquity. While thus sustaining his reputation, and inscribing his name on the eternal monuments of Egyptian grandeur, he hoped to be still within reach of the march of events in Europe, and ready to assume that despotic command, which he already foresaw would be soon called for by the incapacity of the Directory and the never-ending distractions of democratic institutions (2).

Secret views
of the Di-
rectory.
Their desire
to get quit
of Napoléon.
Prepara-
tions for a
descent on
England.

In truth, the Directory, secretly alarmed at the reputation of the Conqueror of Italy, eagerly sought, under the splendid colouring of a descent on England, an opportunity of ridding themselves of so formidable a rival. An extraordinary degree of activity prevailed in all the harbours, not only of France and Holland, but of Spain and Italy; the fleets at Cadiz and Toulon were soon in a condition to put to sea; that at Brest only awaited, to all appearance, their arrival to issue forth, and form a preponderating force in the Channel, where the utmost exertions were making to construct and equip flat-bottomed boats for the conveyance of the land-troops. Means were soon collected in the northern harbours for the transport of sixty thousand men. Meanwhile great part of the armies of the Rhine were brought down to the maritime districts, and

(1) Nap. iv. 285, 286. Savary, i. 32. Bour. ii. 33.

(2) Bour. ii. 32, 35. Lac. xiv. 139.

lined the shores of France and Holland, from Brest to the Texel; nearly one hundred and fifty thousand men were stationed on these coasts, under the name of the Army of England. This immense force might have occasioned great disquietude to the British government, had it been supported by a powerful navy; but the battles of St.-Vincent and Camperdown relieved them of all apprehensions of a descent by these numerous enemies. It does not appear that the Directory then entertained any serious thoughts of carrying the invasion into early execution: although the troops were encamped in the maritime departments, no immediate preparation for embarkation had been made. However, their language breathed nothing but menaces: Napoléon was appointed commander-in-chief of the Army of England, and he was dispatched on a mission to the coasts to superintend the completion of the armament (1).

Pompous
speech of
Barras on
giving him
the com-
mand of the
Army of
England.

"Crown," said Barras, "so illustrious a life, by a conquest which the great nation owes to its outraged dignity. Go, and by the punishment of the cabinet of London, strike terror into the hearts of all who would miscalculate the powers of a free people. Let the conquerors of the Po, the Rhine, and the Tiber, march under your banners; the ocean will be proud to bear them; it is a slave still indignant, who blushes for his fetters. He invokes, in a voice of thunder, the wrath of the earth against the oppressor of the waves. Pompey did not esteem it beneath him to wield the power of Rome against the pirates: Go, and chain the monster who presses on the seas; go, and punish in London the injured rights of humanity. Hardly will the tricolor standard wave on the blood-stained shores of the Thames, ere a unanimous cry will bless your arrival, and that generous nation, perceiving the dawn of its felicity, will receive you as liberators, who come not to combat and enslave, but to put a period to its calamities." Under these high-sounding declamations, however, all parties concealed very different intentions. Immense preparations were made in Italy and the south of France, the whole naval resources of the Mediterranean were put in requisition, the *élite* of the army of Italy moved to Toulon, Genoa, and Civita Vecchia. The Directory were more desirous to see Napoléon engulfed in the sands of Lybia, than conquering on the banks of the Thames; and he dreamt more of the career of Alexander and of Mahomet, than of the descent of Cæsar on the shores of Britain (2).

Napoléon's
growing
horror of
the revolu-
tionary
system.

Independently of his anxiety to engage in some enterprise which might immortalize his name, Napoléon was desirous to detach himself from the government, from his strong and growing aversion for the Jacobin party, whom the Revolution of the 18th Fructidor had placed at the head of the Republic. Already he had, on more than one occasion, openly expressed his dislike at the violent revolutionary course which the Directory were pursuing, both at home and abroad (3); and in private he gave vent, in the strongest terms, to his horror at that grasping insatiable democratic spirit which, through his subsequent life, he set himself so vigorously to resist. "What," said he, "would these Jacobins have? France is revolutionized, Holland is revolutionized, Italy is revolutionized, Switzerland is revolutionized, Europe will soon be revolutionized. But this, it seems, will not suffice them. I know well what they want; they want the domination of thirty or forty individuals founded on the massacre

(1) Bour. ii. 38. 1 ac. xiv. 138, 139. Nap. ii. 165.

(3) Nap. iv. 301.

(2) Nap. ii. 164. 1 ac. xiv. 138, 139, 140. Nap. iv. 287. Bour. ii. 37.

of three or four millions; they want the constitution of 1793, but they shall not have it, and death to him who would demand it (1). For my own part I declare, that if I had only the option between royalty and the system of these gentlemen, I would not hesitate one moment to declare for a king."

In the middle of February, Napoléon proceeded to the coasts, accompanied by Lannes and Bourrienne. He visited, in less than ten days, Boulogne, Calais, Dunkirk, Antwerp, and Flushing, exhibiting every where his usual sagacity and rapidity of apprehension; conversing with, deriving light from, every one possessed of local information, and obtaining in a few weeks what

10th Feb.
1798.

it would have taken others years to acquire. He sat up till midnight at every town, interrogating the sailors, fishermen, and smugglers :

to their objections he listened with patient attention, to his own difficulties he drew their consideration. During this brief journey, he acquired an intimate acquaintance with the relative importance of these maritime stations; and to this period is to be assigned the origin

His journey
to the coasts
of the
Channel.

of those great conceptions concerning Antwerp, which, under the empire, he carried with so much vigour into execution. At length, having acquired all the information which could be obtained, he made up his mind and returned to Paris. "It is too doubtful a chance," said he; "I will not risk it; I will not hazard, on such a throw, the fate of France (2)." Thenceforward all his energies were turned towards the Egyptian expedition.

Reasons
which
determined
him against
the English
expedition.

It was not the difficulty of transporting sixty or eighty thousand men to the shores of Britain which deterred Napoléon; the impossibility of maintaining a strict blockade of an extensive line of coast, on a tempestuous sea, and the chance of getting over unseen in hazy weather, sufficiently demonstrated that such an attempt, however hazardous, was practicable; it was the obstacles in the way of maintaining them in the country after they were landed, and supporting them by the necessary stores and reinforcements, in presence of a superior naval force, which was the decisive consideration. Supposing the troops landed, a battle gained, and London taken, it was not to be expected that England would submit; and how to maintain the conquests made, and penetrate into the interior of the country, without continual reinforcements, and an uninterrupted communication with the Continent, was the insurmountable difficulty. There appeared no rational prospect at this period of accumulating a superior naval power in the Channel, or effecting an open connexion between the invading force and the shores of France; and this being the case, the Republican army, however successful at first, must, to all appearance, have sunk at last under the multiplied efforts of a brave, numerous, and united people (3). Thence may be seen the importance of the naval battles of St.-Vincent and Camperdown in the preceding year; the fate of the world hung upon their event.

Defensive
preparations
of the
British go-
vernment.

Meanwhile, the British government, aware of the great preparations which were making at once in so many different quarters, and ignorant where the blow was to fall, made every arrangement which prudence could suggest to ward off the impending danger. They had little apprehension as to the issue of a contest on the shores of Britain; but Ireland was the vulnerable quarter which filled them with disquietude. The unceasing discontents of that country had formed a large party, who were

(1) Wolfe Tone, *Memoirs*, ii. 276.

(2) *Nap.* iv. 287. *Bour.* ii. 38. *Th.* x. 15.

(3) *Th.* x. 13, 14.

in open and ill-disguised communication with the French Directory, and the narrow escape which it had made by the dispersion of Hoche's squadron in Bantry bay, proved that the utmost vigilance, and a decided naval superiority, could not always be able to secure its extensive sea-coast from hostile invasion. In these circumstances, the principal efforts of the Admiralty were directed to strengthen the fleet off Brest and the Spanish coasts, from whence the menaced invasion might chiefly be expected to issue; while, at the same time, a small squadron was detached under Nelson, by Admiral St.-Vincent, from his squadron off Cadiz, which now amounted to eighteen ships of the line, to the Mediterranean, which was afterwards reinforced, by the junction of eight ships of the line under Admiral Curtis, to thirteen line-of-battle ships, and one of fifty guns. The most active preparations for defence were at the same time made on the whole coasts; the vigilance of the cruisers in the Channel was redoubled; and the spirit of the nation, rising with the dangers which threatened it, prepared without dismay to meet the conqueror of Europe on the British shores (1).

Napoléon persuades the Directory to undertake the Egyptian expedition. While all eyes in Europe, however, were turned to the Channel, and the world awaited, in anxious suspense, the terrible conflict which seemed to be approaching between the two powers whose hostility had so long divided mankind, the tempest had turned away in another direction. After considerable difficulty, Napoléon succeeded in persuading the Directory to undertake the expedition to Egypt; in vain they objected that it was to expose forty thousand of the best troops of the Republic to destruction; that the chance was small of escaping the English squadron; and that Austria would not fail to take advantage of the absence of its best general to regain her lost provinces. The ardent mind of Napoléon obviated every objection; and at length the government, dazzled by the splendour of the design, and secretly rejoiced at the prospect of ridding themselves of so formidable a rival, agreed to his proposal, and gave him unlimited powers for carrying it into execution (2).

Prodigious activity of Napoléon in preparing for the expedition. Napoléon instantly applied himself, with extraordinary activity, to forward the expedition. He himself superintended every thing; instructions succeeded each other with an inconceivable rapidity; night and day he laboured with his secretary, dispatching orders in every direction. The Directory put at his disposal forty thousand of the best troops of the army of Italy; the fleet of Brueys, consisting of thirteen ships of the line and fourteen frigates, was destined to convey the greater part of the army, while above 5,000,000 of francs, of the treasure recently before taken at Berne, were granted by the Directory to meet the expenses of the expedition (3). It is painful to think, that this celebrated undertaking should have been preceded by so flagrant an act of spoliation (4); and that the desire to provide for the charges of the enterprise out of the savings of the

(1) Ann. Reg. 1798, 132, 139, 140. James' Naval. Hist. ii. 215. Th. ix. 73

(2) Th. ix. 67, 68. Bour. iv. 40, 41, 48.

(3) "Napoléon has thus stated the objects which he had in view in the Egyptian expedition. 1. To establish, on the banks of the Nile, a French colony, which could exist without slaves, and supply the place of St.-Domingo. 2. To open a vent for our manufactures in Africa, Arabia, and Syria, and obtain for our commerce the productions of these countries. 3. To set out from Egypt, as a vast *place d'armes*, to push forward an army of 60,000 men to the Indus, rouse the Mahrattas to a revolt, and ex-

cite against the English the population of these vast countries. Sixty thousand men, half Europeans, half natives, transported on 50,000 camels and 10,000 horses, carrying with them provisions for fifty days, water for six, with 150 pieces of cannon, and double ammunition, would arrive in four months in India. The ocean ceased to be an obstacle when vessels were constructed; the desert becomes passable the moment you have camels and dromedaries in abundance."—*Nap. in MONTAIGN*, ii. 208.

(4) *Mad. de Staël*, ii. 209. *Bour.* ii. 41, 42. Th. ix, 52, 53.

Swiss Confederacy during more than two hundred years, should have been one motive for the attack on the independence of that inoffensive republic (1).

Magnificent
preparations
for the
expedition.

From his headquarters at Paris, Napoléon directed the vast preparations for this armament, which were going forward with the utmost activity in all the ports of Italy and the south of France. Four stations were assigned for the assembly of the convoys and the embarkation of the troops, Toulon, Genoa, Ajaccio, and Civita Vecchia; at the latter harbour, transports were moored alongside of the massy piers of Roman architecture to the bronze rings, still undecayed, which were fixed in their blocks by the emperor Trajan. A numerous artillery, and three thousand cavalry, were assembled at these different stations, destined to be mounted on the incomparable horses of Egypt. The most celebrated generals of the Republic, Desaix and Kléber, as yet strangers to the fortunes of Napoléon, as well as those who had so ably seconded his efforts in Italy, Lannes, Murat, Junot, Régnier, Barraguay-d'Hilliers, Vaubois, Bon, Belliard, and Dommartin, were ranged under his command. Caffarelli commanded the engineers; Berthier, who could hardly tear himself from the fascination of beauty at Paris, the staff; the most illustrious philosophers and artists of the age, Monge, Berthollet, Fourier, Larrey, Desgenettes, Geoffroy St.-Hilaire, and Denon, attended the expedition. Genius, in every department, hastened to range itself under the banners of the youthful hero (2).

The disturbance at Vienna, on account of the *fête* given by Bernadotte, the ambassador of the Republic at the Imperial Court, which will be afterwards mentioned, retarded for fifteen days the departure of the expedition. During that period, Europe awaited with breathless anxiety the course of the storm, which it was well known was now ready to burst. Bourrienne, on this occasion, asked Napoléon, if he was finally determined to risk his fate on the expedition to Egypt.—“Yes,” he replied; “I have tried every thing, but they will have nothing to do with me. If I stayed here, it would be necessary to overturn them, and make myself king; but we must not think of that as yet; the nobles would not consent to it; I have sounded, but I find the time for that has not yet arrived (3); I must first dazzle these gentlemen by my exploits.” In truth, he was convinced, at this period, that he had no chance of escaping destruction, but by persisting in his Oriental expedition (4).

The treasure at Berne is sent to Toulon by Napoléon's orders.

(1) The partisans of Napoléon are indignant at the imputation of his having recommended or concurred in the invasion of Switzerland, in order to procure in the treasure of Berne funds for the equipment of his Egyptian expedition; but it is certain that, in his journey through Switzerland, he asked an ominous question as to the amount of that ancient store; [Join. x. 291. Lac. xiv. 195.] and, in his Secret Correspondence, there exists decisive evidence that he participated in the shameful act of robbery which soon afterwards followed, and equipped his fleet out of the funds thus obtained. On the 11th April, 1798, he wrote to Lannes: “I have received, citizen-general, the letter of your aide-de-camp. Three millions have been dispatched, by post, on the 7th of this month, from Berne for Lyon. You will find hereunto subjoined, the order from the treasury to its agent at Lyon to forward it forthwith to Toulon. You will for this purpose cause it to be embarked on the Rhone; you will accompany it to Avignon; and from thence convey it, by post, to Toulon. Do not fail to inform me of what different pieces the three millions consist.” On the 17th April, he again writes to Lannes: “From the infor-

mation I have received from Berne, the three millions should arrive, at the very latest, on the 19th at Lyon. Forward them instantly on their arrival; do not go to bed till this is done; get ready in the mean time the boats for their reception; dispatch a courier to me the instant they are fairly on board.” And on the same day he wrote to the authorities charged at Toulon with the preparation of the expedition: “The treasury has given orders that three millions should be forthwith forwarded to Toulon. The sailors of Bruy's squadron must be paid the instant the three millions arrive from Berne.” And, on 20th April, he wrote to the Commissioners of the Treasury at Paris: “You have only given orders, citizen-commissioners, for the transmission of such part of the three millions at Lyon, as are in francs and piastres, to Toulon: It is indispensable, however, that we have it all; you will be good enough, therefore, to send orders to your agent at Lyon for the transmission of the whole, of whatever descriptions of coin it is composed.”—See *Corresp. Confid. de Napoléon*, v., 74, 85, 86, 87, 102.

(2) Savary, i. 26. Th. ix. 69, 71. Bour. ii. 46.

(3) Bour. ii. 48, 54. Th. ix. 73.

(4) The intelligence of the tumult at Vienna, and the appearance of approaching hostilities between

Napoléon
arrives at
Toulon. His
proclamation
to the
soldiers.

Napoléon having completed his preparations, arrived at Toulon on the 9th May, 1798, and immediately took the command of the army. Never had so spendid an armanient appeared on the ocean.

The fleet consisted of 15 ships of the line, two of 64 guns, 14 frigates, 72 brigs and cutters, and 400 transports. It bore 56,000 soldiers of all arms, and above 10,000 sailors. Before embarking, the general-in-chief, after his usual custom, addressed the following proclamation to his troops:—"Soldiers! You are one of the wings of the Army of England; you have made war in mountains, plains, and cities; it remains to make it on the ocean. The Roman legions, whom you have often imitated but not yet equalled, combated Carthage, by turns, on the seas and on the plains of Zama. Victory never deserted their standards, because they never ceased to be brave, patient, and united. Soldiers! the eyes of Europe are upon you; you have great destinies to accomplish; battles to fight; dangers and fatigues to overcome; you are about to do more than you have yet done for the prosperity of your country, the happiness of man, and your own glory. The genius of liberty, which has rendered, from its birth, the Republic the arbiter of Europe, has now determined that it should become so of the seas, and of the most distant nations (1)." In such magnificent mystery did this great man envelope his designs, even when on the eve of their execution.

His last act
was one of
humanity.

One of the last acts of Napoléon, before embarking, was to issue a humane proclamation to the military commissions of the 9th division, in which Toulon was situated, in which he severely censured the cruel application of one of the harsh laws of the 19th Fructidor to old men above seventy years of age, children in infancy, and women with child, who had been seized and shot for violating that tyrannical edict. This interposition gave universal satisfaction, and added another laurel of a purer colour to those which already encircled the brows of the general (2).

19th May.
Expedition
sets sail.

At length, on the 19th May, the fleet set sail in the finest weather, amidst the discharges of cannon, and the acclamations of an immense crowd of inhabitants. The L'Orient grounded at leaving the harbour, by reason of its enormous bulk; it was taken as a sinister omen by the sailors, more alive than any other class of men to superstitious impressions. The fleet sailed in the first instance towards Genoa, and thence to Ajaccio and Civita Castellana, and having effected a junction with the squadron in those harbours, bore away with a fair wind for Malta. In coasting the shores of Italy, they descried from on board the L'Orient the snowy summit of the Alps in the extreme distance. Napoléon gazed with feeling at the mountains which had been the witnesses of his early achievements. "I cannot," said he, "behold without emotion the land of Italy; these mountains command the plains where I have so often led the French to victory. Now we are bound for the east; with them victory is still secure." His conversation was peculiarly animated during the whole voyage; every headland, every promontory,

Austria and France, induced Napoléon to change his plan; and he earnestly represented to the Directory the impolicy of continuing the Egyptian project at such a crisis. But the rulers of France were now thoroughly awakened to the danger they ran from the ascendancy of Napoléon, and the only answer they made to his representation, was a positive order to leave Paris on the 3d May. This led to a warlike altercation between him and the Directory, in the course of which he resorted to his former manœuvre of tendering his resignation. But on this occasion it did not succeed. Presenting him with a pen, Rew-

bell said coldly, "You wish to retire from the service, general? If you do, the Republic will doubtless lose a brave and skilful chief; but it has still enough of sons who will not abandon it." Merlin upon this interposed, and put an end to so dangerous an altercation; and Napoléon, devouring the affront, prepared to follow out his Egyptian expedition, saying, in private, to Bourrienne, "The pear is not yet ripe; let us depart, we shall return when the moment is arrived."—HARD. vi. 513, 514.

(1) Bour. ii. 48, 54. Th. ix. 81. Jom. x. 391.

(2) Bour. ii. 59.

recalled some glorious exploit of ancient history; and his imagination kindled with fresh fire, as the fleet approached the shores of Asia, and the scenes of the greatest deeds which have illustrated the annals of mankind (1).

Arrives off Malta. On the 10th June, after a prosperous voyage, the white cliffs and superb fortifications of Malta appeared in dazzling brilliancy above the unruffled sea. The fleet anchored before the harbour which had so gloriously resisted the whole force of the Turks under Solymán the Magnificent; its bastions were stronger, its artillery more numerous, than under the heroic Lavalette; but the spirit of the order was gone: a few hundred chevaliers, lost in effeminacy and indolence intrusted to three thousand feeble mercenaries and as many militia the defence of the place, and its noble works seemed ready to become the prey of any invader who had inherited the ancient spirit of the defenders of Christendom. Before leaving France, the capitulation of the place had been secured by secret intelligence with the Grand Master and principal officers. Desaix and Savary landed, and advanced without opposition to the foot of the ramparts. Terms of accommodation were speedily agreed on; the town was surrendered on condition that the Grand Master should obtain 600,000 francs, a principality in Germany, or a pension for life of 500,000 francs (2); the French chevaliers were promised a pension of 700 francs a-year each; and the tricolor flag speedily waved on the ancient bulwark of the Christian world.

Which capitulates without firing a shot. So strongly were the generals impressed with their good fortune on this occasion, that in passing through the impregnable defences, Caffarelli said to Napoléon, "It is well, general, that there was some one within to open the gates to us; we should have had more trouble in making our way through, if the place had been empty." On entering into the place the French knew not how to congratulate themselves on the address on the one side, and pusillanimity on the other, which had obtained for them, without firing a shot, so immense an acquisition. They were never weary of examining the boundless fortifications and stupendous monuments of perseverance which it contained; the luxury and magnificence of the palaces which the Grand Masters had erected during the many centuries of their inglorious repose, and the incomparable harbour, which allowed the L'Orient to touch the quay, and was capable of containing six hundred sail of the line. In securing and organizing this new colony, Napoléon displayed his wonted activity; its innumerable batteries were speedily armed, and General Vaubois left at the head of three thousand men to superintend its defence. All the Turkish prisoners found in the galleys were set at liberty, and scattered through the fleet, in order to produce a moral influence on the Mahometan population in the countries to which their course was bound (3).

The secret of the easy conquest of this impregnable island by Napoléon, is to be found in the estrangement of the chevaliers of other nations from Baron Hompesch, the Grand Master, whom they disliked on account of his German descent, and the intrigues long before practised among the knights of French and Italian birth by a secret agent of Napoléon. Such was the division produced by the circumstances, that the garrison was incapable of making any resistance; and the leading knights, themselves chiefs in the conspiracy, had so prepared matters, by disarming batteries, providing neither stores nor ammunition, and disposing the troops in disadvantageous situations,

(1) Bour. ii. 62, 72, 74, 76. Th. ix. 82.

(3) Jom. x. 399. Savary, i. 32. Bour. ii. 65, 66.

(2) Th. x. 85. Bour. ii. 65. Savary, i. 30. Jom. Hard. vi. 75.

x. 392, 393. Miot. ix. 10.

that resistance was from the first perfectly hopeless. No sooner, however, were the gates delivered up, than these unworthy successors of the defenders of Christendom repented of their weakness. The treasure of St.-John, the accumulation of ages; the silver plate of all the churches, palaces, and hospitals, were seized on with mereiless avidity; and all the ships of war, artillery, and arsenals of the order, converted to the uses of the Republic (1).

June 19. Having secured this important conquest, and left a sufficient garrison to maintain it for the Republic, Napoléon set sail for Egypt. The voyage was uninterrupted by any accident, and the general, enjoying the beautiful sky of the Mediterranean, remained constantly on deck, conversing with Monge and Bertholet on subjects of science, the age of the world, the probable mode of its destruction, the forms of religion, the decline of the Byzantine empire. These interesting themes were often interrupted, however, by the consideration of what would occur if the fleet were to encounter the squadron of Nelson. Admiral Brueys, forcibly struck by the crowded state of the ships, and the encumbrance which the soldiers would prove in the event of an action, and especially to the L'Orient, which had nearly two thousand men on board, could not conceal his apprehensions of the result of such an engagement. Napoléon, less accustomed to maritime affairs, contemplated the event with more calmness. The soldiers were constantly trained to work the great guns; and, as there were five hundred on board each ship of the line, he flattered himself that in a close action they would succeed by boarding in discomfiting the enemy (2).

Meanwhile Nelson's fleet had arrived on the 20th June before Naples; from thence he hastened to Messina, where he received intelligence of the surrender of Malta, and that the French were steering for Candia. He instantly directed his course for Alexandria, where he arrived on the 29th, and finding no enemy there, set sail for the north, imagining that the expedition was bound for the Dardanelles (5). It is a singular circumstance that on the night of the 22d June, the French and English fleets crossed each other's track, without either party discovering their enemy (4).

During the night, as the French fleet approached Egypt, the discharge of cannon was heard on the right; it was the signal which Nelson gave to his squadron, which at this moment was not more than *five leagues* distant, steering northward from the coast of Egypt, where he had been vainly seeking the French armament (3). For several hours, the two fleets were within a few leagues of each other. Had he sailed a little farther to the left, or passed during the day, the two squadrons would have met, and an earlier battle of Aboukir changed the fortunes of the world.

At length on the morning of the 1st July, the shore of Egypt was discovered stretching as far as the eye could reach from east to west. Low sandhills, surmounted by a few scattered palms, presented little of interest to the ordinary eye; but the minarets of Alexandria, the needle of

(1) Hard. vi. 70, 76, 77.

So early as 14th November, 1797, Napoleon had commenced his intrigues with the Knights of Malta. On that day he wrote to Talleyrand: "You will receive herewith a copy of the commission I have given to citizen Pousseltigne, and my letter to the Consul of Malta. The true object of his mission is to put the finishing hand to the projects we have in view on Malta."—*Conf. Desp. Napoléon to Talleyrand, 14th. Nov. 1797.* In the January following,

this agent contrived, by liberal gifts, promises, and entertainments, to seduce from their allegiance all that numerous part of the garrison and knights who were inclined to democratic principles.—Hard. v. 457, 460.

(2) Nap. ii. 169 Bour. ii. 73, 83. Th. x. 87.

(3) Nap. ii. 167. Th. x. 88.

(4) James's Naval Hist. ii. 229 Savary, i. 35.

(5) Savary, i. 35. Bour. ii. 84. Th. x. 88. Miot. 74.

Cleopatra, and the pillar of Pompey, awakened those dreams of ancient grandeur and Oriental conquest, which had long floated in the mind of Napoléon. It was soon learned that the English fleet had only left the roads *two days before*, and had departed for the coasts of Syria in quest of the French expedition. The general immediately pressed the landing of the troops; it was begun on the evening of their arrival, and continued with the utmost expedition through the whole night; and at one in the morning, as the state of the tide permitted the galley on which he stood to approach the shore, he immediately disembarked, and formed three thousand men amidst the sand-hills of the Desert (1).

Napoléon lands, and advances against Alexandria, which is taken. At daybreak, Napoléon advanced at the head of about five thousand men, being all that were already formed, towards Alexandria. The shouts from the ramparts, and the discharge of some pieces of artillery, left no doubt as to the hostile intentions of the Mamelukes; an assault was immediately ordered; and, in a short time, the French grenadiers reached the top of the walls. Kléber was struck by a ball on the head, and Menou thrown down from the top of the rampart to the bottom; but the ardour of the French soldiers overcame every resistance; and the negligence of the Turks having left one of the principal gates open during the assault, the defenders of the walls were speedily taken in rear by those who rushed in at that entrance, and fled in confusion into the interior of the city (2).

The conquerors were astonished to find a large space filled with ruins between the exterior walls and the inhabited houses; an ordinary feature in Asiatic towns, where the tyranny of the government usually occasions an incessant diminution of population, and ramparts, even of recent formation, are speedily found to be too extensive for the declining numbers of the people. The soldiers, who, notwithstanding their military ardour, did not share the Eastern visions of their chief, were soon dissatisfied with the poverty and wretchedness which they found among the inhabitants; the brilliant anticipations of Oriental luxury gave way to the sad realities of a life of privation; and men, in want of food and lodging, derived little satisfaction from the obelisks of the Ptolemies, or the sarcophagus of Alexander (3).

His first proclamation on landing to his troops. Before advancing into the interior of the country, Napoléon issued the following proclamation to his soldiers:—"Soldiers! You are about to undertake a conquest fraught with incalculable effects upon the commerce and civilisation of the world. You will inflict upon England the most grievous stroke she can sustain before receiving her death-blow. The people with whom we are about to live are Mahometans. Their first article of faith is, 'There is but one God, and Mahomet is his prophet.' Contradict them not. Behave to them as you have done to the Jews and the Italians; show the same regard to their Muftis and Imams as you did to their Rabbis and Bishops; manifest for the ceremonies of the Koran the same respect as you have shown to the convents and the synagogues, the religion of Moses and that of Jesus-Christ. The first town we are about to enter was built by Alexander; at every step we shall meet with recollections worthy to excite the emulation of Frenchmen." This address contains a faithful picture of the feeling of the French army on religious subjects at this period. They not only considered the Christian faith as an entire fabrication, but were for the most part ignorant of its very elements. Lavalette has recorded, that hardly one of

(1) Savary, i. 35, 36. Berthier, 3, 4. Th. x, 88.
(2) Berthier, 5, 6. Savary, i. 37, 38.

(3) Savary, i. 33.

them had ever been in a church; and in Palestine, they were ignorant even of the names of the holiest places in sacred history (1).

Description of Egypt. Egypt, on which the French army was now fairly landed, and which became the theatre of such memorable exploits, is one of the most singular countries in the world, not only from its geographical position but its physical conformation. It consists entirely of the valley of the Nile, which, taking its rise in the mountains of Abyssinia, after traversing for 600 leagues the arid deserts of Africa, and receiving the tributary waters of the Bahr-el-Abiad, precipitates itself by the cataracts of Sennaar into the lower valley, 200 leagues long, which forms the country of Egypt. This valley, though of such immense length, is only from one to six leagues in breadth, and bounded on either side by the rocky mountains of the desert. Its habitable and cultivated portion is entirely confined to that part of the surface which is overflowed by the inundations of the Nile; as far as the waters rise, the soil is of extraordinary fertility; beyond it, the glowing desert is alone to be seen. At the distance of fifty leagues from the sea, the Nile divides itself into two branches which fall into the Mediterranean, one at Rosetta, the other at Damietta. The triangle having these two branches for its sides and the sea for its base, is called the Delta, and constitutes the richest and most fertile district of Egypt, being perfectly level, intersected by canals, and covered with the most luxuriant vegetation (2).

The soil of this singular valley was originally as barren as the arid ridges which adjoin it; but it has acquired an extraordinary degree of richness from the well-known inundations of the Nile. These floods, arising from the heavy rains of July and August in the mountains of Abyssinia, cause the river to rise gradually, during a period of nearly three months. It begins to swell in the middle of June, and continues to rise till the end of September, when it attains the height of sixteen or eighteen feet. The fertility of the country is just in proportion to the height of the inundation: hence it is watched with the utmost anxiety by the inhabitants, and public rejoicings are ordered when the *Nilometer* at Cairo indicates a foot or two greater depth of water than usual. It never rains in Egypt. Centuries may elapse without more than a shower of drizzling mist moistening the surface of the soil. Hence cultivation can only be extended beyond the level to which the water rises by an artificial system of irrigation; and the efforts made in this respect by the ancient inhabitants, constitute, perhaps, the most wonderful of the many monuments of industry which they have left to succeeding ages (3).

During the inundation, the level plain of Egypt is flooded with water; the villages, detached from each other communicate only by boats, and appear like the islands on the Lagunæ of Venice, in the midst of the watery waste. No sooner, however, have the floods retired, than the soil, covered to a considerable depth by a rich slime, is cultivated and sown, and the seed, vegetating quickly in that rich mould, and under a tropical sun, springs up, and in three months yields a hundred, and sometimes a hundred and fifty fold. During the whole winter months the soil is covered with the richest harvests, besprinkled with flowers, and dotted by innumerable flocks; but in March the great heats begin, the earth cracks from excessive drought, vegetation disappears, and the country is fast relapsing into the sterility of the desert,

(1) Lav. i. 287. Bour. ii. 77, 78. Th. x. 91.

(2) Th. x. 92, 93. Bour. ii. 271, 275. Savary, i. 47, 49.

(3) Nap. in Bour. ii. 270, 275. Th. x. 94, 95.

when the annual floods of the Nile again cover it with their vivifying waters (1).

Productions of the country. All the varied productions of the temperate and the torrid zone flourish in this favoured region. Besides all the grains of Europe, Egypt produces the finest crops of rice, maize, sugar, indigo, cotton, and senna. It has no oil, but the opposite coasts of Greece furnish it in abundance; nor coffee, but it is supplied in profusion from the adjoining mountains of Arabia. Hardly any trees are to be seen over its vast extent; a few palms and sycamores, in the villages alone, rise above the luxuriant vegetation of the plain. Its horses are celebrated over all the world for their beauty, their spirit, and their incomparable docility; and it possesses the camel, that wonderful animal, which can support thirst for days together, tread without fatigue the moving sands, and traverse like a living ship the ocean of the desert (2).

Its foreign commerce. Every year, immense caravans arrive at Cairo from Syria and Arabia on the one side, and the interior of Africa on the other. They bring all that belongs to the regions of the sun, gold, ivory, ostrich feathers, gum, aromatics of all sorts, coffee, tobacco, spices, perfumes, with the numerous slaves which mark the degradation of the human species in those favoured countries. Cairo becomes, at that period, an *entrepôt* for the finest productions of the earth, of those which the genius of the West will never be able to rival, but for which their opulence and luxury afford a never-failing demand. Thus the commerce of Egypt is the only one in the globe which never can decay; but must, under a tolerable government, continue to flourish, as long as the warmth of Asia furnishes articles which the industry and perseverance of Europe are desirous of possessing (3).

Decay of the population since ancient times. In ancient times, Egypt and Lybia, it is well known, were the granary of Rome; and the masters of the world depended for their subsistence on the floods of the Nile (4). Even at the time of the conquests of the Mahometans, the former is said to have contained twenty millions of souls, including those who dwelt in the adjoining Oases of the desert. This vast population is by no means incredible, if the prodigious fertility of the soil, wherever water can be conveyed, is considered; and the extent to which, under a paternal government, the system of artificial irrigation can be carried. It is to the general decay of all the great establishments for the watering of the country which the industry of antiquity had constructed, that we are to ascribe the present limited extent of agriculture, and the perpetual encroachments which the sands of the desert are making on the region of human cultivation (5).

Importance of Alexandria. Alexandria, selected by the genius of Alexander the Great to be the capital of his vast empire, is situated at the opening of one of the old mouths of the Nile, but which is now choked with sand, and only covered with water in extraordinary floods. Its harbour, capable of containing all the navies of Europe, is the only safe or accessible port between Carthage and the shores of Palestine. Vessels drawing twenty-one feet of water can enter without difficulty, but those of larger dimensions only when lightened of their guns. Rosetta and Damietta admit only barks; the bar at the entrance of their harbours having only six feet of water (6).

At the period of this expedition to Egypt, the population of the country,

(1) Th. x. 95. Nap. x. 202.

(2) Nap. ii. 200, 205. Th. x. 95, 96.

(3) Th. x. 97.

(4) Tac. Annal. xii. 32.

(5) Nap. ii. 205. Bour. ii. 275, 280.

(6) Nap. ii. 212, 213.

consisting of two millions five hundred thousand souls, was divided into four classes; the Mamelukes or Circassians, the Janizaries, the Arabs, and the Copts or natives of the soil (1).

Account of the inhabitants of the country. Mamelukes. The Mamelukes, who were the actual rulers of the country, consisted of young Circassians, torn in infancy from their parents and transported into Egypt, to form the armed force of that province of the Turkish empire. Bred up in camps, without any knowledge of their country or relations, without either a home or kindred, they prided themselves solely on their horses, their arms, and their military prowess. This singular militia was governed by twenty-four Beys, the least considerable of whom was followed by five or six hundred Mamelukes, whom they maintained and equipped. This body of twelve thousand horsemen, each of whom was attended by two helots or servants, constituted the military strength of the country, and formed the finest body of cavalry in the world (2).

The office of Bey was not hereditary: sometimes it descended to the son, more generally to the favourite officer of the deceased commander. They divided the country among them in feudal sovereignty; nominally equal, but necessarily subject to the ascendant of talent, they exhibited alternately the anarchy of feudal rule, and the severity of military despotism. They seldom have been perpetuated beyond the third or fourth generation on the shores of the Nile; and their numbers are only kept up by annual accessions of active youths from the mountains of Circassia.

The force of the Beys was at one period very considerable, but it had been seriously weakened by the Russian conquests in Georgia, which cut off the source from which their numbers were recruited, and at the time when the French landed in Egypt, they were not a half of what they formerly had been; a circumstance which contributed more than any other to the rapid success with which the invasion of the latter was attended (3).

Janizaries. The Turks or Janizaries, forming the second part of the population, were introduced on occasion of the conquest of Egypt by the Sultans of Constantinople. They were about two hundred thousand in number, almost all inscribed on the books of the Janizaries, to acquire their privileges; but, as usual in the Ottoman empire, with a very few of their number in reality following the standard of the Prophet. Those actually in arms formed the guards of the Pacha, who still maintained a shadow of authority for the Sultan of Constantinople; but the great majority were engaged in trades and handicrafts in the towns, and kept in a state of complete subjection to the haughty rule of the Mamelukes (4).

Arabs. The Arabs constituted the great body of the population—at least two millions out of the two millions and a half of which the inhabitants

(1) Nap. ii. 213. Th. x. 97.

(2) The bits in their horses' mouths are so powerful, that the most fiery steeds are speedily checked, even at full career, by an ordinary hand. Their stirrups are extremely short, and give the rider great power both in commanding his horse, and striking with his sabre; and the pommel and back part of the saddle are so high, that the horseman, though wounded, can scarcely lose his balance; he can even sleep without falling, as he would do in an arm-chair. The horse is burdened by no baggage or provisions, all of which are carried by the rider's servants; while the Mameluke himself, covered with shawls and turbans, is protected from the strokes of

a sabre. They are all splendidly armed; in their girdle is always to be seen a pair of pistols and a poniard; from the saddle is suspended another pair of pistols and a hatchet; on one side is a sabre, on the other a blunderbuss, and the servant on foot carries a carbine. They seldom parry with the sword, as their fine blades would break in the collision, but avoid the strokes of their adversary by skill in wheeling their horse, while they trust to his impetus to sever his head from his body, without either cut or thrust." *Mor.* 61, 63.

(3) *Ibid.* vi. 92, 93. Th. x. 100, 101. Nap. ii. 214, 215.

(4) Th. x. 97. Nap. ii. 216.

consist. Their condition was infinitely various; some forming a body of nobles, who were the chief proprietors of the country; others, the doctors of the law and the ministers of religion; a third class, the little proprietors, farmers, and cultivators. The whole instruction of the country, the maintenance of its schools, its mosques, its laws, and religion, were in their hands. A numerous body, living on the borders of the desert, retained the roving propensities and barbaric vices of the Bedouin race. Mounted on camels or horses, driving numerous herds before them, escorting or pillaging the caravans which come to Cairo from Lybia and Arabia, they alternately cultivated their fields on the banks of the Nile, or fled from its shores loaded with the spoils of plundered villages. The indifference or laxity of the Turkish rule almost always suffered their excesses to escape with impunity. Industry languished, and population declined in the districts exposed to their ravages; and the plunderers, retreating into the desert, resumed the wandering life of their forefathers, and re-appeared on the frontiers of civilisation, only, like the moving sands, to devour the traces of human industry. A hundred, or a hundred and twenty thousand of these marauders wandered through the wilderness which bordered on either side the valley of the Nile: they could send into the field twenty thousand men, admirably mounted, and matchless in the skill with which their horses were managed, but destitute of discipline or of the firmness requisite to sustain the attack of regular forces (1).

Copts. The Copts constituted the fourth class of the people. They are the descendants of the native inhabitants of the country; of those Egyptians who so early excelled in the arts of civilisation, and have left so many monuments of immortal endurance. Now insulted and degraded, on account of the Christian faith which they still profess, they were cast down to the lowest stage of society; their numbers not exceeding two hundred thousand; and their occupations being of the meanest description. By one of those wonderful revolutions which mark the lapse of ages, the greater part of the slaves in the country were to be found among the descendants of the followers of Sesostris (2).

Ibrahim Bey and Mourad Bey ruled the country. At the period of the arrival of the French, two Beys, Ibrahim Bey and Mourad Bey, divided between them the sovereignty of Egypt. The first, rich, sagacious, and powerful, was, by a sort of tacit understanding, invested with the civil government of the country; the latter, young, active, and enterprising, was at the head of its military establishments. His ardour, courage, and brilliant qualities, rendered him the idol of the soldiers, who advanced, confident of victory, under his standard (5).

Policy of Napoléon in invading Egypt. The policy of Napoléon in invading a country, uniformly was, to rouse the numerous governed against the few governors, and thus paralyse its means of resistance by arming one part of the population against the other. On approaching Egypt, he at once saw, that, by rousing the Arabs against the domination of the Beys, not only the power of the latter would be awakened, but a numerous and valuable body of auxiliaries might be procured for the invading force. To accomplish this object it was necessary, above all things, to avoid a religious war, which would infallibly have united all ranks of the Mussulmans against the invaders,

(1) Volney, *De l'Egypte*, 137. Th. x. 98, 99. Nap. ii. 219, 220.

(2) Nap. ii. 218. Th. ix. 100, 101.

(3) Th. ix. 100, 101.

and to gain the affections of the Arabs by flattering their leaders, and indulging their prejudices. For this purpose he left the administration of justice and the affairs of religion exclusively in the hands of the Scheiks, and addressed himself to the feelings of the multitude through the medium of their established teachers. For the Mahometan religion and its precepts he professed the highest veneration; for the restoration of Arabian independence the most ardent desire; to the Beys alone he swore eternal and uncompromising hostility. In this manner he hoped to awaken in his favour both the national feelings of the most numerous part of the people, and the religious enthusiasm which is ever so powerful in the East; and, inverting the passions of the crusades, to rouse in favour of European conquest the vehemence of Oriental fanaticism (1).

Proceeding on these principles, Napoléon addressed the following singular proclamation to the Egyptian people. "People of Egypt! you will be told by our enemies, that I am come to destroy your religion. Believe them not. Tell them that I am come to restore your rights, punish your usurpers, and revive the true worship of Mahomet, which I venerate more than the Mamelukes. Tell them that all men are equal in the sight of God; that wisdom, talents, and virtue alone constitute the difference between them. And what are the virtues which distinguish the Mamelukes, that entitle them to appropriate all the enjoyments of life to themselves? If Egypt is their farm, let them show the tenure from God by which they hold it. No! God is just and full of pity to the suffering people. For long a horde of slaves, bought in the Caucasus and Georgia, have tyrannized over the finest part of the world; but God, upon whom every thing depends, has decreed that it should terminate. Cadis, Scheiks, Imams, tell the people that we too are true *Mussulmans*. Are we not the men who have destroyed the Pope, who preached eternal war against the Mussulmans? Are we not those who have destroyed the chevaliers of Malta, because those madmen believed that they should constantly make war on your faith? Are we not those who have been in every age the friends of the Most High, and the enemies of his enemies (2)? Thrice happy those who are with us; they will prosper in all their undertakings: wo to those who shall join the Mamelukes to resist us; they shall perish without merey."

Napoléon was justly desirous to advance to Cairo, before the inundations of the Nile rendered military operations in the level country impossible; but for this purpose it was necessary to accelerate his movements, as the season of the rise of the waters was fast approaching. He made, accordingly, the requisite arrangements with extraordinary celerity; left three thousand men in garrison at Alexandria under Kléber, with a distinguished officer of engineers to put the works in a posture of defence, established the civil government in the persons of the Scheiks and Imams, gave directions for sounding the harbour, with a view to placing

(1) Nap. ii. 226, 227. Th. x. 104, 105.

"The French army," says Napoléon, "since the Revolution, had practised no sort of worship; in Italy even, the soldiers never went to church; we took advantage of that circumstance to present the army to the Mussulmans, as readily disposed to embrace their faith. I had many discussions with the Scheiks on this subject; and after many weeks spent in fruitless discussion, they arrived at the conclusion, that circumcision, and the prohibition against wine, might be dispensed with, provided not a tenth, but a fifth of the income, was spent in acts of bene-

ficence." The general-in-chief then traced out the plan of a mosque, which was to exceed that of Jemilazar, and declared it was to be a monument of the conversion of the army. In all this, however, he sought only to gain time. Napoléon was, upon this, declared the friend of the Prophet, and specially placed under his protection. The report spread generally, that before the expiry of a year, the soldiers would wear the turban. This produced the very best effect; the people ceased to regard them as idolaters—*Nap. in Monr.* ii. 211, 212.

(2) Bour. ii. 96, 98.

the fleet in safety, if the draught of water would permit the entry of the larger vessels; collected a flotilla on the Nile to accompany the troops, and assigned to it as a place of rendez-vous Ramanieh, a small town on that river, situated about half way to Cairo, whither he proposed to advance across the desert of Damanhour (1). While, at the same time, he wrote to the French ambassador at Constantinople to assure the Porte of his anxious desire to remain at peace

6th July. with the Turkish government (2).

6th July. On the 6th July, the army set out on their march, being now reduced, by the garrisons of Malta and that recently left in Alexandria, to 50,000 men. At the same time, Kléber's division, under the orders of Dugua, was directed to move upon Rosetta, to secure that town, and facilitate the entrance of the flotilla into the Nile. Desaix was at the head of the vanguard; his troops began their march in the evening, and advanced with tolerable cheerfulness during the cool of the night; but when morning dawned, and they found themselves traversing a boundless plain of sand, without water or shade—with a burning sun above their head, and troops of Arabs flitting across the horizon, to cut off the weary or stragglers—they were filled with the most gloomy forebodings. Already the desire for rest had taken possession of their minds; they had flattered themselves that they were to find repose and a terrestrial paradise in Egypt; and when they found themselves, instead, surrounded by a pathless desert, their discontent broke out in loud lamentations. All the wells on the road were either filled up or exhausted; hardly a few drops of muddy and brackish water were to be found to quench their burning thirst. At Damanhour, a few houses afforded shelter at night only to the general's staff; the remainder of the troops bivouacked in squares on the sand, incessantly harassed by the clouds of Arabs who wheeled round their position, and sometimes approached within fifty yards of the videttes. After a rest of two days, the army resumed its march across the sandy wilderness, still observed in the distance by the hostile Bedouins; and soon the suffering from thirst became so excessive, that even Lannes and Murat threw themselves on the sand, and gave way to every expression of despair (3). In the midst of the general depression, a sudden gleam of hope illuminated the countenances of the soldiers; a lake appeared in the arid wilderness, with villages and palm trees clearly reflected in its glassy surface. Instantly the parched troops hastened to the enchanting object, but it receded from their steps; in vain they pressed on with burning impatience, it for ever fled from their approach; and they had at length the mortification of discovering that they had been deceived only by the *mirage* of the desert (4).

(1) Berthier, 9, 11. Th. x. 107, 108.

(2) "The army has arrived; it has disembarked at Alexandria, and carried that town; we are now in full march for Cairo. Use your utmost efforts to convince the Porte of our firm resolution to continue to live on the best terms with his government. An ambassador to Constantinople has just been named for that purpose, who will arrive there without delay."—*Letter to the Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople*, 8th July, 1798; *Corresp Secrète*, v., 129.

(3) The sufferings of the army are thus vividly depicted in Desaix's despatch to Napoléon: "If all the army does not pass the desert with the rapidity of lightning, it will perish. It does not contain water to quench the thirst of a thousand men. The greater part of what it does is contained in cisterns, which, once emptied, are not replenished by any

perennial fountain. The villages are huts without resources of any kind. For Heaven's sake, do not leave us in this situation; order us rapidly to advance or retire. I am in despair at being obliged to write to you in the language of anxiety; when we are out of our present horrible position, I hope my wonted firmness will return."—*Corresp. Confid. de Napoléon*, v. 217.

(4) M. Monge, who accompanied the expedition, published the following account of this singular illusion. "When the surface of the earth has been during the day thoroughly heated by the rays of the sun, and towards evening it begins to cool, the higher objects of the landscape seem to rise out of a general inundation. The villages appear to rise out of a vast lake; under each is its image inverted, exactly as if it was in the midst of a glassy sheet of

Arrive on
the Nile. The firmness and resolution of Napoléon, however, triumphed over every obstacle; the approach to the Nile was shortly indicated by the increasing bodies of Arabs, with a few Mamelukes, who watched the columns; and at length the long wished for stream was seen glittering through the sandhills of the desert. At the joyful sight the ranks were immediately broken (4); men, horses, and camels, rushed simultaneously to the banks, and threw themselves into the stream; all heads were instantly lowered into the water; and, in the transports of delight, the sufferings of the preceding days were speedily forgotten.

Actions
with the
Mamelukes. While the troops were thus assuaging their thirst, an alarm was given that the Mamelukes were approaching: the drums beat to arms, and eight hundred horsemen, clad in glittering armour, soon appeared in sight. Finding, however, the leading division prepared, they passed on, and attacked the division of Desaix, which was coming up; but the troops rapidly forming in squares, with the artillery at the angles, dispersed the assailants by a single discharge of grape-shot. The whole army soon came up, and the flotilla having appeared in sight about the same time, the soldiers rested in plenty for a whole day beside the stream. A severe action had taken place on the Nile, between the French and Egyptian flotillas, but the Asiatics were defeated, and the boats arrived at the destined spot at the precise hour assigned to them. The landscape now totally changed; luxuriant verdure on the banks of the river succeeded to the arid uniformity of the desert; incomparable fertility in the soil promised abundant supplies to the troops, and the shade of palm-trees and sycamores afforded an enjoyment unknown to those who have never traversed an Eastern wilderness (2).

After a day's rest, the army pursued its march along the banks of the Nile, towards Chebreiss. Mourad Bey, with four thousand Mamelukes and Fellahs or foot soldiers, lay on the road, his right resting on the village, and supported by a flotilla of gun-boats on the river. The French flotilla out-stripped the march of the land forces, and engaged in a furious and doubtful combat 13th July. with the enemy before the arrival of the army. Napoléon immediately formed his army in five divisions, each composed of squares six deep, with the artillery at the angles, and the grenadiers in platoons, to support the

Action at
Chebreiss.

menaced points. The cavalry, who were only two hundred in number, and still extenuated by the fatigues of the voyage, were placed in the centre of the square. No sooner had the troops approached within half a league of the enemy, than the Mamelukes advanced, and, charging at full gallop, assailed their moving squares with loud cries, and the most determined intrepidity. The artillery opened upon them as soon as they approached within point-blank range, and the rolling fire of the infantry soon mowed down those who escaped the grape-shot. Animated by this success, the French deployed and attacked the village, which was speedily carried. The Mamelukes retreated in disorder towards Cairo, with the loss of 600 men, and the flotilla at the same time abandoned the scene of action, and drew off further up the Nile (3).

The army
advances to-
wards Cairo.

This action, though by no means decisive, sufficed to familiarize the soldiers with the new species of enemy they had to encounter,

water. As you approach the village it recedes from the view; when you arrive at it, you find it is still in the midst of burning sand. and the deception begins anew with some more distant object." The phenomenon admits of an easy explanation on optical principles.—See Mior, 28, 32.

(1) Las Cas. i. 221. Berthier, 11, 12, 13. Th. x. 109, 110. Sav. i. 50. Miot, 26, 38, 39.

(2) Sav. i. 50. Berth. 13 Th. x. 110, 111.

(3) Dam. ii. 134, 135. Berth. 15, 16. Th. x. 112.

and to inspire them with a well-founded confidence in the efficacy of their discipline and tactics to repel the assaults of the Arabian cavalry. The troops continued their march for seven days longer towards Cairo; their fatigues were extreme; and, as the villages were all deserted, it was with the utmost difficulty that subsistence could be obtained. The vicinity of the Nile, however, supplied them with water, and the sight of the Arabs, who constantly prowled round the horizon, impressed them with the necessity of keeping their ranks. At length the army arrived within sight of the PYRAMIDS, and the town of Cairo. All eyes were instantly turned upon the oldest monuments in the world, and the sight of those gigantic structures re-animated the spirit of the soldiers, who had been bitterly lamenting the delights of Italy.

Mourad Bey had there collected all his forces, consisting of six thousand Mamelukes, and double that number of Fellahs, Arabs, and Copts. His camp was placed in the village of Embabeh, on the left bank of the Nile, which was fortified by rude field works and forty pieces of cannon, but the artillery was not mounted on carriages, and consequently could only fire in one direction. Between the camp and the pyramids extended a wide sandy plain, on which were stationed above eight thousand of the finest horsemen in the world, with their right resting on the village, and their left stretching towards the pyramids. A few thousand Arabs, assembled to pillage the vanquished, whoever they should be, filled up the space to the foot of those gigantic monuments (1).

Napoléon no sooner discovered, by means of his telescopes, that the cannon in the intrenched camp were immovable, and could not be turned from the direction in which they were placed, than he resolved to move his army further to the right, towards the pyramids, in order to be beyond the reach, and out of the direction of the guns. The columns accordingly began to march; Desaix, with his division in front, next Regnier, then Dugua, and lastly, Vial and Bon. The sight of the pyramids, and the anxious nature of the moment, inspired the French general with even more than his usual ardour (2); the sun glittered on those immense masses, which seemed to rise in height with every step the soldiers advanced, and the army, sharing his enthusiasm, gazed, as they marched, on the everlasting monuments. "Remember," said he, "that from the summit of those pyramids forty centuries contemplate your actions."

With his usual sagacity, the general had taken extraordinary precautions to ensure success against the formidable cavalry of the desert. The divisions were all drawn up as before, in hollow squares six deep, the artillery at the angles, the generals and baggage in the centre. When they were in mass, the two sides advanced in column, those in front and rear moved forward in their ranks, but the moment they were charged, the whole were to halt, and face outwards on every side. When they were themselves to charge, the three front ranks were to break off and form the column of attack, those in rear remaining behind, still in square, but three deep only, to constitute the reserve. Napoléon had no fears for the result, if the infantry were steady; his only apprehension was that his soldiers, accustomed to charge, would yield to their impetuosity too soon, and would

They arrive
within sight
of the Ma-
meluke
forces.
21st July.

Battle of
the Pyra-
mids.

Lateral
movement of
Napoléon.

(1) Nap. ii. 234. *Jom.* xi. 408.

(2) *Th.* x. 116. Nap. ii. 237. *Jom.* xi. 410.

not be brought to the immovable firmness which this species of warfare required (1).

Furious charge of Mourad Bey. Mourad Bey no sooner perceived the lateral movement of the French army, than, with a promptitude of decision worthy of a skilful general, he resolved to attack the columns while in the act of completing it. An extraordinary movement was immediately observed in the Mameluké line, and speedily seven thousand horsemen detached themselves from the remainder of the army and bore down upon the French columns. It was a terrible sight, capable of daunting the bravest troops, when this immense body of cavalry approached at full gallop the squares of infantry. The horsemen, admirably mounted, and magnificently dressed, rent the air with their cries. The glitter of spears and scimitars dazzled the sight, while the earth groaned under the repeated and increasing thunder of their feet. The soldiers, impressed but not panic-struck by the sight, stood firm, and anxiously waited, with their pieces ready, the order to fire. Desaix's division being entangled in a wood of palm-trees, was not completely formed when the swiftest of the Mamelukes came upon them; they were in consequence partially broken, and thirty or forty of the bravest of the assailants penetrated, and died in the midst of the square at the feet of the officers; but before the mass arrived, the movement was completed, and a rapid fire of musketry and grape drove them from the front round the sides of the column. With matchless intrepidity, they pierced through the interval between Desaix's and Regnier's divisions, and riding round both squares, strove to find an entrance; but an incessant fire from every front mowed them down as fast as they poured in at the opening. Furious at the unexpected resistance, they dashed their horses against the rampart of bayonets, and threw their pistols at the heads of the grenadiers; while many who had lost their steeds, crept along the ground, and cut at the legs of the front rank with their scimitars. In vain thousands succeeded, and galloped round the flaming walls of steel; multitudes perished under the rolling fire which, without intermission, issued from the ranks, and at length the survivors, in despair, fled towards the camp from whence they had issued. Here, however, they were charged in flank by Napoléon at the head of Dugua's division, while those of Vial and

He is totally defeated.

Bon on the extreme left, stormed the intrenchments. The most horrible confusion now reigned in the camp; the horsemen, driven in in disorder, trampled under foot the infantry, who, panic-struck at the rout of the Mamelukes, on whom all their hopes were placed, abandoned their ranks, and rushed in crowds towards the boats to escape to the other side of the Nile. Numbers saved themselves by swimming, but a great proportion perished in the attempt. The Mamelukes, rendered desperate, seeing no possibility of escape in that direction, fell upon the columns who were approaching from the right, with their wings extended in order of attack; but they, forming square again with inconceivable rapidity, repulsed them with great slaughter, and drove them finally off in the direction of the pyramids. The intrenched camp, with all its artillery, stores, and baggage, fell into the hands of the victors. Several thousands of the Mamelukes were drowned or killed; and of the formidable array which had appeared in such splendour in the morning, not more than two thousand five hundred escaped with Mourad Bey into Upper Egypt. The victors hardly lost two hundred men in the action; and several days were occupied after it was over in stripping the

(1) Nap. ii. 236, 237. Th. x. 117.

slain of their magnificent appointments, or fishing up the rich spoils which encumbered the banks of the Nile (1).

Ibrahim
Bey retires
to Syria :
Mourad Bey
to Upper
Egypt. Na-
poléon en-
ters Cairo.

This action decided the fate of Egypt, not only by the destruction of force which it effected, but the dispersion of what remained which it occasioned. Mourad Bey retired to Upper Egypt, leaving Cairo to its fate, while Ibrahim Pacha, who had been a spectator of the combat from the opposite side of the river, set fire to the boats which contained his riches, and retreated to Salahieh, on the frontiers of Arabia, and from thence across the desert into Syria. Two days after the battle, Napoléon entered Cairo, where his soldiers found all the luxuries of the East, which for a time compensated to them for their absence from Europe. The division of Desaix was destined to pursue Mourad Bey into Upper Egypt; the other divisions, dispersed in the environs of Cairo, or advanced towards Syria in pursuit of Ibrahim Pacha, tasted the sweets of repose after their short but fatiguing campaign (2).

Pacific mea-
sures of
Napoléon.

No sooner was Napoléon established in Cairo, and his officers employed in exploring the Pyramids and City of Tombs, which lay at their feet, than he set himself sedulously to follow up the plan for acquiring the dominion over the country to which his proclamations from Alexandria had originally pointed. He visited the principal Scheiks, flattered them, held out hopes of the speedy re-establishment of the Arabian power, promised ample security for their religion and their customs, and at length completely won their confidence, by a mixture of skilful management with the splendid language which was so well calculated to captivate Eastern imaginations. The great object was to obtain from the Scheiks of the Mosque of Jemilazar, which was held in the highest estimation, a declaration in favour of the French, and by adroitly flattering their ambition, this object was at length gained (3). A species of litany was composed by them, in which they celebrated the overthrow of their Mameluke oppressors by the invincible soldiers of the West. "The Beys," said they, "placed their confidence in their cavalry; they ranged their infantry in order of battle. But the Favourite of Fortune, at the head of the brave men of the West, has destroyed their horses, and confounded their hopes. As the vapours which rise in the morning from the Nile are dispersed by the rays of the sun, so has the army of the Mamelukes been dissipated by the heroes of the West; for the Great Allah is irritated against the Mamelukes, and the soldiers of Europe are the thunders of his right hand (4)."

The Battle of the Pyramids struck terror far into Asia and Africa. The caravans which came to Mecca from the interior of those vast regions, carried back the most dazzling accounts of the victories of the invincible legions of Europe; the destruction of the cavalry which had so long tyrannized over

(1) Nap. ii. 237, 239, 241. Sav. i. 57. Th. x. 118, 121. Lac. xiv. 268.

(2) Sav. i. 59. Nap. ii. 246, 249.

(3) "You are not ignorant," said the Scheiks, in this curious proclamation, which evidently hears the roars of the composition of Napoléon, "that the French alone, of all the European nations, have, in every age, been the firm friends of Mussulmans and Mahometism; and the enemies of idolaters and their superstitions. They are the faithful and zealous allies of our sovereign the Sultan, ever ready to give him proofs of their affection, and to fly to his succour; they love those whom he loves, and hate those whom he hates; and that is the cause of their rupture with the Russians, those irreconcilable ene-

mies of the worshippers of the true God, who meditate the capture of Constantinople, and incessantly employ alike violence and artifice to subjugate the faith of Mahomet. But the attachment of the French to the Sublime Porte, and the powerful succours which they are about to bring to him, will doubtless confound their impious desigs. The Russians desire to get possession of St. Sophia, and the other temples dedicated to the service of the true God, to convert them into churches consecrated to the exercises of their perverse faith; but, by the aid of Heaven, the French will enable the Sultan to conquer their country, and exterminate their impious race."—*Corresp. Confid. de Nap. v.*, 407.

(4) Th. x. 123, 127. Dum. ii. 142.

Egypt excited the strongest sentiments of wonder and admiration; and the Orientals, whose imaginations were strongly impressed by the flaming citadels which had dissipated their terrible squadrons, named Napoléon, Sultan Kébir, or the Sultan of Fire (1).

His able and impartial civil government affects the Musulman faith. Napoléon, in addition to the terror inspired by his military exploits, strove to acquire a lasting hold of the affections of the people by the justice and impartiality of his civil government. He made all his troops join with the multitude in celebrating the festival in honour of the inundation of the Nile, which that year rose to an extraordinary height; partook with the Scheiks and Imams in the ceremonies at the Great Mosque; joined in the responses in their litanies like the faithful Mussulmans; and even balanced his body and moved his head in imitation of the Mahometan custom. Nor was it only by an affected regard for their religion that he endeavoured to confirm his civil authority. He permitted justice to be administered by the Scheiks and Imams, enjoining only a scrupulous impartiality in their decisions: established at Cairo a divan, or parliament, to make known the wants of the people; and others, in the different provinces, to send deputies to the Central Assembly; and vigorously repulsed the robbers of the desert, who for centuries had devastated with impunity the frontiers of the cultivated country. Never had Egypt experienced the benefits of regular government so completely as under his administration. One day, when Napoléon was surrounded by the Scheiks, information was received that some Arabs, of the tribe of Osnadis, had slain a Fellah, and carried off the flocks of the village. He instantly ordered that an officer of the staff should take three hundred horsemen, and two hundred camels, to pursue the robbers, and punish the aggressors. "Was the Fellah your cousin," said a Scheik, laughing, "that you are in such a rage at his death?"—"He was more," replied Napoléon; "he was one whose safety Providence had intrusted to my care."—"Wonderful!" replied the Scheik: "You speak like one inspired by the Almighty (2)."

Growing discontents of the army. But while these great designs occupied the commander-in-chief, an extraordinary degree of depression prevailed in the army. Egypt had been held out to the soldiers as the promised land. They expected to find a region flowing with milk and honey, and after a short period of glorious exile, to return with the riches of the East to their native country. A short experience was sufficient to dissipate all these illusions. They found a land illustrious only by the recollections with which it was fraught; filled with the monuments of ancient splendour, but totally destitute of modern comfort; bowed down with tyranny, squalid with poverty, barbarous in manners. When the excitements of the campaign were over, and the troops had leisure to contemplate their situation, a mortal feeling of *ennui* and disquietude took possession of every heart. "They thought," says Bourrienne, "of their country, of their relations, of their amours, of *the opera*;" the prospect of being banished for ever from Europe, on that arid shore, excited the most gloomy presentiments; and at length the discontent reached such a height, that Napoléon was obliged to threaten death to any officer, whatever his rank, who should venture to make known to him the feelings which every one entertained (3).

It is a singular proof of the ascendant which Napoléon had acquired over

(1) Scott, iv, 74.

(3) Bour. ii, 130, 135. Sav. i, 59, 60. Las Cas. i.

(2) Th. x, 128. Bour. ii, 124, 128. Dum. ii, 170, 222.

173. Nap. ii, 222. Las Cas. i, 232.

Calamitous
expedition
to Salahieh
on the Syrian
frontier.
Ibrahim Bey
retires into
Syria.

the minds of the soldiers, that when they were in this state of perilous fermentation, he ventured to proceed in person with the divisions commanded by Dugua and Regnier to extinguish an insurrection which Ibrahim had excited in the eastern part of Egypt, and drive him across the desert into Syria. The French overtook the Mamelukes at Salahieh, on the borders of the desert; and, as their rearguard was heavily laden with baggage, the Arabs who accompanied the cavalry strongly urged them to charge the retiring columns, who were posted near a wood of palm-trees. The disproportion of force was excessive, the Mamelukes being nearly thrice as numerous as the Europeans; nevertheless, Napoléon, confident of success, ordered the attack. But, though the discipline of the Europeans prevailed over the desultory valour of the Mussulmans in a regular engagement, they had no such advantage in an affair of outposts, and on this occasion the skill and courage of the Mamelukes had wellnigh proved fatal to the best part of the French cavalry. The charge, though bravely led by Leclerc and Murat, was as courageously received. The Mamelukes yielded at first, but soon returning, with their wings extended, closed in on every side around their pursuers. In the *mêlée* all the French officers had to sustain desperate personal encounters, and were for the most part severely wounded; nothing but the opportune arrival of the infantry extricated them from their perilous situation. The object, however, of the expedition was gained; Ibrahim crossed the desert into Syria, leaving Mourad Bey alone to maintain the war in Upper Egypt (1).

Intrigues of
Napoléon
with Ali
Pacha.

The success which had attended Napoléon's intrigues with the knights of Malta induced him to extend his views beyond Egypt, for the dismembering of the Turkish empire. With this view, he secretly dispatched his aide-de-camp Lavalette to Ali Pacha, the most powerful of the European vassals of the Porte, to endeavour to stimulate him to revolt. He bore a letter from the French general, in which Napoléon urged him to enter into an immediate concert for measures calculated to subvert the Ottoman empire (2). Lavalette found Ali Pacha with the army on the Danube, but, nevertheless, he contrived means to have it conveyed to him. The crafty Greek, however, did not conceive the power of Napoléon in Egypt sufficiently confirmed to induce him to enter into the proposed alliance, and, accordingly, this attempt to shake the throne of the Grand Seigneur failed of effect (3).

Treachery
of France
towards
Turkey.

While secretly conducting these intrigues, as well as openly assailing one of the most valuable provinces of their empire, both Napoléon and the Directory left nothing untried to prolong the slumber of the Ottoman government, and induce them to believe that the French had no hostile designs whatever against them, and that they were in reality inimical only to the Beys, the common enemy of both. With this view, Napoléon wrote to the Grand Vizier a letter full of assurances of the friendly dispositions both of himself and his government, and the eternal

(1) Sav. i. 63. Bour. ii. 149, 150.

(2) "The occasion appearing to me favourable, I have hastened to write to you a friendly letter, and have intrusted one of my aides-de-camp with its delivery with his own hands. I have charged him also to make certain overtures on my part; and as he does not understand your language, be so kind as to make use of a faithful and confidential interpreter for the conversations which he will have with you. I pray you to give implicit faith to whatever he may

say to you on my part; and to send him back quickly with an answer, written in Turkish with your own hand"—*Corresp. Confid. de Nap.* v., 249. Lavalette's instructions from Napoleon were to tell Ali, "that, after having taken possession of Malta, and ruling in the Mediterranean with thirty ships of the line and fifty thousand men, I wish to establish confidential relations with him, and to know if I can rely on his co-operation."—*LAVALETTE*, i. 358.

(3) Hurd, vi. 265, 269. *Lav.* i. 358.

alliance of the Republic with the Mussulmans (1); while Talleyrand, who had been appointed ambassador at Constantinople, received instructions to exert himself to the very utmost to perpetuate the same perfidious illusion. Such was the ability of that able diplomatist, and of Ruffin, the envoy at the Turkish capital, that for long the Divan shut their eyes to the obvious indications which were afforded of the real designs of France. Proportionally great was the general indignation, when accounts arrived of the invasion of Egypt, and it became evident how completely they had been deceived by these perfidious representations. Preparations for war were made with the utmost activity; the French chargé d'affaires, Ruffin, was sent to the Seven Towers; and the indignation of the Divan broke forth in one of those eloquent manifestoes, which a sense of perfidious injury seldom fails to produce among the honest, though illiterate, rulers of mankind (2).

Naval operations.

But while every thing was thus prospering on land, a desperate reverse awaited Napoléon at sea, brought about by the genius of that illustrious man who seemed to have been the instrument of Providence to balance the destiny of nations, turn from Asiatic wilds to European revolution the chains of military power, and preserve safe, amidst the western waves, the destined ark of European freedom.

Movements of Nelson. He arrives at Alexandria.

After having sought in vain for the French fleet on the coast of Egypt, Nelson returned to Candia, and from thence to Syracuse, where he obtained, with extraordinary rapidity, the supplies of which he stood so much in need. The failure of his pursuit was owing to a singular cause. Nelson had set sail from Sicily on the 21st June, and the French fleet on the 18th; nevertheless, so much more rapidly did his fleet sail than his antagonists', that he passed them on the voyage, and arrived at Alexandria on the 28th, two days before the French squadron. He set sail immediately for Candia, upon not finding them there; and thus, through his activity and zeal, *twice* missed the fleet of which he was in search. But the time was now approaching when his wishes were to be realized. He set sail from Syracuse for the Morea on the 25th July, steered boldly through that dangerous passage, the straits of Messina, and, having received intelligence in Greece that the French fleet had been seen four weeks before, steering to the south-east from Candia, he determined to return to Alexandria. On the 1st

(1) Napoléon's letter was in these terms: "The French army, which I have the honour to command, has entered Egypt, to punish the Beys for the insults they have committed on the French commerce. Citizen Talleyrand Perigord, minister of foreign affairs in France, has been named, on the part of France, ambassador at Constantinople, and he is furnished with full powers to negotiate and sign the requisite treaties, to remove any difficulties that may arise from the occupation of Egypt by the French army, and to consolidate the ancient and necessary friendship that ought to exist between the two powers. But as he may possibly not yet have arrived at Constantinople, I lose no time in making known to your excellency the resolution of the French government, not only to remain on terms of its ancient friendship with the Ottoman Porte, but to procure for it a barrier of which it stands so much in need against its natural enemies, who are at this moment leaguering together for its destruction"—*Despatch*, 22d August, 1798; *Corresp. Confid. de Nap.* vi. 3, 4.

(2) *Hard.* vi. 278, 280.

Turkish declaration of war. The manifesto of Turkey, which was a most able state paper, bears, "On the one hand, the French ambassadors, resident

at Constantinople, making use of the same dissimulation and treachery which they have every where practised, gave to the Turkish government the strongest marks of friendship, and sought by every art of dissimulation to blind it to their real designs, and induce it to come to a rupture with other and friendly powers; while, on the other, the commanders and generals of the French troops in Italy, with the perfidious design of corrupting the subjects of his highness, have never ceased to send into Rome, the Morea, and the islands of the Archipelago, emissaries known for their perfidy and dissimulation, and to spread every where incendiary publications, tending to excite the inhabitants to revolt. And now, as if to demonstrate to the world, that France makes no distinction between its friends and its enemies, it has, in the midst of a profound peace with Turkey, and while still professing to the Porte the same sentiments of friendship, invaded, without either provocation, complaint, or declaration of war, but after the usage of pirates, Egypt, one of the most valuable provinces of the Ottoman empire, from which, to this hour, it has received only marks of friendship."—See the *Manifesto in HARDENBERG*, vi. 483, 493, dated 10th Sept. 1798.

August, about ten in the morning, they came in sight of the Pharos; the port had been vacant and solitary when they last saw it; now it was crowded with ships, and they perceived, with exultation, that the tricolor flag was flying on the walls. The fleet of Brueys was seen lying at anchor in the bay of Aboukir. For many days before, the anxiety of Nelson had been such, that he neither ate nor slept. He now ordered dinner to be prepared, and appeared in the highest spirits. "Before this time to-morrow," said he to his officers, when leaving him to take the command of their vessels, "I shall have gained a peerage or Westminster Abbey (1)."

Brueys' position.

Admiral Brueys having been detained, by Napoléon's orders, at the mouth of the Nile, and being unable to get into the harbour of Alexandria, had drawn up his fleet in order of battle, in a position in the bay of Aboukir so strong, that, in the opinion of his best officers, the English would never venture to attack it. The headmost vessel was close to the shoal on the north-west, and the rest of the fleet formed a sort of curve, with its concave side towards the sea, and supported on the right by the batteries on the fort of Aboukir. He had done his utmost to get his ships into the harbour of Alexandria; but finding that the draught of water was too small for the larger vessels, he wisely determined not to adopt a measure which, by dividing his fleet, would have exposed it to certain destruction. After Napoléon was fairly established in Egypt, by the capture of Cairo, he sent orders to the admiral to go to Corfu, if he could not get the ships into the harbour of Alexandria (2); but till that event took place, he was in too precarious a situation to deprive himself of the assistance of his fleet; and it was then too late to escape the danger, as the English were within sight of the ramparts of Alexandria.

Nelson's plan of attack.

No sooner did Nelson perceive the situation of the French fleet, than he resolved to penetrate between them and the shore, and in that way double with his whole force on part of that of the enemy. "Where there is room for the enemy to swing," said he, "there must be room for us to anchor." His plan was to place his fleet half on the outer, and half on the inner side of the French line, and station his ships, so far as practicable, one on the outer bow and another on the outer quarter of each of the enemy's. Captain Berry, his flag captain, when he was made acquainted with the design, exclaimed, with transport, "If we succeed, what will the world say?"—"There is no 'If' in the case," replied Nelson; "that we shall succeed is certain; who may live to tell the story is a very different question (3)."

Relative forces on the two sides.

The number of ships of the line on the two sides was equal, but the French had a great advantage in the size of their vessels; their ships carrying 1196 guns, and 11,250 men, while the English had only 1012 guns and 8068 men (4). The British squadron consisted entirely of seventy-fours; whereas the French, besides the noble l'Orient of 120 guns, had two 80-gun ships, the Franklin and Guillaume Tell (5). The battery on Aboukir fort was mounted with four pieces of heavy cannon and two mortars, besides pieces of a lighter calibre.

Battle of the Nile.

The squadron advanced to the attack at three o'clock in the afternoon. Admiral Brueys at first imagined that the battle would be deferred till the following morning; but the gallant bearing and steady

(1) Dum. ii. 128. South, ii. 218, 221.

(2) On 30th July. See the letter in Bourrienne, ii. 329; and Corr. Conf. v. 332. Boar. ii. 155, 318, 327, 333, 335. South, i. 222. Scott, iv. 77.

(3) South, i. 226. Jom. xi. 416.

(4) South, ii. 224. Jom. xi. 417. Ann. Reg. 1798, 140.

(5) James, ii. 232.

1st Aug. course of the British ships as they entered the bay soon convinced him that an immediate assault was intended. The moment was felt by the bravest in both fleets; thousands gazed in silence, and with anxious hearts, on each other, who were never destined again to see the sun, and the shore was covered with multitudes of Arabs, anxious to behold a fight on which, to all appearance, the fate of their country would depend. When the English fleet came within range, they were received with a steady fire from the broadsides of all the vessels and the batteries on the island. It fell right on the bows of the leading ships; but, without returning a shot, they bore directly down upon the enemy, the men on board every vessel being employed aloft in furling sails, and below in tending the braces, and making ready for an anchorage. Captain Foley led the way in the *Goliath*, outsailing the *Zealous*, under Captain Hood, which for some time disputed the post of honour with him; and when he reached the van of the enemy's line, he steered between the outermost ship and the shoal, so as to interpose between the French fleet and the shore. In ten minutes he shot away the masts of the *Conquerant*, while the *Zealous*, which immediately followed in the same time totally disabled the *Guerrier*, which was next in line. The other ships in that column followed in their order, still inside the French line, while Nelson, in the *Vanguard*, at the head of five ships, anchored outside of the enemy, within pistol-shot of their third ship, the *Spartiate*. The effect of this manœuvre was to bring an overwhelming force against two-thirds of the enemy's squadron, while the other third, moored at a distance from the scene of danger, could neither aid their friends nor injure their enemies (1).

Nelson had arranged his fleet with such skill, that from the moment that the ships took up their positions, the victory was secure. Five ships had passed the line, and anchored between the first nine of the enemy and the shore, while six had taken their station on the outer side of the same vessels, which were thus placed between two fires, and had no possibility of escape. Another vessel, the *Leander*, was interposed across the line, and cut off the vanguard from all assistance from the rearmost ships of the squadron, while her guns raked right and left those between which she was placed. The *Culloden*, which came up sounding after it was dark, ran aground two leagues from the hostile fleets, and, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of her captain and crew, could take no part in the action which followed; but her fate served as a warning to the *Alexander* and *Swiftsure*, which would else have infallibly struck on the shoal and perished. The way in which these ships entered the bay and took up their stations amidst the gloom of night by the light of the increasing cannonade, excited the admiration of all who witnessed it (2).

Dreadful
na ure of
the action. The British ships, however, had a severe fire to sustain as they successively passed along the enemy's line to take up their appointed stations; and the great size of several of the French squadron rendered them more than a match for any single vessel the English could oppose to them. The *Vanguard*, which bore proudly down, bearing the admiral's flag and six colours on different parts of the rigging, had every man at the first six guns on the fore-castle killed or wounded in a few minutes, and they were three times swept off before the action closed. The *Bellerophon* dropt her stern anchor close under the bow of the *l'Orient*, and, notwithstanding the

(1) Southey, i. 228, 229. James, ii. 238, 239. (2) Dum. ii. 150. South, i. 231. Ann. Reg. 1798, Ann. Reg. 1798, 143. Dum. ii. 149. Jom. xi. 11, 17. 145.

immense disproportion of force, continued to engage her first rate antagonist till her own masts had all gone overboard, and every officer was either killed or wounded, when she drifted away with the tide, overwhelmed, but not subdued, a glorious monument of unconquerable valour. As she floated along, she came close to the *Swiftsure*, which was coming into action, and not having the lights at the mizen-peak, which Nelson had ordered as a signal by which his own ships might distinguish each other, she was at first mistaken for an enemy. Fortunately, Captain Hallowell, who commanded that vessel, had the presence of mind to order his men not to fire, till he ascertained whether the hulk was a friend or an enemy, and thus a catastrophe was prevented which might have proved fatal to both of these ships. The station of the *Bellerophon* in combating the *l'Orient* was now taken by the *Swiftsure*, which opened at once a steady fire on the quarter of the *Franklin* and the bows of the French admiral, while the *Alexander* anchored on his larboard quarter, and, with the *Leander*, completed the destruction of their gigantic opponent (1).

The *l'Orient* blows up. It was now dark, but both fleets were illuminated by the incessant discharge of above two thousand pieces of cannon, and the volumes of flame and smoke that rolled away from the bay gave it the appearance as if a terrific volcano had suddenly burst forth in the midst of the sea. Victory, however, soon declared for the British; before nine, three ships of the line had struck, and two were dismasted; and the flames were seen bursting forth from the *l'Orient*, as she still continued, with unabated energy, her heroic defence. They spread with frightful rapidity, the fire of the *Swiftsure* was directed with such fatal precision to the burning part, that all attempts to extinguish it proved ineffectual; and the masts and rigging were soon wrapped in flames, which threw a prodigious light over the heavens, and rendered the situation of every ship in both fleets distinctly visible. The sight redoubled the ardour of the British seamen, by exhibiting the shattered condition and lowered colours of so many of their enemies, and loud cheers from the whole fleet announced every successive flag that was struck. As the fire approached the magazine of the *l'Orient*, many officers and men jumped overboard, and were picked up by the English boats; others were dragged into the port-holes of the nearest British ships, who for that purpose suspended their firing; but the greater part of the crew, with heroic bravery, stood to their guns to the last, and continued to fire from the lower deck. At ten o'clock she blew up, with an explosion so tremendous, that nothing in ancient or modern war was ever equal to it. Every ship in the hostile fleets was shaken to its centre; the firing by universal consent ceased on both sides, and the tremendous explosion was followed by a silence still more awful, interrupted only, after the lapse of some minutes, by the splash of the shattered masts and yards falling into the water from the vast height to which they had been thrown. The British ships in the vicinity, with admirable coolness had made preparations to avoid the conflagration; all the shrouds and sails were thoroughly wetted, and sailors stationed with buckets of water to extinguish any burning fragments which might fall upon their decks. By these means, although large burning masses fell on the *Swiftsure* and *Alexander*, they were extinguished without doing any serious damage (2).

After a pause of ten minutes, the firing recommenced, and continued

(1) South. i. 230, 232. Ann. Reg. 1798, 145. James, ii. 240, 248. Jom. xi. 417, 418.

(2) South. i. 236, 238. James, ii. 246, 249, Ann.

Reg. 1798, 146. Miot. Exped. en Egypte, 212, 217. Gautheume's Report, Cor. Conf. v. 436, 441.

Glorious victory in which it terminates. without intermission till after midnight, when it gradually grew slacker, from the shattered condition of the French ships and the exhaustion of the British sailors, numbers of whom fell asleep beside their guns, the instant a momentary cessation of loading took place. At day-break the magnitude of the victory was apparent; not a vestige of the *L'Orient* was to be seen; the frigate *La Sérieuse* was sunk, and the whole French line, with the exception of the *Guillaume Tell* and *Généreux*, had struck their colours. These ships having been little engaged in the action, cut their cables, and stood out to sea, followed by the two frigates: they were gallantly pursued by the *Zealous*, which was rapidly gaining on them; but as there was no other ship of the line in a condition to support her, she was recalled, and these ships escaped. Had the *Culloden* not struck on the shoal, and the frigates belonging to the squadron been present, not one of the enemy's fleet would have escaped to convey the mournful tidings to France (1).

Wound of Nelson. Early in the battle, the English admiral received a severe wound on the head, from a piece of Langridge shot. Captain Berry caught him in his arms as he was falling. Nelson, and all around him, thought, from the great effusion of blood, that he was killed. When he was carried to the cockpit, the surgeon quitted the seaman whose wounds he was dressing, to attend to the admiral. "No," said Nelson; "I will take my turn with my brave fellows." Nor would he suffer his wound to be examined till every man, who had previously been brought down, was properly attended to. Fully believing that the wound was mortal, and that he was about to die, as he had ever desired, in the moment of victory, he called for the chaplain, and desired him to deliver what he conceived to be his dying remembrance to Lady Nelson; and, seizing a pen, contrived to write a few words, marking his devout sense of the success which had already been obtained. When the surgeon came in due time to inspect the wound—for no entreaties could prevail on him to let it be examined sooner—the most anxious silence prevailed; and the joy of the wounded men, and of the whole crew, when they found the injury was only superficial, gave Nelson deeper pleasure than the unexpected assurance that his own life was in no danger. When the cry rose that the *L'Orient* was on fire, he contrived to make his way, alone and unassisted, to the quarterdeck, where he instantly gave orders that boats should be dispatched to the relief of the enemy (2).

Heroic deeds in the French squadron. Nor were heroic deeds confined to the British squadron. Most of the captains of the French fleet were killed or wounded, and they all fought with the enthusiastic courage which is characteristic of their nation. The captain of the *Tonnant*, *Du Petit-Thouars*, when both his legs were carried away by a cannon ball, refused to quit the quarterdeck, and made his crew swear not to strike their colours as long as they had a man capable of standing to their guns. Admiral *Brueys* died the death of the brave on his quarterdeck, exhorting his men to continue the combat to the last extremity. *Casa Bianca*, captain of the *L'Orient*, fell mortally wounded, when the flames were devouring that splendid vessel; his son, a boy of ten years of age, was combating beside him when he was struck, and embracing his father, resolutely refused to quit the ship, though a gun-boat was come alongside to bring him off. He contrived to bind his dying parent to the mast, which had fallen into the sea, and floated off with the precious charge (3); he was seen

(1) James, 249, 251, South, i. 238, 240. Ann, Reg. 1798, 146, 147.

(2) South, i. 234, 235, 236.

(3) Dum, ii. 151, 152. James, ii. 236, 237.

after the explosion by some of the British squadron who made the utmost efforts to save his life; but, in the agitation of the waves following that dreadful event, both were swallowed up, and seen no more (1).

Great results of the victory. Such was the battle of the Nile, for which he who gained it felt that victory was too feeble a word; he called it conquest. Of thirteen ships of the line, nine were taken and two burnt; of four frigates, one was sunk and one burnt. The British loss was eight hundred and ninety five in killed and wounded; they had to lament the death of only one commander, Captain Westcott, a brave and able officer. Of the French, five thousand two hundred and twenty-five perished, and three thousand one hundred and five were taken and sent on shore, including the wounded, with all their effects, on their parole not to serve again till regularly exchanged; an act of humanity which was ill requited by Napoléon, who incorporated the whole who were capable of bearing arms into a regiment of his army (2). The annals of the world do not afford an example of so complete an overthrow of so great an armament.

Terrible traces of the action on shore. The Arabs and Egyptians lined the shore during this terrible engagement, and beheld with mingled terror and astonishment the destruction which the Europeans were inflicting on each other. The beach, for an extent of four leagues, was covered with wreck, and innumerable bodies were seen floating in the bay, in spite of the utmost exertions of both fleets to sink them. No sooner, however, was the conquest completed, than a perfect stillness pervaded the whole squadron; it was the moment of the thanksgiving, which, by orders of Nelson, was offered up through all the fleet, for the signal success which the Almighty had vouchsafed to the British arms. The French prisoners remarked that it was no wonder such order was preserved in the English navy, when at such an hour, and after such a victory, their minds could be impressed with such sentiments (3).

Had Nelson possessed a few frigates or bomb-vessels, the whole transports and small craft in the harbour of Alexandria might have been destroyed in a few hours. So severely did he feel the want of them at this period, that in a despatch to the Admiralty, he declared, "Were I to die at this moment, *want of frigates* would be found engraven on my heart!" The want of such light vessels, however, rendered any attack on the shipping in the shoal water of Alexandria perfectly impossible; and it was not without the utmost exer-

(1) Napoléon addressed the following noble letter to Madame Brueys on her husband's death: "Your husband has been killed by a cannon-ball while combating on his quarterdeck. He died without suffering; the death the most easy and the most envied by the brave. I feel warmly for your grief. The moment which separates us from the object which we love is terrible; we feel isolated on the earth; we almost experience the convulsions of the lost agony; the faculties of the soul are annihilated; its connexion with the earth is preserved only across a veil which distorts every thing. We feel in such a situation, that there is nothing which yet binds us to life; that it were far better to die; but when, after such first and unavoidable throes, we press our children to our hearts, tears, and more tender sentiments arise; life becomes bearable for their sakes. Yes, madame, they will open the fountains of your heart; you will watch their childhood; educate their youth; you will speak to them of their father, of your present grief, and of the loss which they and the Republic have sustained in his death.

After having resumed the interest in life by the chord of maternal love, you will perhaps feel some consolation from the friendship and warm interest which I shall ever take in the widow of my friend."

—*Corres. Conf.* v. 383.

(2) James, ii. 254, 255. South. i. 240. Dum. ii. 152, 153. James, ii. 265. Sav. i. 65.

"The English," says Kleber, "have had the disinterestedness to restore every thing to their prisoners; they would not permit an iota to be taken from them. The consequence was, that they display in Alexandria a luxury and elegance, which exhibit a strange contrast to the destitute condition of the land forces."—*Despatch to Napoléon, 22d Aug. 1798*; BOUVERIENNE, ii. 160.—The wounded French sent ashore, are stated by Admiral Ganteaume, in his official report, to amount to nearly eight thousand; an astonishing number, if correct considering that the whole French crews in the action did not exceed twelve thousand.—*See Ganteaume's Report—Corres. Conf. de Napoléon*, v. 483.

(3) South. i. 241.

tions and the united co-operation of all the officers and men, that the fleet was refitted so far as to be able to proceed to sea. Having at length, however, overcome every obstacle, and dispatched an overland messenger to Bombay, to acquaint the government there with his success, he set sail from Aboukir bay on the 18th August, leaving three ships of the line to blockade the harbour of Alexandria. Three of the prizes, being perfect wrecks, were burned; the remaining six arrived in safety at Gibraltar (1).

Honours bestowed upon Nelson. Honours and rewards were showered by a grateful nation upon the heroes of the Nile. Nelson was created Baron Nelson of the Nile, with a pension of £2000 a-year to himself and his two immediate successors; the Grand Seigneur, the Emperor of Russia, the King of Sardinia, the King of Naples, the East India Company, made him magnificent presents; and his name was embalmed for ever in the recollection of his grateful country. With truth did Mr. Pitt observe in Parliament, when reproached for not conferring on him a higher dignity, "Admiral Nelson's fame will be coequal with the British name, and it will be remembered that he gained the greatest naval victory on record, when no man will think of asking whether he had been created a baron, a viscount, or an earl (2)."

(1) James, ii. 266, 267. South, i. 255, 257.

(2) Parl. Hist. xxxiii. p. 1360. South, i. 249.

Napoleon, who never failed to lay every misfortune with which he was connected, upon fortune, destiny, or the faults of others, rather than his own errors, has laboured to exculpate himself from the disaster in Aboukir bay, and declared, in his official despatch to the Directory, that, on July 6, before leaving Alexandria, he wrote to Admiral Brueys, directing him to retire within the harbour of that town, or if that was impossible, make the best of his way to Corfu, [Nap. ii. 170.] and that the catastrophe arose from his disobedience. It is true he sent on order; but it was *conditional*, and as follows:

Napoleon's correspondence with Brueys as to getting the fleet into Alexandria. — "Admiral Brueys will cause the fleet, in the course of to-morrow, to enter the old harbour of Alexandria, if the time permits, and there is sufficient depth of water. If there is not in the harbour sufficient draught, he will take such measures, that during the course of to-morrow, he may have disembarked the artillery and stores, and the individuals belonging to the army, retaining only a hundred soldiers in each ship of the line, and forty in each frigate. The admiral, in the course of to-morrow, will let the general know whether the squadron can get into Alexandria, or can defend itself, while lying in the roads of Aboukir, against a superior enemy; and if it can do neither of these things, it will make the best of its way to Corfu, leaving at Alexandria only the Dubois and Causse, with the Diana, Juno, Alcetes, and Artemise frigates." [Letter, 3d July, 1798.] The order to proceed to Corfu therefore, was *conditional*; to take effect only on failure to get into Alexandria, or find a defensible roadstead; and, from the following letters, it appears that Brueys with the full knowledge of the general-in-chief, proceeded to adopt the prior alternative of taking up a defensive position at Aboukir. The day before, Brueys had written to Napoleon: "All the accounts I have hitherto received are unsatisfactory as to the possibility of getting into the harbour, as the bar has only twenty two feet six inches, which our smallest seventy-fours draw, so that entry is impossible. My present position is untenable, by reason of the rocks with which the bottom of the bay is strewed; and if attacked, I should be infallibly destroyed by the enemy, if I had the misfortune to await them in this place. The only thing that I see practicable is, to

take shelter in the moorings of Beckier (Aboukir), where the bottom is good, and I could take such a position as would render me secure from the enemy."

[Letter, 2d July, 1798.] On the 6th July, Brueys wrote to Napoleon, in addition to his letter of the 2d: "I have neglected nothing which might permit the ships of the line to get into the old port; but it is a labour which requires much time and patience. The loss of a single vessel is too considerable to allow any thing to be permitted to hazard; and hitherto it appears that we cannot attempt such a measure without incurring the greatest dangers; that is the opinion of all the most experienced officers on board the fleet. Admiral Villeneuve and Casa Bianca regard it as impossible. When I have sounded the roadstead of Beckier, I will send you a report of that road. Want of provisions is severely felt in the fleet; on board many vessels there is only 7th July. biscuit for fourteen days." On the 7th July, he again wrote to Napoleon: "I thank you for the precaution you have taken in sending engineer and artillery officers to meet me in the bay of Beckier. I shall concert measures with them as soon as we are moored, and if I am fortunate enough to discover a position where batteries on shore may protect the two extremities of my line, I shall regard the position as impregnable, at least during summer and autumn. It is the more desirable to remain there, because I can set sail *en masse* when I think fit; whereas, even if I could get into the harbour of Alexandria, I should be blockaded by a single vessel of the enemy, and should be unable to contribute

13th July. anything to your glory." On the 13th July, he again wrote to Napoleon: "I am fortifying my position, in case of being obliged to combat at anchor. I have demanded two mortars from Alexandria to put on the sand bank; but I am less apprehensive of that than the other extremity of the line, against which the principal efforts of the enemy will in all probability be directed." And, 26th July. on 26th July, Brueys wrote again to him: "The officers whom I have charged with the sounding of the port, have at length announced that their labours are concluded; I shall forthwith transmit the plan, when I have received it, that you 30th July. may decide what vessels are to enter." On the 30th, Napoleon wrote in answer: "I have received all your letters. The intelligence which I have received of the soundings, induces me to believe that you are by this time safely in the port:"

Disastrous effects of this blow to the French army.

The battle of the Nile was a mortal stroke to Napoléon and the French army. He was too clear-sighted not to perceive the fatal and irremediable nature of the loss there incurred. It had been his design, after the conquest of Egypt was secured, to embark a great proportion of his forces, return to Toulon, and employ them on some other and still greater expedition against the power of England. By this irreparable loss he found these prospects for ever blasted; the army exiled, without hope of return, on an inhospitable shore, all means of preserving his recent conquest frustrated, and himself destined, to all appearance, instead of changing the face of the world, to maintain an inglorious and hopeless struggle in a corner of the Turkish empire. All his dreams of European conquests and Oriental revolutions appeared at once to vanish, by the destruction of the resources from which they were to be realized; and nothing remained but the painful certainty that he had doomed to a lingering fate the finest army of the Republic, and endangered its independence by the sacrifice of so large a portion of its defenders. But, though in secret overwhelmed by the disaster, he maintained in public the appearance of equanimity, and suffered nothing to escape his lips which could add to the discouragement of his soldiers. "Well," said he, "we must remain here, or issue from it equal in grandeur to the ancients."—"Yes," replied Kléber, "we must do great things. I am preparing my mind to go through them (1)."

Despair of the inferior officers and soldiers.

But while the chiefs of the army thus endeavoured to conceal the gloomy presentiments which overwhelmed their minds, the inferior officers and soldiers knew no bounds to the despair with which they were filled. Already, before they reached Cairo, the illusion of the expedition had been dispelled; the riches of the East had given place to poverty and suffering; the promised land had turned out an arid wilderness. But when intelligence arrived of the destruction of the fleet, and with it of all hope of returning to France, except as prisoners of war, they gave vent to such loud complaints, that it required all the firmness of the generals to prevent a sedition breaking out. Many soldiers in despair blew out their brains; others

[Corresp. Conf. v. 192, 194, 200, 201, 222, 237, 266, 332, 404.] and ordered him forthwith to do so, or proceed to Corfu. On the day after this last letter was written, Nelson's fleet attacked Brueys in the bay of Aboukir. Napoléon, therefore, was perfectly aware that the fleet was lying in Aboukir bay; and it was evidently retained there by his orders, or with his approbation, as a support to the army, or a means of retreat in case of disaster. In truth, such was the penury of the country, that the fleet could not lay in provisions at Alexandria to enable it to stand out to sea. [Bour. ii. 144.] He was too able a man, besides, to hazard such an army without any means of retreat in an unknown country; and Bourrienne declares, that previous to the taking of Cairo, he often talked with him on re-embarking the army, and laughed himself at the false colours in which he had represented the matter to the Directory. [Ibid. Bour. ii. 144, 155, 315, 336.] It is proved, by indisputable evidence, that the fleet was detained by the orders, or with the concurrence, of Napoleon. "It may perhaps be said," says Admiral Gauthaume, the second in command, who survived the defeat, "that it would have been more prudent to have quitted the coast after the debarcation was effected; but, considering the orders of the commander-in-chief, and the incalculable support which the fleet gave to the land-forces, the admiral conceived it to be his duty not to abandon those seas. [Ibid. vi. 89.] Brueys

also said to Lavalette, in Aboukir bay, on the 21st July, "Since I could not get into the old harbour of Alexandria, nor retire from the coast of Egypt, without news from the army, I have established myself here in as strong a position as I could." [Lav. i. 274.] The inference to be drawn from these documents is, that neither Napoleon nor Brueys was to blame for the disaster which happened in Aboukir bay; that the former ordered the fleet to enter Alexandria or take a defensible position; and if he could do neither, then proceed to Corfu, but that the latter was unable, from the limited draught of water at the bar, to do the one, and, agreeably to his orders, attempted the other; that it lay at Aboukir bay, with the full knowledge of the general-in-chief, and without his being able to prevent it, though his penetration in the outset perceived the danger to which it was exposed in so doing; and that the only real culpability in the case is imputable to Napoleon, in having endeavoured, after Brueys' death, to blacken his character, by representing the disaster to the Directory as exclusively imputable to that officer, and as having arisen from his disobedience of orders, when, in fact, it arose from extraneous circumstances, over which the admiral had no control, having rendered it necessary for him to adopt the second alternative prescribed to him by his commander.

(1) Th. x. 138, 139. Miot, 79. Bour. ii. 133, 135.

threw themselves into the Nile, and perished, with their arms and baggage. When the generals passed by, the cry, "There go the murderers of the French," involuntarily burst from the ranks. By degrees, however, this stunning misfortune, like every other disaster in life, was softened by time. The soldiers, deprived of the possibility of returning, ceased to disquiet themselves about it, and ultimately they resigned themselves with much greater composure to a continued residence in Egypt, than they could have done had the fleet remained to keep alive for ever in their breasts the desire of returning to their native country (1).

It at once brings on a war between France and Turkey. The consequences of the battle of the Nile were, to the last degree, disastrous to France. Its effects in Europe were immense, by reviving, as will be detailed hereafter, the coalition against its Republican government; but in the East, it at once brought on the Egyptian army the whole weight of the Ottoman empire. The French ambassador at Constantinople had found great difficulty for long in restraining the indignation of the Sultan; the good sense of the Turks could not easily be persuaded that it was an act of friendship to the Porte to invade one of the most important provinces of the empire, destroy its militia, and subject its inhabitants to the dominion of an European power. No sooner, therefore, was the Divan at liberty to speak their real sentiments, by the destruction of the armament which had so long spread terror through the Levant, than they gave vent to their indignation. War was formally declared against France, the differences with Russia adjusted, and the formation of an army immediately decreed to restore the authority of the Crescent on the banks of the Nile (2).

Passage of the Hellespont by the Russian fleet. Among the many wonders of this eventful period, not the least surprising was the alliance which the French invasion of Egypt produced between Turkey and Russia, and the suspension of all the ancient animosity between the Christians and Mussulmans, in the pressure of a danger common to both. This soon led to an event so extraordinary, that it produced a profound impression even on the minds of the Mussulman spectators. On the 1st September, a Russian fleet, of ten ships of the line and eight frigates, entered the canal of the Bosphorus, and united at the Golden Horn with the Turkish squadron; from whence the combined force, in presence of an immense concourse of spectators, whose acclamations rent the skies, passed under the walls of the Seraglio, and swept majestically through the classic stream of the Hellespont. The effect of the passage of so vast an armament through the beautiful scenery of the straits, was much enhanced by the brilliancy of the sun, which shone in unclouded splendour on its full-spread sails; the placid surface of the water reflected alike the Russian masts and the Turkish minarets; and the multitude, both European and Mussulman, were never weary of admiring the magnificent spectacle, which so forcibly imprinted upon their minds a sense of the extraordinary alliance which the French Revolution had produced, and the slumber in which it had plunged national antipathies the most violent, and religious discord the most inveterate (3).

The combined squadrons, not being required on the coast of Egypt, steered for the island of Corfu, and immediately established a rigorous blockade of its fortress and noble harbour, which soon began to feel the want of provi-

(1) Bour. ii. 134, 138. Sav. i. 65.

(3) Hard. vi. 298, 299.

(2) Th. x. 143. Dum. ii. 160, 161. Hard. vi. 300. Nap. ii. 172.

sions. Already, without any formal treaty, the courts of St.-Petersburg, London, and Constantinople, acted in concert, and the bases of a triple alliance were laid, and sent to their respective courts for ratification (1).

Critical
situation of
the French
army. Vast
efforts of
Napoléon.

The situation of the French army was now in the highest degree critical. Isolated from their country, unable either to obtain succours from home, or to regain it in case of disaster, pressed and blockaded by the fleets of England, in the midst of a hostile population, they were about to be exposed to the formidable forces of the Turkish empire. In these discouraging circumstances, the firmness of Napoléon, so far from forsaking, only prompted him to redouble his efforts to establish his authority firmly in the conquered country. The months which immediately followed the destruction of the fleet were marked by an extraordinary degree of activity in every department. At Alexandria, Rosetta, and Cairo, mills were established, in which flour was ground as finely as at Paris; hospitals were formed, where the sick were treated with the most sedulous care by the distinguished talents of Larrey and Desgenettes; a foundry, where cannon were cast, and a manufactory of gunpowder and saltpetre, rendered the army independent of external aid for its ammunition and artillery. An institute at Cairo, formed on the model of that at Paris, concentrated the labours of the numerous scientific persons who accompanied the army; the geography, antiquities, hieroglyphics, and natural history of Egypt, began to be studied with an accuracy unknown in modern times; the extremities and line of the canal of Suez were explored by Napoléon in person, with the most extraordinary ardour; a flotilla formed on the Nile; printing presses set agoing at Cairo; the cavalry and artillery remounted with the admirable horses of Arabia, the troops equipped in new clothing, manufactured in the country; the fortifications of Rosetta, Damietta, Alexandria, and Salabieh, put in a respectable posture of defence; while the skilful draughtsmen who accompanied the expedition, prepared, amidst the wonders of Upper Egypt, the magnificent work which, under the auspices of Denon, has immortalized the expedition (2).

Expedition
of Desaix
to Upper
Egypt.

As soon as the inundation of the Nile had subsided, Desaix commenced his march to Upper Egypt, to pursue the broken remains of Mourad Bey's corps. On the 7th October, he came up with the enemy, consisting of four thousand Mamelukes and Arabs, and six thousand Fellahs, stationed in the village of Sidiman. The French were not more than two thousand three hundred strong; they formed three squares, and received the charges as at the battle of the Pyramids, of which this action in all its parts was a repetition on a smaller scale. The smallest square, however, was broken by the impetuous shock of the Mamelukes; but the soldiers, with admirable presence of mind, fell on their faces, so that the loss was not so great as might have been expected (3). All the efforts of the cavalry failed against the steady sides of the larger squares; and at length, the Mamelukes being broken and dispersed, the village was stormed with great slaughter, and the soldiers returned to take a severe vengeance on a body of the enemy, who, during the assault, had committed great carnage on those wounded in

(1) Hard. vi. 300.

(2) Dum. ii. 172, 173, 184, 185. Sav. i. 66, 67. Bour. ii. 162, 163. Th. x. 142, 143.

(3) On this, as on other occasions, the scientific characters and draughtsmen who attended the army, were huddled with the baggage into the centre, as the only place of security, the moment that the

enemy appeared. No sooner were the Mameluke horse descried, than the word was given, "Form square; artillery to the angles; asses and *savans* to the centre;" a command which afforded no small merriment to the sold ers, and made them call the asses *demi-savans*.—LAS CASES, i. 225.

the broken square. This action was more bloody than any which had yet occurred in Egypt; the French having lost three hundred and forty men killed, and one hundred and sixty wounded; a great proportion, when every life was precious, and no means of replacing it existed (1). It was decisive, however, of the fate of Upper Egypt. Desaix continued steadily to advance, driving his indefatigable opponents continually before him; the rose-covered fields of Faioum, the Lake Mœris, the City of the Dead, were successively visited; another cloud of Mamelukes was dispersed by the rolling fire of the French at Samanhout; and at length the ruins of Luxor opened to their view, and the astonished soldiers gazed on the avenues of sphinxes, gigantic remains of temples, obelisks, and sepulchral monuments, which are destined to perpetuate to the end of the world the glories of the city of Thebes (2).

Bloody suppression of a revolt at Cairo.

While Desaix was thus extending the French dominion towards the cataracts of the Nile, a dangerous insurrection was extinguished in blood in the centre of Egypt. Notwithstanding all the efforts of Napoléon to conciliate the Mussulman population, the Beys still retained a considerable influence over them, and the declaration of war by the Porte revived the spirit of religious hostility, which he had been at such pains to allay. In the end of October, the insurrection broke out, at a time when the French were so far from suspecting their danger, that they had very few troops within the town. Dupuis, the commander of the city, who proceeded with a feeble escort to quell the tumult, was slain, with several of his officers; a vast number of insulated Frenchmen were murdered, and the house of General Caffarelli was besieged and forced. The *alarme* was immediately beat in the streets, several battalions in the neighbourhood entered the town, the citadel began to bombard the most populous quarters, and the Turks, driven into the principal mosques, prepared for a desperate resistance. During the night they barricaded their posts, and the Arabs advanced from the desert to support their efforts; but it was all in vain. The French commander drove back the Bedouins into the inundation of the Nile, the mosques were forced, the buildings which sheltered the insurgents battered down or destroyed, and, after the slaughter of above five thousand of the inhabitants, and the conflagration of a considerable part of the city, Cairo submitted to the conqueror. This terrible disaster, with the cruel executions which followed it, struck such a terror into the Mahometan population, that they never after made the smallest attempt to get quit of the French authority (3).

Expedition of Napoléon to the Red Sea.

Meanwhile, Napoléon made an expedition in person to Suez, in order to inspect the line of the Roman canal, which united the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. At Suez he visited the harbour, and gave orders for the construction of new works, and the formation of an infant marine; and passed the Red Sea, in a dry channel, when the tide was out, on the identical passage which had been traversed three thousand years before, by the children of Israel. Having refreshed himself at the fountains which still bear the name of the Wells of Moses, at the foot of Mount-Sinai, and visited a great reservoir, constructed by the Venetians in the sixteenth century, he returned to recross to the African side. It was dark when he reached the shore; and in crossing the sands, as the tide was flowing, they wandered from the right path, and were for some time exposed to the most

(1) Sav. i. 69, 70. Th. x. 379, 380.

(2) Sav. i. 70, 91. Jom. xi. 422.

(3) Dum. ii. 176, 177. Jom. x. 423, 424. Bour. ii. 182.

imminent danger. Already the water was up to their middle, and still rapidly flowing, when the presence of mind of Napoléon extricated them from their perilous situation. He caused one of his escort to go in every direction, and shout when he found the depth of water increasing, and that he had lost his footing; by this means it was discovered in what quarter the slope of the shore ascended, and the party at length gained the coast of Egypt. "Had I perished in that manner like Pharaoh," and Napoléon, "it would have furnished all the preachers of Christendom with a magnificent text against me (1)."

Extraordi-
nary procla-
mation of
Napoléon.

The suppression of the revolts drew from Napoléon one of those singular proclamations which are so characteristic of the vague ambition of his mind;—"Scheiks, Ulemats, Orators of the Mosque, teach the people, that those who become my enemies shall have no refuge in this world or the next. Is there any one so blind as not to see that I am the Man of Destiny? Make the people understand, that from the beginning of time it was ordained, that, having destroyed the enemies of Islamism, and vanquished the Cross, I should come from the distant parts of the West, to accomplish my destined task. Show them, that in twenty passages of the Koran my coming is foretold. I could demand a reckoning from each of you, of the most secret thoughts of his soul, since to me every thing is known; but the day will come, when all shall know from whom I derived my commission, and that human efforts cannot prevail against me." Thus did Napoléon expect that he was to gain the confidence of the Mussulmans, at the very time when he was executing thirty of their number a-day, and throwing their corpses, in sacks, every night into the Nile (2).

He resolves
to penetrate
into Syria.

Being now excluded from all intercourse with Europe, and menaced with a serious attack by land and sea from the Turks, Napoléon resolved to assail his enemies by an expedition into Syria, where the principal army of the Sultan was assembling. Prudence prescribed that he should anticipate the enemy, and not wait till, having assembled their strength, a preponderating force was ready to fall upon the French army. But it was not merely defensive operations that the general contemplated; his ardent mind, now thrown upon its own resources, and deprived of all assistance from Europe, indulged in visions of Oriental conquest. To advance into Syria, with a part of his troops, and rouse the population of that country and Asia Minor against the Turkish rule; assemble an army of fifteen thousand French veterans, and a hundred thousand Asiatic auxiliaries on the Euphrates, and overawe at once Persia, Turkey, and India, formed the splendid project which filled his imagination. His eyes were continually fixed on the deserts which separated Asia Minor from Persia; he had sounded the dispositions of the Persian court, and ascertained that, for a sum of money, they were willing to allow the passage of his army through their territories; and he confidently expected to renew the march of Alexander, from the shores of the Nile to those of the Ganges. Having overrun India, and established a colossal reputation, he projected returning to Europe; attacking Turkey and Austria with the whole forces of the East, and establishing an empire, greater than that of the Romans, in the centre of Eu-

His vast
designs.

(1) Bour. ii. 195, 196. Las Cas. i. 226. Sav. i. 99.

(2) Miot, 103. Scott, iv. 86. Th. x. 394.

"Every night," said Napoléon, in a letter to Regnier, "we cut off thirty heads, and those of several chiefs; that will teach them, I think, a good lesson." The victims were put to death in prison,

thrust into sacks, and thrown into the Nile. This continued six days after tranquillity was restored. [Bour. ii. 184.] The executions were continued for long after, and under circumstances that will admit of neither extenuation nor apology.

ropean civilisation. Full of these ideas, he wrote to Tippoo Saib, that “ he
 Jan 9, 1799. had arrived on the shores of the Red Sea with an innumerable and
 invincible army, and inviting him to send a confidential person to Suez,
 to concert measures for the destruction of the British power in Hind-
 dostan (1).”

Limited extent of his forces. The forces, however, which the French general could command
 for the Syrian expedition, were by no means commensurate to
 these magnificent projects. They consisted only of thirteen thousand men ;
 for although the army had been recruited by the three thousand prisoners
 sent back by the British after the battle of the Nile, and almost all the sailors
 of the transports, yet such were the losses which had been sustained since
 the period when they landed, by fatigue, sickness, and the sword, that no
 larger number could be spared from the defence of Egypt. These, with nine
 hundred cavalry, and forty-nine pieces of cannon, constituted the whole force
 with which Napoléon expected to change the face of the world ; while the
 reserves left on the banks of the Nile did not exceed in all sixteen thousand
 men. The artillery destined for the siege of Acre, the capital of the Pacha
 Djezzar, was put on board three frigates at Alexandria, and orders dispatched
 to Villeneuve at Malta to endeavour to escape the vigilance of the English
 cruisers, and come to support the maritime operations (2).

11th Feb. On the 11th February, the army commenced its march over the
 desert which separates Africa from Asia. The track, otherwise impercep-
 tible amidst the blowing sand, was distinctly marked by innumerable skele-
 tons of men and animals, which had perished on that solitary pathway, the
 line of communication between Asia and Africa, which from the earliest
 times had been frequented by the human race. Six days afterwards, Napo-
 léon reached El Arish, where the camp of the Mamelukes was surprised dur-
 ing the night, and after a siege of two days the fort capitulated.

Passage of the Syrian Desert. The sufferings of the troops, however, were extreme in crossing
 the desert ; the excessive heat of the weather, and the want of water, pro-
 duced the greatest discontent among the soldiers, and Napoléon felt the ne-
 cessity of bringing his men as rapidly as possible through that perilous dis-
 trict. The garrison were conveyed as prisoners in the rear of the army, which
28th March. augmented their difficulty in obtaining subsistence. Damas was
 abandoned by the Mussulman forces at the sight of the French squares of
 infantry, and at length the granite pillars were passed which marked the
 confines of Asia and Africa ; the hitherto clear and glowing sky was streaked
 by a veil of clouds, some drops of rain refreshed the parched lips of the sol-
 diers, and the suffering troops beheld the green valleys and wood-covered
 hills of Syria. The soldiers at first mistook them for the *mirage* of the desert,
 which had so often disappointed their hopes ; they hardly ventured to trust
 their own eyes, when they beheld woods and water, green meadows, and
 olive groves, and all the features of European scenery ; but at length, the ap-
 pearance of verdant slopes and clear brooks convinced them, that they had
 passed from the sands of Africa to a land watered by the dew of heaven. But
 if the days were more refreshing, the nights were far more uncomfortable
 than on the banks of the Nile ; the heavy dews and rains of Syria soon pene-
 trated the thin clothing of the troops, and rendered their situation extremely
 disagreeable ; and, drenched with rain, they soon came to regret, at least for

(1) Bour. ii. 188, 189. Nap. ii. 300, 301, and
 Corresp. Conf. vi. 192.

(2) Miot, 111. Jom, xi. 397, 400. Dum. ii. 186,
 190.

their night bivouacs, the dry sands and star-bespangled firmament of Egypt (1).

Storming of Jaffa.

Jaffa, the Joppa of antiquity, was the first considerable town of Palestine which presented itself to the French in the course of their march. It was invested on the 4th of March, and a flag of truce, whom Napoléon sent to summon the town, beheaded on the spot. The breach being declared practicable, the assault took place on the 6th, and success was for some time doubtful; but the grenadiers of Bon's division at length discovered, on the sea-side, an opening left unguarded, by which they entered, and in the confusion occasioned by this unexpected success, the breach was carried, and the Turks driven from the walls (2). A desperate carnage took place, and the town was delivered over to the horrors of war, which never appeared in a more frightful form (3).

Four thousand of the garrison capitulate.

During this scene of slaughter, a large part of the garrison, consisting chiefly of Albanians and Arnaouts, had taken refuge in some old caravanseries, where they called out from the windows that they would lay down their arms, provided their lives were spared; but that if not, they would defend themselves to the last extremity. The officers, Eugene Beauharnais and Crosier, his own aides-de-camp, took upon themselves to agree to the proposal, although the garrison had all been devoted by Napoléon to destruction; and they brought them, disarmed, in two bodies, the one consisting of two thousand five hundred men, the other of fifteen hundred, to the general's headquarters. Napoléon received them with a stern and relentless air, and expressed the greatest indignation against his aides-de-camp, for encumbering him with such a body of prisoners in the famished condition of the army. The unhappy wretches were made to sit down, with their hands tied behind their backs, in front of the tents; despair was already painted in their countenances. They uttered no cries, but seemed resigned to death. The French gave them biscuit and water; and a council of war was summoned to deliberate on their fate (4).

Massacre of these prisoners.

For two days the terrible question was debated, what was to be done with these captives; and the French officers approached it without any predisposition to cruel measures. But the difficulties were represented as insurmountable on the side of humanity. If they sent them back, it was said, to Egypt, a considerable detachment would be required to guard so large a body of captives, and that could ill be spared from the army in its present situation; if they gave them their liberty, they would forthwith join the garrison of Acre, or the clouds of Arabs who already hung on the flanks of the army; if they were incorporated unarmed in the ranks, the prisoners would add grievously to the number of mouths for whom, already, it was

(1) Bour. ii. 215, 217. Miot, 129. Jom. x. 401. Dum. ii. 190.

(2) Nap. ii. 373. Jom. xi. 403. Dum. ii. 195. Miot, 138, 139.

(3) Though resolved utterly to exterminate, if he could, the Pacha of Acre, Napoléon kept up his usual system of endeavouring to persuade him that he invaded his country with no hostile intentions. On the 9th of March he wrote to him from Jaffa, yet recking with the blood shed in this terrible assault:—"Since my entry into Egypt, I have sent you several letters expressive of my wish not to be involved in hostilities with you, and that my sole object was to disperse the Mamelukes. The provinces of Gaza and Jaffa are in my power; I have treated with generosity those who surrendered at

discretion, with severity those who violated the laws of war. In a few days I shall march against Acre; but what cause of hostility have I with an old man whom I do not know? What are a few leagues of territory to me? Since God gives me victory, I wish to imitate his clemency, not only towards the people, but their rulers. You have no reason for being my enemy, since you were the foe of the Mamelukes; become again my friend; declare war against the English and the Mamelukes, and I will do you as much good as I have done, and I can do you evil." The Pacha, however, paid no regard to this communication, and continued, without interruption, his preparations of defence.—See *Correspond. de Napoléon*, vi. 232.

(4) Bour. ii. 221, 223. Jom. xi. 403. Miot, 272.

sufficiently difficult to procure subsistence. No friendly sail appeared in the distance to take off the burden on the side of the ocean; the difficulty of maintaining them became every day more grievous. The committee, to whom the matter was referred, unanimously reported that they should be put to death, and Napoléon, with reluctance, signed the fatal order. It was carried into execution on the 10th March; the melancholy troop were marched down, firmly fettered, to the sandhills on the sea-coast, where they were divided into small squares, and mowed down, amidst shrieks which yet ring in the souls of all who witnessed the scene, by successive discharges of musketry. No separation of the Egyptians from the other prisoners took place; all met the same tragic fate. In vain they appealed to the capitulation by which their lives had been guaranteed; bound as they stood together, they were fired at for hours successively, and such as survived the shot were dispatched with the bayonet. One young man, in an agony of terror, burst his bonds, threw himself among the horses of the French officers, and embracing their knees, passionately implored that his life might be spared; he was sternly refused, and bayoneted at their feet. But with this exception, all the other prisoners received their fate with the fortitude which is the peculiar characteristic of the Mussulman faith; they calmly performed their ablutions in the stagnant pools among which they were placed, and taking each other's hands, after having placed them on their lips and their hearts, in the Mussulman mode of salutation, gave and received an eternal adieu. One old chief, slightly wounded, had strength enough left to excavate with his own hands his grave, where he was interred while yet alive by his followers, themselves sinking into the arms of death. After the massacre had lasted some time, the horrors which surrounded them shook the hearts of many, especially of the younger part of the captives. Several at length broke their bonds, and swam to a ridge of coral rocks out of the reach of shot; the troops made signs to them of peace and forgiveness, and when they came within a short distance, fired at them in the sea, where they perished from the discharge or the waves. The bones of the vast multitude still remain in great heaps amidst the sandhills of the desert (1); the Arab turns from the field of blood, and it remains in solitary horror, a melancholy monument of Christian atrocity.

It would be to little purpose that the great drama of human events were recorded in history, if the judgment of posterity were not strongly pronounced on the scene. Napoléon lived for posthumous celebrity; in this instance he shall have his deserts; the massacre at Jaffa is an eternal and ineffaceable blot on his memory; and so it is considered by the ablest and most impartial of his own military historians (2). The laws of war can never justify the massacre of prisoners in cold blood, three days after the action has ceased; least of all, of those who had laid down their arms on the promise that their lives should be spared; the plea of expedience can never be admitted to extenuate a deed of cruelty. If it were, it would vindicate the massacres in the prisons of Paris, the carnage of Saint-Bartholomew, the burning of Joan of Arc, or any of the other foul deeds with which the page of history is stained. Least of all should Napoléon recur to such an argument, for it justifies at once all the severities of which he so loudly complained, when applied in a much lighter degree to himself at Saint-Helena. If the peril arising from dismissing a few thousand obscure

Unpardonable
atrocious of
this act.

(1) Jom. xi. 404. Bour. ii. 225, 227. Sav. i. 100.
Miot, 144, 148. O'Meara, i. 329. Nap. ii. 373.

(2) Jom. xi. 404. Th. ix. 384.

Albanians justified their indiscriminate massacre, what is to be said against the exile of him who had wrapped the world in flames? Nothing was easier than to have disarmed the captives and sent them away; the Vendéens, in circumstances infinitely more perilous, had given a noble instance of such humanity, when they shaved the heads of eleven thousand of the Republican soldiers, who had been made prisoners, and gave them their liberty. Even if they had all taken refuge in Acre, it would, so far from strengthening, have weakened the defence of that fortress; the deed of mercy would have opened a wider breach than the Republican batteries. In reality, the iniquitous act was as short-sighted as it was atrocious; and, sooner or later, such execrable deeds, even in this world, work out their own punishment. It was despair which gave such resolution to the defenders of the Turkish fortress. Napoléon has said, that Sir Sidney Smith made him miss his destiny, and threw him back from the empire of the East to a solitary island in the Atlantic; in truth, however, it was not the sword of his enemies, but his own cruelty which rendered the battlements of Acre invincible to his arms; if the fate of their comrades at Jaffa had not rendered its garrison desperate, all the bravery of that gallant chevalier would have been exerted in vain; and, instead of perishing by a lingering death on the rock of Saint-Helena, the mighty conqueror might have left to his descendants the throne of Constantinople (1).

The French
advance to
Acre. De-
scription of
that for-
tress.

After this hideous massacre, the French army wound round the promontory of Mount Carmel, and, after defeating a large body of horse, under the command of Abdallah Pacha, on the mountains of Naplouse, appeared before ACRE on the 16th March. This town, so celebrated for its long siege, and the heroic exploits of which it was the witness in the holy wars, is situated on a peninsula, which enables the besieged to unite all their means of defence on the isthmus which connects it with the mainland. A single wall, with curtains flanked by square towers, and a wet ditch, constituted its sole means of defence; but these, in the hands of Ottoman soldiers, were not to be despised. The Pacha of Syria, with all his treasures, arms, and artillery, had shut himself up in that stronghold, determined to make the most desperate resistance. But all his efforts would probably have proved unavailing, had it not been for the desperation inspired by the previous massacre at Jaffa, and the courage and activity of an English officer, Sir SIDNEY SMITH, who at that period commanded the squadron in the bay of Acre (2).

Sir Sidney
Smith's pre-
parations for
its defence.

This celebrated man, who had been wrecked on the coast of France, and confined in the Temple, made his escape a few days after Napoléon left Paris to take the command of the Egyptian expedition. After a variety of adventures, which would pass for fabulous, if they had not occurred in real life, he arrived in England, where his enterprise and talents were immediately put in requisition for the command of the squadron in the Archipelago. Having received information from the Pacha of Syria that Acre was to be attacked, he hastened to the scene of danger, and arrived there just two days before the appearance of the French army, with the *Tiger* of eighty-four, and *Theseus* of seventy-four guns, and some smaller vessels. This precious interval was actively employed by

(1) Napoléon, and all his eulogists, admit the massacre, but assert that it was justifiable, because the garrison was partly composed of those who had been taken at El Arish. This is now proved to be false. No part of the garrison at El Arish was in

Jaffa, but it was conveyed in the rear of the French army.—*SEC BOURRIENNE*, ii. 216, and *JOMINI*, x. 403.—*O'MEARA*, i. 329.

(2) *JOM.* xi. 406. *DUM.* ii. 196, 197. *TH.* x. 384, 385. *BERLH.* 54, 55.

him in strengthening the works, and making preparations for the defence of the place. On the following day, he was fortunate enough to capture the whole flotilla dispatched from Alexandria with the heavy artillery and stores for the siege of the town, as it was creeping round the head-lands of Mount Carmel; and the guns, forty-four in number, were immediately mounted on the ramparts, and contributed, in the most important manner, to the defence of the place. At the same time, Colonel Philippeaux, a French officer of engineers, expatriated from his country by the Revolution, exerted his talents in repairing and arming the fortifications; and a large body of seamen and marines, headed by Sir Sidney himself, were landed to co-operate in the defence of the works (1).

Commence-
ment of the
siege. The irreparable loss sustained by the capture of the flotilla, reduced the battering cannon of the assailants to four bombs, four twelve, and eight eight-pounders. Notwithstanding, however, these slender means, such was the activity and perseverance of the French engineers, that the works of the besiegers advanced with great expedition; a sally of the garrison was vigorously repulsed on the 26th, and a mine having been run under one of the principal towers which had been severely battered, the explosion took place two days after, and a practicable breach was effected. The grenadiers instantly advanced to the assault, and running rapidly forward arrived at the edge of the counterscarp. They were there arrested by a ditch, fifteen feet deep, which was only half filled up with the ruins of the wall. Their ardour, however, speedily overcame this obstacle; they descended into the fosse, and mounting the breach, effected a lodgment in the tower; but the impediment of the counterscarp having prevented them from being adequately supported (2), the Turks returned to the charge, and, after a desperate struggle, succeeded in expelling them from that part of the ramparts, and driving them with great slaughter back into their trenches (3).

This repulse convinced the French that they had to deal with very different foes from those whom they had massacred at Jaffa. A second assault, on the 1st April, having met with no better success, the troops were withdrawn into the works, and the general-in-chief resolved to await the arrival of the heavy artillery from Damietta. Meanwhile the Ottomans were collecting all their forces on the other side of the Jordan, to raise the siege. Napoléon had concluded a sort of alliance with the Druses, a bold and hardy race of Christian mountaineers, who inhabit the heights of Lebanon, and only awaited the capture of Acre to declare openly for his cause, and throw off the yoke of their Mussulman rulers. The Turks, however, on their side, had not been idle. By vast exertions, they had succeeded in rousing the Mahometan population of all the surrounding provinces; the remains of the Mamelukes of Ibrahim Bey, the Janizaries of Aleppo and of Damascus, joined to an innumerable horde of irregular cavalry, formed a vast army, which had already pushed

(1) Jom. xi. 406. Dum. ii. 197, 198. Ann. Reg. 1799, 28.

It is not the least curious fact in that age of wonders, that Philippeaux, whose talents so powerfully contributed, at this crisis, to change the fate of Napoléon, had been his companion at the Military School at Brienne, and passed his examinations with him, previous to joining their respective regiments. [Las Cas. i. 233.]

(2) Miot, 162, 163. Jom. xi. 407. Dum. ii. 200, 202. Ann. Reg. 1799, 29. Th. x 386.

(3) A striking instance of the attachment of the soldiers to Napoléon appeared on this occasion. In the trenches, a bomb, with the fusee burning, fell at his feet; two grenadiers instantly seized him in their arms, and covering him with their bodies, carried him out of danger. They got him out of the reach of the explosion before it took place, and no one was injured.—LAS CASAS, i. 235.

its advanced posts beyond the Jordan, and threatened soon to envelope the besieging force. The French troops occupied the mountains of Naplouse, Cana in Galilee, and Nazareth; names for ever immortal in holy writ, at which the devout ardour of the Crusaders burned with generous enthusiasm (1), but which were now visited by the descendants of a Christian people without either interest in, or knowledge of, the inestimable benefits which were there conferred upon mankind.

The French advance to meet them. These alarming reports induced Napoléon to send detachments to Tyre and Saffet, and reinforce the troops under the command of Junot at Nazareth. Their arrival was not premature; for the advanced posts of the enemy had already crossed the Jordan, at the bridge of Jacob, and were pressing in vast multitudes towards the mountain-ridge which separates the valley of that river from the maritime coast. Kléber, on his march from the camp at Acre to join Junot, encountered a body of four thousand horse on the heights of Loubi; but they were defeated and driven beyond the Jordan by the same rolling fire which had so often proved fatal to the Mamelukes in Egypt. On the day following, a grand sortie, headed by English officers, and supported by some marines from the fleet, took place from Acre, and obtained at first considerable advantages; but the arrival of reinforcements from the camp at length obliged the assailants to return into the town (2).

Napoléon now saw that he had not a moment to lose in marching to attack the cloud of enemies which were collecting in his rear, and preventing a general concentration of the hostile forces by sea and land against the camp before Acre. For this purpose he ordered Kléber, with his division, to join Junot; Murat, with a thousand infantry, and two squadrons of horse, was stationed at the bridge of Jacob, and he himself set out from the camp before Acre with the division of General Bon, the cavalry, and eight pieces of cannon (3).

Battle of Mount Thabor. Kléber had left Nazareth with all his forces, in order to make an attack on the Turkish camp; but he was anticipated by the enemy who advanced to meet him with fifteen thousand cavalry, and as many infantry, as far as the village of Fouli. Kléber instantly drew up his little army in squares, with the artillery at the angles, and the formation was hardly completed when the immense mass came thundering down, threatening to trample their handful of enemies under their horses' hoofs. The steady aim and rolling fire of the French veterans brought down the foremost of the assailants, and soon formed a rampart of dead bodies of men and horses; behind which they bravely maintained the unequal combat for six hours, until at length Napoléon, with the cavalry and fresh divisions, arrived on the heights which overlooked the field of battle, and amidst the multitudes with which it was covered, distinguished his men by the regular and incessant volleys which issued from their ranks, forming steady flaming spots amidst the moving throng with which they were surrounded. He instantly took his resolution. General Letourq was dispatched, with the cavalry and two pieces of light artillery, against the Mamelukes who were in reserve at the foot of the mountains of Naplouse, while the division of Bon, divided into two squares, advanced to the attack of the flank and rear of the multitude who were surrounding Kléber's division, and Napoléon, with the cannon and

(1) Lav. i. 372.

(2) Jour. xi. 409. Ann. Reg. 1793, 30. Dum. ii.

(3) Jour. x. 410. Dum. ii. 287.

guides, pressed them in front. A twelve-pounder fired from the heights, announced to the wearied band of heroes the joyful intelligence that succour was at hand; the columns all advanced rapidly to the attack, while Kléber, resuming the offensive, extended his ranks, and charged the mass who had so long oppressed him with the bayonet. The immense superiority of European discipline and tactics was then apparent; the Turks, attacked in so many quarters at once, and exposed to a concentric fire from all the squares, were unable to make any resistance; no measures, either to arrest the enemy or secure a retreat, were taken, and the motley throng, mowed down by the discharges of grape-shot, fled in confusion behind Mount-Thabor, and finding the bridge of Jacob seized by Murat, rushed in desperation, in the night, through the Jordan, where great numbers were drowned (1).

This great victory, gained by six thousand veterans over a brave but undisciplined mass of thirty thousand Oriental militia, completely secured the flank and rear of Napoléon's army. The defeat had been complete; the Turkish camp, with all their baggage and ammunition, fell into the hands of the conquerors; the army which the people of the country called "innumerable as the sands of the sea or the stars of heaven," had dispersed, never again to return (2). Kléber occupied in force the bridge of Jacob, the forts of Saffet and Tabarieh; and, having stationed patrols along the banks of the Jordan, fixed his headquarters at the village of Nazareth, while Napoléon returned, with the remainder of the army, to the siege of Acre (3).

Renewal of the siege of Acre. The French cruisers having at length succeeded in debarking three twenty-four and six eighteen-pounders at Jaffa, they were forthwith brought up to the trenches, and a heavy fire opened upon the tower, which had been the object of such vehement contests. Mines were run under the walls, and all the resources of art exhausted to effect the reduction of the place, but in vain. The defence under Philippeaux was not less determined nor less skilful than the attack; he erected some external works in the fosse, to take the grenadiers in flank as they advanced to the assault; the mines of the besiegers were countermined, and constant sorties made to retard their approaches. In the course of these desperate contests, both Caffarelli, who commanded the engineers of the assailants, and Philippeaux, who directed the operations of the besieged, were slain. The vigour and resolution of the garrison increased with every hour the siege continued. Napoléon, by a desperate effort, for a time succeeded in effecting a lodgment in the ruined tower; but his men were soon driven out with immense loss, and the Turks regained possession of all their fortifications. The trenches had been open and the breach practicable for nearly two months, but no sensible progress as yet made in the reduction of the place (4).

At length, on the evening of the 7th May, a few sails were seen from the towers of Acre, on the farthest verge of the horizon. All eyes were instantly turned in that direction, and the besiegers and besieged equally flattered themselves that succour was at hand. The English cruisers in the bay hastily, and in doubt, stood out to reconnoitre this unknown fleet; but the hearts of the French sank within them when they beheld the two squadrons unite, and

(1) Miot, 176, 182. Jom. xi. 412, 413. Dum. ii. 207, 208.

General Junot commanded one of these squares, which heroically resisted the Ottomans. His valour and steadiness attracted the especial notice of Napoléon, who had the names of the three hundred men of which it was composed, engraved on a splendid

shield, which he presented to that officer, to be preserved among the archives of his family — See DUCHESSE D'ARRANTÈS, xi. 372.

(2) Th. x. 388.

(3) Dum. ii. 208. Miot, 181, 183. Th. x. 389.

(4) Jom. xi. 414, 415. Dum. ii. 212. Th. x. 389. Miot, 190, 193.

the Ottoman crescent, joined to the English pendant, approach the road of Acre. Soon after a fleet of thirty sail entered the bay, with seven thousand men, and abundance of artillery and ammunition, from Rhodes. Napoléon, calculating that this reinforcement could not be disembarked for at least six hours, resolved to anticipate its arrival by an assault during the night. For this the division of Bon, at ten at night, drove the enemy from their exterior works. The artillery took advantage of that circumstance to approach to the counterscarp, and batter the curtain. At daybreak, another breach in the rampart was declared practicable, and an assault ordered. The division of Lannes renewed the attack on the tower, while General Rambaud led the column to the new breach. The grenadiers, advancing with the most heroic intrepidity, made their way to the summit of the rampart, and the morning sun displayed the tricolor flag on the outer angle of the tower. The fire of the place was now sensibly slackened, while the besiegers, redoubling their boldness, were seen intrenching themselves, in the lodgments they had formed, with sand-bags and dead bodies, the points of their bayonets only appearing above the bloody parapet. The troops in the roads were embarked in the boats, and were pulling as hard as they could across the bay; but several hours must still elapse before they could arrive at the menaced point. In this extremity Sir Sidney Smith landed the crews of the ships, and led them, armed with pikes, to the breach. The sight reanimated the courage of the besieged, who were beginning to quail under the prospect of instant death, and they mounted the long-disputed tower, amidst loud shouts from the brave men who still defended its ruins. Immediately a furious contest ensued; the besieged hurled down large stones on the assailants, who fired at them within half pistolshot, the muzzles of the muskets touched each other, and the spearheads of the standards were locked together. At length the desperate daring of the French yielded to the unconquerable firmness of the British and the heroic valour of the Mussulmans; the grenadiers were driven from the tower, and a body of Turks, issuing from the gates, attacked them in flank while they crossed the ditch, and drove them back with great loss to the trenches (1).

But while this success was gained in one quarter, ruin was impending in another. The division headed by Rambaud succeeded in reaching the summit of the rampart, and leaping down into the tower, attained the very garden of the Pacha's seraglio. Every thing seemed lost; but at the critical moment Sir Sidney Smith, at the head of a regiment of Janizaries, disciplined in the European method, rushed to the spot. The progress of the assailants was stopped by a tremendous fire from the house-tops and the barricades which surrounded the seraglio; and at length the French, who had penetrated so far, were cut off from the breach by which they had entered, and driven into a neighbouring mosque, where they owed their lives to the humane intercession of Sir Sidney Smith. In this bloody affair the loss of lives was very great on both sides: Rambaud was killed, and Lannes severely wounded (2).

Notwithstanding this disaster, Napoléon was not yet sufficiently subdued by misfortune to order a retreat (3). "The fate of the East," said he, "is in yonder fort; the fall of Acre is the object of my expedition; Damascus will be its first fruit." Although the troops in the fleet were now landed, and the force in the place greatly increased, he resolved to make a last effort with the division of

(1) Ann. Reg. 1799, 32. Jom. xi. 416. Dum. ii. 213. Miot, 194, 196.

(2) Jom. xi. 416, 417. Dum. ii. 213, 214. Th. x. 390. Ann. Reg. 1799, 32. Miot, 197, 198.

(3) Miot, 184.

Kléber, which had been recalled in haste from its advanced post on the Jordan. Early on the 10th May, he advanced in person to the foot of the breach, and, seeing that it was greatly enlarged by the fire of the preceding days, a new assault was ordered. The summit of the breach was again attained; but the troops were there arrested by the murderous fire which issued from the barricades, and intrenchments, with which the garrison had strengthened the interior of the tower. In the evening, the division of Kléber arrived, and, proud of its triumph at Mount Thabor, eagerly demanded to be led to the assault. "If St.-Jean d'Acre is not taken this evening," said one of the colonels, as he was marching at the head of his regiment to the assault, "be assured Venoux is slain." He kept his word; the fortress held out, but he lay at the foot of the walls (1). A little before sunset, a dark massy column issued from the trenches, and advanced with a firm and solemn step to the breach. The assailants were permitted to ascend unmolested to the summit, and descend into the garden of the Pacha; but no sooner had they reached that point, than they were assailed with irresistible fury by a body of Janizaries, who, with the sabre in one hand, and the dagger in the other, speedily reduced the whole column to headless trunks. In vain other columns, and even the Guides of Napoléon, his last reserve, advanced to the attack; they were all repulsed with dreadful loss. Among the killed in this last encounter was General Bon, and the wounded, Crosier, aide-de-camp of the general-in-chief, and a large proportion of his staff (2). On this occasion, as in the assault on Schumla in 1808, it was proved that, in a personal struggle, the bayonet of the European is no match for the Turkish scimitar.

Napoléon at length retreats. Success being now hopeless, preparations were made for a retreat, after sixty days of open trenches; a proclamation was issued to the troops, announcing that their return was required to withstand a descent which was threatened from the island of Rhodes, and the fire from the trenches kept up with such vigour to the last moment, that the Turks were not aware of the preparations made for a retreat. Meanwhile, the baggage, sick, and field-artillery were silently defiling to the rear, the heavy cannon were buried in the sand, and, on the 20th May, Napoléon, for the first time in his life, ordered a retreat (3).

No event, down to the retreat from Moscow, so deeply affected Napoléon as the repulse at Acre. It had cost him 5000 of his bravest troops, slain or dead of their wounds; a still greater number were irrevocably mutilated, or had in them the seeds of the plague, contracted during the stay at Jaffa; and the illusion of his invincibility was dispelled. But these disasters, great as they were to an army situated as his was, were not the real cause of his chagrin. It was the destruction of his dreams of Oriental conquest which cut him to the heart. Standing on the mount which still bears the name of Richard Cœur-de-Lion, on the evening of the fatal assault when Lannes was wounded, he said to his secretary Bourrienne: "Yes, Bourrienne, that miserable fort has indeed cost me dear; but matters have gone too far not to make a last effort. If I succeed, as I trust I shall, I shall find in the town all the treasures of the Pacha, and arms for 500,000 men. I shall raise and arm all Syria, which at this moment unanimously prays for the success of the assault. I will march on Damascus and Aleppo; I will swell my army as I advance with the discontented in every country through which I pass; I

(1) Miot, 199.

(3) Dum. ii. 218. Jem. xi. 417. Th. x. 391.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1799, 33. Jem. x. 417. Dum. ii. Miot, 200.

217. Miot, 199, 200.

will announce to the people the breaking of their chains, and the abolition of the tyranny of the Pachas. Do you not see that the Druses wait only for the fall of Acre to declare themselves? Have I not been already offered the keys of Damascus? I have only lingered under these walls because at present I could derive no advantage from that great town. Acre taken, I will secure Egypt; on the side of Egypt cut off all succour from the Beys, and proclaim Desaix general-in-chief of that country. I will arrive at Constantinople with armed masses; overturn the empire of the Turks, and establish a new one in the East, which will fix my place with posterity; and perhaps I may return to Paris by Adrianople and Vienna, after having annihilated the House of Austria (1)." Boundless as these anticipations were, they were not the result merely of the enthusiasm of the moment, but were deliberately repeated by Napoléon, after the lapse of twenty years, on the rock of St.-Helena. "St.-Jean d'Acre once taken," said he, "the French army would have flown to Aleppo and Damascus; in the twinkling of an eye it would have been on the Euphrates; the Christians of Syria, the Druses, the Christians of Armenia would have joined it; the whole population of the East would have been agitated." Some one said, he would soon have been reinforced by a hundred thousand men; "Say rather six hundred thousand," replied Napoléon, "who can calculate what would have happened (2)? I would have reached Constantinople and the Indies; I would have changed the face of the world." Splendid as his situation afterwards was, he never ceased to regret the throne which he relinquished when he retired from Acre, and repeatedly said of Sir Sidney Smith, "That man made me miss my destiny (3)."

Disastrous
retreat of
the troops
to Egypt.

The army occupied two days in the retreat to Jaffa, and remained there destroying the fortifications for three more. The field-artillery was embarked, in order to avoid the painful passage over the desert, but it all fell into the hands of Sir Sidney Smith, who followed the movements of the army, and harassed them incessantly with the light vessels of his squadron. All the horrors of war were accumulated on the troops and the inhabitants of the unhappy villages which lay on the line of the retreat. A devouring thirst, total want of water, a fatiguing march through burning sands, reduced the soldiers to despair, and shook the firmness even of the bravest officers. The seeds of the plague were in the army, and, independently of the number who were actually the victims of that dreadful

(1) Bour. ii. 243, 244.

(2) Las Cas. i. 384. Th. x. 392. D'Abr. iv. 268, 269.

(3) Napoléon, who had been hitherto accustomed to an uninterrupted career of victory, achieved frequently with inconsiderable means, did not evince the patience requisite for success in this siege; he began it with too slender resources, and wasted the lives of his brave soldiers in assaults, which, against Turkish and English troops, were little better than hopeless. Kleber, whose disposition was entirely different, and who shared in none of the ardour which led him to overlook or undervalue these obstacles, from the beginning predicted that the siege would fail, and loudly expressed, during its progress, his disapprobation of the slovenly, insufficient manner in which the works of the siege were advanced, and the dreadful butchery to which the soldiers were exposed in so many hopeless assaults. [Mint, 209.]

Though grievously mortified by this failure, the French general evinced unusual dexterity in the art with which, in his proclamation to his troops, he veiled his defeat:—"Soldiers! You have traversed

the desert which separates Asia and Africa with the rapidity of the Arab horse. The army which was advancing to invade Egypt is destroyed; you have made prisoner its general, its baggage, its camels; you have captured all the forts which guard the wells of the desert; you have dispersed on the field of Mount Thabor the innumerable host which assembled from all parts of Asia to share in the pillage of Egypt. Finally, after having, with a handful of men, maintained the war for three months in the heart of Syria, taken forty pieces of cannon, fifty standards, and six thousand prisoners, razed the fortifications of Gaza, Jaffa, Caiffa, and Acre, we are about to re enter Egypt; the season of debarkation commands it. Yet a few days, and you would have taken the Pacha in the midst of his palace; but at this moment such a prize is not worth a few days' combat; the brave men who would have perished in it are essential for further operations. Soldiers! we have dangers and fatigues to encounter; after having disabled the forces of the East, for the remainder of the campaign we shall perhaps have to repel the attacks of a part of the West."—Mint, 204.

malady, the sick and wounded suffered under the unbounded apprehensions of all who approached them. The dying, laid down by the side of the road, exclaimed with a faltering voice, "I am not sick of the plague, but only wounded;" and to prove the truth of what they said, tore their bandages asunder, and let their wounds bleed afresh. The heavens were darkened during the day by the clouds which rose from the burning villages; the march of the columns was at night illuminated by the flames which followed their steps. On their right was the sea, on their left and rear the wilderness they had made; before them, the desert with all its horrors. In the general suffering, Napoléon set the example of disinterested self-denial; abandoning his horse, and that of all his equipage for the use of the sick, he marched himself at the head of the troops on foot, inspiring all around him with cheerfulness and resolution (1). At Jaffa he visited himself the plague hospital, inviting those who had sufficient strength to rise to raise themselves on their beds, and endeavour to get into the litters prepared for their use (2). He walked through the rooms, affected a careless air, striking his boot with his riding whip, in order to remove the apprehensions which had seized all the soldiers in regard to the contagious nature of the malady (3). Those who could not be removed, were, it is to be feared, poisoned by orders of the general; their numbers did not exceed sixty; and, as the Turks were within an hour's march of the place, their recovery hopeless, and a cruel death awaited them at the hands of those barbarians the moment they arrived, the painful act may perhaps be justified, not only on the ground of necessity but of humanity (4). Napoléon did not expressly admit the fact at St. Helena, but he reasoned in such a manner as plainly implied that it was true. He argued, and argued justly, that, in the circumstances in which he was placed, it could not be considered as a crime. "What man," said he, "would not have preferred immediate death to the horror of being exposed to lingering tortures on the part of these barbarians? If my own son, whom I love as well as any man can love his child, were in such a situation, my advice would be, that he should be treated in the same manner; and if I were so myself, I would implore that the same should be done to me (5)." While history, however, must acquit Napoléon of decided criminality in this matter, the more especially as the Turks murdered all the prisoners and sick who fell into their hands, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of the British officers (6), it must record with admiration the answer of the French chief of the medical staff when the proposal was made by Napoléon to him, "My vocation is to prolong life, and not to extinguish it (7)."

Poisoning of
the sick at
Jaffa. It was
justifiable.

(1) Bour. ii. 251, 252. Miot. 215. Dum. ii. 219.

(2) Bour. ii. 257. Las. Cas. vii. 221, 222.

(3) Savary, i. 105.

(4) Bour. ii. 262, 263. Miot, 206. Sir Robert Wilson, 172. Th. x. 393.

Sir Robert Wilson states the number of those poisoned, at 580; Miot says merely, "If we are to trust the reports of the army and the general rumour, which is often the organ of tardy truth, which power seeks in vain to suppress, some of the wounded at Mount Carmel, and a large part of the sick in the hospital of Jaffa, died of what was administered to them in the form of medicine."—See Wilson, 176; Miot, 206.

(5) Las. Cas. i. 214. Bour. ii. 264. O'Mea. i. 329, 353.

(6) Ann. Reg. 1799, 33, 34.

(7) Las. Cas. i. 214. Th. x. 393. O'Mea. i. 330. It is a curious fact, illustrative of the inconceiv-

able effect of such seasons of horror on the human mind, that while the soldiers who were ill of the plague expressed the utmost horror at being left behind, and rose with difficulty from the bed of death to stagger a few steps after their departing comrades, their fate excited little or no commiseration in the more fortunate soldiers who had escaped the pestilence. "Who would not have supposed," says Miot, "that in such an extremity, the comrades of the unhappy sufferers would have done all they could to succour or relieve them. So far from it, they were the objects only of horror and derision. The soldiers avoided the sick as the pestilence with which they were afflicted, and burst into immoderate fits of laughter at the convulsive efforts which they made to rise, 'He has made up his accounts,' said one; 'He will not get on far,' said another; and when the poor wretch fell, for the last time, they exclaimed, 'His lodging is secured.' The ter-

After a painful march over the desert, in the course of which numbers of the sick and wounded perished from heat and suffering, the army reached June 1. El-Arish on the 1st June, and at length exchanged the privations and thirst of the desert for the riches and comforts of Egypt. During this march the thermometer rose to 55° of Reaumur, and when the globe of mercury was plunged in the sand, it stood at 45°, corresponding to 92° and 115° of Fahrenheit. The water to be met with in the desert was so salt, that numbers of horses expired shortly after drinking it; and, notwithstanding their frequent experience of the illusion, such was the deceitful appearance of the mirage, which constantly presented itself, that the men frequently rushed to the glassy streams and lakes, which vanished on their approach into air (1).

Though Egypt in general preserved its tranquillity during the absence of Napoléon, disturbances of a threatening character had taken place in the Delta. A chief in Lower Egypt, who had contrived to assemble together a number of Mamelukes and discontented characters, gave himself out for the angel El-Mody, and put to the sword the garrison of Damanhour; and it was not till two different divisions May 10. had been sent against him that the insurrection was suppressed, and its leader killed. Meanwhile Desaix, pursuing with indefatigable activity May 20. his gallant opponent, had followed the course of the Nile as far as Sleim, the extreme limit of the Roman empire, where he learned that Mourad Bey had ascended beyond the Cataracts, and retired altogether into Nubia. A bloody skirmish afterwards took place near Thebes, between a body of French cavalry and a party of Mamelukes; and Mahommed-Elfi, one of the most enterprising of their officers, sustained so severe a defeat at Souhama, on the banks of the Nile, that out of twelve hundred horse, only a hundred and fifty escaped into the Great Oasis in the desert. This success was counter- Conquest of Upper Egypt. balanced by the destruction of the flotilla on the Nile, containing the wounded and ammunition of Desaix's division, and which, when on the point of being taken by the Arabs, was blown up by the officer commanding it. At length Davoust gave a final blow to the incursions of the Arabs by the defeat of a large body at Benyhady, when above two thousand men were slain. After this disaster, Upper Egypt was thoroughly subdued, and the French division took up its cantonments in the villages which formed the southern limits of the Roman empire (2). Such was the wisdom and equity of Desaix's administration in those distant provinces, that it procured for him the appellation of "Sultan the Just (3)."

Napoléon, ever anxious to conceal his reverses, made a sort of triumphal

rible truth must be told; in such a crisis, indifference and egotism are the ruling sentiments of the army; and if you would be well with your comrades you must never need their assistance, and remain in good health." The same facts were most conspicuous during the Russian retreat, and in the Spanish war.—See *Moor*, 220.

(1) *Bour*. ii. 265. *Savary*, i. 56.

(2) *Jom*. xi. 420, 425, 428 *Dum*. ii. 225, 227. *Th*. ix. 393.

(3) *Sav*. i. 96.

Perhaps the private correspondence of few conquerors would bear the light: but unhappily the confidential letters and orders of Napoleon at this period, bear evidence of too much and unnecessary cruelty. On the 28th June, 1799, he wrote to General Dugua:—"You will cause to be shot, citizen-general, Joseph, a native of Cherkene, near the Black

Sea, and Selim, a native of Constantinople, both prisoners in the citadel." On the 12th July:—"You will cause to be shot, Hassan, Jousset, Ibrahim, Saleh, Mahomet Bekir, Hadj Saleh, Mustapha Mahomet, all Mamelukes." And on 13th July:—"You will cause to be shot, Lachin and Emir Mahomet, Mamelukes." What crimes these persons had been guilty of towards the French army, does not appear; but from the circumstance of their execution being intrusted to the French officers, and not to the civil authorities of the country, there seems no reason to believe that they had done any thing further than taken a share in the effort to liberate their country from the yoke of the French; an attempt which, however much it might authorize measures of hostility in the field, could never justify executions in prison, without trial, in cold blood.—*Corresp. Confid. de Nap*. vi. 374, 392, 394.

entry upon his return into Cairo, and published a deceitful proclamation, in which he boasted of having conquered in all his engagements, and ruined the fortifications of the Pacha of Acre. In truth, though he had failed in the principal object of his expedition, he had effectually prevented an invasion from the side of Syria by the terror which his arms had inspired, and the desolation which he had occasioned on the frontiers of the desert; and he had abundant reason to pride himself upon the vast achievements of the inconsiderable body of men whom he led to these hazardous exploits (1).

Great dis- contents in the army. The discontents of the army increased to the highest degree after the disastrous issue of the Syrian expedition. They did not arise from apprehensions of danger, but the desire to return home, which tormented their minds the farther that it seemed removed from the bounds of probability. Every day some generals or officers demanded, under various pretexts, leave of absence to return to Europe, which was always granted, though with such cutting expressions as rendered the concession the object of dread to every honourable mind. Berthier himself, consumed by a romantic passion for a lady at Paris, twice solicited and obtained his dismissal, and twice relinquished the project, from a sense of honourable shame at abandoning his benefactor. With Kléber the general-in-chief had several warm altercations, and to such a height did the dissatisfaction rise, that the whole army, soldiers and officers, for a time entertained the design of marching from Cairo to Alexandria, to await the first opportunity of returning home; a project which the great personal ascendant of Napoléon alone prevented them from carrying into effect (2).

Landing of the Turks in Aboukir Bay. Influenced by an ardent desire to visit the indestructible monuments of ancient grandeur at Thebes, Napoléon was on the point of setting out for Upper Egypt, when a courier from Marmont, governor of Alexandria, announced the disembarkation of a large body of Turks in Aboukir bay. They had appeared there on the 10th July, and landed, July 11, 1799. under the protection of the British navy, on the following day. This intelligence was received by him on the evening of the 15th at Cairo; he sat up all night, dictating orders for the direction of all the divisions of his army, and on the 16th, at four in the morning, he was on horseback, and all his troops in full march. On the 23d he arrived at Alexandria with the divisions of Murat, Lannes, and Bon, where he joined the garrison under Marmont, which had not ventured to leave its intrenchments in presence of such formidable enemies. The division of Desaix was at the same time ordered to fall back to Cairo from Upper Egypt, so that, if necessary, the whole French force might be brought to the menaced point. Mourad Bey, in concert with the Turks at Aboukir, descended from Upper Egypt with three thousand horse, intending to cut his way across to the forces which had landed at

(1) Th x. 394. Bour. ii. 266, 267.

(2) Th x. 394, 395. Bour. ii. 298, 303.

It deserves notice, as an indication of the total disregard of Napoléon and the French army for the Christian religion, that all his proclamations and addresses to the powers or people of Egypt, or the East, at this period, set out with the words:—"In the name of the merciful God; there is but one God, and Mahomet is his prophet."—See *Letters to Sultan Darfour*, 30th June, 1799, and 17th July, 1799; *to the Scherif of Mecca*, 30th June, 1799; *Proclamation to the People of Egypt*, 17th July, 1799; and *to the Sultans of Morocco and Tripoli*, 16th August, 1799.—See *Corresp. Confid. de Nap.* vi. 377, 391, 402, 436. "After all," said he, at St.-Hélène, "it is by

no means impossible that circumstances might have induced me to embrace Islamism; but I would not have done so till I came to the Euphrates. Henry IV said truly, Paris is worth a mass. Do you think the empire of the East, possibly the subjugation of all Asia, was not worth a turban and trowsers, for, after all, the matter comes to that? The army would undoubtedly have joined in it, and would only have made a joke of its conversion. Consider the consequences; I would have taken Europe in rear; its old institutions would have been beset on all sides; and who, after that, would have thought of interrupting the destinies of France, or the regeneration of the age?"—LAS CASAS, iii. 91.

July 14. Aboukir; but he was met and encountered near the Lake Natron by Murat, at the head of a body of cavalry, and after a severe action obliged to retrace his steps, and take refuge in the desert (1).

Force of the invaders. The army, which landed at Aboukir nine thousand strong, consisting of the forces which had arrived at the close of the siege at Acre from Rhodes and had been transported thence to the mouth of the Nile by Sir Sidney Smith's squadron, though almost destitute of cavalry, was much more formidable than any which the French troops had yet encountered in the East. It was composed, not of the miserable Fellahs who constituted the sole infantry of the Mamelukes, but of intrepid Janizaries, admirably equipped and well disciplined, accustomed to discharge their firelock and throw themselves on the enemy with a sabre in one hand and a pistol in the other. The artillery of those troops was numerous and well served; they were supported by the British squadron; and they had recently made themselves masters of the fort of Aboukir, after putting its garrison of three hundred men to the sword. This fort was situated at the neck of an isthmus of sand, on which the Turkish forces were disembarked; the peninsula there is not above four hundred toises in breadth; so that the possession of it gave them a secure place of retreat in case of disaster. It was the more necessary to get quit of this army, as there was reason to expect that a new host of invaders would ere long make their appearance on the side of Syria (2).

Position which the Turks occupied. Napoléon arrived within sight of the peninsula of Aboukir on the 25th July, and, though his force did not exceed eight thousand men, including Kléber's division, which had just arrived and was in reserve, he no sooner saw the dispositions of the enemy, than he resolved to make an immediate attack. The Turks occupied the peninsula, and had covered the approach to it with two lines of intrenchments. The first, which ran across the neck of land, about a mile in front of the village of Aboukir, from the lake Maadieh to the sea, extended between two mounts of sand, each of which was strongly occupied and covered with artillery, and was supported in the centre by a village, which was garrisoned by two thousand men. The second, a mile in the rear, was strengthened in the centre by the fort constructed by the French, and terminated at one extremity in the sea (3), at the other in the lake. Between the two lines was placed the camp. The first line was guarded by four thousand men, the latter by five thousand, and supported by twelve pieces of cannon, besides those mounted on the fort (4).

Napoléon's dispositions for an attack. First line carried. The dispositions of the general were speedily made. Lannes, with two thousand men, attacked the right of the first line; D'Estaing, with the like force, the left; while Murat, whose cavalry was arranged in three divisions, was destined at once to pierce the centre and turn both wings, so as to cut off all communication with the reserve in the second intrenchment. These measures were speedily crowned with success. The Turks maintained their ground on the height on the left, till they saw it turned by Murat's cavalry; but the moment that was done they fled in

(1) Nap. ii. 323. Bour. 304.

(2) Th. x. 397. Dum. ii. 227. Nap. ii. 326, 328. Wilson's Egypt, 29.

(3) Join. xii. 295, 296. Th. x. 399. Nap. ii. 334, 332. Dum. ii. 232.

(4) So strongly was the mind of Napoléon already impressed by the great destinies to which he conceived himself called, that when he arrived in sight of these intrenchments, he said to Murat.—“This

battle will decide the fate of the world.”—“At least of this army,” replied the other; “but you should feel confidence from the circumstance, that all the soldiers feel they must now conquer or die. The enemy have no cavalry; ours is brave; and he assured, if ever infantry were charged to the teeth by cavalry, the Turks shall be to-morrow by mine”—Mior, 249.

confusion to the second line, and being charged in their flight by the French horse, rushed tumultuously into the water, where almost the whole were either drowned or cut down by grape-shot. The same thing occurred at the other extremity of the line. Lannes attacked the height on the right, while the other division of Murat's cavalry turned it. The Turks fled at the first onset, and were driven by Murat into the sea. Lannes and D'Estaing, now united, attacked the village in the centre. The Janizaries defended themselves bravely, calculating on being supported from the second line; but the column detached for that purpose from the fort of Aboukir having been charged in the interval between the two lines, and routed by Murat, the village was at length carried with the bayonet, and its defenders, who refused all quarter, put to the sword, or drowned in the water (1).

Second line also forced, after a desperate struggle. The extraordinary success of this first attack inspired Napoléon with the hope, that by repeating the same manœuvre with the second, the whole remainder of the army might be destroyed. For this purpose, after allowing a few hours' repose to the troops, and establishing a battery to protect their operations, he commenced a new attack upon the interior and more formidable line of defence. On the right a trench joined the fort of Aboukir to the sea; but on the left it was not carried quite so far, leaving a small open space between the intrenchment and the lake Maadieh. Napoléon's dispositions were made accordingly. On the right D'Estaing was to attack the intrenchment, while the principal effort was directed against the left, where the whole cavalry, marching under cover of Lannes' division, were to enter at the open space, between the trenches and the lake, and take the line in rear. At three o'clock the charge was beat, and the troops advanced to the attack. D'Estaing led his men gallantly forward, arranged in echelon of battalions; but the Turks, transported by their ardour, advanced out of their intrenchments to meet them, and a bloody conflict took place in the plain. In vain the Janizaries, after discharging their fusils and pistols, rushed to the attack with their formidable sabres in the air; their desperate valour at length yielded to the steady pressure of the European bayonet, and they were borne back, struggling every inch of ground, to the foot of the intrenchments. Here, however, the plunging fire of the redoubt, and the sustained discharge of musketry from the top of the works, arrested the French soldiers; Letoureq was killed, Fuguries wounded, and the column, in disorder, recoiled from the field of carnage towards the exterior line. Nor was Murat more successful on his side. Lannes indeed forced the intrenchments towards the extremity of the lake, and occupied some of the houses in the village; but when the cavalry attempted to pass the narrow defile between the works and the lake, they were assailed by such a terrible fire from the gunboats, that they were repeatedly forced to retire. The attack had failed at both extremities, and Napoléon was doubtful whether he should continue the combat, or rest contented with the advantage already gained (2).

Total destruction of the Turks. From this perplexity he was relieved by the imprudent conduct of the Turks themselves. No sooner did they see the column which had assailed their right retire, than they rushed out of the fort of Aboukir, in the centre, and began to cut off the heads of the dead bodies which lay scattered over the plain. Napoléon instantly saw his advantage, and quickly

(1) Th. x. 400. Jom. xii. 298. Nap. ii. 334.

(2) Miot, 251. Jom. xii. 299, 300. Dum. ii. 234. Th. x. 402. Nap. ii. 335.

turned it to the best account. Advancing rapidly with his reserves in admirable order, he arrested the sortie of the centre, while Lannes returned to the attack of the intrenchments, now in a great measure denuded of their defenders, and d'Estaing re-formed his troops for another effort on the lines to the right. All these attacks proved successful; the whole line of redoubts, now almost destitute of troops, was captured, while several squadrons, in the confusion, penetrated through the narrow opening on the margin of the lake, and got into the rear of the second line. The Turks upon this fled in confusion towards the fort of Aboukir; but the cavalry of Murat, which now inundated the space between the second line and the fort, charged them so furiously in flank, that they were thrown into the sea, and almost all perished in the waves. Murat penetrated into the camp of Mustapha Pacha, where, with his own hand, he made that commander prisoner, and shut up the remnant of the army, amounting to about two thousand men, in the fort of 30th July. Aboukir. Heavy cannon were immediately planted against the fort, which surrendered a few days after. Five thousand corpses floated in the bay of Aboukir; two thousand had perished in the battle, and the like number were made prisoners of war in the fort. Hardly any escaped; a circumstance almost unexampled in modern warfare (1).

Napoléon is made acquainted with the disasters of the Republic in Europe.

The day after this extraordinary battle, Napoléon returned to Alexandria. He had ample subject for meditation. Sir Sidney Smith, having dispatched a flag of truce on shore to settle an exchange of prisoners, sent some files of English newspapers, which made him acquainted with the disasters experienced by the Directory in Europe, the conquest of Italy, the reverses in the Alps, the retreat to Zurich. At the same time he learned the capture of Corfu by the Russians and English, and the close blockade which promised soon to deliver over Malta to the same power. His resolution was instantly taken. He determined to return alone, braving the English fleets, to Europe. All prospects of great success in Egypt were at an end, and he now only wished to regain the scene of his early triumphs and primitive ambition in France. Orders were immediately given that two frigates, the Muiron and the Carrera, should be made ready for sea, and Napoléon, preserving the utmost secrecy as to his intended departure, proceeded to Cairo, where he drew up long and minute instructions for Kléber, to whom the command of the army was intrusted, and immediately returned to Alexandria (2).

22d Aug. He secretly sets sail for Europe from Alexandria.

On the 22d August he secretly set out from that town, accompanied by Berthier, Lannes, Murat, Marmont, Andreossy, Berthollet, Monge, and Bourrienne, and escorted only by a few of his faithful guides. The party embarked on a solitary part of the beach on board a few fishing boats, which conveyed them out to the frigates, which lay at a little distance from the shore. The joy which animated all these persons when they were told that they were to return to France, can hardly be conceived. Desirous to avoid a personal altercation with Kléber, whose rude and fearless demeanour led him to apprehend some painful sally of passion on receiving the intelligence, Napoléon communicated to him his resolution by letter, which he was aware could not reach Cairo till several days after his departure. Kléber afterwards expressed the highest indignation at that cir-

(1) Nap. ii. 336, 338. Th. x. 402, 403. Jom. xii. 300, 301. Dum. ii. 235, 237. Wilson's Egypt, 29.

(2) Jom. xii. 302. Th. x. 405. Bour. ii. 305. Dum. ii. 240.

cumstance, and in a long and impassioned report to the Directory, charged Napoléon with leaving the army in such a state of destitution, that the defence of the country for any length of time was impossible (1).

It was almost dark when the boats reached the frigates, and the distant lights of Alexandria were faintly descried by the glimmering of the stars on the verge of the horizon. How different from the pomp and circumstance of war which attended his arrival on the same shore,—in the midst of a splendid fleet, surrounded by a powerful army, with the visions of hope glittering before his eyes, and dreams of Oriental conquest captivating his imagination, Napoléon directed that the ships should steer along the coast of Africa, in order that, if escape from the English cruisers became impossible, he might land on the deserts of Lybia, and force his way to Tunis, Oran, or some other port, declaring that he would run any danger rather than return to Egypt.

He steers along the coast of Africa. For three and twenty days they beat against adverse winds along the coast of Africa, and at length, after passing the site of Carthage, a favourable wind from the southeast enabled them to stretch across to the western side of Sardinia, still keeping near the shore, in order to run aground, if necessary, to avoid the approach of an enemy. The sombre disquietude of this voyage afforded the most striking contrast to the brilliant anticipations of the former. His favourite aides-de-camp were all killed; Caffarelli, Brueys, Casa-Bianca, were no more; the illusions of hope were dispelled, the visions of imagination extinguished; no more scientific conversations enlivened the weary hours of navigation, no more historical recollections gilded the headlands which they passed. One only apprehension occupied every mind, the dread of falling in with English cruisers; an object of rational disquietude to every one on board, but of mortal anxiety to Napoléon, from the destruction which it would occasion to the fresh ambitious projects which already filled his mind (2).

He lands at Ajaccio in Corsica. Contrary winds obliged the vessel which conveyed him to put into Ajaccio in Corsica, where he revisited, for the first time since his prodigious elevation, the house of his fathers and the scenes of his infancy. He there learned the result of the battle of Novi and the death of Joubert. This only increased the feverish anxiety of his mind; and he began to contemplate with horror the *ennui* of the quarantine at Toulon, where he proposed to land. His project at times was to make for Italy, take the command of the Italian army, and gain a victory, the intelligence of which he Sets sail, and avoids the English fleet. hoped would reach Paris as soon as that of his victory at Aboukir. At length, after a sojourn of eight days at the place of his nativity, he set sail with a fair wind. On the following evening, an English fleet of fourteen sail was descried in the midst of the rays of the setting sun. Admiral Gauthaume proposed to return to Corsica, but Napoléon replied, “No. Spread every sail; every man to his post; steer for the north-west.” This order proved the salvation of the ships; the English saw the frigates, and made signals to them; but concluding, from the view they got with their glasses, that they were of Venetian construction, then at peace with Great Britain, they did not give chase. The night was spent in the utmost anxiety, during which Napoléon resolved, if escape was impossible, to throw himself into a boat, and trust for safety to his oars; but the morning sun dispelled these apprehensions, by disclosing the English fleet steering peaceably towards the north-east. All sail

(1) Four. ii. 313, 314.

(2) Four. iii. 5, 6, 7.

8th Oct.
Lands in
France.

was now spread for France; and at length, on the 8th October, the long-wished-for mountains of Provence appeared; and the frigates shortly after anchored in the bay of Frejus. The impatience and enthusiasm of the inhabitants when they heard of his arrival, knew no bounds; the sea was covered with boats eager to get a glimpse of the Conqueror of the East (1); the quarantine laws were, by common consent, disregarded; and Napoléon landed in a few hours, and set off the same day for Paris.

Proof which
the Egyptian
expedition
affords of the
superiority
of civilized
to savage
arms.

The expedition to Egypt demonstrates one fact of more importance to mankind than the transitory conquests of civilized nations over each other. It can no longer be doubted, from the constant triumphs of a small body of European troops over the whole forces of the East, that the invention of fire-arms and artillery, the improvement of discipline, and the establishment of regular soldiers as a separate profession, have given the European a decided superiority over the other nations of the world. Europe, in the words of Gibbon, may now contemplate without apprehension an irruption of the Tartar horse; barbarous nations, to overcome the civilized, must cease to be barbarous. The progress of this superiority since the era of the Crusades, is extremely remarkable. On the same ground where the whole feudal array of France perished, under St.-Louis, from the arrows of the Egyptians, the Mameluke cavalry was dispersed by half the Italian army of the Republic; and ten thousand veterans could with ease have wrested that Holy Land from the hordes of Asia, which Saladin successfully defended against the united forces of France and England under Richard Cœur-de-Lion. Civilisation, therefore, has given Europe a decided superiority over barbaric valour; if it is a second time overwhelmed by savage violence, it will not be because the means of resistance are wanting, but because the courage to wield them has decayed.

General reflections
on the probable
fate of an
Eastern empire
under
Napoléon.

It is a curious speculation, what would have been the fate of Asia and the world if Napoléon had not been arrested at Acre by Sir Sidney Smith, and had accomplished his project of arming the Christian population of Syria and Asia Minor, against the Mussulman power. When it is recollected, that in the parts of the Ottoman empire where the Turkish population is most abundant, the number of Christians is in general triple that of their oppressors, there can be little doubt, that, headed by that great general, and disciplined by the French veterans, a force could have been formed which would have subverted the tottering fabric of the Turkish power, and possibly secured for its ruler a name as terrible as Genghis Khan or Tamerlane. But there seems no reason to believe that such a sudden apparition, how splendid soever, would have permanently altered the destinies of mankind, or that the Oriental empire of Napoléon would have been more lasting than that of Alexander or Nadir Shah. With the life of the hero who had formed, with the energy of the veterans who had cemented it, the vast dominion would have perished. The Crusades, though supported for above a century by the incessant tide of European enthusiasm, were unable to form a lasting establishment in Asia. It is in a different region, from the arms of another power, that we are to look for the permanent subjugation of the Asiatic powers, and the final establishment of the Christian religion in the regions from which it sprung. The north is the quarter from whence all the great settlements of mankind have come, and by its inhabitants all the lasting

(1) Th. x. 430, 431. Bour. iii. 13, 16, 20.

conquests of history have been effected. Napoléon indirectly paved the way for a permanent revolution in the East ; but it was destined to be accomplished, not by the capture of Acre, but the conflagration of Moscow. The recoil of his ambition to Europe, which the defeat in Syria occasioned, still further increased by mutual slaughter the warlike skill of the European states; and from the strife of civilisation at last has arisen that gigantic power which now overshadows the Asiatic empires, and is pouring down upon the corrupted regions of the East the energy of northern valour and the blessings of Christian civilisation.

CHAPTER XXVI.

FROM THE PEACE OF CAMPO FORMIO TO THE RENEWAL OF THE WAR.

OCTOBER 1797—MARCH 1799.

ARGUMENT.

Views of the different Parties on the War—Fair opportunity afforded to France of pursuing a pacific System after the Treaty of Campo Formio—Limited Estimates for the year in Britain—Establishment of the Volunteer System in these Islands—Its great Effects—Finances of France—National Bankruptcy there—External Policy of the Directory—Attack upon Holland—Its situation since the French Conquest—Measures of the French Directory to Revolutionize that State—Tyrannical Acts of the Dutch Directory—Political State of Switzerland—Inequality of Political Rights in the different Cantons—Measures of the Discontented to bring on a Contest with the Swiss Diet—Powerful Impression which they produce in the Subject Cantons—First open Acts of Hostility by the French—This is all done under the direction of Napoléon—Consternation in consequence excited in Switzerland—The Aristocratic Party make some Concessions—Hostilities commence in the Pays de Vaud—Heroic conduct of the Mountaineers—Commencement of Hostilities in the Canton of Berne—Surrender of Soleure and Fribourg—Bloody Battle before Berne—Heroic Resolution of the Swiss, their dreadful Excesses after Defeat—Capture of Berne, its Treasure, and Arsenal—Enormous Contributions every where levied by the French—New Constitution of Switzerland—Generous efforts of the Mountaineers—Arguments by which they were roused by the Clergy—Aloys Reding—First Successes, and ultimate Disasters of the Peasants—Heroic Defence of the Schwytzers at Morgarten—Bloody Conflicts in the Valais—Oppressive conduct of the French to the Inhabitants—An Alliance offensive and defensive with France is forced upon Switzerland—Glorious resistance of Uri, Schwytz, and Underwalden—Cruel Massacre by the French—The Grisons invoke the aid of Austria, which occupies their country—Extreme Impolicy, as well as Iniquity of this attack on Switzerland—Great Indignation excited by it in Europe—Attack on the Papal States—Miserable Situation of the Pope—Measures of Napoléon, and the French Government, to hasten the catastrophe of the Papal Government—Duphot is slain in a Scuffle at the French Ambassador's—War is in consequence declared by France against Rome—Berthier advances to Rome—Revolution there—Atrocious Cruelty of the Republicans to the Pope—Their continued Severity towards him—He is removed into France, and there dies—Systematic and Abominable Pillage of Rome by the Republicans—Confiscation of the Church Property in the whole Papal territories—These disorders excite even the Indignation of the French Army—Great Mutiny at Rome and Mantua—Revolt of the Roman Populace—Its bloody Suppression—The whole Papal States are Revolutionized—New Constitution and Alliance with France—Violent changes effected by the French in the Cisalpine Republic—Excessive Discontent excited by these changes in Lombardy—The Spoliation of the King of Sardinia is resolved on—Cruel Humiliations to which he had previously been subjected—The King is reduced to the condition of a prisoner in his own capital—He is at length forced to Abdicate, and retire to Sardinia—Affairs of Naples—Their Military Preparations—The Court enter into Secret Engagements with Austria—and are encouraged to Resist by the Battle of the Nile—On Nelson's arrival at Naples, Hostilities are rashly resolved on—Forces levied by the French in the affiliated Republics—Mack takes the Command at Naples—Dispersed Situation of the French Troops in the Roman States—The Neapolitans enter Rome—They are every where Defeated when advancing further—Fresh Disasters of the Neapolitans—Retreat of Mack—The Neapolitan Court take Refuge on board the English Fleet—Championnet resolves to invade Naples—His Plan of Operations—And surprising Success—Critical Situation of the French Army in front of Capua—Mack proposes an Armistice, which is gladly accepted—Indignation which it excites among the Neapolitan Populace—Advance of the French against Naples—Desperate Resistance of the Lazzaroni—Frightful Combats around the Capital—The French force the Gates and Forts—Bloody Conflicts in the Streets—Establishment of the Parthenopian Republic—State of Ireland—Reflections on the Melancholy History of that Country—Original Evil arising from Confiscation of Land—Peculiar Causes which

have aggravated this evil in that Country—Its inhabitants are as yet unfit for Free Privileges—Intimate Union formed by the Irish Malecontents with France—Revolutionary Organization established throughout the whole Country—Combination of Orangemen to uphold the British Connexion—Treaty of Irish Rebels with France—The Insurrection at length breaks out—Various Actions with the Insurgents—They are totally Defeated at Vinegar Hill—Imminent Danger from which England then escaped—Nugatory Efforts of the Directory to revive the Insurrection—Maritime Affairs of the Year—Disputes of France with the United States—Shameful Rapacity of the French Government—Contributions levied on the Hanse Towns by the Directory—Retrospect of the late Encroachments of France—Their System rendered the continuance of Peace impossible—Leads to a general Feeling in favour of a Confederacy, in which Russia joins—Tumult at Vienna, and insult to the French Ambassador—Who leaves the Austrian Capital—Progress of the Negotiation at Rastadt—The Secret Understanding between France and Austria is made manifest—Financial Measures of the Directory to meet the approaching Hostilities—Adoption of the law of the Conscription by the Legislature—Reflections on this Event.

THE two great parties into which the civilized world had been divided by the French Revolution, entertained different sentiments in regard to the necessity of the war which had so long been waged by the aristocratic monarchies against its unruly authority. The partisans of democracy alleged that the whole misfortunes of Europe, and all the crimes of France, had arisen from the iniquitous coalition of kings to overturn its infant freedom; that if its government had been let alone, it would neither have stained its hands with innocent blood at home, nor pursued plans of aggrandisement abroad; and that the Republic, relieved from the pressure of external danger, and no longer roused by the call of patriotic duty, would have quietly turned its swords into pruning-hooks, and, renouncing the allurements of foreign conquest, thought only of promoting the internal felicity of its citizens. The aristocratic party, on the other hand, maintained that democracy is in its very essence and from necessity ambitious; that the turbulent activity which it calls forth, the energetic courage which it awakens, the latent talent which it developes, can find vent only in the enterprise of foreign warfare; that being founded on popular passion, and supported by the most vehement and enthusiastic classes in the state, it is driven into external aggression as the only means of allaying internal discontent; that it advances before a devouring flame, which, the instant it stops, threatens to consume itself; and that, in the domestic suffering which it engenders, and the stoppage of pacific industry which necessarily results from its convulsions, is to be found both a more eogent inducement to foreign conquest, and more formidable means for carrying it on, than either the ambition of kings or the rivalry of their ministers.

Had the revolutionary war continued without interruption from its commencement in 1792 till its conclusion in 1815, it might have been difficult to have determined which of these opinions was the better founded. The ideas of men would probably have been divided upon them till the end of time; and to whichever side the philosophic observer of human events, who traced the history of democratic societies in time past, had inclined, the great body of mankind, who judge merely from the event, would have leaned to the one or the other, according as their interests or their affections led them to espouse the conservative or the innovating order of things.

It is fortunate, therefore, for the cause of historic truth, and the lessons to be drawn from past calamity in future times, that two years of Continental peace followed the first six years of this bloody contest, and that the Republican government, relieved of all grounds of apprehension from foreign

Views of the
different
parties on
the war.

Fair opportunity afforded to France of pursuing a pacific system after the peace of Campo-Formio.

powers, and placed with uncontrolled authority at the head of the vast population of France, had so fair an opportunity presented of carrying into effect its alleged pacific inclinations. The coalition was broken down and destroyed; Spain had not only given up the contest, but had engaged in a disastrous maritime war to support the interests of the revolutionary state; Flanders was incorporated with its territory, which had no boundaries but the Alps, the Rhine, and the Pyrenees; Holland was converted into an affiliated republic; Piedmont was crushed; Lombardy revolutionized, and its frontier secured by Mantua and the fortified line of the Adige; the Italian powers were overawed, and had purchased peace by the most disgraceful submissions, and the Emperor himself had retired from the strife, and gained the temporary safety of his capital by the cession of a large portion of his dominions. Great Britain alone, firm and unsubdued, continued the war, but without either any definite military object, now that the Continent was pacified, or the means of shaking the military supremacy which the arms of France had there acquired, and rather from the determination of the Directory to break off the recent negotiations, than any inclination on the part of the English government to prolong, at an enormous expense, an apparently hopeless contest. To complete the means of restoring a lasting peace which were at the disposal of the French cabinet, the military spirit had signally declined with the vast consumption of human life in the rural departments during the war; the armies were every where weakened by desertion; and the most ambitious general of the Republic, with its finest army, was engaged in a doubtful contest in Africa, without any means, to all appearance, of ever returning with his troops to the scene of European ambition (1). Now, therefore, was the time when the pacific tendency of the revolutionary system was to be put to the test, and it was to be demonstrated, by actual experiment, whether its existence was consistent with the independence of the adjoining states.

Limited estimates for the year in Britain.

The estimates and preparations of Great Britain for the year 1798 were suited to the defensive nature of the war in which she was now to be engaged, the cessation of all foreign subsidies, and the approach of an apparently interminable struggle to her own shores. The regular soldiers were fixed at one hundred and nine thousand men, besides sixty-three thousand militia; a force amply sufficient to ensure the safety of her extensive dominions, considering the great protection she received from her innumerable fleets which guarded the seas. One hundred and four ships of the line, and three hundred frigates and smaller vessels, were put in commission, manned by one hundred thousand seamen. Supplies to the amount of L. 25,500,000 were voted, which, with a supplementary budget brought forward on 25th April, 1798, in consequence of the expenses occasioned by the threatened invasion from France, amounted to L. 28,450,000; exclusive, of course, of the charges of the debt and sinking fund (2).

But in providing for these great expenses, Mr. Pitt unfolded an important change in his financial policy, and made the first step towards a system of taxation, which, although more burdensome at the moment, is incomparably less oppressive in the end than that on which he had previously proceeded. He stated, that the time had now arrived when the policy hitherto pursued, of providing for all extraordinary expenses by loan, could not be carried further without evident danger to public credit; that such a system, however

(1) Jom. x. 264.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1798, 181.

applicable to a period when an extraordinary and forced effort was to be made to bring the war at once to a conclusion by means of foreign alliances, was unsuitable to the lengthened single-handed contest in which the nation was at last, to all appearance, engaged; that the great object now should be, to make the sum raised within the year as nearly as possible equal its expenditure, so as to entail no burden upon posterity; and therefore he proposed, instead of making the loan, as in former years, L.19,000,000, to make it only L.12,000,000, and raise the additional L.7,000,000 by means of trebling the assessed taxes on house-windows, carriages, and horses. By this means an addition of only L.8,000,000 would be made to the national debt, because L.4,000,000 would be paid off in the course of the year by the sinking fund; and, to pay off this L.8,000,000, he proposed to keep on the treble assessed taxes a year longer; so that, at the expiration of that short period, no part of the debt then contracted would remain a burden on the nation. An admirable plan, and a near approach to the only safe system of finance, that of making the taxes raised within the year equal its expenditure, but which was speedily abandoned amidst the necessities and improvidence of succeeding years (1).

The same period gave birth to another great change in the military policy of Great Britain, fraught in its ultimate results with most important effects, both upon the turn of the public mind, and the final issue of the war. This was the *Volunteer System*, and the general arming of the people.

Establish-
ment of the
Volunteer
System in
Great
Britain.

During the uncertainty which prevailed as to the destination of the great armaments preparing both in the harbours of the Channel and the Mediterranean, the British government naturally felt the greatest anxiety as to the means of providing for the national defence, without incurring a ruinous expense by the augmentation of the regular army. The discipline of that force was admirable, and its courage unquestioned; but its numbers were limited, and it appeared highly desirable to provide some subsidiary body which might furnish supplies of men to fill the chasms which might be expected to occur in the troops of the line, in the event of a campaign taking place on the British shores. For this purpose the militia, which, in fact, was part of the regular force, was obviously insufficient; its officers were drawn from a class from whom the most effective military service was not to be expected; and under the pressure of the danger which was anticipated, government, with the cordial approbation of the King, ventured upon the bold, but, as it turned out, wise and fortunate step, of allowing regiments of volunteers to be raised in every part of the kingdom. On the 11th April it was determined by the cabinet to take this decisive step; and soon after a bill was brought into Parliament by the secretary at war, Mr. Dundas, to permit the regular militia to volunteer to go to Ireland, and to provide for the raising of volunteer corps in every part of the kingdom. The speech which he made on this occasion was worthy of an English minister. Not attempting to conceal the danger which menaced the country, he sought only to rouse the determined spirit which might resist it. "The truth," said he, "is undeniable, that the crisis which is approaching must determine whether we are any longer to be ranked as an independent

(1) James, ii No. 6, App. Ann. Reg. 1798, 182, 184, 211. Parl. Deb. xxxiii. 1042, 1066.

Even in that very year it was, to a certain degree, broken in upon; the assessed taxes produced only L.4,500,000 instead of L.9,000,000, as was expected;

and the expenses having increased to L.3,000,000 beyond the estimates, the loan was augmented to L.15,000,000, exclusive of L.2,000,000 for Ireland, besides L.3,000,000 raised by means of exchequer bills.

nation. We must take the steps which are best calculated to meet it; let us provide for the safety of the infirm, the aged, the women, the children, and put arms into the hands of the people. We must fortify the menaced points, accumulate forces round the capital, affix on the churchdoors the names of those who have come forward as volunteers, and authorize members of Parliament to hold commissions in the army without vacating their seats. I am well aware of the danger of intrusting arms to the whole people without distinction. I am no stranger to the disaffection, albeit much diminished, which still lingers amongst us; I know well that, under the mask of pursuing only salutary reforms, many are still intent upon bringing about a revolution, and for that purpose are willing to enter into the closest correspondence with the avowed enemies of their country. But, serious as is the danger of entrusting arms to a people embracing a considerable portion of such characters, it is nothing to the risk which we should run, if, when invaded by the enemy, we were unprepared with any adequate means of defence. I trust to the good sense of the great body of the people to resist the factious designs of such enemies to their country. I trust that the patriotism by which the immense majority of them are animated, will preclude them from ever using their arms but for worthy purposes: I trust to the melancholy example which has been afforded in the neighbouring kingdom of the consequences of engaging in popular insurrection, for a warning to all Britons who shall take up arms, never to use them but in defence of their country, or the support of our venerable constitution." So obvious was the danger to national independence from the foreign invasion which was threatened, that the bill passed the House without opposition; and in a few weeks a hundred and fifty thousand volunteers were in arms in Great Britain. Mr. Sheridan, as he always did on such occasions, made a noble speech in support of Government. Another bill, which at the same time received the sanction of Parliament, authorized the King, in the event of an invasion, to call out the levy *en masse* of the population, conferred extraordinary powers upon lords-lieutenant and generals in command, for the seizure, on such a crisis, of horses and carriages, and provided for the indemnification, at the public expense, of such persons as might suffer in their properties in consequence of these measures (1). At the same time, to guard against the insidious system of French propagandism, the alien bill was re-enacted, and the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act continued for another year.

The adoption of these measures indicates an important era in the war: that in which popular energy was first appealed to, in order to *combat* the Revolution; and governments, resting on the stubborn evidence of facts, confidently called upon their subjects to join with them in resisting a power which threatened to be equally destructive to the cottage and the throne. It was a step worthy of England, the first-born of modern freedom, to put arms into the hands of her people, to take the lead in the great contest of general liberty against democratic tyranny; and the event proved that the confidence of government had not been misplaced. In no instance did the volunteer corps deviate from their duty, in none did they swerve from the principles of patriotism and loyalty which first brought them round the standard of their country. With the uniform which they put on, they cast off all the vacillating or ambiguous feelings of former years: with the arms which they received, they imbibed the firm resolution to defend the cause

(1) Parl. Hist. xxxiii. 1358, 1423, 1429, 1454.

of England. Even in the great manufacturing towns, and the quarters where sedition had once been most prevalent, the volunteer corps formed so many centres of loyalty, which gradually expelled the former disaffection from their neighbourhood; and to nothing more than this well-timed and judicious step, was the subsequent unanimity of the British empire in the prosecution of the war to be ascribed. Had it been earlier adopted, it might have shaken the foundations of society, and engendered all the horrors of civil war; subsequently, it would probably have come too late to develop the military energy requisite for success in the contest. Nor were the effects of this great change confined only to the British isles; it extended to foreign nations and distant times; it gave the first example of that touching development of patriotic ardour which afterwards burned so strongly in Spain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia; and in the British volunteers of 1798 was found the model of those dauntless bands by which, fifteen years afterwards, the resurrection of the Fatherland was accomplished.

While England was thus reaping the fruits, in the comparatively prosperous state of its finances and the united patriotism of its inhabitants, of the good faith and stability of its government, the French tasted, in a ruinous and disgraceful national bankruptcy, the natural consequences of undue democratic influence and revolutionary convulsions. When the new government, established by the Revolution of the 18th Fructidor, began to attend to the administration of the finances, they speedily found that, without some great change, and the sacrifice of a large class of existing interests, it was impossible to carry on the affairs of the state. The resources of assignats and mandates were exhausted, and nothing remained but to reduce the most helpless class, the public creditors, and by their ruin extricate the government from its embarrassments (1). As the income was calculated at the very highest possible rate, and the expenditure obviously within its probable amount, it was evident that some decisive measure was necessary to make the one square with the other. For this purpose, they at once struck off *two-thirds* of the debt, and thereby reduced its annual charge from 258 millions to 86 (2). To cover, indeed, the gross injustice of this proceeding, the public creditors received a paper, secured over the national domains, to the extent of the remaining two-thirds, calculated at twenty years' purchase: but it was at the time foreseen what immediately happened, that, from the total impossibility of these miserable fund-holders turning to any account the national domains which were thus tendered in payment of their claims, the paper fell to a tenth part of the value at which it was forced on their acceptance, and soon became altogether unsaleable; so that the measure was to all intents and purposes a public bankruptcy. Notwithstanding the enfeebled state of the legislature by the mutilations which followed the 18th Fructidor, this measure excited a warm opposition; but at length the revolutionary party prevailed, and it

(1) The most favourable view of the public revenue, and which in the end proved to be greatly overcharged, only exhibited an income of. 616,000,000 francs.

But the expenses of the war were

| | | |
|-----------------------------|-------------|---------------|
| estimated at, | 283,000,000 | } 788,000,000 |
| Other services, | 247,000,000 | |
| Interest of debt, | 258,000,000 | |

Annual deficit, 172,000,000, or L. 7,000,000.

Being just about the same deficit which in 1789 was made the pretext to justify the Revolution.

(2) See *ante*, ch. xxiv.

passed both Councils by a large majority. Yet such had been the abject destitution of the fundholders for many years, in consequence of the unparalleled depreciation of the paper circulation in which they were paid, that this destruction of two-thirds of their capital, when accompanied by the payment of the interest of the remainder in specie, was felt rather as a relief than a misfortune. Such were the consequences, to the monied interest, of the Revolution which they had so strongly supported, and which they fondly imagined was to be an invincible rampart between them and national bankruptcy (1).

External
policy of the
French
Directory.

The external policy of the Directory soon evinced that passion for foreign conquest which is the unhappy characteristic of democratic states, especially in periods of unusual fervour, and forms the true vindication of the obstinate war which was maintained against them by the European monarchs. "The coalition," they contended, "was less formed against France than against the principles of the Revolution. Peace, it is true, is signed; but the hatred which the sovereigns have vowed against it, is not, on that account, the less active; and the chicanery which the Emperor and England oppose in the way of a general pacification, by showing that they are only waiting for an opportunity for a rupture, demonstrates the necessity of establishing a just equilibrium between the monarchical and the democratical states. Switzerland, that ancient asylum of liberty, now trampled under foot by an insolent aristocracy, cannot long maintain its present government without depriving France of a part of its resources, and of the support which it would have a right to expect in the event of the contest being renewed (2)." Thus the French nation, having thrown down the gauntlet to all Europe, felt, in the extremities to which they had already proceeded, a motive for still further aggressions and more insatiable conquests; obeying thus the moral law of nature, which, in nations as well as individuals, renders the career of guilt the certain instrument of its own punishment, by the subsequent and intolerant excesses into which it precipitates its votaries.

Attack upon
Holland.

Holland was the first victim of the Republican ambition. Not content with having revolutionized that ancient commonwealth, expelled the Stadtholder, and compelled its rulers to enter into a costly and ruinous war to support the interests of France, in which they had performed their engagements with exemplary fidelity, they resolved to subject its inhabitants to a convulsion of the same kind as that which had been terminated in France by the 18th Fructidor.

Its situation
since the
French con-
quest.

Since their conquest by Pichegru, the Dutch had had ample opportunity to contrast the ancient and temperate government of the House of Orange, under which they had risen to an unexampled height of prosperity and glory, with the democratic rule which had been substituted in its stead. Their trade was ruined, their navy defeated, their flag swept from the ocean, and their numerous merchant vessels rotting in their harbours. A reaction, in consequence, had become very general in favour of the ancient order of things; and so strong and fervent was this feeling, that the National Assembly, which had met on the first triumph of the Republicans, had never ventured to interfere with the separate rights and privileges of the provinces, as settled by prescription and the old constitution. The French Directory beheld with secret disquietude this leaning

(1) Dum. 32, 35. Th. ix. 321, 322. Jom. x. 277.

(2) Jom. x. 285. Th. x. 25.

to the ancient order of things, and could not endure that the old patrician families should, by their influence in the provincial diets, temper in any degree the vigour of their central democratic government. To arrest this tendency, they recalled their minister from the Hague: supplied his place by Delacroix, a man of noted democratic principles, and gave Joubert the command of the armed force. Their instructions were, to accomplish the overthrow of the ancient federative constitution, overturn the aristocracy, and vest the government in a Directory of democratic principles entirely devoted to the interests of France (1).

The Dutch Assembly was engaged at this juncture in the formation of a constitution, all previous attempts of that description having proved miserable failures. The adherents of the old institutions, who still formed a majority of the inhabitants, and embraced all the wealth and almost all the respectability of the United Provinces, had hitherto contrived to baffle the designs of the vehement and indefatigable minority, who, as in all similar contests, represented themselves as the only real representatives of the people, and stigmatized their opponents as a mere faction, obstinately opposed to every species of improvement. A majority of the Assembly had passed some decrees, which the democratic party strenuously resisted, and forty-three of its members, all of the most violent character, had protested against their adoption. It was to this minority that the French minister addressed himself to procure the overthrow of the constitution (2).

At a public dinner, Delacroix, after a number of popular toasts, exclaimed, with a glass in his hand, "Is there no Batavian who will plunge a poniard into the constitution, on the altar of his country?" Amidst the fumes of wine, and the riot of intoxication, the plan for its assassination was soon adopted; and its execution was fixed for the 22d January. On that night, the forty-three deputies who had signed the protest assembled at the Hotel of Haarlem, and ordered the arrest of twenty-two of the leading deputies of the Orange party and the six commissioners of foreign relations. At the same time the barriers were closed; the national guard called forth; and the French troops, headed by Joubert and Daendels, intrusted with the execution of the order. Resistance was fruitless; before daybreak those arrested were all in prison; and the remainder of the Assembly, early in the morning, met in the hall of their deliberations, where, surrounded by troops, and under the dictation of the bayonet, they passed decrees, sanctioning all that had been done in the night, and introducing a new form of government on the model of that already established in France (3).

By this constitution the privileges of the provinces were entirely abolished; the ancient federal union superseded by a republic, one and indivisible; the provincial authorities changed into functionaries emanating from the central government; a Council of Ancients and a Chamber of Deputies established, in imitation of those at Paris: and the executive authority confided to a Directory of five members all completely in the interest of France. The sitting was terminated by an oath of hatred to the Stadtholder, the federal system, and the aristocracy: and ten deputies, who refused to take it, were deprived of their seats on the spot. So completely was the whole done under the terror of the army, that some months afterwards, when the means of intimidation

(1) Th. x. 26, 27. Join. x. 281. Ann. Reg. 1798, 49, 50, 78, 80.

(3) Th. x. 27. Join. x. 281, 282, Ann. Reg. 1798, 80.

(2) Th. x. 26. Join. x. 128.

were removed, a number of deputies who had joined in these acts of usurpation gave in their resignation, and protested against the part they had been compelled to take in the transaction (1).

Tyrannical
acts of the
new Direc-
tory.

The inhabitants of Holland soon discovered that, in the pursuit of democratic power, they had lost all their ancient liberties. The first step of the new Directory was to issue a proclamation, strictly forbidding, under severe penalties, all petitions from corporate bodies or assemblages of men, and declaring that none would be received but from insulated individuals; thereby extinguishing the national voice in the only quarter where it could make itself heard in a serious manner. All the public functionaries were changed, and their situations filled by persons of the Jacobin party; numbers banished or proscribed; and, under the pretext of securing the public tranquillity, domiciliary visits and arrests multiplied in the most arbitrary manner. The individuals suspected of a leaning to the adverse party were every where deprived of their right of voting in the primary assemblies; and finally, to complete the destruction of all the privileges of the people, the sitting Assembly passed a decree, declaring itself the legislative body, thereby depriving the inhabitants of the election of their representatives. This flagrant usurpation excited the most violent discontents in the whole country, and the Directors soon became as obnoxious as they had formerly been agreeable to the populace. Alarmed at this state of matters, and apprehensive lest it should undermine their influence in Holland, the French Directory enjoined General Daendels to take military possession of the government. He accordingly put himself at the head of two companies of grenadiers, and proceeded to the palace of the Directory, where one member was seized, while two resigned, and the other two escaped. A provisional government was immediately formed, consisting of Daendels and two associates, all entirely in the interest of France, without the slightest regard to the wishes of, or any pretence even of authority from, the people. Thus was military despotism the result of revolutionary changes in Holland, as it had been in France, within a few years after they were first commenced amidst the general transports of the lower orders (2).

Political
state of
Switzer-
land.

Switzerland was the next object of the ambition of the Directory. The seclusion of that beautiful country, its retirement from all political contests for above two centuries, the perfect neutrality which it had maintained between all the contending parties since the commencement of the Revolution, the indifference which it had evinced to the massacre of its citizens on the 10th August, could not save it from the devouring ambition of the Parisian enthusiasts. As little, it must be owned with regret, could the wisdom and stability of its institutions, the perfect protection which they afforded to persons and property, the simple character of its inhabitants, or the admirable prosperity which they had enjoyed for above five centuries under their influence, save a large proportion of them from the pernicious contagion of French democracy. The constitutions of the cantons were various. In some, as the Forest Cantons, highly democratical; in others, as in Berne, essentially aristocratic; but in all, the great objects of government, security to persons and property, freedom in life and religion, were attained, and the aspect of the population exhibited a degree of well-being unparalleled in any other part of the world. The traveller was never weary of admiring, on the sunny margin of the lake of Zurich, on the vine-clad hills

(1) *Journ.* x. 282. *Th. x.* 27. *Ann. Reg.* 1798, 81.

(2) *Ann. Reg.* 1798, 82, 85. *Journ.* xi. 14, 15.

of the Lemman sea, in the smiling fields of Appenzel, in the romantic valleys of Berne, and the lovely recesses of Underwalden—the beautiful cottages, the property of their inhabitants, where industry had accumulated its fruits, and art had spread its elegancies, and virtue had diffused its contentment; and where, amidst the savage magnificence of nature, a nearer approach appeared to have been made to the simplicity of the golden age than in any other quarter of the civilized globe (1).

Of all the European governments, that of Switzerland was the one the weight of which was least felt by the people. Economy, justice, and moderation, were the bases of its administration, and the federal union by which the different cantons of which it was composed were held together, seemed to have no other object than to secure their common independence. Taxes were almost unknown, property was perfectly secure, and the expenses of government incredibly small (2). The military strength of the state consisted in the militia of the different cantons, which, though formidable, if united and led by chiefs well skilled in the difficult art of mountain warfare, was little qualified to maintain a protracted struggle with the vast forces which the neighbouring powers had now brought into the field.

Inequality of political rights in the different Cantons. The chief defect in the political constitution of the Helvetic Confederacy was, that with the usual jealousy of the possessors of political power, they had refused to admit the conquered provinces to a participation of the privileges which they themselves enjoyed, and thereby sown the seeds of future dissension and disaffection between the different parts of their dominion. In this way the Pays de Vaud was politically subject to the canton of Berne, the Italian bailiwicks to that of Uri, and some towns of Argovia and Thurgovia to other cantons; while the peasants of Zurich, in addition to the absence of political privileges, were galled by a monopoly in the sale of their produce, which was justly complained of as oppressive. Yet the moderation and justice of the government of the senate of Berne was admitted even by its bitterest enemies; the economy of their administration had enabled them, with extremely light burdens, not only to meet all the expenses of the state, but accumulate a large treasure for future emergencies; and the practical blessings of their rule were unequivocally demonstrated by the well-being of the peasantry and the density of the population,—features rarely found in unison, but which cannot coexist but under a paternal and beneficent system of administration (3).

The French resolve to excite one part of the inhabitants against the other. The uniform system of the French revolutionary government, when they wished to make themselves masters of any country, was to excite a part of the population, by the prospect of the extension of political power, against the other; to awaken democratic ambition by the offer of fraternal support, and having thus distracted the state by intestine divisions, they soon found it an easy matter to triumph over both. The situation of the Swiss cantons, some of which held conquered provinces in subjection, and which varied extremely among each other, in the extent to which the elective franchise was diffused through the people, offered a favourable prospect of undermining the patriotism of the inhabitants, and accomplishing the subjection of the whole by the adoption of this insidious system. The treasure of Berne, of which report had magnified the amount, offered an irresistible bait to the cupidity of the French Directory; and whatever argu-

(1) Dum. i. 425, 428.

(2) Jom. x. 293, 294, 300.

(3) Hard. v. 277, Lac. xiv. 184. Jom. x. 295,

ments were adduced in favour of respecting the neutrality of that asylum of freedom, they were always met by the consideration of the immense relief which those accumulated savings of three centuries would afford to the finances of the Republic (1).

The first spark of the revolutionary flame had been lighted in Switzerland in 1791, when many sincere and enthusiastic men, among whom was Colonel La Harpe, formerly preceptor to the Emperor Alexander, contributed by their publications to the growth of democratic principles. The patricians of Berne were the especial object of their attacks, and numerous were the efforts made to induce the inhabitants of its territory to shake off the aristocratic yoke. But the success of their endeavours was for many years prevented by the catastrophe of 10th August, and the savage ferocity with which the Swiss guard were treated by the Parisian populace on that occasion, for no other crime than unshaken fidelity to their duty and their oaths. Barthélemy was sent to Berne as ambassador of France to counteract this tendency; and his efforts and address were not without success in allaying the general exasperation, and reviving those feelings of discontent which, in an especial manner, brooded among the inhabitants of the subject cantons. The government, however, persisted in a cautious system of neutrality; the wisest course which they could possibly have adopted, if supported by such a force as to cause it to be respected, but the most unfortunate when accompanied, as it was, by no military preparations to meet the coming danger (2).

The Swiss democrats formed a considerable party, formidable chiefly from their influence being concentrated in the great towns, where the powers of thought were more active, and the means of communication greater than in the rural districts. Zurich was the centre of their intrigues; and it was the great object of the revolutionists to counterbalance, by the influence of that city, the authority of Berne, at the head of which was Steiger, the chief magistrate of the confederacy. Ochs, grand tribune of Basle, a turbulent and ambitious demagogue, Pfeffir, son of one of the chief magistrates of Lucerne, and Colonel Weiss at Berne, formed a secret committee, the object of which was, by all possible means, to bring about the downfall of the existing constitution, and the ascendancy of French influence in the whole confederacy. Their united efforts occasioned an explosion at Geneva in 1792, and threatened the liberties of all Switzerland; but the firmness of the government of Berne averted the danger; fourteen thousand militia speedily approached the menaced point; and the troops of the Convention retired before a nation determined to assert its independence (3).

The subjugation of Switzerland, however, continued a favourite object of French ambition; it had been resolved on by the Directory long before the treaty of Campo Formio. In July, 1797, their envoy Mengaud was dispatched to Berne to insist upon the dismissal of the English resident Wickham, and at the same time to set on foot intrigues, with the democratic party, similar to those which had proved so successful in effecting the overthrow of the Venetian republic. By the prudent resolution of the English government, who were desirous not to embroil the Swiss with their formidable neighbours, Wickham was withdrawn. Foiled in this attempt to involve the Swiss in a conflict, the Directory next ordered their troops on the frontier to take possession of that part of the territory of Basle

(1) Lac. xiv, 188.

(2) Hard. v. 277, 285.

(3) Hard. v. 282, 290.

which was subject to the jurisdiction of the cantons; but here too they were unsuccessful, for the Swiss government confined themselves to simple negotiations for so glaring a violation of existing treaties. But Napoléon, by his conduct in regard to the Valteline, struck a chord which soon vibrated with fatal effect throughout Switzerland, and, by rousing the spirit of democracy, prepared the subjugation of the country. This country, consisting of five bailiwicks, and containing one hundred and sixty thousand souls, extending from the source of the Adda to its junction with the lake of Como, had been conquered by the Grisons from the Dukes of Milan; Francis I guaranteed to them their enjoyment of it, and they had governed it with justice and moderation with a council of its own for three centuries. Napoléon, however, perceived in the situation of this sequestered valley the means of inserting the point of the wedge into the Helvetic confederacy. Its proximity to the Milanese territory, where the revolutionary spirit was then furiously raging, and the common language which they spoke, rendered it probable that they would rapidly imbibe the spirit of revolt against their German superiors; and, in order to sound their intentions, and foment the desire of independence, he, early in the summer 1797, sent his aide-de-camp Leclerc to their cottages. The result was, that the inhabitants of the Valteline openly claimed their independence, rose in insurrection, hoisted the tricolor flag, and expelled the Swiss authorities. Napoléon, chosen during the plenitude of his power at Montebello as mediator between the contending parties, pronounced, on 10th Oct. 10, October, 1797, a decree which, instead of settling the disputed 1797. points between them, annexed the whole insurgent territory to the Cisalpine Republic, thereby bereaving the ancient allies of France, during a time of profound peace, of a territory to them of great value, which they had enjoyed for three hundred years. This decree was professedly based on the principle of still more general application. "That no one people should be subjected to another people (1).

Powerful effect which they produce in the subject cantons.

This iniquitous proceeding, which openly encouraged every subject district in the Swiss confederacy to declare its independence, was not lost upon the Valais, the Pays de Vaud, and all the other dependencies of that Republic. To increase the ferment, a large body of troops, under General Ménard, was moved forward to the frontiers of that discontented province, and Napoléon, in his journey from Milan to Rastadt, took care to pass through those districts, and stop in those towns, where the democratic spirit was known to be most violent. At Lausanne he was surrounded by the most ardent of the revolutionary party, and openly proclaimed as the Restorer of their independence. A plan of operations was soon concerted with Ochs and La Harpe, the leaders of revolutionary projects in that country. It was agreed that a republic, one and indivisible, should be erected, as that was considered as more favourable to the interests of France than the present federal union; that the Directory should commence by taking possession of Bienne, L'Esquil, and Munsterthal, which were dependencies of

(1) Nap. iv. 196, 200, 202. Jom. x. 202, 262, 263. Ann. Reg. 1798, 22. Hard. v. 302, 307.

June 21, 1797. Napoléon at the same time dispatched an agent to negotiate with the republic of the Valais for a communication over the Simplon, through their territory, with the Cisalpine Republic. The Swiss government, however, had influence enough, by means of Barthélemy, who, at that period, was a member of the Directory, to obtain a negative on that attempt. The French general, upon

this, had recourse to the usual engine of revolution; he stirred up, by his secret emissaries, the lower Valaisans to revolt against the upper Valaisans, by whom they were held in subjection; and the inhabitants, assured of his support, and encouraged by the successful result of the revolt of the Valteline, declared their independence. [Corresp. Conf. June 21, 1797, and July 13, 1797. Hard. v. 295, 293.]

the bishopric of Basle : that all the Italian bailiwicks should be stimulated to follow the example of the Pays de Vaud in throwing off the yoke of the other cantons : that the French Republic should declare itself the protector of all the districts and individuals who were disposed to shake off the authority of the aristocratic cantons, and that Mengaud should encourage the formation of clubs, inundate the country with revolutionary writings, and promise speedy succours in men and money. At Berne, Napoléon asked a question of sinister import as to the *amount of its treasure* ; and though the senator, to whom it was addressed, prudently reduced its amount to 10,000,000 francs, or about L.400,000, this was sufficient to induce that ambitious man, who was intent on procuring funds for his Eastern expedition, to urge the Directory to prosecute their invasion of Switzerland (1).

First open acts of hostility. Dec. 15, 1797. The first act of open hostility against the Helvetic league was the seizure of the country of Erguel by five battalions, drawn from the army of the Rhine, on the 15th December. This event, accompanied as it was by an alarming fermentation, and soon an open insurrection in the Pays de Vaud, produced the utmost consternation in Switzerland ; and a diet assembled at Arau to deliberate concerning the public exigencies. This act of hostility was followed, two days after, by an intimation from Mengaud, the French envoy, "that the members of the governments of

Dec. 17. Berne and Friburg should answer personally for the safety of the persons and property of such of the inhabitants of the Pays de Vaud as might address themselves to the French Republic to obtain the restitution of their rights." As the senate of Berne seemed resolved to defend their country, Mengaud, early in January, summoned them instantly to declare their intentions. At the same time, General Ménard crossed Savoy with ten thousand men, from the army of Italy, and established his headquarters at Ferney, Jan. 4, 1798. near Geneva ; while Monnier, who commanded the troops in the Cisalpine Republic, advanced to the frontiers of the Italian bailiwicks, to support the expected insurrection in the southern side of the Alps. These threatening measures brought matters to a crisis in the Pays de Vaud ; the standard of insurrection was openly hoisted, trees of liberty planted, the Swiss authorities expelled, and the *Leman Republic* solemnly recognised by the French Directory (2).

This is all done under the direction of Napoléon. These iniquitous measures against the Swiss confederacy were all adopted by the government, with the concurrence and by the advice of Napoléon. He was the great centre of correspondence with the malecontents of Helvetia ; and by his council, assistance, and directions, kept alive that spirit of disaffection which ultimately proved fatal to the independence of the confederacy. In concert, at Paris, with La Harpe, Ochs, and the other leaders of the insurrection, he prepared a general plan of a revolt against the Swiss government. So little did the Directory deem it necessary to conceal either their own or his share in these intrigues, that they openly avowed it ; and, in a journal published under their immediate superintendence, it was publicly declared that, with the assistance of Napoléon, they were engaged in a general plan for the remodelling the Helvetic constitution ; and that they took under their especial protection the patriots of the Pays de Vaud, and all who were engaged in the great struggle

(1) Jom. x. 292, 298. Lac. xiv. 195. De Staël, (2) Ann. Reg. 1798, 22, 23. Jom. x. 302. Lac. ii. 209. Ann. Reg. 1798, 24, 25, xiv. 195.

for equality of privileges and French fraternization throughout the whole confederacy (1).

(1) Hard. v. 310, 311.

In the *Ami des Lois*, a journal entirely under the direction of Barras, there appeared at this period the following article: "Several French travellers have been sent within these few days to Switzerland, with instructions to observe the singular variety in the Helvetic governments, their division into thirteen republics, and their distribution into sovereign and subject states. The same travellers are directed to consider the inconveniences likely to arise from the accumulation, so near the French frontiers, of the leaders of so many parties who have been vanquished in the different crises of the Revolution. They are authorized to declare that France is particularly the ally of all the conquered or subject people, and of all who are in a state of opposition to their governments, all of which are notoriously sold to England. They are directed, in an especial manner, to observe the situation of Geneva, which is eminently republican, and friendly to France. M. Talleyrand is much occupied with the political state of Switzerland; he has frequent conferences with General Bonaparte, Colonel La Harpe, and the Grand Tribune Ochs. The latter distinguished character, who is received at all the public fêtes on the same terms as the foreign ambassadors, is occupied, under the auspices of the Directory, and in concert with the persons whom they have appointed to share their labours, with a general remodelling of the ancient Helvetic constitution. In a word, a revolutionary explosion is hourly expected on the two extremities of Switzerland, in the Grisons and the Pays de Vaud."—*Ami des Lois*, Dec. 11, 1797.

The direction which Napoléon took of these intrigues is abundantly proved by his *Confidential Dec. 12.* Correspondence. On December 12, 1797, Ochs addressed the following note to that general:—"The material points to consider are, whether we are to continue the federal union which is so agreeable to Austria, or establish unity, the only means of rendering Switzerland the permanent ally of France. I perceive, with the highest satisfaction, that you agree with the Swiss patriots on this point. But the result of our conferences and correspondence is, that it is indispensable that we should have a convention, supported by a French *corps d'armée*, in the immediate neighbourhood. May I therefore be permitted to insinuate to my friends, in guarded phrases, that they will be supported? May I assure the patriots of Zurich, that the amnesty demanded will be extended to the inhabitants of Kaiffa, that France will make good its incontestable rights to the Val Moutier, the Val d'Erguel, and the town of Bienne; that she will guarantee the liberties of the Pays de Vaud, and that the Italian bailiwicks may present petitions, and fraternize with the Cisalpine Republic? Basle revolutionized might propose to the Italian bailiwicks, the Pays de Vaud, and the other subject states, to send deputies to a national convention; if matters were only brought that length, there can be no doubt that the remainder of Switzerland would come into their measures. But it is indispensable that the agents of France should publish revolutionary writings, and declare every where that you take under your especial protection all who labour for the regeneration of their country. This declaration, however, may be made either publicly or confidentially; I shall be happy to prepare a sketch of such a confidential letter, if you prefer that method." [Corr. Conf. iv. 470, 472.]

19th Dec. It would appear that Napoléon had not at once replied to this letter; for, six days after-

wards, Ochs again wrote to him:—"I wrote to you on the 12th, and begged to know to which of the alternatives proposed in my letter the patriots are to look. Meanwhile, they are preparing, but I am much afraid they will do more harm than good; they will probably effect a half revolution only, which will be speedily overturned, and leave matters worse than before." [Ibid. iv. 474, 475.] 2d Dec.

On the 2d December, Bacher, the revolutionary agent for the Grisons, wrote to Napoléon:—"The explosion which we have so long expected has at length taken place; the chiefs and members of the Grey league have been deposed, and placed in confinement at Coire; the general assembly of the people has been convoked. Their first act has been to send a deputation to express to you, citizen general, the profound sense which the Congress entertain of your powerful mediation, and to give you all the information which you can desire." [Ibid. iv. 463.] On 21st December, Ochs wrote to Napoléon:—"My letters have at length informed me, that the French troops are in possession of the bishopric of Basle. I am transported with joy on the occasion; the last hour of the aristocracy appears to have struck. Listen to what one of your agents writes to me:—"Have only a little patience, and full justice will be done; war will be waged with the oligarchy and the aristocracy; government established in its primitive simplicity, universal equality will prevail, and then France will indeed live on terms of amity with its Swiss neighbours." [Corresp. Conf. iv. 476, 477.]

17th Feb. 1798. On the 17th February, 1798, the revolutionary deputies of the Pays de Vaud presented the following address to Napoléon:—"The deputies of the Pays de Vaud, whom the generous protection of the Directory has so powerfully aided, desire to lay their homage at your feet. They owe it the more, because it was your passage through their country which electrified the inhabitants, and was the precursor of the thunderbolt which has overwhelmed the oligarchy. The Helvetians swore, when they beheld the Liberator of Italy, to recover their rights." [Ibid. iv. 508.] Brune also corresponded with Napoléon throughout the whole campaign in Switzerland:—"In one of his letters, 17th March. on 17th March, 1798, he says,—"I have studied your political conduct throughout your Italian campaign; I follow your labours to the best of my ability; according to your advice, I spare no methods of conciliation; but at the same time am fully prepared to act with force, and the genius of liberty has seconded my enterprises. I am, like you, surrounded by rascals; I am constantly paring their nails, and locking the public treasures from them." [Ibid. iv. 533.] Lastly, Napoléon no sooner heard of the invasion of the Pays de Vaud, than he wrote to the Directors of the Cisalpine Republic in these terms:—"The Pays de Vaud and the different cantons of Switzerland are animated with the same spirit of liberty; we know that the Italian bailiwicks share in the same disposition; but we deem it indispensable that at this moment they should declare their sentiments, and manifest a desire to be united to the Cisalpine Republic. We desire in consequence that you will avail yourselves of all the means in your power to spread in your neighbourhood the spirit of liberty; circulate liberal writings; and excite a movement which may accelerate the general revolution of Switzerland. We have given orders to General Monnier to approach the frontiers of the Italian bailiwicks with his troops, to support any movements of the insurgents; he has received orders to

Consternation in consequence excited in Switzerland. They make some concessions.

These violent steps, which threatened the whole confederacy with dissolution, excited the deepest alarm in the Swiss Diet, assembled at Arau. This was increased by a note addressed by Mengaud, which declared that, if the Austrians entered the Grisons, the French would immediately occupy the canton of Berne. The most violent debates, meantime, took place in the senate of that canton, as to the course which should be adopted. In order to appease the public discontents, they passed a decree by which the principal towns and districts in the canton were empowered to elect fifty deputies to sit in the legislature. This example was immediately followed by the cantons of Zurich, Friburg, Lucerne, Soleure, and Schaffhausen. But this measure met with the usual fate of all concessions yielded, under the influence of fear, to revolutionary ambition; it displayed weakness without evincing firmness, and encouraged audacity without awakening gratitude (1).

Convinced at length by the eloquence of Steiger, that resistance was the only course which remained, the Senate of Berne ordered the militia, twenty thousand strong, to be called out, and sent Colonel Weiss, with a small force, to take possession of Lausanne. But this officer had not troops sufficient to accomplish the object; the insurgents instantly invited General Ménard to enter the territory of the confederacy, and the French battalions quickly poured down from the Jura. Upon his approach, the revolution broke out at Lausanne, the Swiss were driven out, and Ménard, advancing, summoned Weiss instantly and entirely to evacuate the Pays de Vaud. Two soldiers of the escort of the flag of truce were killed; and although the Senate of Berne offered to deliver up the men who had committed this aggression, Ménard obstinately insisted upon construing it into a declaration of war, and established his head-quarters at Lausanne. Meanwhile Ochs and Mengaud, the leaders of the democratic party, succeeded in revolutionizing all the north of Switzerland, as far as the foot of the mountains; the territories of Zurich, Basle, and Argovie, quickly hoisted the tricolor flag, and convulsions took place in the Lower Valais, Friburg, Soleure, and St.-Gall (2). To such a height of audacity did the insurgents arrive, that they hoisted that emblem of revolution at Arau, without the Diet being able to overawe them by their presence, or prevent them by their authority.

Driven to desperation by these insurrections, the Senate of Berne tardily, but resolutely, resolved upon resistance. They intimated to the French government the concessions made to the popular party; but the Directory declared that nothing would be deemed satisfactory, unless the whole ancient constitution was overturned, and a provisional government of five revolutionists established in its stead. The Senate, finding their ruin resolved on, issued a proclamation calling on the shepherds of the Alps to defend their country; Steiger repaired in person to the army to put himself under the orders of Erlach, and the most energetic measures to repel the danger were adopted (3). A minority, unworthy of the name of Swiss, abdicated, and agreed to all the propositions of the French general; not intimidated by the terror of the Republican arms, but deluded by the contagion of its principles.

Desirous still, if possible, to avoid proceeding to extremities, the Senate

concert measures with you for the attainment of an object equally important to both Republics."—See HARP. v. 330.

(1) Ann. Reg. 1798, 25. Jom. x. 304, 308. Th. x. 46.

(2) Jom. x. 305, 306. Lac. xiv. 200. Th. x. 47, 49. Ann. Reg. 1798, 26.

(3) Jom. x. 308. Lac. xiv. 201. HARP. v. 318, 319.

addressed a note to the Directory, in which they complained of the irruption of their troops into the Pays de Vaud, and offered to disband their militia if the invaders were withdrawn. This drew forth from the enemy a full statement of their designs. No longer pretending to confine themselves to the support of the districts in a state of revolution, or the securing for them the privileges of citizens, they insisted on overturning the whole constitution of the country, forming twenty-two cantons instead of thirteen, and creating a Republic, one and indivisible, with a Directory, formed in all respects on the model of that of France (1); at the same time Mengaud published at Aran a declaration, that "all Swiss who should refuse to obey the commands, or follow the standards of the Senate of Berne, would be taken under the immediate protection of the French Republic."

Heroic conduct of the mountain-eers.

Meanwhile the Oberland *en masse* flew to arms; the shepherds descended from their glaciers; every valley sent forth its little horde of men, and the accumulated streams, uniting like the torrents of the Alps, formed a body of nearly twenty thousand combatants on the frontiers of Berne. The small cantons followed the glorious example; Uri, Unterwalden, Schwytz, and Soleure, sent forth their contingents with alacrity; the inmost recesses of the Alps teemed with warlike activity, and the peasants joyfully set out from their cottages, not doubting that the triumphs of Morat, Laupen, and Granson, were about to be renewed in the holy war of independence. The women fanned the generous flame: they not only encouraged their husbands and brothers to swell the bands of their countrymen, but themselves in many instances joined the ranks, resolved to share in the perils and glories of the strife. Almost every where the inhabitants of the mountains remained faithful to their country, the citizens of towns and of the plains alone were deluded by the fanaticism of revolution (2).

Commencement of hostilities.

General d'Erlach, who commanded the Swiss troops, had divided his army into three divisions, consisting of about seven thousand men each. The first, under General Andermatt, occupied the space between Friburg and the lake of Morat; the second, under Graffenried, was encamped between the town of Buren and the bridge over the river Thiels, the third, under Colonel Watteville, was in communication with the preceding, and covered Soleure. Had the Swiss army instantly attacked, they might possibly have overwhelmed the two divisions of the French troops, which were so far separated as to be incapable of supporting each other; the multitude of waverers in Switzerland would probably have been decided by such an event, to join the armies of their country, and thus the confederacy might have been enabled to maintain its ground till the distant armies of Austria advanced to its relief. But, from a dread of precipitating hostilities while yet accommodation was practicable, this opportunity, notwithstanding the most urgent representations of Steiger, was allowed to escape, and General Brune, who at this time replaced Ménard in the command, instantly concentrated his forces, and sent forward an envoy to Berne to propose terms of accommodation. By this artifice he both induced the enemy to relax their efforts, and gained time to complete his own preparations. The Senate meanwhile fluctuated between the enthusiasm of the peasantry to resist the enemy, and their apprehensions of engaging in such a contest. At length Brune, having com-

(1) Jom. x. 310. Hard. v. 343.

(2) De Staël, ii. 72. Lac. xiv. 202, 203. Jom. x. 310. Ann. Reg. 1798, 28. Hard. v. 321, 322.

pleted his preparations, declared that nothing would satisfy the Directory but the immediate disbanding of the whole army; upon which the Senate at length authorized d'Erlach to commence hostilities, and notice was sent to the French commander that the armistice would not be renewed (1).

Brune, however, resolved to anticipate the enemy. For this purpose, the March 2. troops were moved, before day-break on the 2d March, towards Soleure and Friburg, where they had many partisans among the revolutionary classes. A battalion of Swiss, after a heroic resistance, was cut to pieces at the Surrender of Soleure and Friburg. advanced posts; but the towns were far from imitating this gallant example. Soleure surrendered at the first summons, and Friburg, after a show of resistance, did the same. These great successes, gained evidently by concert with the party who distracted Switzerland, not only gave the invaders a secure bridge over the Aar, but by uncovering the right of the Swiss army, compelled the retreat of the whole. This retrograde movement, immediately following these treacherous surrenders, produced the most fatal effect; the peasants conceived they were betrayed, some disbanded and retired, boiling with rage, to their mountains, others mutinied and murdered their officers; nothing but the efforts of Steiger and d'Erlach brought any part of the troops back to their colours, and then it was discovered that half their number had disappeared during the confusion (2).

Bloody battle before Berne. While the Swiss troops at this critical moment were undergoing this ruinous diminution, the French were vigorously following up their successes. Before daybreak, on the 5th, a general attack was commenced on the Swiss position. General Pigeon, with fifteen thousand men, passed the Sarine, and, by a sudden assault, made himself master of the post of Neuenneck, on the left of the army; but the Swiss, though only eight thousand strong, under Graffenried, having returned to the charge, after a desperate conflict, drove his veteran bands back, with the loss of eighteen pieces of cannon, and two thousand men, and, amidst loud shouts, regained the position they had occupied in the morning. But while fortune thus smiled on the arms of freedom on the left, a fatal disaster occurred on the right. After the fall of Soleure, the division of Schawenburg moved forward on the road to Berne, and, after an obstinate struggle, dislodged the Swiss advanced guard of four thousand men placed in the village of Frauenbrunne. After this success, he pushed on till his advance was arrested by the corps commanded by d'Erlach in person, seven thousand strong, posted, with his right resting on a ridge of rocks, and his left on marshes and woods. But the strength of this position, where formerly the Swiss had triumphed over the Sire of Coucy, proved inadequate to arrest the immense force which now assailed it. The great superiority of the French, who had no less than sixteen thousand veteran troops in the field, enabled them to scale the rocks and turn his right, while dense battalions, supported by a numerous artillery, pressed upon the centre and left. After a brave resistance, the Swiss were forced to retreat; in the course of it, they made a heroic stand at Granholz. The extraordinary

(1) Join. x. 312, 315. Ann. Reg. 1798, 23, 28. Harl. v. 359, 375.

The ultimatum of the French general was in these terms:—"The government of Berne is to recall the troops which it has sent into the other cantons, and disband its militia. There shall forthwith be established a provisional government, differing in form and composition from the one which exists; within a month after the establishment of that provisional government, the primary

assemblies shall be convoked; the principle of political liberty and equality of rights assumed as the base of the new constitution, and declared the fundamental law of the confederacy; all persons detained for political offences shall be set at liberty. The Senate of Berne shall instantly resign its authority into the hands of the provisional government."—Harl. v. 375, 376.

(2) Join. x. 317, 318. Lac. xiv. 203, 204. Ann. Reg. 1798, 29.

nature of the war here appeared in the strongest colours. The Swiss peasants, though defeated, faced about with the utmost resolution; old men, women, children, joined their ranks; the place of the dead and the wounded was instantly supplied by crowds of every age and sex, who rushed forward, with inextinguishable devotion, to the scene of danger. At length the numbers and discipline of the French prevailed over the undaunted resolution of their opponents; the motley crowd was borne backwards at the point of the bayonet to the heights in front of Berne. Here d'Erlach renewed the combat for the fifth time that day, and for a while arrested their progress; but the cannon and cavalry having thrown his undisciplined troops into confusion, they were driven into the town, and the cannon of the ramparts alone prevented the victors from following in their steps. The city capitulated the same night, and the troops dispersed in every direction (1).

Dreadful ex-
cesses of the
Swiss after
defeat.

Deplorable excesses followed the dissolution of the Swiss army. The brave d'Erlach was massacred by the deluded soldiers at Munningen, as he was endeavouring to reach the small cantons. Steiger after undergoing incredible hardships, escaped by the mountains of Oberland into Bavaria. Numbers of the bravest officers fell victims to the fury of the troops; and the democratic party, by spreading the belief that they had been betrayed by their leaders, occasioned the destruction of the few men who could have sustained the sinking fortunes of their country (2).

Capture of
Berne, its
treasures
and arsenal.

The French, immediately after their entrance into Berne, made themselves masters of its treasures, the chief incentive to the war. Its exact amount was never ascertained, but the most moderate estimate made it reach to 20,000,000 francs, or L.800,000 sterling. The arsenal, containing 500 pieces of cannon, and 40,000 muskets, the stores, the archives, all became the prey of the victors. The tree of liberty was planted, the democratic constitution promulgated, and a Directory appointed. Several senators put themselves to death at beholding the destruction of their country; many died of grief at the sight (3).

Enormous
contribu-
tions levied
by the
French
every where.

The fall of Berne was soon followed by an explosion of the revolutionary volcano over great part of Switzerland. The people of Zurich and Lucerne rose in open insurrection; dispossessed the authorities; and hoisted the tricolor flag; the Lower Valaisans revolted against the Upper, and by the aid of the French, made themselves masters of the castellated elisfs of Sion. All the level parts of Switzerland almost joined the innovating party. They were not long in tasting the bitter fruits of such conduct. Enormous contributions, pillage of every sort, attended the steps of the French armies; even the altar of Notre-Dame-des-

(1) *Jom. x. 319, 322. Ann. Reg. 1798, 30, 31. Lac. xiv. 205, 208. Th. x. 50.*

During all these negotiations and combats with the Republic of Berne, Brune corresponded confidentially with, and took directions from, Napoleon. On the 8th February he wrote from Lausanne to him:—"Berne has made some flourishes before my arrival, but since that period it has been chiefly occupied with remodelling its constitution; anticipating thus the stroke which the Directory had prepared for it. To-morrow I shall advance to Morat, and from thence make you acquainted, my general, with our military and political situation." Three days afterwards he again wrote:—"The letter of citizen Mengaud, affixed to the coffee-houses of Berne, has awakened the oligarchs; their battalions are on foot; nothing less than the 12,000 men which you have demanded from the army of the

Rhine for this expedition can ensure its success. The presence of an armed force is indispensable.—*Corresp. Conf. de Nap. iv. 511, 512; and Hard. v. 355, 356.*

(2) *Jom. x. 322. Lac. xiv. 208. Hard. v. 391.*

(3) *Jom. x. 322, 323. Lac. xiv. 209. Th. x. 51. Hard. v. 409.*

Brune announced the capture of Berne to Napoleon in these terms:—"From the moment that I found myself in a situation to act, I assembled all my strength to strike like lightning; for Switzerland is a vast barrack, and I had every thing to fear from a war of posts: I avoided it by negotiations, which I knew were not sincere on the part of the Bernese, and since that I have followed the plan which I traced out to you. I think always that I am still under your command."—*Correspond. Conf. iv. 531.*

Hermites, the object of peculiar veneration, was despoiled; the generals received prodigious gifts out of the plunder (1); the troops were clothed at the expense of their democratic allies; and the scourge of commissaries, as in Belgium and Italy, following in the rear of the armies, exhibited, by the severity and enormity of their exactions, a painful contrast to the lenity and indulgence of their former government (2). The Swiss revolutionists were horrorstruck at these exactions, and all persons of respectable character, who had been misled by the fumes of democracy, saw that the independence of Switzerland was destroyed, threw up their employments in the service of the invaders (3), and lamented in silence the despotic yoke they had brought on their country (4).

A new constitution was speedily framed for the confederacy, formed on the basis of that established in France in 1793, and proclaimed at Arau April 12. on 12th April. The barriers of nature, the divisions formed by New constitution of Switzerland. mountains, lakes, and torrents; the varieties of character, occupation, language, and descent, were disregarded, and the Republic, one and indivisible proclaimed. Five directors, entirely in the interest of France, were appointed, with the absolute disposal of the executive and military power of the state; and by a law, worthy of Tiberius, whoever *spoke even* in a disrespectful manner of the new authorities, was to be punished with death (5). Geneva at the same time fell a prey to the ambition of the all-engrossing Republic. This celebrated city had long been an object of their desire; and the divisions by which it now was distracted, afforded a favourable opportunity for accomplishing the object. The democratic party loudly demanded a union with that power, and a commission was appointed by the Senate, to report upon the subject. Their report, however, was unfavourable; upon which General Gérard, who commanded a small corps in the neighbourhood, took possession of the town; and the Senate, with the bayonet at their throats, formally agreed to a union with the conquering Republic (6).

But while the rich and populous part of Switzerland was thus falling a prey to the revolutionary fervour of the times, a more generous spirit animated the shepherds of the small cantons. The people of Schwytz, Uri, Underwalden, Glarus, Sargans, Turgovie, and St.-Gall, rejected the new constitution. The inhabitants of these romantic and sequestered regions, communicating little with the rest of the world, ardently attached to their liberties, proud of their heroic struggles in defence of

(1) That of General Brune amounted to 800,000 francs, or L. 36,000 sterling.—LACRETELLE, *NIV.* 210.

(2) The French imposed a tax of 15,000,000 francs, or L. 600,000, on their democratic "allies" in Berne, Friburg, Soleure, Lucerne, and Zurich; a sum far greater than ever had been raised before in those simple countries in ten years. This was independent of 19,000,000 francs, or L. 760,000, already paid by these cantons in bills of exchange and cash, and of

5,000,000 francs, or L. 200,000 worth of articles taken from the arsenals. Such were the first fruits of republican fraternization.

(3) *Jom.* x. 323, 330, 348, 349. *Lac.* xiv. 210, 241. *Th.* x. 53.

(4) The total plunder exacted from the canton of Berne alone by the French, in 1798, amounted to the enormous sum of 42,280,000 francs, or above L. 1,700,000. The particulars were as follows :

| | Francs. |
|--------------------------------------|------------|
| Treasure, | 7,000,000 |
| Ingots, | 3,700,000 |
| Contributions, | 4,000,000 |
| Sale of Titles, | 2,000,000 |
| Wheat seized, | 17,140,000 |
| Wine, | 1,440,000 |
| Artillery and stores in arsenal, . . | 7,000,000 |

Total, 42,280,000 francs, or L. 1,710,000.

(5) *Lac.* xiv. 213. *Jom.* x. 330.

(6) *Jom.* x. 331.

ancient freedom, and inheriting all the dauntless intrepidity of their forefathers, were not to be seduced by the glittering but deceitful offers which had deluded their richer and more civilized brethren. They clearly perceived that, when once they were merged in the Helvetic Union, their influence would be destroyed by the multitude who would share their privileges; that they would soon fall under the dominion of the cities, with whose wealth and ambition they were wholly disqualified to contend; and that, in the wreck of all their ancient institutions, the independence of their country could not long be maintained. They saw that the insidious promises of the French envoys had terminated only in ruinous exactions and tyrannical rule, and that irreligion, sacrilege, and infidelity universally marked the invaders' steps. Every day they had proofs of the repentance, when too late, of the cantons who had invited the enemy into their bosom; and multitudes, escaping from the theatre of French exactions, fled into their secluded valleys, stimulating their inhabitants to resistance, by the recital of their oppressions, and offering to aid them by their arms. Animated by these feelings, the small cantons unanimously rejected the new constitution. "We have lived," said they, "for several centuries, under a republic based on liberty and equality; possessing no other goods in the world but our religion and our independence, no other riches but our herds, our first duty is to defend them (1)."

Arguments
by which
they were
roused by
the clergy.

The clergy in these valleys had unbounded influence over their flocks. They were justly horrorstruck at the total irreligion which was manifested by the French armies in every part of the world, and the acrimonious war which they, in an especial manner, waged against the Catholic faith. The priests traversed the ranks, with the crucifix in their hands, to exhort the peasants to die as martyrs if they could not preserve the independence and religion of their country. "It is for you," they exclaimed, "to be faithful to the cause of God; you have received from Him gifts a thousand times more precious than gold or riches,—the freedom and faith of your ancestors. A peril far more terrible than heresy now assails you; impiety itself is at your gates; the enemy marches covered with the spoils of your churches; you will no longer be the sons of William Tell if you abandon the faith of your fathers; you are now called on not only to combat as heroes, but to die as martyrs." The women showed the same ardour as at Berne; numbers joined the ranks with their husbands, others carried provisions and ammunition for the combatants; all were engaged in the holy cause. The tricolor flag became the object of the same hatred as the Austrian standard five centuries before; the tree of liberty recalled the pole of Gesler; all the recollections of William Tell mingled with the newborn enthusiasm of the moment. "We do not fear," said the shepherds of Uri, "the armies of France; we are four hundred, and if that is not sufficient, four hundred more in our valley are ready to march to the defence of their country (2)." Animated by such feelings, the peasants confidently hoped for victory; the spots on which the triumphs of Naefels, Laupen, and Morgarten were to be renewed, were already pointed out with exulting anticipations of success; and the shepherds of a few cantons, who could not bring ten thousand men into the field, fearlessly entered the lists with a power beneath which the Austrian monarchy had sunk to the ground.

(1) Jom. x, 326, 348, 349. Lac. xiv. 216, 217.

(2) De Staël, *Rév. Franç.* ii. 216. Lac. xiv. 218, 219. Jom. x. 349, 350.

Aloys Reding. Aloys Reding was the soul of the confederacy. Descended from the ancient founders of Helvetic independence, the relative of numbers who had perished on the Place du Carrousel on the 10th August, an old antagonist of the French in the Spanish war, he was filled with the strongest enmity at that grasping tyranny, which, under the name of freedom, threatened to extinguish all the liberties of the civilized world. His military talents and long experience made him fully aware of the perilous nature of the contest in which his countrymen were engaged, but he flattered himself that, amidst the precipices and woods of the Alps, a Vendéen war might be maintained till the German nations were roused to their relief, forgetting that a few valleys, whose whole population was not eighty thousand, could hardly hope for success in a contest in which three millions of Bretons and Vendéens had failed (1).

First successes and ultimate disasters of the peasants. The peasants were justly apprehensive of the war being carried into their own territories, as the ravages of the soldiers or the torch of the incendiary might destroy in a moment the work of centuries of labour. Reding, too, was in hopes that, by assailing the French troops when dispersed over a long line, he might gain a decisive success in the outset of the campaign; and accordingly it was determined to make an immediate attack on Lucerne and Zurich. A body of four thousand men marched April 18. upon the former town, which surrendered by capitulation, and where the Swiss got possession of a few pieces of cannon, which they made good use of in the mountain warfare to which they were soon reduced. No sooner had they made themselves masters of the city, than, like the Vendéens, they flocked to the churches to return thanks to Heaven for their success. Meanwhile two other columns threatened Zurich, the one from Rapperswyl, the other from Richtenswyl: but here they found that the French, now thoroughly alarmed, were advancing in great force; and that, abandoning all April 30. thoughts of foreign conquest, it was necessary to concentrate all their forces for the defence of their own valleys. In effect, Schawenberg, with one brigade, surprised three thousand peasants at Zug, and made them all prisoners; while General Nouvion, after a bloody conflict, won the passage of the Reuss at Mellingen. He then divided his men into two divisions, one of which, after an obstinate battle, drove the peasants back into Rapperswyl, while the other forced them, after a desperate struggle, from Richtenswyl into the defile of Kusnacht (2).

May 2. After these disasters, the canton of Zug, which was now overrun by French troops, accepted the new constitution. But Schwytz was still unsubdued; its little army of three thousand men resolved to defend their country, or perish in the attempt. They took post, under Reding, Heroic defence of the Schwytzers at Morgarten. at Morgarten, already immortalized in the wars of Helvetic independence. At daybreak the French appeared, more than double their force, descending the hills to the attack. They instantly advanced to meet them, and running across the plain, encountered their adversaries before they had come to the bottom of the slope. The shock was irresistible; the French were borne backwards to the summit of the ridge, and after a furious conflict, which lasted the whole day, the peasants remained masters of the contested ground. Fresh reinforcements came up on both sides during the night, and the struggle was renewed next day with doubtful success.

(1) Jom. x. 346. Lac. xiv. 216.

(2) Jom. x. 353, 356. Lac. xiv. 221, 222. Ann. Reg. 1798, 33.

The coolness and skill of the Swiss marksmen counterbalanced the immense superiority of force, and the greater experience and rapidity of movement, on the part of their adversaries; but, in spite of all their efforts, they were unable to gain a decisive success over the invaders. The rocks, the woods, May 3. the thickets, were bristling with armed men; every cottage became a post of defence, every meadow a scene of carnage, every stream was dyed with blood. Darkness put an end to the contest while the mountaineers were still unsubdued; but they received intelligence during the night which rendered a longer continuance of the struggle hopeless. The inhabitants of Uri and Underwalden had been driven into their valleys; a French corps was rapidly marching in their rear upon Schwytz, where none but women remained to defend the passes; the auxiliaries of Sargans and Glarus had submitted to the invaders. Slowly and reluctantly the men of Schwytz were brought to yield to inexorable necessity; a resolution not to submit till two-thirds of the canton had fallen was at first carried by acclamation; but at length they yielded to the persuasions of an enlightened ecclesiastic and the brave Reding, who represented the hopelessness of any further contest, and agreed to a convention, by which they were to accept the constitution and be allowed to enjoy the use of their arms, their religion, and their property, and the French troops to be withdrawn from their frontier. The other small cantons soon followed their example, and peace was for a time restored to that part of Switzerland (1).

Bloody conflict in the Valais. The same chequered fortune attended the arms of the Swiss in the Valais. The brave inhabitants of the rocky, pine-clad mountains, which guard the sources of the Rhone, descended from Leuk to Sion, where they expelled the French garrison, and pursued them as far as St.-Maurice. Here, however, they were assailed by a column of the Republicans, May 7. on their march to Italy, and driven back towards the Upper Valais. An obstinate conflict ensued at the bridge of La Morge, in front of Sion; twice the Republicans were repulsed; even the Cretins, seeming to have recovered their intellect amidst the animation of the affray, behaved with devoted courage. At length, however, the post was forced, and the town carried by escalade; the peasants despairing of success retired to their mountains, and the new constitution was proclaimed with opposition, amidst deserted and smoking ruins (2).

Oppressive conduct of the French to the inhabitants. A temporary breathing time from hostilities followed these bloody defeats; but it was a period of bitter suffering and humiliation to Switzerland. Forty thousand men lived at free quarters upon the inhabitants; the requisitions for the pay, clothing, and equipment of these hard taskmasters proved a sad contrast to the illusions of hope which had seduced the patriotism of its urban population. The rapacity and exactions of the commissaries and inferior authorities, exceeded even the cruel spoliation of the Directory; and the warmest supporters of the democratic party sighed when they beheld the treasures, the accumulation of ages, and the warlike stores, the provident savings of unsubdued generations, sent off, under a powerful guard, to France, never to return. In vain the revolutionary authorities of Switzerland, now alive to the tyranny they had brought on their country, protested against the spoliation, and affixed their seals to the treasures which were to be carried off; they were instantly broken by the French commissaries; and a proclamation of the Directory informed the in-

(1) *Journ.* x. 337, 358. *Lac.* xiv. 224, 226.(2) *Journ.* x. 360.

habitants that they were a conquered nation, and must submit to the lot of the vanquished (1).

An alliance offensive and defensive with France is forced upon Switzerland. All the public property, stores, and treasures of the cantons were soon declared prize by the French authorities, the liberty of the press extinguished, a vexatious system of police introduced, and those magistrates who showed the slightest regard for the liberties of their country dismissed without trial or investigation. The ardent democrats, who had joined the French party in the commencement of the troubles, were now the foremost to exclaim against their rapacity, and lament their own weakness in having ever lent an ear to their promises. But it was all in vain; more subservient Directors were placed by the French authorities at

Aug. 4. the head of affairs, in lieu of those who had resigned in disgust; and an alliance offensive and defensive concluded at Paris between the two Republics, which bound Switzerland to furnish a contingent of troops, and to submit to the formation of two military roads through the Alps, one to Italy, and one to Swabia,—conditions which, as Jomini justly observes, were worse for Switzerland than an annexation to France, as they imposed upon it all the burdens and dangers of war, without either its advantages or its glories (2).

Glorious resistance of Uri and Schwytz. Cruel massacre by the French. The discontents arising from these circumstances were accumulating on all sides, when the imposition of an oath to the new constitution brought matters to a crisis in the small cantons. All took it with the utmost reluctance; but the shepherds of Underwalden unanimously declared they would rather perish, and thither the most determined of the men of Schwytz and Uri flocked, to sell their lives dearly in defence of their country. But resistance was hopeless. Eight thousand French embarked at Lucerne, and landed at Stantz, on the eastern side, while the like number crossed the beech-clad ridge of the Brunig, and descended by the lovely lakes of Lungern and Sarnen, at the western extremity of the valley. Oppressed by such overwhelming forces, the peasants no longer hoped for success; an honourable death was alone the object of their wishes. In their despair they observed little design, and were conducted with hardly any discipline; yet such is the force of mere native valour, that for several days it enabled three thousand shepherds to keep at bay above sixteen thousand of the bravest troops of France. Every hedge, every thicket, every cottage, was obstinately contested; the dying crawled into the hottest of the fire; the women and children threw themselves upon the enemy's bayonets; the greyhaired raised their feeble hands against the invaders: but what could heroism and devotion achieve against such desperate odds? Slowly, but steadily, the French columns forced their way through the valley, the flames of the houses, the massacre of the inhabitants, marking their steps. The beautiful village of Stantz, entirely built of wood, was soon consumed; seventy peasants, with their curate at their head, perished in the flames of the church. Two hundred auxiliaries from Schwytz arriving too late to prevent the massacre, rushed into the thickest of the fight; and, after slaying

(1) Aon. Reg. 1798, 35, 36. Jom. x. 361.

The rapacity of the French commissaries who followed in the rear of the armies, soon made the Swiss regret even the spoiliations of Bruce and their first conquerors. Locarlier levied 100,000 crowns in Friburg, and 800,000 francs in Berne; and as the public treasure was exhausted, the effects of 300 of the richest families were taken in payment, and the

principal senators sent as prisoners to the citadel of Besaçon till the contribution was paid. He was succeeded by Rapiot, whose exactions were still more intolerable. He levied a fresh contribution of 6,000,000 oo Berne; on Zurich, Friburg, and Solothure, of 7 000,000; 750,000 francs were taken from six abbeys alone.—HARD. vi. 180, 181.

(2) Jom. xi. 17, 18. HARD. vi. 180, 182.

double their own number of the enemy, perished to the last man. Night at length drew its veil over these scenes of horror; but the fires from the burning villages still threw a lurid light over the cliffs of the Engleberg; and long after the rosy tint of evening had ceased to tinge the glaciers of the Titlis, the glare of the conflagration illuminated the summit of the mountain (1).

The Grisons invoke the aid of Austria, who occupy their country. Oct. 19. These tragical events were little calculated to induce other states to follow the example of the Swiss in calling in the aid of the French democracy. The Grisons, who had felt the shocks of the revolutionary earthquake, took counsel from the disaster of their brethren in the forest cantons, and invoking the aid of Austria, guaranteed by ancient treaties, succeeded in preserving their independence and ancient institutions. Seven thousand Imperialists entered Coire in the end of October; and spreading through the valley of the Rhine, already occupied those posts which were destined to be the scene of such sanguinary conflicts in the succeeding campaign. The French, on their part, augmented rather than diminished the force with which they occupied Switzerland; and it was already apparent that, in the next conflict between these gigantic powers, the Alps would be the principal theatre of their strife (2).

Extreme impolicy, as well as iniquity, of the attack on Switzerland. In this unprovoked attack upon Switzerland, the Directory committed as great a fault in political wisdom as in moral duty. The neutrality of that country was a better defence to France, on its south-eastern frontier, than either the Rhine or the iron barrier on its north-western. The allies could never venture to violate the neutrality of the Helvetic Confederacy, lest they should throw its warlike population into the arms of France; no armies were required for that frontier, and the whole disposable forces of the state could be turned to the Rhine and the Maritime Alps. In offensive operations, the advantage was equally apparent. The French, possessing the line of the Rhine, with its numerous fortifications, had the best possible base for their operations in Germany; the fortresses of Piedmont gave them the same advantage in Italy; while the great mass of the Alps, occupied by a neutral power, rendered their conquests, pushed forward in either of these directions, secure from an attack in flank, and preserved the invading army from all risk of being cut off from its resources. But when the Alps themselves became the theatre of conflict, these advantages were all lost to the Republic; the bulwark of the Rhine was liable to be rendered valueless at any time, by a reverse in Switzerland, and France exposed to an invasion in the only quarter where her frontier is totally defenceless; while the fortifications of Mantua and the line of the Adige were of comparatively little importance, when they were liable to be turned by any inconsiderable success in the Grisons or the Italian bailiwicks. The Tyrol, besides, with its numerous, warlike, and enthusiastic population, afforded a base for mountain warfare, and a secure asylum in case of disaster, which the French could never expect to find amidst the foreign language and hostile feelings of German Switzerland; while, by extending the line of operations from the Adriatic to the Channel, the Republic was forced to defend an extent of frontier, for which even its resources, ample as they were, might be expected to prove insufficient (3).

Nothing done by the revolutionary government of France ever had so powerful an effect in cooling the ardour of its partisans in Europe, and opening

(1) *Lac.* xiv. 229, 230. *Ann. Reg.* 1798, 34, 35.
Jom. xi. 19, 20.

(2) *Jom.* xi. 20, 22.

(3) *Arch. Ch.* i. 127, 110. *Jom.* x. 236, 289.

Great indig-
nation ex-
cited by it
in Europe.

the eyes of the intelligent and respectable classes in every other country as to their ultimate designs, as the attack on Switzerland (1). As long as the Republic was contending with the armies of kings, or resisting the efforts of the aristocracy, it was alleged that it was only defending its own liberties, and that the whole monarchies of Europe were leagued together for its destruction. But when, in a moment of general peace, its rulers commenced an unprovoked attack on the Swiss confederacy; when the loud declaimers in favour of popular rights forced an obnoxious constitution on the mountaineers of the Alps, and desolated with fire and sword the beautiful recesses of the democratic cantons; the sympathies of Europe were awakened in favour of a gallant and suffering people, and the native atrocity of the invasion called forth the wishes of freedom on the other side. The Whig leaders of England, who had palliated the atrocities of the Revolution longer than was consistent either with their own character or their interest as a political party, confessed that "the mask had fallen from the face of revolutionary France, if indeed it ever had worn it (2)." "Where," it was asked over all Europe, "will the Revolution stop? What country could be imagined less alluring to their cupidity than that, where, notwithstanding the industry of the inhabitants, the churlish soil will barely yield its children bread? What government can pretend to favour in the eyes of the Directory, when it visits with fire and sword those fields where the whole inhabitants of a canton assemble under the vault of heaven to deliberate, like the Spartans of old, on their common concerns? What fidelity, and proof of confidence does it expect more complete than that which leaves a whole frontier without defence, or rather which has hitherto considered it as better defended by the unalterable neutrality of its faithful allies, than by the triple line of fortresses which elsewhere guards the entrance to its soil (3)?"

The Ecclesiastical States were the next object of attack. It had long been an avowed object of ambition with the Republican government to revolutionize the Roman people, and plant the tricolor flag in the city of Brutus (4),

(1) Its effect on the friends of freedom in England may be judged of from the following indignant lines by Coleridge, once an ardent supporter of the Revolution, in his *Ode to Freedom*, written in 1798:—

"Forgive me, freedom! oh forgive those dreams!
I hear thy voice, I hear thy loud lament,
From bleak Helvetia's icy cavern sent—
I hear thy groans upon her blood-stain'd streams!
Heroes, that for your peaceful country perish'd,
And ye, that lying, spot your mountain snows
With bleeding wounds, forgive me, that I cherish'd
One thought that ever bless'd your cruel foes!
To scatter rage and traitorous guilt,
Where peace her jealous home had built;
A patriot race to disinherit
Of all that made their stormy wilds so dear!—
Oh! France, that mockest heaven, adulterous, blind,
And patriot only in pernicious toils,
Are these thy boasts, champion of humankind,
To insult the shrine of liberty with spoils
From freemen torn; to tempt and to betray?"

(2) *Parl. Deb.* xxxiv. 1323.

(3) *Dum. i.* 428, 429. *Join. x.* 331.

(4) The resolution of Napoléon and the Directory to revolutionize Rome, and effect the overthrow of the papal government, was adopted long before the treaty of Campo-Fornio. On the 12th February, 1797, the Directory wrote to Napoléon:—"The possession of Tyrol and Trieste, and the conquest of Rome, will be the glorious fruits of the fall of Man-
May 19, 1797. tua." On 19th May, 1797, Napoléon wrote to the Directory:—"The Pope is dangerously

ill, and is eighty-three years old. The moment I received this intelligence, I assembled all my Poles at Bologna, from whence I shall push them forward to Ancona. What shall I do if the Pope dies?" The May 25.

Directory answered:—"The minister of foreign affairs will inform General Bonaparte, that they trust to his accustomed prudence to bring about a democratic revolution in the Roman states with as little convulsion as possible." [*Hard. iv.* 387, 388.] The prospect, however, failed at that time, as the Pope recovered. Meanwhile the pillage of the ecclesiastical states continued without intermission; and having exhausted the public treasury, and drained the country of all its specie, the French agents laid their rapacious hands upon all the jewels and precious stones they could find. The value of plunder thus got was astonishing. "The Pope," says Cacaault, the French ambassador at Rome, to Napoléon, "gives us full satisfaction in every thing regarding any errors in accounting, weight, etc., that may occur in the payment of the 30,000,000 francs. June 3, 1797. *The payments in diamonds amount to 11,271,000 francs (L.450,000). He has paid 4,000,000 in francs, of contributions levied since the treaty of Tolentino.* But it is with the utmost difficulty that these payments are raised; the country is exhausted; let us not drive it to bankruptcy. My agent, citizen Haller, wrote to me the other day, 'Do not forget, citizen minister, that the immense and unceasing demands of the army oblige us to play a little the corsair, and that we must not enter into discussions,

and fortune at length presented them with a favourable opportunity to accomplish the design.

The situation of the Pope had become, since the French conquests in Italy, in the highest degree precarious. Cut off, by the Cisalpine republic, from any support from Austria; left by the treaty of Campo Formio entirely at the mercy of the French Republic; threatened by the heavings of the democratic spirit within his own dominions, and exposed to all the contagion arising from the complete establishment, and close vicinity, of republican governments in the north of Italy, he was almost destitute of the means of resisting so many seen and unseen enemies. The pontifical treasury was exhausted by the immense payments stipulated by the treaty of Tolentino; while the activity and zeal of the revolutionary clubs in all the principal towns of the ecclesiastical states was daily increasing with the prospect of success. To enable the government to meet the enormous demands of the French army, the principal Roman families, like the Pope, had sold their gold, their silver, their jewels, their horses, their carriages, in a word, all their valuable effects; but the exactions of the republican agents were still unabated. In despair, they had recourse to the fatal expedient of issuing a paper circulation; but that, in a country destitute of credit (1), soon fell to an inconsiderable value, and augmented rather than relieved the public distress.

Joseph Bonaparte, brother to Napoléon, had been appointed ambassador at the court of Rome; but as his character was deemed too honourable for political intrigue, Generals Duphot and Sherlock were sent along with him; the former of whom had been so successful in effecting the overthrow of the Genoese aristocracy. The French embassy, under their direction, soon became the centre of the revolutionary action, and those numerous ardent characters with which the Italian cities abound, flocked there as to a common focus, from whence the next great explosion of democratic power was to be expected (2). In this extremity, Pius VI, who was above eighty years of age, and sinking into the grave, called to his counsels the Austrian General Provera, already distinguished in the Italian campaigns; but the Directory soon compelled the humiliated Pontiff to dismiss that intrepid counsellor (3). As

as it would sometimes turn out that we are in the wrong,' I always supported a mortal war against the Pope, as long as the Papal government resisted; but now that it is prostrated at our feet, I am become suddenly pacific; I think such a system is both for your interest and that of the Directory." [Corresp. Conf. iii. 274, 275.] On the 25th May, 1797, the same ambassador wrote to Napoléon:—"I am occupied in collecting and transporting from hence to Milan all the diamonds and jewels I can collect; I send there also whatever is made the subject of dispute in the payments of the contributions. You will keep in view that the people here are exhausted, and that it is in vain to expect the destitute to pay. I take advantage of these circumstances, to prostrate at your feet Rome and the Papal government." [Ibid. iii. 246, 249.] On 5th August, 1797, he again wrote to Napoléon:—"Discontent is at its height in the Papal states; the government will fall to pieces of itself, as I have repeatedly predicted to you. But it is not at Rome that the explosion will take place; too many persons are here dependent upon the expenditure of the great. The payment of 30,000 000, stipulated by the treaty of Tolentino, at the close of so many previous losses, has totally exhausted this old carcass. *We are making it expire by a slow fire*; it will soon crumble to the dust. The revolutionists,

by accelerating matters, would only hasten a dissolution certain and inevitable. [Corresp. Conf. iii. 515, 516.]

(1) Hard. v. 175, 176. Bot. ii. 443.

(2) It would appear, however, that the French ambassador was by no means satisfied with the first efforts of the Roman patriots. "They have manifested," said Joseph Bonaparte to Napoléon, "all the disposition to overturn the government, but none of the resolution. If they have thought and felt like Brutus and the great men of antiquity, they have spoken like women, and acted like children. The government has caused them all to be arrested"—*Letter Joseph to Napoléon, 10th September, 1797; Corresp. Confid.*

Sept. 29, 1797. (3) "You must forthwith intimate to the Court of Rome," said Napoléon to his brother Joseph, ambassador there, "that if General Provera is not immediately sent away from Rome, the Republic will regard it as a declaration of war. I attach the utmost importance to the removal of an Austrian commander from the Roman troops. You will insist not only that he be deprived of the command of the Roman troops, but that within twenty-four hours he departs from Rome. Assume a high tone: it is only by evincing the greatest firmness, and making use of the most energetic expressions,

his recovery then seemed hopeless, the instructions of government to their ambassador were to delay the proclamation of a republic till his death, when the vacant chair of St.-Peter might be overturned with little difficulty; but such was the activity of the revolutionary agents, that the train was ready to take fire before that event took place, and the ears of the Romans were assailed by incessant abuse of the ecclesiastical government, and vehement declamations in favour of republican freedom (1).

The resolution to overturn the Papal government, like all the other ambitious projects of the Directory, received a very great impulse from the resuscitant of Jacobin influence at Paris, by the results of the revolution of 18th Fructidor. One of the first measures of the new government was to dispatch an order to Joseph Bonaparte at Rome, to promote, by all the means in his power, the approaching revolution in the Papal states; and above all things to take care that at the Pope's death no successor should be elected to the chair of St.-Peter (2). Napoléon's language to the Roman pontiff became daily more menacing. Immediately before setting out for Rastadt, he ordered his brother Joseph to intimate to the Pope that three thousand additional troops had been forwarded to Ancona; that if Provera was not dismissed within twenty-four hours, war would be declared; that if any of the revolutionists who had been arrested were executed, reprisals would forthwith be exercised on the cardinals; and that, if the Cisalpine republic was not instantly recognized, it would be the signal for immediate hostilities (3). At

that you will succeed in overawing the Papal authority. Timid when you show your teeth, they rapidly become overbearing if you treat them with any respect. I know the court of Rome well. That single step, if properly taken, will complete its ruin. At the same time, you will hold out to the Papal secretary of state, 'That the French Republic, continuing its feelings of regard for the Papal government, is on the point of restoring Ancona. You are ruining all your affairs; the whole responsibility rests on your head. The French troops will give you no assistance in quelling the revolts with which you are menaced, if you continue your present course.' Should the Pope die, you must do your utmost to prevent the nomination of a successor, and bring about a revolution. Depend upon it, the King of Naples will not stir. Should he do so, you will inform him that the Roman people are under the protection of the French Republic; but, at the same time, you must hold out to him secretly that the government is desirous to renew its negotiations with him. In a word, you must be as haughty in public as you are pliant in private,—the object of the first being to deter him from entering Rome; of the last, to make him believe that it is for his interest not to do so. Should no revolutionary movement break out at Rome, so that there is no pretence for preventing the nomination of a Pope, at least take care that the Cardinal Albani is not put in nomination. Declare, that the moment that is done I will march upon Rome." [Corresp. Conf. iv. 199, 201.]—*Secret Despatch, Napoléon to Joseph Bonaparte, dated Passeriano, 29th Sept. 1797.*—These instructions, it is to be recollected, were sent to the French ambassador at Rome, when France was still and completely at peace with the Holy See, and it had honourably discharged the burdensome conditions of the treaty of Tolentino.

(1) Bot. ii. 443, 445. Lac. xiv. 145, 147. Jom. x. 332.

(2) Talleyrand, on 10th October, wrote to Joseph Bonaparte at Rome:—"You have two things, citizen-general, to do:—1. To prevent, by all possible means, the King of Naples from entering

the Papal territory. 2. To increase, rather than restrain, the good dispositions of those who think that it is high time the reign of the popes should finish; in a word, to encourage the *clan* of the Roman people towards liberty. At all events, take care that we get hold of Ancona and a large portion of the coast of Italy." [Corresp. Conf. Oct. 10, 1797.] Eleven days afterwards Laréveillière Lépoux, the President of the Directory, wrote to Napoléon:—"In regard to Rome, the Directory cordially approve of the instructions you have given to your brother to prevent a successor being appointed to Pius VI. We must lay hold of the present favourable circumstances to deliver Europe from the pretended Papal supremacy. Tuscany will next attract your attention. You will, therefore, if hostilities are resumed, give the Grand Duke his congé, and facilitate by every means the establishment of a free and representative government in Tuscany."—*Letter of the Directory to Napoléon, 21st Oct. 1797; Corresp. Confid. iv. 241.*

(3) "I cannot tell you, citizen-ambassador," said Napoléon, "what indignation I felt when I heard that Provera was still in the service of the Pope. Let him know instantly, that though the French Republic is at peace with the Holy See, it will not for an instant suffer any officer or agent of the Imperialists to hold any situation under the Papal government. You will, therefore, insist on the dismissal of M. Provera within twenty-four hours, on pain of instantly demanding your passports. You will let him know that I have moved three thousand additional soldiers to Ancona, not one of whom will recede till Provera is dismissed. Let him know further, that if one of the prisoners for political offences is executed, Cardinal Rusca and the other cardinals shall answer for it with their heads. Finally, make him aware that the moment you quit the Papal territory, Ancona will be incorporated with the Cisalpine Republic. You will easily understand that the last phrase must be *spoken, not written.*"—*Confidential Letter, Napoléon to Joseph Bonaparte, 14th Nov. 1797.*

the same time, ten thousand troops of the Cisalpine republic advanced to St.-Léon, in the Papal duchy of Urbino, and made themselves masters of that fortress; while at Ancona, which was still garrisoned by French troops, notwithstanding its stipulated restoration by the treaty of Tolentino to the Holy See, the democratic party openly proclaimed "the Anconite republic." Similar revolutionary movements took place at Corneto, Civita Vecchia, Pesaro, and Senigaglia; while at Rome itself, Joseph Bonaparte, by compelling the Papal government to liberate all persons confined for political offences, suddenly vomited forth upon the capital several hundreds of the most heated Republicans in Italy. After this great addition, measures were no longer kept with the government. Seditious meetings were constantly held in every part of the city; immense collections of tricolor cockades were made to distinguish the insurgents, and deputations of the citizens openly waited upon the French ambassador to invite him to support the insurrection, to which he replied in ambiguous terms, "The fate of nations, as of individuals, being buried in the womb of futurity, it is not given to me to penetrate its mysteries (1)."

In this temper of men's minds, a spark was sufficient to occasion an explosion. On the 27th December, 1798, an immense crowd assembled, with seditious cries, and moved to the palace of the French ambassador, where they exclaimed—"Vive la République Romaine," and loudly invoked the aid of the French to enable them to plant the tricolor flag on the Capitol. The insurgents displayed the tricolor cockade, and evinced the most menacing disposition; the danger was extreme; from similar beginnings the overthrow of the governments of Venice and Genoa had rapidly followed. The papal ministers sent a regiment of dragoons to prevent any sortie of the Revolutionists from the palace of the French ambassador; and they repeatedly warned the insurgents, that their orders were to allow no one to leave its precincts. Duphot is slain in a scuffle at the French ambassador's. Duphot, however, indignant at being restrained by the pontifical troops, drew his sword, rushed down the staircase, and put himself at the head of one hundred and fifty armed Roman democrats, who were now contending with the dragoons in the court-yard of the palace; he was immediately killed by a discharge ordered by the sergeant commanding the patrol of the Papal troops; and the ambassador himself, who had followed to appease the tumult, narrowly escaped the same fate. A violent scuffle ensued, several persons were killed and wounded on both sides; and, after remaining several hours in the greatest alarm, Joseph Bonaparte with his suite retired to Florence (2).

War is in consequence declared against Rome. This catastrophe, however obviously occasioned by the revolutionary schemes which were in agitation at the residence of the French ambassador, having taken place within the precincts of his palace, was unhappily a violation of the law of nations, and gave the Directory too fair a ground to demand satisfaction. But they instantly resolved to make it the pretext for the immediate occupation of Rome and overthrow of the Papal government. The march of troops out of Italy was countermanded, and Berthier, the commander-in-chief, received orders to advance rapidly into the Ecclesiastical States. Meanwhile, the democratic spirit burst forth more violently than ever at Ancona and the neighbouring towns; and the Papal authority was soon lost in all the provinces on the

(1) Hard. v. 196, 206.

209, 215. Bot. ii. 445, 447. Lac. xiv. 146, 147.

(2) Joseph Bonaparte's Report. Hard. v. 207, Jom. x. 333, 334.

eastern slope of the Apennines. To these accumulated disasters, the Pontiff could only oppose the fasts and prayers of an aged conclave—weapons of spiritual warfare little calculated to arrest the conquerors of Arcola and Lodi (1).

Berthier
advances to
Rome.
Jan. 25,
1798.

Berthier, without an instant's delay, carried into execution the orders of the Directory. Six thousand Poles were stationed at Rimini to cover the Cisalpine republic, a reserve was established at Tolentino, while the commander-in-chief, at the head of eighteen thousand veteran troops, entered Ancona. Having completed the work of revolution in that turbulent district, and secured the fortress, he crossed the Apennines; and, advancing by Foligno and Narni, appeared on the 10th February before the Eternal City. The Pope, in the utmost consternation, shut himself up in the Vatican, and spent night and day at the foot of the altar in imploring the Divine protection (2).

Revolution
at Rome.

Rome, almost defenceless, would have offered no obstacle to the entrance of the French troops; but it was part of the policy of the Directory to make it appear that their aid was invoked by the spontaneous efforts of the inhabitants. Contenting himself, therefore, with occupying the castle of St.-Angelo, from which the feeble guards of the Pope were soon expelled, Berthier kept his troops for five days encamped without the walls.

Feb. 15. At length the revolutionists having completed their preparations, a noisy crowd assembled in the Campo Vaccino, the ancient Forum; the old foundations of the Capitol were made again to resound with the cries, if not the spirit, of freedom, and the venerable ensigns, S. P. Q. R., after the lapse of fourteen hundred years, again floated in the winds (3). The multitude tumultuously demanded the overthrow of the Papal authority; the French troops were invited to enter; the conquerors of Italy, with a haughty air, passed the gates of Aurelian, defiled through the Piazza del Popolo, gazed on the indestructible monuments of Roman grandeur, and, amidst the shouts of the inhabitants, the tricolor flag was displayed from the summit of the Capitol.

Atrocious
cruelty of
the Repub-
licans to the
Pope.

But while part of the Roman populace were surrendering themselves to a pardonable intoxication upon the fancied recovery of their liberties, the agents of the Directory were preparing for them

(1) Bot. ii. 450. Jom. x. 334.

(2) Bot. ii. 452. Jom. x. 336. Hard. v. 230, 241.

The Directory, in their orders to Berthier, prescribed to him a course as perfidious as it was hostile. Their words were as follows:—"The intention of the Directory is, that you march *secretly and rapidly* as possible on Rome with 18,000 men. Its celerity is of the utmost importance; that alone can ensure success. The King of Naples will probably send an envoy to your headquarters, to whom you will declare that the French government is *actuated by no ambitious designs*; and that, if it was generous enough to restrain its indignation at Tolentino, when it had much more serious causes of complaint against the Holy See, it is still more probable that it will do the same now. While holding out these assurances, you will at the same time advance as rapidly as possible towards Rome: the great object is to keep your design secret, till you are so near that city that the King of Naples cannot prevent it. When within two days' march of Rome, menace the Pope and all the members of the government, in order to terrify them, and make them take to flight. Arrived in Rome, *employ your whole influence to establish a Roman republic*."—Hard. v. 221.

Berthier, however, was too much a man of honour to enter cordially into the revolutionary projects of the Directory. On 1st January, 1798, he wrote to Napoleon:—"I always told you the command in Italy was not suited to me. I wish to *extricate myself from revolutions*. Four years' service in them in America, ten in France, is enough, general. I shall ever be ready to combat as a soldier for my country, but have no desire to be mixed up with revolutionary politics." [Corresp. Conf. iv. 482.] It would appear that the Roman people generally had no greater desire than he had to be involved in a revolution; for, on the morning of his arrival at that city, he wrote to Napoleon:—"I have been in Rome since this morning; but I have found nothing but the utmost consternation among the inhabitants. *One solitary patriot* has appeared at headquarters; he offered to put at my disposition two thousand galley slaves; you may believe how I received that proposition. My further presence here is useless. I beseech you to recall me; it is the greatest boon you can possibly confer upon me."—Berthier to Napoleon, 10th Feb. 1798. Corresp. Confid. iv. 510.

(3) Bot. ii. 458, 459. Jom. x. 336. Lac. xiv. 150.

the sad realities of slavery. The Pope, who had been guarded by five hundred soldiers ever since the entry of the Republicans, was directed to retire into Tuscany; his Swiss guard relieved by a French one, and he himself ordered to dispossess himself of all his temporal authority. He replied, with the firmness of a martyr, "I am prepared for every species of disgrace. As supreme Pontiff, I am resolved to die in the exercise of all my powers. You may employ force—you have the power to do so; but know that though you may be masters of my body, you are not so of my soul. Free in the region where it is placed, it fears neither the events nor the sufferings of this life. I stand on the threshold of another world; there I shall be sheltered alike from the violence and impiety of this." Force was soon employed to dispossess him of his authority; he was dragged from the altar in his palace, his repositories all ransacked and plundered, the rings even torn from his fingers, the whole effects in the Vatican and Quirinal inventoried and seized, and the aged pontiff conducted, with only a few domestics, amidst the brutal jests and sacrilegious songs of the French dragoons, into Tuscany, where the generous hospitality of the Grand Duke strove to soften the hardships of his exile. But though a captive in the hands of his enemies, the venerable old man still retained the supreme authority in the church. From his retreat in the convent of the Chartreuse, he yet guided the counsels of the faithful; multitudes fell on their knees wherever he passed, and sought that benediction from a captive which they would, perhaps, have disregarded from a triumphant pontiff (1).

Their continued severity towards him. He is removed into France and there dies.

The subsequent treatment of this venerable man was as disgraceful to the Republican government as it was honourable to his piety and constancy as the head of the church. Fearful that from his virtues and sufferings he might have too much influence on the continent of Italy, he was removed by their orders to Leghorn, in March 1799, with the design of transferring him to Cagliari in Sardinia; and the English cruisers in the Mediterranean redoubled their vigilance, in the generous hope of rescuing the father of an opposite church from the persecution of his enemies. Apprehensive of losing their prisoner, the French altered his destination, and forcing him to traverse, often during the night, the Apennines and the Alps in a rigorous season, he at length Aug. 29, 1799. reached Valence, where, after an illness of ten days, he expired in the eighty-second year of his age, and the twenty-fourth of his pontificate. The cruelty of the Directory increased as he approached their dominions; all his old attendants were compelled to leave him, and the Father of the Faithful was allowed to expire, attended only by his confessor. Yet even in this disconsolate state, he derived the highest satisfaction from the devotion and reverence of the people in the provinces of France through which he passed. Multitudes from Gap, Vizelle, and Grenoble, flocked to the road to receive his benediction; and he frequently repeated, with tears in his eyes (2), the words of Scripture: "Verily, I say unto you, I have not seen such faith, no, not in Israel."

Systematic and abominable pillage of Rome by the Republicans.

But long before the Pope had sunk under the persecution of his oppressors, Rome had experienced the bitter fruits of Republican fraternization. Immediately after the entry of the French troops, commenced the regular and systematic pillage of the city. Not

(1) Bot. ii. 463. Lac. xiv. 152, 153. Hard. v. 243, 244. Paccia, i. 172, 174.

(2) Hard. v. 248, 253. Lac. xiv. 157, 159. Bot. ii. 464. Paccia, i. 180, 194.

only the churches and the convents, but the palaces of the cardinals and of the nobility, were laid waste. The agents of the Directory, insatiable in the pursuit of plunder, and merciless in the means of exacting it, ransacked every quarter within its walls, seized the most valuable works of art, and stripped the Eternal City of those treasures which had survived the Gothic fire and the rapacious hands of the Spanish soldiers. The bloodshed was much less, but the spoil collected incomparably greater, than at the disastrous sack which followed the death of the Constable Bourbon. Almost all the great works of art which have, since that time, been collected throughout Europe, were then scattered abroad. The spoliation exceeded all that the Goths or Vandals had effected. Not only the palaces of the Vatican, and the Monte Cavallo, and the chief nobility of Rome, but those of Castel Gandolfo, on the margin of the Alban lake, of Terracina, the Villa Albani, and others in the environs of Rome, were plundered of every article of value which they possessed. The whole sacerdotal habits of the Pope and cardinals were burnt, in order to collect from the flames the gold with which they were adorned. The Vatican was stripped to its naked walls; the immortal frescoes of Raphael and Michael Angelo remained in solitary beauty amidst the general desolation. A contribution of four millions in money, two millions in provisions, and three thousand horses, was imposed on a city already exhausted by the enormous exactions it had previously undergone. Under the directions of the infamous commissary Haller, the domestic library, museum, furniture, jewels, and even the private clothes of the Pope, were sold. Nor did the palaces of the Roman nobility escape devastation. The noble galleries of the Cardinal Braschi and the Cardinal York, the last relic of the Stuart line, underwent the same fate. Others, as those of the Chigi, Borghese, and Doria palaces, were rescued from destruction only by enormous ransoms. Every thing of value that the treaty of Tolentino had left in Rome, became the prey of republican cupidity, and the very name of freedom soon became odious from the sordid and infamous crimes which were committed in its name (1).

Confiscation
of the whole
Church prop-
erty in the
Papal terri-
tories.

Nor were the exactions of the French confined to the plunder of palaces and churches. Eight cardinals were arrested and sent to Civita Castellana; while enormous contributions were levied on the Papal territory, and brought home the bitterness of conquest to every poor man's door. At the same time, the ample territorial possessions of the church and the monasteries were confiscated, and declared national property; a measure which, by drying up at once the whole resources of the affluent classes, precipitated into the extreme of misery the numerous poor who were maintained by their expenditure or fed by their bounty. All the respectable citizens and clergy were in fetters; and a base and despicable faction alone, among whom, to their disgrace be it told, were found fourteen cardinals, followed in the train of the oppressors (2); and at a public festival, returned thanks to God for the miseries they had brought upon their country.

These dis-
orders excite
even the in-
dignation of
the French
army.
Great muti-
ny at Rome
and Mantua.

To such a height did the disorders rise, that they excited the indignation of the army itself, albeit little scrupulous in general about the means by which plunder was acquired. While the agents of the Directory were thus enriching themselves and sullyng the name of France by unheard-of spoliation, the inferior officers and sol-

(1) Hard. v. 244, 245, 249. Bot. ii. 465, 469, 470. Join. x. 336, 337. Lac. xiv. 160, 161.

(2) Bot. ii. 472, 473. Ann. Reg. 1798, 60, 62. Join. x. 337, 338. Lac. xiv. 160, 161.

diers were suffering the greatest privations. For several months they had been without pay, their clothes were worn out, their feet bare, their knapsacks empty. Indignant at the painful contrast which their condition offered to that of the civil agents, who were daily becoming richer from the spoils of the city, and comparing their penury with the luxurious condition of the corps stationed in the Cisalpine republic, the officers and soldiers in and around Rome broke out into open and unmeasured terms of vituperation.

Feb. 24. On the 24th February a general meeting of all the officers, from the rank of captain downwards, was held in the Pantheon, at which an address was agreed to by General Berthier, in which they declared their detestation of the extortions which had been practised in Rome, protested that they would no longer be the instruments of the ignominious wretches who had made such a use of their valour, and insisted for immediate payment of their large arrears. The discontents soon wore so alarming an aspect, that Masséna, who had assumed the command, ordered all the troops, excepting three thousand, to leave the capital. But they refused to obey; and another meeting, at which still more menacing language was used, having shortly after been held (1), which his soldiers refused to disperse, he was compelled to abandon the command, and retire to Ancona, leaving the direction of the army to General Dallemagne. At the same time the troops in Mantua raised the standard of revolt, and, resolving to abandon Italy, had already fixed all their days' march to Lyons and the banks of the Rhine (2).

Revolt of
the Roman
populæ.
Its rapid
suppression.

The Roman populæ, encouraged by these dissensions among their oppressors, deemed the opportunity favourable to shake off the yoke, and recover their independence. But they soon found

(1) St.-Cyr, Hist. Mil. i. 35, 36. Ann. Beg. 1798, 60, 61. Jom. x. 338. Bot. ii. 470, 471. Hard. v. 254.

(2) The remonstrance framed by the French army at this great meeting in the Pantheon bears:—"The first cause of our discontent is regret that a horde of robbers, who have insinuated themselves into the confidence of the nation, should deprive us of our honour. These men enter the chief houses of Rome, give themselves out for persons authorized to receive contributions, carry off all the gold, jewels, and horses; in a word, every article of value they can find, without giving any receipts. This conduct, if it remains unpunished, is calculated to bring eternal disgrace on the French nation in the eyes of the whole universe. We could furnish a thousand proofs of these assertions. The second cause is the misery in which both officers and men are involved; destitute of pay for five months; in want of every thing. The excessive luxury of the officers of the staff, affords a painful contrast to the naked condition of the general body of the army. The third cause of the general discontent is the arrival of General Masséna. The soldiers have not forgot the extortions and robberies he has committed wherever he has been invested with the command. The Venetian territory, and above all Padua, is a district teeming with proofs of his immorality." [Hard. v. 526.] In an address to Berthier from the officers of the army, the expressions are still more strong:—"The soldiers are in the utmost misery for want of pay. Many millions are in the public chest; three would discharge their arrears. We disavow in the sight of Heaven, in whose temple we are assembled, the crimes committed in the city of Rome and the Ecclesiastical States; we swear that we will no longer be the instruments of the

wretches who have perpetrated them. We insist that the effects seized from various individuals, belonging to states with whom we are still at peace, be restored; and, independent of our pay, we persist in demanding justice upon the official and elevated monsters, plunged night and day in luxury and debauchery, who have committed the robberies and spoliations in Rome."—See St.-Cyr, Hist. Mil. i. 282.

A singular occurrence took place at the revolt in Mantua, highly characteristic of the composition of the French army in Italy at this period. The chief of the twelfth demi-brigade, when endeavouring, sword in hand, to defend the standard with which he was intrusted, killed one of the grenadiers. His fellow soldiers immediately exclaimed, "We will not revenge our comrade; you are only doing your duty." The chief of the fourteenth wishing, for the same reason, to resist the mutineers, they unscrewed their bayonets from their guns to prevent his being injured in the strife which ensued for its seizure. Not a single officer was insulted or maltreated; the battalions answered by unanimous refusals all the exhortations of their officers to return to their duty, but the sentinels saluted the officers when they passed, as if in a state of the most perfect subordination. No acts of pillage followed the raising the standard of revolt, though the shops where it broke out were all open and unguarded. The soldiers were equally, as their brethren at Rome, loud in their condemnation of the officers and civil authorities who had "embezzled all the funds which should have gone to the payment of their arrears." In the midst of so much revolutionary profligacy and corruption, it is pleasing to have to record traits so honourable to the French army.—See BARAGUAY D'HILLIERS' Report, 19th Feb. 1798; Correspond. Confid. iv. 517, 525.

that it is easier to invite an enemy within your walls than expel him when the gates are placed in his hands. The assemblages in Rome were soon dispersed with great slaughter by General Dallemagne; and, collecting a few troops, he moved rapidly to Velletri and Castel Gandolfo, routed the insurgents who had occupied these posts, and struck such a terror into the inhabitants, that they quickly threw aside their arms, and abandoned all thoughts of further resistance (1).

Meanwhile the work of revolution proceeded rapidly in the Roman states. The whole ancient institutions were subverted; the executive made to consist of five consuls, after the model of the French Directory; heavy contributions and forced loans exacted from the wealthier classes; the legislative power vested in two chambers, chosen by the lowest ranks, and the state divided into eight departments. But, to preserve the entire dependence of this government on the French Directory, it was specially provided that an alliance, offensive and defensive, should immediately be concluded between the French and Roman Republics; that no laws made by the Roman legislative bodies should either be promulgated or have force without the approval of the French general stationed at Rome; and that he might of his own authority, enact such laws as might appear necessary, or were ordered by the French Directory. At the same time edicts were published, prohibiting the nobles, under severe penalties, from dismissing any of their domestics, or discontinuing any of their charitable donations, on account of the diminished or ruined state of their fortunes (2).

While the Roman states were thus undergoing fusion in the revolutionary crucible, the constitution of the Cisalpine republic disappeared as rapidly as it had been formed. Towards the end of March, a treaty was concluded at Paris between the French Republic and its infant offspring, by which it was stipulated that the Cisalpine should receive a French garrison of 22,000 infantry, and 2500 cavalry, to be paid and clothed while there by the Italian Republic; and that, in case of war, they should mutually assist each other with all their forces. This treaty, which placed its resources entirely at the disposal of France, was highly unpopular in the whole republic, and it was not without the utmost difficulty, and by the aid, both of threats of arresting a large portion of their members, and unbounded promises in case of compliance, that the councils could be brought to ratify it. The democratic spirit extended greatly in the country. Those chosen to the principal offices of government were all men of the most violent temperament, and a conspiracy was generally formed to emancipate themselves from French thralldom, and establish, instead of a Gallic yoke, real freedom. To curb this dangerous disposition, the Directory sent Trouvé, a man of a determined character, to Milan, and his first care was to suppress, by measures of severity, the spirit of freedom which threatened to thwart the ambitious projects of the French government. With this view the constitution of the Republic was violently changed by the Transalpine forces; the number of deputies was reduced from 240 to 120, and those only retained who were known to be devoted to the French government. After this violent revolution, Trouvé, who was detested throughout all Lombardy, was recalled, and Brune and Fouché were succes-

(1) Hard. v. 267, 270. Jom. x. 338. Ann. Reg. 1798, 65. Bol. ii. 470, 471. St.-Cyr, i. 39, 48.

(2) Hard. v. 263, 275. Bol. ii. 474, 475. Ann. Reg. 1798, 65.

sively sent in his stead; but all their efforts proved ineffectual to stem the torrent. The discontents went on continually increasing, and at length recourse Dec. 6, 1798. was openly had to military force. On the morning of the 6th December, the legislative body was surrounded with foreign bayonets; the senators opposed to the French interest expelled; several members of the Directory changed, and the government prostrated, as in France and Holland, by a military despotism. The democratic constitution, established by Napoléon, was immediately annulled, and a new one established under the dictation of the French ambassador, in the formation of which no attention was paid to the liberties or wishes of the people (1).

Excessive
discontent
excited by
these chan-
ges in Lom-
bardy.

These violent changes, introduced by the mere force of military power, occasioned the utmost discontent in the Cisalpine republic; and contributed more than any thing that had yet occurred, to cool the ardour of the Italian Revolutionists. "This, then," it was said, "is the faith, the fraternity, and the friendship which you have brought to us from France. This is the liberty, the prosperity, which you boast of having established in Italy! What vast materials for eloquence do you afford to those who have never trusted in your promises! They will say, that you never promised liberty to the Italians but in order that you might be the better enabled to plunder and oppress them; that under every project of reform were concealed new, and still more grievous, chains; that gold, not freedom, is your idol; that that fountain of every thing noble or generous is not made for you, nor you for it; finally, that the liberty of France consists entirely in words and speeches; in the howling of a frantic tribune, and the declamations of impudent sophists. These changes which, with your despotic power and so much unconcern, you have effected in the Cisalpine governments, will assuredly prove the forerunner of the fall of your own republic (2)."

The spolia-
tion of the
King of Sar-
dinia is re-
solved on.

While Lombardy was thus writhing under the withering grasp of the French Republic, the King of Sardinia was undergoing the last acts of humiliation from his merciless allies. The early peace which this monarch had concluded with their victorious general, the fidelity with which he had discharged his engagements, the firm support which the possession of his fortresses had given to their arms, were unable to save him from spoliation. The Directory persisted in believing that a rickety republic, torn by intestine divisions, would be a more solid support to their power than a king who had devoted his last soldier and his last gun to their service (3). They soon found an excuse for subjecting him finally to their power, and rewarding him for his faithful adherence to their cause by the forfeiture of all his continental dominions.

After the unworthy descendant of Emmanuel Victor had opened the gates of Italy to France by the fatal cession of the Piedmontese fortresses (4), his

(1) Bot. iii. 45, 58. Lac. xiv. 172. Th. x. 175, 177. Jom. x. 364, 365.

(2) Bot. ii. 53. Th. x. 177, 178.

Lucien Bonaparte did not hesitate, at Milan, to give vent to the same sentiments. "Nothing," said he, "can excuse the bad faith which has characterised these transactions. The innovations in the Cisalpine republic, tending as they do to abridge popular freedom by the excessive power they confer upon the Directory, especially the exclusive right of proposing laws, are worthy of eternal condemnation. Nations, disgusted at last with the vain and empty name of liberty which France is continually resounding in their ears, and with the

constitutions given to them one day, only to be taken away the next, will finally conceive a well-founded detestation of the Republic, and prefer their former submission to a sovereign."—BORRA, ii. 53.

(3) Jom. x. 365.

(4) The magnitude of the obligation thus conferred by Piedmont on France, was fully admitted by the Directory. "Never," said they, on congratulating Charles-Emmanuel on his accession to the throne, "Never will France forget the obligations which she owes to the Prince of Piedmont."—HARD, vii. 72.

Cruel humiliations to which he had previously been subjected.

life had been a continual scene of mortification and humiliations. His territories were traversed in every direction by French columns, of whose approach he received no notification except a statement of the supplies required by them, which he was obliged to furnish gratuitously to the Republican commissaries. He was compelled to banish all the emigrants from his dominions, and oppress his subjects by enormous contributions for the use of his insatiable allies; while the language of the revolutionary clubs, openly patronised by the French ambassador and agents, daily became more menacing to the regal government. At length they threw off the mask. The insurgents of the valleys of the Tanaro and the Bormida assembled to the number of six thousand in the neighbourhood of Carrosio, supported by two thousand troops of the Ligurian republic, who left Genoa at midday, with drums beating and the tricolor flag flying. Ginguené, the French ambassador, endeavoured to persuade the King, in the usual language of revolutionists, that there was no danger in conceding all the demands of the insurgents, but great in opposing any resistance to their wishes; and strongly urged the necessity, as a measure of security, of his placing the citadel of Turin in the hands of a French garrison; while the Ligurian republic resolutely refused any passage for the Piedmontese troops through that part of their territories which required to be passed before the insulated district of Carrosio could be reached. This was soon followed by a menacing proclamation, in which they declared their resolution to support the insur-

gents to the utmost of their power; while the French ambassador continued to insist for a complete pardon of these rebels, on condition of their laying down their arms, and above all, the immediate surrender of the citadel of Turin. When the troops of Piedmont approached the Ligurian territory to attack the rebels in Carrosio, the French ambassador forbade them to pass the frontier, lest they should violate the neutrality of the allied republic. Not-

Successful intrigues of the Republicans, who get hold of Turin.

withstanding this, they came up with the united forces of the insurgents and Genoese, and defeated them in two engagements, with such loss, that it was evident their total overthrow was at hand.

The Directory now threw off the mask; they pretended that a conspiracy had been discovered for renewing the Sicilian Vespers with all the French in Piedmont, and, as a test of the King not being involved in the design, insisted on the immediate cession of the citadel of Turin. Pressed on all sides, threatened with insurrection in his own dominions, and menaced with the whole weight of republican vengeance, the King at length submitted to their demands; and that admirable fortress, the masterpiece of Vauban, which had stood, a century before, the famous siege which enabled the Austrian forces, under Eugene, to advance to its relief, and terminated in the expulsion of the French from Italy, was yielded without a struggle to their arms (1).

The King is reduced to a prisoner.

The surrender of this impregnable fortress put the King of Sardinia entirely at the mercy of the French troops. He was no longer permitted the semblance even of regal authority; French guards attended him on all occasions, and, under the semblance of respect, kept him a state prisoner in his own palace; while the ambassadors of the other powers, deeming Piedmont now a French province, wrote to their respective sovereigns, requesting to be recalled from Turin, where the French ambassador was now the real sovereign. The republican generals improved the time to reduce the

(1) Ann. Reg. 1798, 121, 122. Bot. iii. 63, 105. Lac. xiv. 174, 175

unhappy monarch to despair. They loaded all his ministers, civil and military, with accusations, and insisted on their dismissal from his court and capital; forced him to abandon all proceedings against the insurgents of every description; new-modelled the government according to their republican ideas, and compelled him to deliver up all the places he had taken from the Genesee republic (1).

For a few months this shadow of authority was left to the King; but at length his complete dethronement was effected. He was charged with having, in his secret correspondence with Vienna, allowed a wish to escape him, that he might soon be delivered from his imperious allies; and only made his peace with the Directory by the immediate payment of 8,000,000 francs, or L.550,000. When the Roman republic was invaded by the Neapolitans, he was ordered to furnish the stipulated contingent of eight thousand men; and this was agreed to. The surrender of all the royal arsenals was next demanded; and during the discussion of that demand, the French, under Joubert, treacherously commenced hostilities (2). Novarra, Suza, Coni, and Alexandria, were surprised; a few battalions who attempted to resist were driven into Turin, where the King, having drained the cup of misery to the dregs, was compelled to resign all his continental dominions, which were immediately taken possession of by the French authorities. A fugitive from his capital, the ill-fated monarch left his palace by torch-light during the night, and owed his safe retreat to the island of Sardinia to the generous efforts of Talleyrand, then ambassador at Turin, who protected him from the dangers which threatened his life. A provisional government was immediately established in Turin, composed of twenty-five of the most violent of the democratic party; while Grouchy seized hold of the treasury, arsenals, and fortresses of the kingdom, and published a proclamation, denoun-

(1) *Annu. Reg.* 1798, 122. *Bot.* iii. 112, 115. *Lac.* xiv. 177.

(2) Recovering, in the last extremity, a portion of the courage which, if earlier exerted, might have averted their fate, the Piedmontese cabinet at this crisis prepared a manifesto, which the Directory instantly and carefully suppressed. It bore:—“The Piedmontese government, in the anxious wish of sparing its subjects the misfortunes which threatened it, has acceded to all the demands of the French Republic, both in contributions, clothing, and supplies for the army of Italy, though greatly exceeding the engagements which it had contracted, and which were so burdensome as entirely to exhaust the royal treasury. His majesty has even gone so far as to agree to place in their hands the citadel of Turin; and the very day on which it was demanded, he gave orders for the furnishing of the contingent stipulated by the treaty. At the same moment he dispatched a messenger to Paris to negotiate concerning other demands, which were inadmissible, in particular the surrender of all the arsenals. But in the midst of these measures, the commander of the French garrison in the citadel of Turin violently seized possession of the towns of Novarra, Alexandria, Chivasso, and Suza. His Majesty, profoundly afflicted at these events, feels it his duty to declare thus publicly, that he has faithfully performed all his engagements to France, and given no provocation whatever to the disastrous events which threaten his kingdom.” Grouchy, the French general, forced the King to suppress this proclamation, threatening to bombard him in his own palace in case of refusal. [*Hard.* vii. 117.]

The unworthy intrigues, falsehoods, and menaces by which the resignation of the throne was forced

upon the King, are thus detailed by the same general in his secret report to the Directory.—“The moment had now arrived, when all the springs which I had prepared were to be put in motion. At this crisis, an envoy came to me from the King; he was a man to be gained, and was so; other persons were also corrupted; but the great difficulty was, that these propositions all emanated from the King, and that no writing reached me, so that in no event could I be disavowed. Circumspection was the more necessary, as war was not yet declared against the King of Sardinia, and it was necessary to act so that his resignation might appear to be voluntary. I confined myself to threatening the envoy, and sent him out of the citadel. Meanwhile, my secret agents were incessantly at work; the envoy returned to me; I announced the arrival of columns which had not yet come up; and informed him that the hour of vengeance had arrived, that Turin was surrounded on all sides, that escape was impossible, and that unqualified submission alone remained. The Council of State had sat all the morning; my hidden emissaries there had carried their point. The conditions I exacted were agreed to. I insisted, as an indispensable preliminary, that all the Piedmontese troops which had been assembled in Turin for a month past, should be dismissed; in presence of Clausel, the King signed the order; and after eight hours of further altercation, the same officer compelled him to sign the whole articles which I had required.”—See *HARD.* vii. 118, 120. See also the *Resignation*, correctly given in *HARD.* vii. 122, *et seq.* The French general made the King disavow the proclamation already quoted, of which some copies had been printed.

cing the pain of death against whoever had a pound of powder or a gun in his possession, and declaring that any nobles who might engage in an insurrection should be arrested, sent to France, and have half their goods confiscated (1).

While these events were in progress in the north of Italy, war had arisen and a kingdom been overthrown in the south of the peninsula. Naples, placed on the edge of the revolutionary volcano since the erection of the States of the Church into a separate republic, had viewed with the utmost alarm the progress of the democratic spirit in its dominions; and on the occupation of Rome by the French troops, thirty thousand men were stationed in the mountain passes on the frontier, in the belief that an immediate invasion was intended. These apprehensions were not diminished by the appearance of the expedition to Egypt in the Mediterranean, the capture of Malta, and the vicinity of so large a force to the coasts of Naples. Rightly judging, from the fate of the other states in Italy, that their destruction was unavoidable, either from internal revolution or external violence, if measures were not taken to avert the danger, the Neapolitan cabinet augmented their military establishment, and secretly entered into negotiations with Austria, whose disposition to put a stop to the further encroachments of France was obvious from their occupation of the Grisons, for the purpose of concerting measures for their common defence. The French ambassador, Garat, a well-known republican, in vain endeavoured to allay their apprehensions; but, at the same time, smiled at the feeble military force with which they hoped to arrest the conquerors of Arcola and Rivoli (2).

Considered merely with reference to the number and equipment of its forces, the Neapolitan monarchy was by no means to be despised, and was capable, apparently, of interfering with decisive effect in the approaching struggle between France and Austria in the Italian peninsula. Its infantry consisted of thirty thousand regular soldiers and fifteen thousand militia; the artillery, organized by French officers, was on the best possible footing; and the cavalry had given proof of its efficiency in the actions on the Po, in the commencement of the campaign of 1796. Forty thousand men were ordered to be added to the army, to carry it to the war establishment, and the militia to be quadrupled. But these energetic measures were never carried into full execution; notwithstanding the imposition of heavy taxes, and liberal donations from the nobility and clergy, insurmountable difficulties were experienced in the levying and equipping so large a body of troops; and the effective forces of the monarchy never exceeded sixty thousand men, of which one-third were required to garrison the fortresses on the frontier. These troops, such as they were, appeared deficient in military spirit; the officers, appointed by court intrigue, had lost all the confidence of the soldiers; and the discipline, alternately carried on on the German and Spanish systems, was in the most deplorable state. To crown the whole, the common men, especially in the infantry, were destitute of courage; a singular circumstance in the descendants of the Samnites, but which has invariably been the disgrace of the Neapolitan army since the fall of the Roman empire (3).

The French commenced their revolutionary measures in Naples by requiring the immediate liberation of all those of the democratic party who were confined for political offences, and though this demand

(1) Hard. vii. 126, 128. Join. xi. 59. Lac. xiv. 178, 179. Bot. iii. 120, 137.

(2) Join. xi. 33, 34. Lac. xiv. 165, 166. Ann. Reg. 1798, 125.

(3) Join. xi. 34. Ann. Reg. 1798, 124, 125.

was highly obnoxious to the court, yet such was the terror inspired by the French arms, that they were obliged to comply. Meanwhile, intrigues of every kind were set on foot by the French agents in the Neapolitan territories; the insolence of their ambassador knew no bounds; the grossest libels were daily published in the Roman papers, under the direction of the French generals, against the queen and the royal family (1); and a general military survey made of the Neapolitan frontiers, and transmitted to the Directory at Paris.

The court enter into secret engagements with Austria. During these revolutionary measures, however, the French were daily augmenting their forces at Rome, and making preparations for offensive operations; and the cabinet of Naples was warned not to put any reliance on so distant a power as Austria, as the French in the Ecclesiastical States would be adequate to the conquest of Naples before the Imperial troops could pass the Pô. But the court were firm; the military preparations were continued with unabated vigour, and a treaty, offensive Aug. 10. and defensive, was concluded with the Emperor, by which the King of Naples was to be assisted, in the event of an invasion, by a powerful army of Austrians. It was no part of the first design of the Neapolitans to commence hostilities, but to wait till the Republicans were fully engaged with the Imperialists on the Adige, when it was thought their forces might act with effect in the centre of the peninsula (2).

Aug. 20, 1799. Matters were in this inflammable state in the kingdom of Naples when the intelligence arrived of the glorious victory of the Nile, and the total destruction of the French fleet on the shores of Egypt. The effect produced over all Europe, but especially in Italy, by this great event, was truly electrical. It was the first decisive defeat which the French had experienced since the rise of the Republic; it annihilated their naval power in the Mediterranean, left Malta to its fate, and, above all, seemed to banish Napoléon and his victorious troops for ever from the scene of European warfare. The language of humiliation and despondency was every where laid aside; loud complaints of the perfidy and extortion of the French armies became universal; and the giddy multitude, who had recently hailed their approach with tumultuous shouts of joy, taught by bitter experience, now prepared to salute, with still louder acclamations, those who should deliver them from their yoke (3).

On Nelson's arrival at Naples, they rashly resolve on hostilities. The enthusiasm at Naples was already very great, when the arrival of Nelson with his victorious fleet at that port, raised it to the highest possible pitch. He was received with more than regal honours; the King and the Queen went out to meet him in the bay; the immense and ardent population of the capital rent the air with their acclamations; and the shores of Posilippo were thronged with crowds anxious to catch a glance of the Conqueror of the Nile. The remonstrances of the French ambassador were unable to restrain the universal joy; the presence of the British admiral was deemed a security against every danger; a signal for the resurrection of the world against its oppressors. In vain Ariola, and the more prudent counsellors of the King, represented the extreme peril of attacking, with their inexperienced forces, the veterans of France before the Austrians were ready to support them on the Adige; these wise remonstrances were disregarded, and the war party, at the head of which were the Queen and Lady

(1) Hard. vii. 6, 8.

(3) Jom. xi. 36, 37. Ann. Reg. 1798, 126, 127.

(2) Jom. x. 36. Bot. iii. 142. Ann. Reg. 1798, Th. x. 141, 142.

125, 126.

Hamilton, the wife of the English ambassador, succeeded in producing a determination for the immediate commencement of hostilities (1).

Though irritated to the last degree at the determined stand which the King of Naples had made against their revolutionary designs, and the open joy his subjects had testified at their disasters, the French were by no means desirous at this time to engage in immediate warfare with a new opponent. The battle of the Nile, and consequent isolation of their bravest army and best general, had greatly damped the arrogance of their former presumption : their finances were in an inextricable state of confusion ; the soldiers, both at Rome and Mantua, had lately mutinied from want of pay ; and the forces of Austria, supported, as it was foreseen they would be, by those of Russia, were rapidly increasing both in numbers and efficiency. In these circumstances, it was their obvious policy to temporize, and delay the overthrow of the Neapolitan monarchy till the great levies they were making in France were ready to take the field, and keep in check the Imperial forces on the Adige till the work of revolution in the south of Italy was completed (2).

Force levied
by the
French in
the affiliated
Republics

Meanwhile, the affiliated republics were called on to take their full share of the burdens consequent upon their alliance with France. Every man in Switzerland capable of bearing arms, from sixteen to forty-five years of age, was put in requisition ; the King of Sardinia compelled to advance 8,000,000 francs ; the Cisalpine republic assessed at a loan of 24,000,000 francs, or L.4,000,000 sterling, and required to put its whole contingent at the disposal of France ; and a fresh contribution of 12,000,000 francs imposed on the Roman territory, besides having assignats issued on the security of ecclesiastical estates (3).

Mack takes
the com-
mand in
Naples.

Previous to the commencement of hostilities, the Neapolitan government had requested the Austrians to send them some general capable of directing the movements of the large force which they had in readiness to take the field. The Aulic Council sent General Mack, an officer who stood high at Vienna in the estimation of military men, but who, though skilled in sketching out plans of a campaign on paper, and possessed of considerable talent in strategetical design, was totally destitute of the penetration and decision requisite for success in the field. Nelson at once saw through his character. "Mack," said he, "cannot travel without five carriages. I have formed my opinion of him : would to God that I may be mistaken !" An opinion which, to the disgrace of Austria, was too literally verified in the events at Ulm, which have given a mournful celebrity to his name (4).

Dispersed
situation of
the French
troops.

For long the Directory persisted in the belief that the Neapolitans would never venture to take the field till the Austrian forces were ready to support them, which it was known would not be the case till the following spring. They had done nothing, accordingly, towards concentrating their troops : and when there could no longer be any doubt that war was about to commence, their only resource was to send Championnet to take the command of the army in the environs of Rome. He found them dispersed over a surface of sixty leagues. Macdonald, with 6000, lay at Terracina, and guarded the narrow defile betwixt its rocks and the Mediterranean sea ; Casa Bianca with the left wing, 5000 strong, occupied the reverse of the Apennines towards Ancona ; in the centre, General Lemoine, with

(1) *Jom.* xi. 37. *Ann. Reg.* 1798, 128. *Th. x.* 143, 144.

(2) *Jom.* xi. 37, 38. *Ann. Reg.* 1798, 129.

(3) *Ann. Reg.* 1798, 128. *Lac.* xiv. 168.

(4) Southey's *Nelson*, ii. 19. *Jom.* xi. 168. *Hard.* vii. 16.

1000 men, was stationed at Terni, and watched the central defiles of the Apennines; while 5000 were in the neighbourhood of Rome. Thus 20,000 men were stretched across the peninsula from sea to sea, while double that number of Neapolitans were concentrated in the environs of Capua, ready to separate and overwhelm them. This was rendered the more feasible, as the bulk of the Neapolitan forces advanced in the Abruzzi, had passed, by a considerable distance, the Republicans at Rome and Terracina. Circumstances never occurred more favourable to a decisive stroke, had the Neapolitan generals possessed capacity to undertake, or their soldiers courage to execute it (1).

Nov. 23,

1798.

Mack commences hostilities.

Mack began his operations on the 23d of November; but, instead of profiting by the dispersion of the French force, to throw an overwhelming mass upon their centre, detach and surround the right wing and troops at Rome, which were so far advanced as almost to invite his seizure, he divided his forces into five columns to enter the Roman territory by as many different points of attack. A corps of seven thousand infantry and six hundred horse, was destined to advance along the shore of the Adriatic towards Ancona; two thousand men were directed against Terni and Foligno; the main body, under Mack in person, consisting of twenty thousand infantry and four thousand cavalry, was moved forward, through the centre of the Peninsula, by Valmontone, on Fresecati, while eight thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry advanced by Terracina and the Pontine marshes on Albano and Rome, and five thousand men were embarked on board some of Lord Nelson's ships, to be landed at Leghorn and effect a diversion in the rear of the enemy (2).

The Neapolitans enter Rome.

The overwhelming force which was directed against Fresecati, and which threatened to separate the Republicans stationed there from the remainder of the army, obliged Championnet to evacuate Rome and concentrate his forces at Terni; and the King of Naples made his triumphal entry into that city on the 29th. Such, however, was the state of discipline of his troops, that they fell into confusion merely from the fatigues of the march and the severity of the rains, and arrived in as great disorder at the termination of a few days' advance, as if they had sustained a disastrous retreat. While Mack was reorganizing his battalions at Rome, General Lemoine succeeded in surrounding and making prisoners the corps of two thousand men which advanced against Terni; while Giustini, who commanded another little column in the centre, was driven over the mountains to the main body on the banks of the Tiber. The corps which advanced against Ancona, after some trifling success, was thrown back about the same time within the Neapolitan frontier (3).

They are every where defeated when advancing further.

These successes, and the accounts he received of the disordered state of the main body of the enemy's forces at Rome, encouraged Championnet to keep his ground on the southern slope of the Apennines. Stationing, therefore, Macdonald, with a large force, at Civita Castellana, the ancient Veii, a city surrounded by inaccessible precipices, he hastened himself to Ancona to accelerate the formation of the parks of artillery, and the organization of the reserves of the army. This distribution of his forces exposed the troops at Civita Castellana to the risk of being cut off by an irruption, in force, of the enemy upon the line of their retreat

(1) Jom. xi. 38, 39, 40. Ann. Reg. 1798, 131.

(3) Jom. xi. 41, 46. Ann. Reg. 1798, 129. Hard.

(2) Hard. vii. 16, 19. Jom. xi. 40, 41. Lac. xiv. v. 17, 18, 169, 233.

at Terni; but the Republicans had not to contend either with the genius or the troops of Napoléon. Mack, persisting in the system of dividing his forces, exposed them to defeat from the veterans of France at every point of attack, and in truth, their character was such that by no possible exertions could they be brought to face the enemy. One of his columns, commanded by the Chevalier Saxe, destined to turn Civita Castellana on the left, was attacked, at the bridge of Borghetto over the Tiber, by Kniazwitz, at the head of three thousand of the Polish legion, and totally defeated, with the loss of all its artillery. The other, intended to turn it on the right, encountered the advanced guard of Macdonald near Nepi, and was speedily routed, with the loss of two thousand prisoners, all its baggage, and fifteen pieces of artillery. Dec. 4, 1798. In the centre, Marshal Bourcard in vain endeavoured to force the bridge of Rome, thrown over the chasm on the southern side of Civita Castellana; and at length Mack, finding both his wings defeated, withdrew his forces, and began to meditate a new design to dislodge his antagonists from their formidable position (1).

Fresh disasters of the Neapolitans. Instructed by this disaster, both in regard to the miserable quality of his own troops and the ruinous selection he had made of the point of attack, Mack resolved upon a different disposition of his forces. Leaving, therefore, Marshal Bourcard with four thousand men in front of Civita Castellana, he transported the main body of his army to the other bank of the Tiber, with the design of overwhelming Lemoine in the central and important position of Terni. This movement, which, if rapidly executed with steady troops, might have been attended with decisive success, became, from the slowness with which it was performed, and the wretched quality of the soldiers to whom it was intrusted, the source of irreparable disasters. Dec. 10. General Metch, who commanded his advanced guard, five thousand strong, having descended from the mountains and surprised Otricoli, was soon assailed there by General Mathieu, and driven back to Calvi, where he was thrown into such consternation by the arrival of Kniazwitz on his flank with fifteen hundred men, that he laid down his arms with four thousand men (2), though both the attacking columns did not exceed three thousand five hundred.

Retreat of Mack. After this check, accompanied with such disgraceful conduct on the part of the troops, Mack despaired of success, and instantly commenced his retreat towards the Neapolitan frontier. The King of Naples hastily left Rome in the night, and fled in the utmost alarm to his own capital, while Mack retired with all his forces, abandoning the Ecclesiastical Dec. 12. States to their fate. Championnet vigorously pursued the retiring column; the French troops entered Rome; and General Damas, cut off with three thousand men from the main body, and driven to Orbitello, concluded a convention with Kellermann, by which it was agreed that they should evacuate the Tuscan states without being considered as prisoners of war. Seventeen days after the opening of the campaign, the Neapolitan troops were expelled at all points from the ecclesiastical territory; Rome was again in the hands of the Republicans; eighteen thousand veterans had driven before them forty thousand men, splendidly dressed and abundantly equipped, but destitute of all the discipline and courage requisite to obtain success in war (3).

(1) Th. x. 194, 195, 196. Jom. xi. 48, 50.

(3) Th. x. 196, 197. Jom. xi. 55, 57. Bot. iii.

(2) Jom. xi. 52, 53, Th. x. 195, 196. Ann. Reg. 141, 147.

Such was the terror inspired by these disasters, that the Court of Naples did not conceive themselves in safety even in their own capital. On the 21st December, the royal family, during the night, withdrew on board Nelson's fleet, and embarked for Sicily, taking with them the most valuable effects in the palace at Naples and Caserta, the chief curiosities in the museum of Portici, and above a million in specie from the public treasury. The inhabitants of the capital were thrown into the utmost consternation when they learned in the morning that the royal family and ministers had all fled, leaving to them the burden of maintaining a disastrous and ruinous contest with France. Nothing, of course, could be expected from the citizens when the leaders of the state had been the first to show the example of desertion. The revolutionary spirit immediately broke out in the democratical part of the community; rival authorities were constituted, the dissensions of party paralysed the efforts of the few who were attached to their country, and every thing seemed to promise an easy victory to the invaders (1).

Meanwhile, Championnet was engaged in preparations for the conquest of Naples; an object which, considered in a military point of view, required little more than vigour and capacity, but which, politically, could not fail to be highly injurious to the interests of France, by the demonstration it would afford of the insatiable nature of the spirit of propagandism by which its government was actuated, and the dispersion of its military force over the whole extent of the peninsula which it would produce. The sagacity of Napoléon was never more clearly evinced than in the resistance which he made to the tempting offers made to him in his first campaign for the conquest of Rome; and the wisdom of his resolution was soon manifested by the disastrous effects which followed the extension of the French forces into the extremity of Naples, when they had the whole weight of Austria to expect on the Adige (2).

Untaught by the ruinous consequences of an undue dispersion of force by the Austrian commander, Championnet fell into precisely the same error in the invasion of Naples. He had at his disposal, after deducting the garrisons of Rome and Ancona, twenty-one thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, having received considerable reinforcements from the north of Italy since the contest commenced. This force he divided into five columns: on the extreme right, Rey, with two thousand five hundred infantry and eight hundred cavalry, was ordered to advance by the Pontine marshes to Terracina, while Macdonald, with seven thousand foot and three hundred horse, pushed forward to Ciprano; Lemoine, with four thousand infantry and two hundred cavalry, was directed to move upon Sulmona; while seven thousand infantry and two hundred horse, under Duhesme, ascended the course of the Pescara to Popoli, where they were to effect their junction with the division of Lemoine. The object of these complicated movements was to assemble a formidable force in front of Capua and along the stream of the Volturnus; but the difficulty of uniting the different columns after a long march in a mountainous and rugged country was so great, that, had they been opposed by an enemy of skill and resolution, they would have experienced the fate of Wurmser, when he divided his army in presence of Napoléon on the opposite sides of the lake of Guarda (3).

(1) Jom. xi. 60, 61. Th. x. 199. Lac. xiv. 234.
Bot. iii. 154, 155.

(2) Jom. xi. 61. Bot. iii. 150.

(3) Jom. xi. 64, 65. Bot. iii. 150, 151.

His surpris- Notwithstanding their perilous dispersion of force, the invading
sing success. army at all points met with surprising success. On approaching the
Neapolitan territory, they found Mack posted with twenty-five thousand men
in a strong position behind the Volturnus, stretching from Castella Mare to
Scaffa di Cajazzo; having Capua, with its formidable ramparts, in the centre,
and both its wings covered by a numerous artillery. But nothing could in-
duce the Neapolitan troops to withstand the enemy. After a sharp skirmish,
their advanced guard abandoned the wooded cliffs of Itri, fled through their
almost impregnable thickets to Gaeta, the strongest place in the Neapolitan
dominions, which surrendered with its garrison, three thousand six hundred
strong, on the first summons of General Rey, with an inferior force. The
troops on the left, behind the Volturnus, seized with an unaccountable panic,
at the same time abandoned their position and artillery, and fled for refuge
under the cannon of Capua. Thither they were pursued in haste by
Macdonald's division; but the cannon of the ramparts opened upon them so
terrible a fire of grape-shot, that they were repulsed with great slaughter;
and had the Neapolitan cavalry obeyed Mack's order to charge at that critical
moment, that division of the French army would have been totally de-
stroyed (1).

Critical si- But though the junction of the divisions of Rey and Macdonald,
tuation of and the capture of Gaeta, gave Championnet a solid footing on the
Champion- great road from Rome to Naples, in front of the Volturnus, his
net in front situation was daily becoming more critical. For more than a week no intel-
of Capua. ligence had been received from the other divisions of the army; the detach-
ments sent out to gain intelligence, found all the mountain passes in the
interior of the Abruzzi choked up with snow, and the villages in a state of
insurrection; Itri, Fondi, and all the posts in the rear of the army, soon fell
into the hands of the peasants, who evinced a courage which afforded a strik-
ing contrast to the pusillanimity of the regular forces; and the victorious
division was insulated in the midst of its conquests. At the same time, the
insurrection spread with the utmost rapidity in the whole Terra di Lavoro;
a large assemblage of armed peasants collected at Sessa, the bridge over the
Volturnus was broken down, and all the insulated detachments of the army
Jan. 6, 1799. attacked with a fury very different from the languid operations of
the regular forces. Had Mack profited by his advantages, and made a vigo-
rous attack with his whole centre upon Macdonald's division, there is reason
to think that, notwithstanding the pusillanimity of his troops, he might have
forced them to a disastrous retreat (2).

Mack pro- But the Austrian general had now lost all confidence in the forces
poses an under his command; and the vacillation of the provisional govern-
armistice, ment at Naples, gave him no hopes of receiving support from the
which is rear in the event of disaster. An attempt against the mountains of Ca-
gladly ac- jazzo with a few battalions failed; Damas had not yet arrived with the troops
cepted. from Tuscany; of nine battalions, routed at the passage of the Volturnus,
none but the officers had entered Naples, and he was aware that a powerful
party, having ramifications in his own camp, was desirous to take advantage
of the vicinity of the French army to overturn the monarchy. Rendered des-
perate by these untoward circumstances, he resolved to make the most of
the critical situation of the invaders, by proposing an armistice. The situa-

(1) Jom. xi. 65, 66. Bot. iii. 157. Th. x. 200.

(2) Jom. ix. 67, 70. Bot. ii. 157, 158. Th. x.
200. Hard. vii. 133, 134.

Jan. 11, 1799. tion of Championnet was become so hazardous, from the failure of provisions and the increasing boldness of the insurgents, that the proposal was accepted with joy, and an armistice for two months was agreed to, on condition that 2,500,000 francs should be paid in fifteen days, and the fortresses of Capua, Acerra, and Benevento, delivered up to the French forces. Thus, by the extraordinary pusillanimity of the Italian troops, was the French general delivered from a situation all but hopeless, and an army, which ran the most imminent danger of passing through the Caudine forks, enabled to dictate a glorious peace to its enemies. Shortly after the conclusion of the convention (1), Mack, disgusted with the conduct of his soldiers, and finding that they were rapidly melting away by desertion, resigned the command and retired to Naples.

Indignation which it excites among the Neapolitan populace. The intelligence of this armistice excited the utmost indignation among the populacc of that capital, whose inhabitants, like all others of Greek descent, were extremely liable to vivid impressions, and totally destitute of the information requisite to form a correct judgment on the chance of success. The discontent was raised to the highest pitch by the arrival of the French commissaries appointed to receive payment of the first instalment of the contribution stipulated by the convention. The popular indignation was now worked up to a perfect fury; the lazzaroni flew to arms; the regular troops refused to act against the insurgents; the cry arose that they had been betrayed by the viceroy, the general, and the army; and the people, assembling in multitudes, exclaimed, "Long live our holy faith; long live the Neapolitan people." In the midst of the general confusion, the viceroy and the provisional government fled to Sicily; for three days the city was a prey to all the horrors of anarchy; and the tumult was only appeased by the appointment of Prince Moliterno and the Duke of Bocca Romana as chiefs of the insurrection, who engaged to give it a direction that might save the capital from the ruin with which it was threatened (2).

Advance of the French against Naples. Meanwhile, the divisions in the Abruzzi having fortunately effected their junction with the main army on the Volturnus, Championnet advanced in three columns, with all his forces, towards Naples, while Mack, whose life was equally threatened by the furious lazzaroni and his own soldiers, sought safety in the French camp. Championnet had the generosity to leave him his sword, and treat him with the hospitality due to his misfortunes: an admirable piece of courtesy, which the Directory showed they were incapable of appreciating, by ordering him to be detained a prisoner of war. As the French army approached Naples, the fury of the parties at each other increased in violence, and the insurrection of the lazzaroni assumed a more formidable character. Distrusting all their leaders of rank or property, whose weakness had in truth proved that they were unworthy of confidence, they deposed Prince Moliterno and the Duke of Bocca Romana, and elected two simple lazzaroni, Paggio and Michel le Fou, to be their leaders. Almost all the shopkeepers and burghers, however, being attached to democratic principles, desired a revolutionary government, and to these were now added nearly the whole class of proprietors, who were justly afraid of general pillage, if the unruly defenders, to whom their fate was unhappily intrusted, should prove successful. The quarters of

(1) Bot. iii, 158, 160. Jom. xi. 72, 73. Th. x.
200. Hard. vii, 134, 139.

(2) Th. x, 201. Bot. iii, 160, 161. Jom. xi. 74.

Championnet, in consequence, were besieged by deputations from the more opulent citizens, who offered to assist his forces in effecting the reduction of the capital; but the French general, aware of the danger of engaging a desperate population in the streets of a great city, refused to advance till fort St.-Elmo, which commands the town, was put into the hands of the partisans of the Republic. This assurance having at length been given, he put all his forces in motion, and advanced in three columns against the city.

At the same time he issued a proclamation to the Neapolitan people, in which he said, "Be not alarmed, we are not your enemies. The French punish unjust and haughty kings, but they bear no arms against the people. Those who show themselves friends of the Republic will be secured in their persons and property, and experience only its protection. Disarm the perfidious wretches who excite you to resistance. You will change your government for one of a republican form: I am about to establish a provisional government(1)." In effect, a revolutionary committee was immediately organized at the French headquarters, having at its head Charles Laubert, a furious republican, and formerly one of the warmest partisans of Robespierre.

Desperate
resistance of
the lazza-
roni.

But the lazzaroni of Naples, brave and enthusiastic, were not intimidated by his approach, and though deserted by their king, their government, their army, and their natural leaders, prepared with undaunted resolution to defend their country. Acting with inconceivable energy, they at once drew the artillery from the arsenals to guard the avenues to the city, commenced intrenchments on the heights which commanded its different approaches, armed the ardent multitude with whatever weapons chance threw in their way, barricaded the principal streets, and stationed guards at all the important points in its vast circumference. The few regular troops who had not deserted their colours were formed into a reserve, consisting of four battalions and a brigade of cannoniers. The zeal of the populace was inflamed by a nocturnal procession of the head and blood of St.-Januarius around the city, and the enthusiastic multitude issued in crowds from the gates to meet the conquerors of Italy (2).

Frightful
combats
around the
capital,
21st and
22d Jan.
1799.

The combat which ensued was one of the most extraordinary of the revolutionary war, fruitful as it was in events of unprecedented character. For three days the battle lasted, between Aversa and Capua,—on the one side, numbers, resolution, and enthusiasm; on the other, discipline, skill, and military experience. Often the Republican ranks were broken by the impetuous charges of their infuriated opponents; but these transient moments of success led to no lasting result, from the want of any reserve to follow up the advantage, and the disorder into which any rapid advance threw the tumultuary ranks. Still crowd after crowd succeeded. As the assailants were swept down by volleys of grape-shot, new multitudes rushed forward. The plain was covered with the dead and the dying; and the Republicans, weary with the work of slaughter, slept at night beside their guns, within pistol-shot of their indomitable opponents. At length the artillery and skill of the French prevailed; the Neapolitans were driven back into the city, still resolved to defend it to the last extremity (3).

A terrible combat ensued at the gate of Capua. The Swiss battalion, which,

(1) Jom. xi. 76, 79. Th. x. 202. Bot. iii. 162, 163. Hard. vii. 139, 144, 149.

(2) Jom. xi. 79. Lac. xiv. 242. Bot. iii. 162.

(3) Bot. iii. 164, 165. Jom. xi. 79, 80. Lac. xiv. 242. Hard. vii. 151, 153.

The French
force the
gates and
forts; bloody
conflicts in
the streets.

with two thousand lazzaroni, was entrusted with the defence of that important post, long resisted all the efforts of the Republicans. Two attacks were repulsed with great slaughter, and at length the chief of the staff, Thiébault, only succeeded in making himself master of the entrance by feigning a retreat, and thus drawing the inexperienced troops from their barricades into the plain, where they were charged with the bayonet by the French, who entered the gate pell-mell with the fugitives. Still, however, they made good their ground in the streets. The Republicans found they could expel the besieged from their fastnesses only by burning down or blowing up the edifices, and their advance through the city was rendered almost impracticable by the mountains of slain which choked up the causeway. But while this heroic resistance was going on at the gates, a body of the citizens, attached to the French party, made themselves masters of the fort of St.-Elmo, and the castello del Uovo, and immediately sending intimation to Championnet, a body of troops were moved forward, and these important posts taken possession of by his soldiers. The lazzaroni shed tears of despair when they beheld the tricolor flag waving on the last strong-holds of their city; but still the resistance continued with unabated resolution. Championnet upon this gave orders for a general attack. Early Jan. 23. on the morning of the 25d, the artillery from the castle of St.-Elmo showered down cannon-shot upon the city, and dense columns of infantry approached all the avenues to its principal quarters. Notwithstanding the utmost resistance, they made themselves masters of the fort del Carmine; but Kellermann was held in check by Paggio, near the Seraglio. The roofs of the houses were covered with armed men, showers of balls, flaming combustibles, and boiling water fell from the windows, and all the other columns were repulsed with great slaughter, when an accidental circumstance put an end to the strife, and gave the French the entire command of Naples. Michel-le-Fou, the lazzaroni leader, having been made prisoner, was conducted to the headquarters of the French general, and having been kindly treated, offered to mediate between the contending parties. Peace was speedily established. The French soldiers exclaimed, "Vive St.-Januaire," —the Neapolitans, "Vivent les Français;" a guard of honour was given to St.-Januarius (1); and the populace, passing, with the characteristic levity of their nation, from one extreme to another, embraced the French soldiers with whom they had so recently been engaged in mortal strife (2).

No sooner was the reduction of Naples effected than the lazzaroni were disarmed, the castles which command the city garrisoned by French troops, royalty abolished, and a new democratic state, called the *Parthenopeian Republic*, proclaimed in its stead. In the outset, a provisional government of twenty-one members was appointed. Their first measure was to levy upon the exhausted inhabitants of the capital a contribution of 12,000,000 of francs, or L.500,000, and upon the remainder of the kingdom one of 15,000,000 francs, or L.620,000, burdens which were felt as altogether overwhelming in that poor country, and were rendered doubly oppressive by the unequal manner in which they were levied, and the additional burden of feeding, clothing, lodging, and paying the troops, to which they were at

(1) Bot. iii. 166, 169. Jom. xi. 84, 85. Lac. xiv. 243, 244. Hard. vii. 159, 175.

(2) The most contemptuous proclamations against the reigning family immediately covered the walls of Naples. In one of them it was said, "Who is the Capet who pretends to reign over you, in virtue of

the investiture of the Pope? Who is the crowned scoundrel who dares to govern you? Let him dread the fate of his relative who crushed by his despotism the rising liberty of the Gauls." (Signed.) "CHAMPIONNET."—HARD. vii. 172, 173.

the same time subjected. Shortly after, there arrived Faypoult, the commissary of the Convention, who instantly sequestered the whole royal property, all the estates of the monasteries, the whole banks containing the property of individuals, the allodial lands, of which the King was only administrator, and even the curiosities of Herculaneum and Pompeii, though still buried in the bowels of the earth. Championnet, ashamed of this odious proceeding, suspended the decree of the Convention; upon which he was immediately recalled, indicted for his disobedience, and Macdonald intrusted with the supreme command; while a commission of twenty-five members was appointed to draw up a constitution for the new Republic. The constitution which they framed was, as might have been anticipated, fraught with the grossest injustice, and totally unsuitable to the circumstances of the country. Jacobin clubs were established; the right of election confined to colleges of electors named by government, deprived the people of the free franchises which they had inherited from the ancient customs; a national guard established, in which not three hundred men were ever enrolled; and, finally a decree passed, which declared that in every dispute between the barons and individuals, judgment should, without investigation, be given in favour of the private citizen! But amidst these frantic proceedings, the French generals and civil authorities did not lose sight of their favourite objects, public and private plunder; the arsenals, palaces, and private houses were pillaged without mercy; all the bronze cannon which could be found, melted down and sold; and the Neapolitan democrats had even the mortification of seeing the beautiful statues of the same metal which adorned the streets of their capital, disposed of to the highest bidder, to fill the pockets of their republican allies. The utmost discontent immediately ensued in all classes; the patriots broke out into vehement exclamations against the perfidy and avarice of their deliverers; and the democratic government soon became more odious even to the popular party than the regal authority by which it had been preceded (1).

State of
Ireland.

While Italy, convulsed by democratic passions, was thus every where falling under the yoke of the French Directory, Great Britain underwent a perilous crisis of its fate; and the firmness and intrepidity of English patriotism was finely contrasted with the fumes of Continental democracy, and the vacillation of Continental resolution. Ireland was the scene of danger; the theatre, in so many periods of English history, of oppressive or unfortunate legislation on the side of government, and of fierce and blindfold passions on the part of the people.

Reflections
on the melancholy
history of that
country.

In surveying the annals of this unhappy country, it appears impossible at first sight to explain the causes of its suffering by any of the known principles of human nature. Severe and conciliatory policy seem to have been equally unavailing to heal its wounds. Conquest has failed in producing submission, severity in enforcing tranquillity, indulgence in awakening gratitude. The irritation excited by the original subjugation of the island, seems to be unabated after the lapse of five centuries; the indulgence with which it has been often treated, has led uniformly only to increased exasperation, and more formidable insurrections; and the greater part of the suffering which it has so long undergone, appears to have arisen from the measures of severity rendered necessary by the excitation of popular passion consequent on every attempt to return to a more lenient system of government.

(1) Bot. iii. 172, 177. Jom. xi. 318, 319. Hard. vii. 178, 187.

The first British sovereign who directed his attention to the improvement of Ireland was James I. He justly boasted that there would be found the true theatre of his glory, and that he had done more in a single reign for the improvement of that important part of the empire, than all his predecessors, from the days of Henry II. Instead of increased tranquillity and augmented gratitude, there broke out, shortly after, the dreadful rebellion of 1644, which was only extinguished by Cromwell in oceans of blood. A severe and oppressive code was imposed soon after the Revolution in 1688, and under it the island remained discontented, indeed, but comparatively tranquil, for a hundred years. The more galling parts of this code were removed by the beneficent policy of George III. From 1780 to 1798, was an uninterrupted course of improvement, concession, and removal of disability, and this indulgent policy was immediately followed by the rebellion of 1798. The last fetters of restriction were struck off by the Catholic Relief Bill in 1829, and the exasperation, discontent, and violence in Ireland, which immediately followed, have been unprecedented in the long course of its humiliated existence. All the promises of tranquillity so often held forth by its advocates were falsified, and half a century of unbroken indulgence was succeeded by the fierce demand for the Repeal of the Union, and a degree of anarchy, devastation, and bloodshed, unparalleled in any Christian land.

These effects are so much at variance with what was predicted and expected to arise from such conciliatory measures, that many able observers have not hesitated to declare them inexplicable, and to set down Ireland as an exception to all the ordinary principles of human nature. A little consideration, however, of the motives which influence mankind on such occasions, and the state of society in which they were called into operation, will be sufficient to demonstrate that this is not the case, and that the continued turbulence of Ireland is the natural result of these principles acting in peculiar and almost unprecedented circumstances.

The first evil which has attached to Ireland was the original and subsequent confiscation of so large a portion of the landed property; and its acquisition by persons of a different country, habits, and religion, from the great body of the inhabitants. In the greater part of the insurrections which that country has witnessed, since the English standard first approached its shores, nearly all its landed property has been confiscated, and lavished either on the English nobility, or companies, or individuals of English extraction. Above eight millions of acres were bestowed away in this manner upon the adventurers and soldiers of fortune who followed the standard of Cromwell (1). It is the great extent of this cruel and unjust measure which has been the original cause of the disasters of Ireland, by nourishing profound feelings of hatred in the descendants of the dispossessed proprietors, and introducing a body of men into the country, necessarily dependent for their existence upon the exclusion of the heirs of the original owners from the inheritance of their forefathers.

But other countries have been subjected to landed confiscation as well as Ireland; nearly all the land of England was transferred, first from the Britons to the Saxons, and thence from the Saxons to the Normans; the lands of Gaul were almost entirely, in the course of five centuries, wrested by the Franks from the native inhabitants (2); and yet upon that foundation have been

(1) Lingard, xi. 136, and xii. 74.

(2) Guizot, *Essais sur l'Histoire de France*, 179, 179.

reared the glories of English civilisation and the concentrated vigour of the French monarchy. Other causes, therefore, must be looked for, coexisting with or succeeding these, which have prevented the healing powers of nature from closing there, as elsewhere, that ghastly wound, and perpetuated to distant ages the irritation and the animosities consequent on the first bitterness of conquest. These causes are to be found in the unfortunate circumstance, that Ireland was not the seat, like England or Gaul, of the permanent residence of the victorious nation; that absent proprietors, and their necessary attendants, middlemen, arose from the very first subjugation of the kingdom, by a race of conquerors who were not to make it their resting-place; and that a different religion was subsequently embraced by the victors from the faith of the vanquished, and the bitterness of religious animosity superadded to the causes of discontent arising from civil distinction. The same progress was beginning in Scotland after the country was overrun by Edward I, when it was arrested by the vigorous efforts of her unconquerable people; five centuries of experienced obligation have not yet fully developed the inappreciable consequences of the victory of Bannockburn, or stamped adequate celebrity on the name of Robert Bruce.

Peculiar causes which have aggravated this evil in Ireland.

Great as were these causes of discontent, and deeply as they had poisoned the fountains of national prosperity, they might yet have been obliterated in process of time, and the victors and vanquished settled down, as in France and England, into one united people, had it not been for another circumstance, to which sufficient attention has not yet been paid, viz., the incessant agitation and vehemence of party strife arising from the extension, perhaps unavoidable from the connexion with England, of the forms of a free and representative government to a people who were in a state of civilisation unfit for either. The fervid and passionate character of the Irish peasantry, which they share more or less with all nations in an infant state of civilisation, and, still more, of unmixed Celtic descent, is totally inconsistent with the calm consideration and deliberate judgment requisite for the due exercise of political rights. The duties of grand and common jurymen, of electors for representatives to Parliament, and of citizens uniting in public meetings, cannot as yet be fitly exercised by a large portion of the Irish people.

The Irish are as yet unfit for free privileges.

From the periodical recurrence of such seasons of excitation has arisen the perpetuating of popular passions, and the maintenance of party strife, from the extinction of which alone can habits of industry or good order be expected to arise. Continued despotism might have healed the wounds of Ireland in a few generations, by extinguishing the passions of the people with the power of indulging them; but the alternations of severity and indulgence which they have experienced under the British government, like a similar course pursued to a spoiled child, have fostered rather than diminished the public discontent, by giving the power of complaint without removing its causes, and prolonging the sense of suffering by perpetuating the passions from which it has arisen. This explains the otherwise unaccountable circumstance, that all the most violent ebullitions of Irish insurrection have taken place shortly after the greatest boons had been conferred upon them by the British Legislature, and that the severest oppression of which they complain is not that of the English Government, whose conduct towards them for the last forty years has been singularly gentle and beneficent, but of their own native magistracy, from whose vindictive or reckless proceedings their chief

miseries are said to have arisen. A people in such circumstances are almost as incapable of bearing the excitements of political change, or the exercise of political power, as the West India Negroes or the Bedouins of Arabia; and hence, the fanatical temper of the English nation, in the reign of Charles I, speedily generated the horrors of the Tyrone rebellion; the fumes of French democracy, in the close of the eighteenth century, gave rise to the insurrection of the United Irishmen; and the excitement consequent on the party agitation set on foot to effect Catholic Emancipation, the removal of tithes, and the repeal of the Union, has produced in our own times a degree of animosity and discord on its peopled shores, which bids fair to throw it back for half a century in the career of real freedom (1).

Intimate union formed by Irish malecontents with France. Following out the system which they uniformly adopted towards the states which they wished to overthrow, whether by open hostility or secret propagandism, the French government had for years held out hopes to the Irish malecontents, and by every means in their power sought to widen the breach, already, unhappily, too great, between the native and the English population. This was no difficult task. The Irish were already sufficiently disposed to ally themselves with any enemy who promised to liberate them from the odious yoke of the Saxons, and the dreams of liberty and equality which the French spread wherever they went, and which turned so many of the strongest heads in Europe, proved altogether intoxicating to their ardent and enthusiastic minds. From the beginning of the Revolution, accordingly, its progress was watched with intense anxiety in Ireland. All the horrors of the Reign of Terror failed in opening the eyes of its inhabitants to its real tendency; and the greater and more enterprising part of the Catholic population, who constituted three-fourths of its entire inhabitants, soon became leagued together for the establishment of a republic in alliance with France, the severance of all connexion with England, the restoration of the Catholic religion, and the resumption of the forfeited lands (2).

Revolutionary organization established throughout Ireland. The system by which this immense insurrection was organized was one of the most simple, and, at the same time, one of the most efficacious, that ever was devised. Persons were sworn into an association in every part of Ireland, called the Society of United Irishmen, the real objects of which were kept a profound secret, while the ostensible ones were those best calculated to allure the populace. No meeting was allowed to consist of more than twelve members; five of these were represented by five members in a committee, vested with the management of all their affairs. From each of these committees a deputy attended in a superior body; one or two deputies from these composed a county committee; two from every county committee, a provincial one; and they elected five persons to superintend the whole business of the Union. This provisional government was elected by ballot; and the names of its members were only communicated to the secretaries of the provincial committees, who

(1) The serious crimes in Ireland during the last three months of 1829

(The Emancipation Bill passed in March), 300

Do. of 1830, 499

Do. of 1831 (Reform Agitation), . . . 814

Do. of 1832 Tithe and Repeal agitation), 1513

The crimes reported in Ireland in the year 1831 were 16,669, of which 210 were murders; 1478 robberies; burning houses, 466; attacks on houses, 2296; burglaries, 531; robbery of arms, 678. The

crimes reported in England in the same year were 19,647. The population of England and Wales in 1831, was 13,894,000; that of Ireland, 7,784,000. See Parl. Returns, 14th March, 1833; 8th May, 1833; and population census, 1833. By the Coercion Act the serious crimes were at once reduced to a fourth part, or nearly so, of these numbers.—See HANSARD, Parl. Deb. Feb. 9, 1834.

(2) Wolfe Tone, ii. 187; 191. Ann. Reg. 1798, 153, 157. Jom. xi. 428, 429. *Ante*, iii. 96.

were officially intrusted with the scrutiny of the votes. Thus, though their power was unbounded, their agency was invisible, and many hundred thousand men obeyed the dictates of an unknown authority. Liberation from tithes and dues to the Protestant clergy, and the restoration of the Roman Catholic faith, formed the chief boons presented to the lower classes; and, in order to effect these objects, it was speciously pretended that a total change of government was necessary. The real objects of the chiefs of the insurrection, which they would have had no difficulty in persuading the giddy multitude who followed their steps to adopt, were the overthrow of the English Government, and the formation of a republic allied to France. Parliamentary Reform was the object ostensibly held out to the country, as being the one most calculated to conceal their ultimate designs, and enlist the greatest number of the respectable classes on their side. So strongly were men's minds infected with party spirit at that period, and so completely did it obliterate the better feelings of our nature, even in the most generous minds, that these intentions were communicated to several of the Opposition party on both sides of the Channel; and even Mr. Fox, if we may believe the poetic biographer of Lord E. Fitzgerald (1), was no stranger to the project entertained for the dismemberment and revolutionizing of the empire (2).

Combina-
tion of
Orangemen
to uphold
British con-
nexion.

To resist this formidable combination, another society, composed of those attached to the British government and the Protestant ascendancy, was formed, under the name of Orangemen, who soon rivalled the activity and energy of the Catholic party. The same vehement zeal and ardent passions which have always characterised the Irish people, signalized their efforts. The feuds between these two great parties soon became universal; deeds of depredation, rapine, and murder filled the land; and it was sometimes hard to say whether most acts of violence were perpetrated by the open enemies of law and order, or its unruly defenders (3).

Treaty of the
Irish rebels
with France.

The leaders of the insurrection, Lord Edward Fitzgerald, Mr. Arthur O'Connor, and Wolfe Tone, went over to France in June 1796, where a treaty was concluded with the French Directory, by which it was agreed that a considerable fleet and army should, in the autumn of that year, be ready for the invasion of Ireland, to enable it to throw off the connexion with England, and form a republic in alliance with France, It has been already mentioned how these expectations were thwarted, first by

(1) Ann. Reg. 1798, 154, 157. Wolfe Tone, ii. 197, 201. Moore's Fitzgerald, i. 165, 166, 277. Hard. vi. 201, 202.

(2) "In order to settle," says Moore, "all the details of their late agreement with France, and in fact to enter into a formal treaty with the Directory, it was thought of importance by the United Irishmen to send some agent whose station and character should, in the eyes of their new allies, lend weight to his mission; and to Lord Edward Fitzgerald the no less delicate than daring task was assigned. About the latter end of May, he passed a day or two in London on his way, and dined at a member of the House of Lords', as I have been informed by a gentleman present, where the company consisted of Mr. Fox, Mr. Sheridan, and several other distinguished Whigs—all persons who had been known to concur warmly in every step of the popular cause in Ireland, and to whom, if Lord Edward did not give some intimation of the object of his present journey,

such an effort of reserve and secrecy was, I must say, very unusual to his character. . . . It is well known that Mr. Fox himself, impatient at the hopelessness of all his efforts to rid England, by any ordinary means, of a despotism which aristocratic alarm had brought upon her, found himself driven, in his despair of Reform, so near that edge where revolution begins, that had there existed, at that time, in England any thing like the same prevalent sympathy with the new doctrines of democracy as responded throughout Ireland, there is no saying how far short of the daring aims of Lord Edward even this great constitutional leader of the Whigs might, in the warmth of his generous zeal, have ventured." It is to be hoped that the biographer of the great English statesman will be able to efface the stain thus cast on his memory by the warmth of combined poetic and Irish zeal.—See Moore's Fitzgerald, i. 165, 166, 276.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1798, 155.

the dispersion of the French fleet in Bantry bay in December 1796, and then by the glorious victory of Camperdown in 1797. The vigorous efforts of government at that period, and the patriotic ardour of a large portion of the more respectable part of the people, contributed in no small degree to overawe the discontented, and postponed for a considerable period the final explosion of the insurrection (1).

Government, meanwhile, were by no means aware of the magnitude of the danger which threatened them. They had received only some vague information of the existence of a seditious confederacy; when there were two hundred and fifty thousand men organized in companies and regiments in different parts of the kingdom, and the leaders appointed by whom the insurrection was to be carried into execution in every county of the island. But the defeat of the Dutch fleet having left the insurgents little hope of any powerful succour from France, they became desperate, and began to break out into acts of violence in several parts of the country. From want of arms and military organization, however, they were unable to act in large bodies, and, commencing a Vendéen system of warfare in the southern counties, soon compelled all the respectable inhabitants to fly to the towns to avoid massacre and conflagration. These disorders were repressed with great severity by the British troops and the German auxiliaries in English pay. The yeomanry, forty thousand strong, turned out with undaunted courage at the approach of danger, and many cruelties were perpetrated under the British colours, which, though only a retaliation upon the insurgents of their own excesses, excited a deep feeling of revenge, and drove to desperation their furious and undisciplined multitudes (2).

Feb. 19, 1798. The beginning of 1798 brought matters to an extremity between the contending parties. On the 19th February, Lord Moira made an eloquent speech in their favour in Parliament; but the period of accommodation was past. On the same day the Irish committees came to a formal resolution, to pay no attention to any offers from either House of Parliament, and to agree to no terms but a total separation from Great-Britain. Still, though their designs were discovered, the chiefs of the conspiracy were unknown: but at length, their names having been revealed March 12. by one of their own leaders, fourteen of the chiefs were arrested at Dublin; and Lord Edward Fitzgerald, who escaped at that time, was mortally wounded, some months after, when defending himself from arrest, after having rejected, from a generous devotion to his comrades, all the humane offers made by government to enable him to retire in safety from the kingdom (3). The places of these leaders were filled up by subordinate authorities; but their arrest was a fatal blow to the rebellion, by depriving it of all the chiefs of character, rank, or ability.

Various ac- Notwithstanding this untoward event, the insurrection, broke tions with the insur- out at once in many different parts of Ireland in the end of May. gents. The design was to seize the castle and artillery, and surprise the May 23, camp at Dublin, while, at the same time, the attention of govern- 1798. ment was to be distracted by a simultaneous rising in many different parts of the country. The attempt upon Dublin was frustrated by the vigilance of the lord-lieutenant, who, on the very day on which it was to have taken

(1) Ann. Reg. 1798, 158, 159. Wolfe Tone, ii. Moore's Fitzgerald, i. 2, 77. Hard. vi. 212, 213.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1798, 162. Moore's Fitzgerald, ii. 371, 378.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1798, 158, 161. Jom. x. 429, 430. Wolfe Tone, ii. 255, 270. Hard. vi. 205, 206.

place, arrested the leaders of the conspiracy in that capital; but in other quarters the revolt broke out with great violence. Bodies of the insurgents were worsted at Rath farm-house by Lord Roden, and at Tallanghill by the

May 25. royal forces, but their principal army, fifteen thousand strong, defeated the English at Enniscorthy, captured that burgh, and soon after made themselves masters of the important town of Wexford, containing a considerable train of artillery, and opening a point of communication with France. Following up their successes, they advanced against New Ross, on the confines of Kilkenny, but there they were defeated with great loss by the royal troops; and the rebels revenged themselves for the disaster, by the massacre, in cold blood, of above a hundred prisoners taken at Wexford. At Newtonbarry, after having taken and retaken the town several times, they were finally dislodged with great loss, by the yeomanry and militia. At length, the British commanders having collected above ten thousand men

June 21. in the county of Wexford, commenced a general attack on the insurgents, who were fifteen thousand strong in their camp at Vinegar Hill.

Totally defeated at Vinegar Hill. The resistance was more obstinate than could have been expected from their tumultuary masses, but at length discipline and skill prevailed over untrained valour. They were broken in several charges by the English cavalry, and dispersed, leaving all their cannon, thirteen in number, and their whole ammunition in the hands of the victors. This was a mortal stroke to the rebellion. The insurgents, flying in all directions, were routed in several smaller encounters, and at length the revolt was so completely got under, that government were enabled to send Lord Cornwallis with a general amnesty for all who submitted before a certain day, with the exception of a few leaders who were afterwards brought to justice. Such was the success of these measures, that out of sixty thousand men who were in arms at the commencement of the insurrection, there remained at the end of July only a few isolated bands in the mountains of Wicklow and Wexford (1).

Imminent danger from which England then escaped. It was fortunate for England, during this dangerous crisis, that the French government made no adequate attempt to support the insurrection; that they had exposed their navy to defeat in the previous actions at St.-Vincent's and Camperdown, and that now, instead of wounding their mortal enemy in this vulnerable point, they had sent the flower of their army, their best general, and most powerful squadron, upon a distant expedition to the coast of Africa. Confidently trusting, as every Briton must do, that the struggle between France and this country would have terminated in the overthrow of the former, even if it had taken place on our own shores, it is impossible to deny that the landing of Napoléon with forty thousand men, in the midst of the immense and discontented population of Ireland, would have led to most alarming consequences; and possibly the imminent peril to the empire might earlier have produced that burst of patriotic feeling and development of military prowess which was afterwards so conspicuous in the Peninsula war.

Negatory efforts of the Directory to revive the insurrection. Awakened when too late to the importance of the opening which was thus afforded to their arms, the Directory made several attempts to rekindle the expiring flame of the insurrection. Eleven hundred men, under General Humbert, setting sail from Rochfort, landed at Killala, and, with the aid of Napper Tandy, the Irish revolutionist,

speedily commenced the organization of a provisional government and the enrolment of revolutionary legions, in the province of Connaught (1) A force of four thousand men, consisting chiefly of yeomanry and militia, was defeated by this enterprising commander, with the loss of seven pieces of cannon and six hundred prisoners;—a disaster which demonstrates the danger which would have been incurred if Napoléon, with the army of Egypt, had arrived in his stead. At length the little corps was surrounded, and compelled

Sept. 8. led to surrender, after a gallant resistance, by Lord Cornwallis. A French force, consisting of the *Hoche* of seventy-four guns and eight frigates, having on board three thousand men, eluded the vigilance of the Channel fleet, and arrived on the coast of Ireland; but they were there attacked by the squadron under the command of Sir John Borlase Warren, and the whole

Oct. 12, 1798. taken, after a short action, with the exception of two frigates, which regained the ports of the Republic. On board the *Hoche* was seized the celebrated leader, Wolfe Tone, who, after having with great firmness undergone a trial for high treason, prevented a public execution by a deplorable suicide, accompanied with more than ordinary circumstances of horror. His death closed the melancholy catalogue of executions on account of this unhappy rebellion; and it is but justice to the British government to add, that although many grievous acts were perpetrated by the troops under their orders in its suppression, yet the moderation and humanity which they themselves displayed towards the vanquished, were as conspicuous as the vigilance and firmness of their administration (2).

Maritime
affairs of the
year.

The maritime affairs of this year were chiefly distinguished by the capture of Minorca, which, notwithstanding the great strength of

(1) The landing of the French troops was announced by two proclamations, one from the French general, the other from Napper Tandy to his countrymen. The first bore:—"United Irish! The soldiers of the great nation have landed on your shores, amply provided with arms, artillery, and munitions of all sorts, to aid you in breaking your fetters and recovering your liberties. Napper Tandy is at their head; he has sworn to break your fetters or perish in the attempt. To arms! freemen, to arms! the trumpet calls you; do not let your brethren perish unrevenged; if it is their destiny to fall, may their blood cement the glorious fabric of freedom." That from Napper Tandy was still more vehement:—"What do I hear? The British government talks of concessions! will you accept them? Can you for a moment entertain the thought of entering into terms with a government which leaves you at the mercy of the English soldiery, which massacres inhumanly your best citizens—with a ministry which is the pest of society and the scourge of the human race! They hold out in one hand the olive branch; look well to the other, you will see in it the hidden dagger. No, Irishmen; you will not be the dupe of such base intrigues; feeling its inability to subdue your courage, it seeks only to seduce you. But you will frustrate all its efforts. Barbarous crimes have been committed in your country; your friends have fallen victims to their devotion to your cause; their shades surround you; they cry aloud for vengeance. It is your duty to avenge their death; it is your duty to strike the assassins of your friends on their bloody thrones. Irishmen! declare a war of extermination against your oppressors; the eternal war of liberty against tyranny.—NAPPER TANDY." But the conduct of this leader was far from keeping pace with these vehement protestations; for no sooner did he hear of the reverse sustained by the French corps which had landed in Killala bay, than he re-embarked on

board the French brig *Anacreon*, and got safe across the Channel.—See both proclamations in *HARD*, vi. 223, 225.

(2) *Ann. Reg.* 1798, 165. *Jour.* x. 440, 442. *Hard*, vi. 219.

The firmness and success of the British government, amidst so many examples of weakness elsewhere, excited at this juncture the highest admiration on the Continent. "In the British cabinet," says Prince Hardenberg, "there was then to be seen neither irresolution nor discouragement; no symptoms of that cruel perplexity which tormented the continental sovereigns. In vain were the efforts of the Directory directed against that point of the globe, which they assailed with all their weapons, both military and revolutionary. England sustained the shock with daily increasing energy. Her dignity was untouched, her arms unconquered. The most terrible war to which an empire could be exposed, there produced less anxiety, troubles, and disquietude, than was experienced by those states which had been seduced by the prospect of a fallacious peace to come to terms of accommodation with the French Republic. It was with eight hundred ships of war, a hundred and fifty thousand sailors, three hundred thousand land troops, and an expenditure of fifty millions sterling a-year, that she maintained the contest. It was by periodical victories of unprecedented splendour, by drawing closer together the bonds of her constitution, that she replied to all the efforts of France to dismember her dominions. But never did she run greater danger than this year, when one expedition, directed against the East, threatened with destruction her Indian empire, and another against the West, was destined to carry into Ireland the principles of the French Revolution, and sever that important island from the British Empire." —*HARD*, vi. 197, 198.

its fortifications, yielded to a British force under the command of General Stewart. In August, the inhabitants of the little island of Gozo, a dependence of Malta, revolted against the French garrison, made them prisoners to the number of three hundred, and compelled the Republicans to shut themselves up in the walls of la Valette, where they were immediately subjected to the most rigorous blockade by the British forces by land and sea (1).

Disputes of France with the United States. So unbounded was the arrogance, so reckless the policy of the French government at this time, that it all but involved them in a war with the United States of North America, the country in the world in which democratic institutions prevail to the greatest extent, and where gratitude to France was most unbounded for the services rendered to them during their contest with Great Britain.

The origin of these disputes was a decree of the French government in January 1789, which directed "that all ships having for their cargoes, in whole or in part, any English merchandise, should be held lawful prize, whoever was the proprietor of that merchandise, which should be held contraband from the single circumstance of its coming from England, or any of its foreign settlements; that the harbours of France should be shut against all vessels which had so much as touched at an English harbour, and that neutral sailors found on board English vessels, *should be put to death.*" This barbarous decree immediately brought the French into collision with the United States, who, at that period, were the great neutral carriers of the world. Letters of marque were issued, and an immense number of American vessels, having touched at English harbours, brought into the French ports. The American government sent envoys to Paris, in order to remonstrate against these proceedings. They urged that the decree of the French proceeded on the oppressive principle, that because a neutral is obliged to submit to exactions from one belligerent party, from inability to prevent them, therefore it must submit to the same from the other, though neither sanctioned, as in the other case, by previous usage, nor authorized by treaty. The envoys could not obtain an audience of the Directory, but they were permitted to remain in Paris, and a negotiation opened with Talleyrand and his inferior agents,

Shameful rapacity of the French government.

which soon unfolded the real object which the French government had in view. It was intimated to the envoys that the intention of the Directory, in refusing to receive them in public, and permitting them to remain in a private capacity, was to lay the United States under a contribution, not only of a large sum as a loan to the government, but of another for the private use of the Directors. The sum required for the first object was L.1,000,000, and for the last L.50,000. This disgraceful proposal was repeatedly pressed upon the envoys, not only by the subaltern agents of Talleyrand, but by that minister himself, who openly avowed that nothing could be done at Paris without money, and that there was not an American there who would not confirm him in this statement. Finding that the Americans resolutely resisted this proposal, they were at length informed, that if they would only "pay, by way of fees, just as they would to any lawyer who should plead their cause, the sum required for the private use of the Directory, they might remain at Paris until they had received further orders from America as to the loan required for government (2). These terms were indignantly rejected; the American envoys left Paris, letters

May 26.
June 9.
July 7.

(1) Ann. Reg. 1798, 127. Jom. x. 443.
(2) This transaction was so extraordinary, that it is advisable to lay before the reader the official re-

port on the subject, presented by the American plenipotentiaries to their government. "On the 18th October, the plenipotentiary Pinckney received a

of marque were issued by the American President, all commercial intercourse with France was suspended, Washington declared generalissimo of the forces of the commonwealth, the treaties with France declared at an end, and every preparation made to sustain the national independence (1).

Contributions levied on the Hanse Towns by the Directory. The Hanse towns were not so fortunate in escaping from the exactions of the Directory. Their distance from the scene of contest, their neutrality so favourable to the commerce of the Republic, the protection openly afforded them by the Prussian government, could not save them from French rapacity. Their ships, bearing a neutral flag, were daily made prisoners by the French cruisers, and they obtained licenses to navigate the high seas only by the secret payment of L.150,000 to the republican rulers (2).

Retrospect of the late encroachments of France. It was impossible, as long as the slightest hope of maintaining their independence remained to the European states, that these incessant and endless usurpations of the French government could fail to lead to a renewal of the war. France began the year 1798 with three affiliated republics at her side, the Batavian, the Cisalpine, and the Ligurian. Before its close she had organized three more, the Helvetic, the Roman, and the Parthenopean. Pursuing constantly the same system; addressing herself to the discontented multitude in every state; paralysing the national strength by a division of its population, and taking advantage of that division to overthrow its independence, she had succeeded in establishing her dominion over more than one-half of Europe. From the Texel to the extremity of Calabria, a compact chain of republics was formed, which not only threatened the independence of the other states of Europe by their military power, but promised speedily to subvert their whole social institutions by the incessant propagation of revolutionary principles. Experience had proved that the freedom which the Jacobin agents insidiously offered to the deluded population of other states, was neither more nor less than an entire subjection to the agents of France; and that the moment that they endeavoured to obtain in reality that liberty which they had been promised in name, they were subjected to the most arbitrary and despotic oppression (3).

Their system rendered peace impossible. In resisting this alarming invasion not merely of the independence of nations, but the principles which hold together the social union, it was obvious that no time was to be lost; and that the peril incurred was even greater in peace than during the utmost dangers of war. France had made more rapid strides towards universal dominion during one

visit from the secret agent of M. Talleyrand (M. Bellarni). He assured us that Citizen Talleyrand had the highest esteem for America and the citizens of the United States; and that he was most anxious for their reconciliation with France. He added, that, with that view, some of the most offensive passages in the speech of President Adams must be expunged, and a *douceur* of L 50,000 sterling put at the disposal of M. Talleyrand for the use of the Directors; and a large loan furnished by America to France. On the 20th the same subject was resumed in the apartments of the plenipotentiary, and on this occasion, besides the secret agent, an intimate friend of Talleyrand was present; the expunging of the passages was again insisted on, and it was added, that after that, money was the principal object. His words were—'We must have money, a great deal of money.' On the 21st, at a third conference, the sum was fixed at 32,000,000 (L.1,280,000) as a loan, secured on the *Dutch contributions*, and a gratification of L.50,000 in the form of a *douceur* to the Di-

rectors." At a subsequent meeting on the 27th October, the same secret agent said, "Gentlemen, you mistake the point; *you say nothing of the money you are to give. You make no offer of money.* On that point you are not explicit."—"We are explicit enough," replied the American envoys, "we will not give you one farthing; and before coming here we should have thought such an offer as you now propose would have been regarded as a mortal insult."—"See the Report in *HAAR*, vi. 14. 22. When the American envoys published this statement, Talleyrand disavowed all the proceedings of these secret agents; but M. Bellarni published a declaration at Hauburg, "that he had neither said, written, or done a single thing without the orders of Citizen Talleyrand." —*Ibid.* vi. 29.

(1) *Ann. Reg.* 1798, 241, 247. *Jom.* x. 363. *Hard.* vi. 21.

(2) *Jom.* x. 364. *Hard.* vi. 34, 33.

(3) *Th.* x. 205.

year of pacific encroachment, than six previous years of hostilities. The continuance of amicable relations was favourable to the secret propagation of the revolutionary mania, with all the extravagant hopes and expectations to which it gave rise; and without the shock of war, or an effort even to maintain the public fortunes, the independence of nations was silently melting away before the insidious, but incessant efforts of democratic ambition. It was but a poor consolation to those who witnessed this deplorable progress, that those who lent an ear to these suggestions were the first to suffer from their effects, and that they subjected themselves and their country to a far worse despotism than that from which they hoped to emancipate it; the evil was done, the national independence was subverted; revolutionary interests were created, and the principle of democracy, using the vanquished states as an advanced post, was daily proceeding to fresh conquests, and openly aimed at universal dominion.

Leads to a general feeling in favour of a confederacy, which Russia joins. These considerations, strongly excited by the subjugation of Switzerland and the Papal States, led to a general feeling throughout all the European monarchies, of the necessity of a general coalition to resist the further encroachments of France, and stop the alarming progress of revolutionary principles. The Emperor of Russia at length saw the necessity of joining his great empire to the confederacy; and a Muscovite army, sixty thousand strong, began its march from Poland towards the north of Italy, while another, amounting nearly to forty thousand, moved towards the south of Germany (1):

Progress of the negotiations at Rastadt. The negotiations at Rastadt, notwithstanding their length and intricacy, had led to no satisfactory result. The temper in which they were conducted underwent a material change with the lapse of time. The treaty of Campo Formio was more than an ordinary accommodation; it was a league by the great powers, who there terminated their hostilities, for their own aggrandisement at the expense of their neighbours, and in its secret articles were contained stipulations which amounted to an abandonment of the empire, by its head, to the rapacity of the Republican government.

Signed on Dec. 1, 1797. Venice was the glittering prize which induced this dereliction of principle on the part of the Emperor; and accordingly it was agreed, that on the same day on which that great city was surrendered to the imperial troops, Mayence, the bulwark of the German empire on the Lower Rhine, should be given to the Republicans (2). By an additional article it was provided, that the Austrian troops should, within twenty days after the ratification of the secret articles, evacuate also Ingolstadt, Philipsburg, and all the fortresses as far back as the frontiers of the hereditary states, and that within the same period the French forces should retire from Palma Nuova, Legnago, Ozoppo, and the Italian fortresses as far as the Adige (3).

This important military convention, which totally disabled the empire from making any effectual resistance to the French forces, was kept a pro-

(1) Th. x. 146. Lac. xiv. 311, 312.

(2) The Emperor, in the secret articles, agreed that the Republican frontiers should be advanced to the Rhine, and stipulated that the Imperial troops should take possession of Venice on the same day on which the Republicans entered Mayence. He promised to use his influence to induce the empire to agree to that arrangement; but if, notwithstanding his endeavours, the Germanic states should refuse to accede to it he engaged to employ no troops, excepting the contingent he was bound, as a member of the Confederation, to furnish, in any war which

might ensue, and not even to suffer them to be engaged in the defence of any fortified place; any violation of this last article was to be considered as a sufficient ground for a resumption of hostilities against Austria. Indemnities were to be obtained, if possible, for the dispossessed princes on the left bank of the Rhine; but no acquisition was to be proposed for the benefit of Prussia."—See the *Secret Articles in Corresp. Conf. de Nap.* vii. 287, 292.

(3) Art. 12, 14, Secret Treaty. *Corresp. Conf. de Nap.* vii. 291, 292.

The secret understanding between France and Austria is made manifest. found secret, and only became known to the German princes when, from its provisions being carried into execution, it could no longer, in part at least, be concealed. But in the mean time it led to a very great degree of intimacy between Napoléon and Cobentzell, the Austrian ambassador at Rastadt, insomuch that the Emperor, who perceived the extreme irritation which at that moment the French general felt against the Republican government at Paris, offered him a principality in Germany, with 250,000 souls, in order that "he might be for ever placed beyond the reach of democratic ingratitude." But the French general, whose ambition was fixed on very different objects, declined the offer. To such a length, however, did the two diplomatists proceed, that Napoléon made Cobentzell acquainted with his secret intention at some future period of subverting the Directory. "An army," said he, "is assembled on the coasts of the channel ostensibly for the invasion of England; but my real object is to march at its head to Paris, and overturn that ridiculous government of lawyers, which cannot much longer oppress France. Believe me, two years will not elapse before that preposterous scaffolding of a Republic will fall to the ground. The Directory may maintain its ground during peace, but it cannot withstand the shock of war; and therefore it is, that it is indispensable that we should both occupy good positions." Cobentzell lost no time in making his cabinet acquainted with these extraordinary revelations, which were highly acceptable at Vienna, and furnish the true key to the great influence exercised by Napoléon over that government during the remainder of his residence in Europe prior to the Egyptian expedition (1).

Great was the consternation in Germany when at length it could no longer be concealed that the line of the Rhine had been abandoned, and that all the states on the left bank of that river were to be sacrificed to the engrossing republic. It was the more difficult for the Austrian plenipotentiaries at Rastadt to reconcile the dispossessed proprietors to this catastrophe, as the Emperor had officially announced to the Diet, shortly after the conclusion of the armistice of Leoben, "that an armistice had been concluded by the Emperor for the empire, on the base of the *integrity of the Germanic body*." Remonstrances and petitions in consequence rapidly succeeded each other, as suspicions of the fate impending over them got afloat, but without effect; and soon the decisive evidence of facts convinced the most incredulous, that a portion at least of the empire had been abandoned. Intelligence successively arrived, that Mayence had been surrendered to the Republicans on the 30th December, in presence of, and without opposition from, the Austrian forces: that Venice, stripped of all its riches, had been abandoned to the Imperialists on the 15th January; and that the fort of the Rhine, opposite Mannheim, which refused to surrender to the summons of the Republican general, had been carried by assault on the 25th of the same month; while the Austrian forces, instead of opposing any resistance, were evidently retiring towards the frontiers of the hereditary states. An universal stupor seized on the German people when they beheld themselves thus abandoned by their natural guardians, and the only ones capable of rendering them any effectual protection; and their deputies expressed themselves in angry terms to the imperial plenipotentiaries on the subject (2). But, M. Lehrbach

(1) Hard, v. 66, 70, 71.

(2) Hard, v. 78, 96.

replied, when no longer able to conceal this dismemberment of the empire, —“All the world is aware of the sacrifices which Austria has made during the war; and that the misfortunes which have occurred are nothing more than what she has uniformly predicted would occur, if a cordial union of all the Germanic states was not effected to maintain their independence. Singly, she has made the utmost efforts to maintain the integrity of the empire; she has exhausted all her resources in the attempt; if she has been unsuccessful, let those answer for it who contributed nothing towards the common cause.” This defence was perfectly just; Austria had performed, and nobly performed her part as head of the empire; its dismemberment arose from the inaction of Prussia, which, with an armed force of above two hundred thousand men, and a revenue of nearly L.6,000,000 sterling, had done nothing whatever for the cause of Germany. It is not the cession of the left bank of the Rhine to France; it is the spoliation of Venice which at this period forms an indelible stain on the Austrian annals (1).

After the cession of the line of the Rhine to France was finally divulged, the attention of the plenipotentiaries was chiefly directed to the means of providing indemnities to the dispossessed princes, and the republican envoys had already broached their favourite project of *secularizations*; in other words, indemnifying the lay princes at the expense of the church, when an event occurred at Vienna, which threatened to produce an immediate explosion between the two governments. On occasion of the anniversary of the

April 13. 1798.

Tumult at
Vienna, and
insult to the
French am-
basador.

general arming of the Vienna volunteers on April 13, the youth of that capital expressed a strong desire to give vent to the ardour of their patriotic feeling by a *fête* in honour of the glorious stand then made by their countrymen. It was hazardous to agree to such a proposal, as the French ambassador, General Bernadotte, had testified his repugnance to it, and declared his resolution, if it was persisted in, to give a dinner in honour of democratic principles at his hotel. But the Austrian government could not withstand the wishes of the defenders of the monarchy; the proposed *fête* took place, and the French ambassador, in consequence, gave a great entertainment to his friends, and hoisted an immense tricolor flag before his gate, with the words “*Liberté, Égalité*,” inscribed upon it. The opposing principles being thus brought into contact with each other, a collision took place. The people of Vienna conceived the conduct of the French ambassador to be a direct insult offered to their beloved Emperor, and flocked in menacing crowds to the neighbourhood of his hotel. The Austrian authorities, seeing the popular exasperation hourly increasing, in vain besought Bernadotte to remove the obnoxious standard. He deemed his own honour and that of the Republic pledged to its being kept up, and at length the multitude began to ascend ladders to break open the windows. A pistol discharged by one of the servants within, which wounded one of the assailants, only increased the ferment; the gates and windows were speedily forced, the apartments pilaged, and the carriages in the yard broken to pieces. Fifty thousand persons assembled in the streets, and the French ambassador, barricaded in one of the rooms of his hotel, was only delivered at one o’clock in the morning by two regiments of cuirassiers, which the Imperial government sent to his relief. Justly indignant at this disgraceful outrage, Bernadotte transmitted several

April 15.

angry notes to the Austrian cabinet; and although they published

(1) Hard. vi. 433, 434, and vii. 6.

a proclamation on the following day, expressing the deepest regret at the disorders which had occurred, nothing would appease the exasperated ambassador, and on the 15th he left Vienna, under a numerous escort of cavalry, and took the road for Rastadt (1).

Conferences opened at Seltz, which lead to no result. When matters were in this combustible state, a spark only was required to light the conflagration. Conferences were opened at Seltz, in Germany, were, on the one hand, the Directory insisted on satisfaction for the insult offered to the ambassador of the Republic; and, on the other hand, the Emperor demanded an explanation of the conduct of France in subduing, without the shadow of a pretext, the Helvetic Confederacy, and extending its dominion through the whole of Italy. As the Austrians could obtain no satisfaction on these points, the Emperor drew more closely his bonds of intimacy with the court of St.-Petersburg, and the march of the Russian armies through Galicia and Moravia was hastened, while the military preparations of the Austrian monarchy proceeded with redoubled activity (2).

Progress of the negotiations at Rastadt. The negotiations at Rastadt for the settlement of the affairs of the Germanic empire proceeded slowly towards an adjustment; but their importance disappeared upon the commencement of the more weighty discussions involved in the Seltz conferences. The French insisted upon a variety of articles, utterly inconsistent with the spirit of the treaty of Campo Formio or the independence of Germany. They first demanded all the islands of the Rhine, which were of very great importance in a military point of view; next that they should be put in possession of Kehl and its territory opposite to Strasburg, and Cassel and its territory opposite to Mayence; then that a piece of ground, adequate to the formation of a *tête-de-pont*, should be ceded to them at the German end of the bridge of Huningen; and, lastly, that the important fortress of Ehrenbreitzen should be demolished. The German deputation, on the other hand, insisted that the principle of separation should be that of the *thalweg*; that is to say, of the division of the valley by the middle of its principal stream. As a consequence of this principle, they refused to cede Kehl, Cassel, or the *tête-de-pont* at Huningen, or to demolish the fortifications of Ehrenbreitzen, all of which lay on the German bank of the river. Subsequently, the French commissioners admitted the principle of the *thalweg*, consented to the demolition of Cassel and Kehl, and the Germans agreed to that of Ehrenbreitzen; but the Republicans insisted on the cession of the island of Petersaw, which would have given them the means of crossing opposite that important point. Matters were in this unsettled state when they were interrupted by the march of the Russian troops through Moravia. The French government upon that issued a note, in which they declared that they would consider the crossing of the Germanic frontier by that army as equivalent to a declaration of war; and as their advance continued without interruption, the negotiations at Rastadt virtually came to an end (3).

Financial measures of the Directory to meet the approaching hostilities. Seeing themselves seriously menaced with an armed resistance to their project for subjugating all the adjoining states by means of exciting revolutions in their bosom, the Directory at length began to adopt measures to make head against the danger. The finances of

(1) Hard. v. 135, 493, 508.

(3) Jom. xi. 27, 28. Th. x. 154, 157. Hard. vi.

(2) Th. x, 145, 146, 149. Jom. xi. 8, 9. Lac. x. 371, 388.

the Republic were in a most alarming state. Notwithstanding the confiscation of two-thirds of the national debt, it was discovered that there would be a deficit of 200,000,000 francs, or above L.8,000,000 sterling, in the returns of the year. New taxes, chiefly on doors and windows, were imposed, and a decree passed, authorizing national domains, to the value of 123,000,000 of francs, or L.5,000,000 sterling, to be taken from the public creditors, to whom they had been surrendered in liquidation of their claims, and the property of the whole Protestant clergy to be confiscated to the service of the state (1) : thus putting, to support their revolutionary conquests, the last hand to their revolutionary confiscations.

Adoption
of the law
of the con-
scription by
the legisla-
ture.

It remained, to adopt some method for the augmentation of the army, which had been extremely diminished by sickness and desertion since the peace of Campo Formio. The skeletons of the regiments and the non-commissioned officers remained; but the ranks exhibited large chasms, which the existing state of the law provided no means of supplying. The Convention, notwithstanding their energy, had made no permanent provision for recruiting the army, but had contented themselves with two levies, one of 500,000, and one of 1,200,000 men, which, with the voluntary supplies since furnished by the patriotism or suffering of the people, had been found adequate to the wants of the state. But now that the revolutionary fervour had subsided, and a necessity existed for finding a permanent supply of soldiers to meet the wars into which the insatiable ambition of the government had plunged the country, some lasting resource became indispensable. To meet the difficulty, General Jourdan proposed the law of the CONSCRIPTION, which became one of the most important consequences of the Revolution. By this decree, every Frenchman from twenty to forty-five years of age was declared amenable to military service. Those liable to serve were divided into classes, according to the years of their birth, and the government were authorized to call out the youngest, second, or third class, according to Sept. 28, 1798 the exigencies of the times. The conscription was to take place by lot, in the class from which it was directed to be taken (2). This law was immediately adopted; and the first levy of two hundred thousand men from France ordered to be immediately enforced, while eighteen thousand men were required from the affiliated republic of Switzerland, and the like number from that of Holland.

Reflections
on this
event.

Thus, the justice of Heaven made the revolutionary passions of France the means of working out their own punishment. The atrocious aggression on Switzerland, the flames of Underwalden, the subjugation of Italy, were registered in the book of fate, and brought about a dreadful and lasting retribution. Not the bayonets of the Allies, not the defence of their country, occasioned this lasting scourge; the invasion of other states, the cries of injured innocence, first brought it into existence. They fixed upon its infatuated people that terrible law, which soon carried misery into every cottage, and bathed with tears every mother in France. Wide as had been the spread of the national sin, as wide was the lash of national punishment. By furnishing an almost inexhaustible supply of military population, it fanned the spirit of universal conquest, and precipitated its people into the bloody career of Napoléon. It produced that terrible contest which, after

(1) *Jom.* xi. 25, 26.

(2) *Jom.* xi. 23, 24. *1b.* x. 183, 184.

exhausting the resources, brought about the subjugation of that great kingdom, and wrung from its infuriated but not repentant inhabitants what they themselves have styled tears of blood (1). It is thus that Providence vindicates its superintendence of the moral world; that the guilty career of nations, equally as that of individuals, brings down upon itself a righteous punishment; and that we feel, amidst all the sins of rulers, or madness of the people; the truth of the sublime words of Scripture: "Ephraim is joined to idols; let him alone."

(1) Sav. iv. 382.

CHAPTER XXVII.

CIVIL HISTORY OF FRANCE FROM THE REVOLUTION OF 18TH FRUCTIDOR, TO THE SEIZURE OF SUPREME POWER BY NAPOLEON.

SEPTEMBER 1797—NOVEMBER 1799.

ARGUMENT.

Apathy of the public mind after the Revolution of 18th Fructidor—Extreme Difficulties of Government since that event—Universal Dissatisfaction after the new elections in Spring 1799—Restoration of the Liberty of the Press—Formation of a league against the Government—Measures of the Opposition—Revolution of 30th Prairial—Character of the New Directory—Fresh Ministerial Appointments—Efforts of the Jacobins to revive the Revolutionary spirit, which totally fail—Forced Loan and Levy of 200,000 men decreed by the Councils—Anarchy of the Provinces—Cruel Law of the Hostages—Insurrection in Brittany and la Vendée—Great Severity in the collection of the Forced Loan—Success of the Military Conscription—Increased Violence of the Jacobins—Fouché is appointed Minister of Police—His Character and Conservative designs—He closes the Jacobin Club—Violence of the Daily Press—Attack on the Journalists by the Directory—Their continued vigorous Measures against the Jacobins—Deplorable state of France at this period—Arrival of Napoleon at Fréjus—Universal Enthusiasm which it excites—His Journey, and Arrival at Paris—Reception there by the Directory—Previous Intrigues of Barras and Siéyes with Louis XVIII.—Junction of the Malecontents of all Parties to support Napoleon—Profound Dissimulation of his Conduct.—His Efforts to gain Gohier and Moulins, who refuse—After much hesitation, he resolves to join Siéyes—Measures resolved on—He tries in vain to gain Bernadotte—Progress of the Conspiracy—Great Banquet at the Hall of the Ancients—Preparations of the Conspirators at the Council of the Ancients—Efforts of Napoleon with all Parties—The 18th Brumaire—Meeting of all the Conspirators in the rue Chantereine—Napoleon's Address to the Ancients—Resignation of some of the Directory, Arrest of others—Napoleon, Siéyes, and Roger Ducos are appointed Consuls—The 13th Brumaire at St.-Cloud—Excessive Vehemence in the Council of Five Hundred—Imminent Danger of Napoleon, who enters the Hall of the Ancients—His Speech there—He enters the Hall of the Five Hundred—Frightful Disorder there—Intrepid Conduct of Lucien—Dissolution of the Five Hundred by an armed Force—Nocturnal Meeting of the Conspirators in the Orangery—Their Decrees—Joy in Paris at these events—General Satisfaction which they diffused through the Country—Clemency of Napoleon after his Victory—Formation of a Constitution—Napoleon is appointed First Consul—Outlines of the New Constitution—Appointments in Administration made by Napoleon—Venality of Siéyes—Immense majority of the People who approved of the New Constitution—Reflections on the Accession of Napoleon to the Consular Throne—Durable Liberty had been rendered impossible in France by the destruction of the Aristocracy and Clergy—Disastrous Effects of the Irreligion of that country—Prodigious Effects of the Centralization of Power introduced by the Revolution—Distinction between the safe and dangerous Spirit of Freedom—Immense impulse which the changes resulting from the Revolution have given to the spread of Christianity over the World.

THE Revolution of France had run through the usual course of universal enthusiasm, general suffering, plebeian revolt, bloody anarchy, democratic cruelty, and military despotism. There remained a last stage to which it had not yet arrived, but which, nevertheless, was necessary to tame the passions of the people, and reconstruct the fabric of society out of the ruined fragments of former civilisation. This stage was that of a SINGLE DESPOT, and to this final result the weakness consequent on exhausted passion was speedily bringing the country.

Apathy of
the public
mind after
the Revolution
of 18th
Fructidor.

To the fervour of democratic license there invariably succeeds in a few years a period of languor and listlessness, of blighted hope and disappointed ambition, of despair at the calamitous results of previous changes, and heedlessness to every thing but the gratification of selfish passion. The energetic, the ardent, the enthusiastic, have for the most part sunk under the contests of former faction, few remain but the base and calculating, who, by stooping before the storms under which their more elevated rivals perished, have contrived to survive their fall. This era is that of public degradation, of external disaster, and internal suffering, and in the despair of all classes, it prepares the way for the return to a more stable order of things.

Extreme
difficulties
of govern-
ment since
that event.

The external disasters, which had accumulated upon the Republic rapidly since the commencement of hostilities, of which an account will be given in the next chapter, could hardly have failed to overturn a government so dependant on the fleeting gales of popular favour as that of the Directory, even if it had not been tainted by the inherent vice of having been established by the force of military power, in opposition to the wishes of the nation and the forms of the constitution. But this cause had for long been preparing its downfall; and the removal of the armies to the frontier, upon the resumption of hostilities, rendered it impossible any longer to stifle the public voice. That inevitable scourge of all revolutionary states, embarrassment of finance, had, since the Revolution of the 18th Fructidor, impeded all their operations. Notwithstanding the confiscation of two-thirds of the public debt, it was found impossible, in the succeeding season, to pay the interest on the third which remained, without recurring to fresh expenditures. The deficit on the year was announced by the minister of finance as amounting to at least 63,000,000 francs, or L.2,520,000; it was known to amount to nearly 100,000,000; and the taxes were levied slowly, and with extreme difficulty. To meet the deficiency, the duty on doors and windows was doubled; that on carriages raised tenfold, and the effects of the Protestant clergy were confiscated, putting them, like the Catholics, on the footing of payment from government. Thus the Revolution, as it advanced, was successively swallowing up the property even of the humblest in the community (1).

The new elections of a third of the legislature, in March 1799, were conducted with greater order and freedom than any which had preceded them, because the army, the great support of the Directory, was for the most part removed, and the violence used on previous occasions to secure the return could not so easily be put in force. A large proportion of representatives, accordingly, were returned adverse to the government established by the bayonets of Augereau, and waited only for an opportunity to displace it from the helm. It fell to Rewbell's lot to retire from the Directory, and Siéyes was chosen by the two Councils in his stead. The people were already dissatisfied with the administration of affairs, when the disasters at the commencement of the campaign came to blow the flame into a conflagration (2).

Universal
dissatisfac-
tion after
the new
elections.

After these events, the public indignation could no longer be restrained. Complaints broke out on all sides; the conduct of the war, the management of the finances, the tyranny exercised over the elections, the arbitrary dispersion of the Chambers, the iniquitous removal of nearly one-half of the deputies, the choice of the generals, the di-

(1) Th. x. 214, 215. Mig. ii. 442.

(2) Lac. xiv. 351, 352. Th. x. 260.

rection of the armies, all were made the subject of vehement and impassioned invective. The old battalions, it was said, had been left in the interior to overawe the elections; the best generals were in irons; Championnet, the conqueror of Naples, had been dismissed for striving to repress the rapacity of the inferior agents of the Directory; Moreau, the commander in so glorious a retreat, was reduced to the rank of a general of division, and Scherer, unknown to fame, had been invested with the command of the army of Italy. Even measures which had formerly been the object of general praise, were now condemned in no measured terms; the expedition to Egypt, it was discovered, had given an eccentric direction to the best general and bravest army of the Republic, and provoked the hostility at once of the Sublime Porte and the Emperor of Russia; while the attack on Switzerland was an unjustifiable invasion of neutral rights, which necessarily aroused the indignation of all the European powers, and brought on a war which the government had made no preparations to withstand. These complaints were, in a great degree, well founded; but they would never have been heard if the fortune of war had proved favourable, and the Republican armies, instead of being thrown back on their own frontier, had been following the career of victory into the Imperial states. But the Directory now experienced the truth of the saying of Tacitus:—“*Hæc est bellorum pessima conditio: Prospera omnes sibi vindicant, adversa uni solo imputantur* (1).”

Restoration
of the liber-
ty of the
press.

In the midst of this general effervescence, the restraints imposed on the liberty of the press after the revolution of the 18th Fructidor, could no longer be maintained. The armed force which had imposed and kept them on was wanting; the soldiers were almost all combating on the frontier. They were, accordingly, no longer enforced against the daily journals, and the universal indignation speedily spread to the periodical press. In every quarter, in the newspapers, the tribune, the pamphlets, the clubs, nothing was to be heard but declamations against the government. The parties who had alternately felt the weight of their vengeance, the Royalists and the Jacobins, vied with each other in inveighing against their imbecility and want of foresight; while the soldiers, hitherto their firmest support, gave open vent to their indignation at the “Advocates” who had brought back the Republican standards to the Alps and the Rhine (2).

Formation
of a league
against the
government.

A league was speedily formed against the government, at the head of which were Generals Joubert and Augereau. Barras, though a Director, entered into the plan, and gave it the weight of his reputation, or rather his revolutionary audacity and vigour. It was agreed that no questions should be brought forward, until the obnoxious Directors were removed, as to the form of government which should succeed them; and the three Directors Laréveillière-Lépaux, Treilhard, and Merlin de Douai, were marked out for destruction. The conspiracy was far advanced when the misfortunes in Italy and on the Rhine gave tenfold force to the public discontent, and deprived the government of all means of resistance. The departments in the south, now threatened with invasion from the Allied army, were in a state of extreme fermentation, and sent deputations to the Councils, who painted in the most lively colours the destitute state of the troops, the consternation of the provinces, the vexations of the people, the injustice done to

(1) Lac. xiv. 352, 353. Th. x. 260, 261. Dum. i. 220, 221.

(2) Th. x. 268. Lac. xiv. 354. Goh. i. 96.

the generals, and the indignation of the soldiers. The nomination of Sièyes to the Directory was the most convincing proof of the temper of the Councils, as he had always and openly expressed his dislike at the constitution and the Directorial government. To elect him, was to proclaim, as it were, that they desired a revolution (1).

Measures of the opposition. Sièyes soon became the head of the conspirators, who thus numbered among their ranks two Directors, and a great majority of both Councils. It was no longer their object to remodel the constitution, but to gain immediate possession of the reins of power, in order to extricate the country from the perilous situation in which it was placed. For this purpose they refused all accommodation or consultation with the three devoted Directors; while the most vehement attacks were made on them in both Councils. The disastrous state of the finances afforded too fair an opportunity for invective. Out of 400,000,000 francs already consumed in the public service for the year 1799, not more than 210,000,000 francs had been received by the treasury, and the arrears were coming in very slowly. Various new taxes were voted by the Councils, but it was apparent to every one that their collection, under the present system, was impossible. A still more engrossing topic was afforded by the discussions on the proposed alteration of the law on the liberty of the press and the popular societies, in order to take away from the Directory the arbitrary power with which they had been invested by the law of the 19th Fructidor. The democrats exclaimed that it was indispensable to electrify the public mind, that the country was in the same danger as in 1793, and that the same means must be taken to meet it; that every species of patriotism would speedily expire if the clubs were not re-opened, and unlimited freedom allowed to the press. Without joining in this democratic fervour, the Royalists and Constitutionalists concurred with them in holding that the Directory had made a bad use of the dictatorial power given to them by the revolution of 18th Fructidor, and that the restoration of the popular clubs had become indispensable. So general a concord among men of such dissimilar opinions on all other subjects, announced the speedy fall of the government (2).

Revolution of 30th Prairial. The first measures of the conspirators were opened by a message from the different commissions of the Councils, presented by Boulay de la Meurthe, in which they insisted upon being informed of the causes of the exterior and interior dangers which threatened the state, and the means of averting them which existed. The Directory, upon receiving this message, endeavoured to gain time, by promising to give an answer in detail, which required several days to prepare. But this was by no means what the revolutionists intended. After waiting a fortnight without receiving any answer, the Councils, on the recommendation of their committees of war, expenditure, and finance, agreed to declare their sittings permanent, till an answer to the message was obtained, and the three committees were constituted into a single commission of eleven members, in other words, a provisional government. The Directory on their part also declared their sittings permanent, and every thing seemed to presage a fierce conflict. The commission dexterously availed themselves of the circumstance that Treillard, who for thirteen months had been in the Directory, had been appointed four days before the legal period, and instantly proposed that his nomination should

(1) Mign. ii. 442, 443. Lac. xiv. 333, 355. Th. x. 268, 274, and 310.

(2) Th. x. 313, 317. Mign. ii. 417. Lac. xiv. 355.

be annulled. Laréveillière, who was gifted with great political firmness, in vain strove to induce Treilhard to resist; he saw his danger, and resolved to yield to the storm. He accordingly sent in his resignation, and Gohier, a vehement republican, but a man of little political capacity, though an able writer, was named by the Councils in his stead (1).

The victory was gained, because this change gave the Councils a majority in the Directory; but Laréveillière was still firm in his refusal to resign. After exhausting every engine of flattery, threats, entreaties, and promises, Barras
25th May, 1799. at length broke up the conference by declaring, "Well, then, it is all over; the sabres must be drawn."—"Wretch!" exclaimed Laréveillière, "is it you that speak of sabres? There is nothing here but knives, and they are all directed against those virtuous citizens whom you wish to murder, because you cannot induce them to degrade themselves."
30th Prairial. But a single individual could not withstand the legislature; he yielded at length to the entreaty of a deputation from the Councils, and sent in his resignation during the night. His example was immediately followed by Merlin; and General Moulins and Roger Ducos were appointed as successors to the expelled Directors (2).

Thus, the government of the Directory was overturned in less than four years after its first establishment, and in twenty months after it had, by a violent stretch of illegal force, usurped dictatorial powers. The people of Paris took no part in this subversion of their rulers, which was effected by the force of the national assemblies illegally directed. Revolutionary fervour had exhausted itself; and an event which, six years before, would have convulsed France from one extremity to the other, passed over with hardly more agitation than a change of ministers in a constitutional monarchy (5).

Character of the new Directory. The violent measures, however, which had dispossessed the government, were far from bringing to the helm of affairs any accession either of vigour or ability. The new Directory, composed, like the Councils, of men of opposite principles, was even less qualified than that which had preceded it to make head against the tempest, both without and within, which assailed the state. Sièyes, the only man among them of a superior intellect, dreamed of nothing but a new political organization of society, and had none of the qualities fitted to struggle with the misfortunes of a sinking state. Roger Ducos, an old Girondist, was merely his creature, and unfit to direct any department of the Republic. Moulins, an obscure general, but a vehement republican, had been nominated by the Jacobin party to uphold their interests in the government, and being unknown to the armies, possessed none of the influence with the military so necessary to revive their former spirit. Barras was the only man capable of giving any effectual assistance to the administration; but he was so much under the influence of his passions and his vices, and had taken so many and such contradictory parts in the course of the Revolution, that no reliance could be placed on his assistance. After having been a violent Jacobin after the revolution of 31st May, a leading Thermidorien after the fall of Robespierre, a revolutionary Director on the 18th Fructidor, and a vehement enemy of his ancient colleagues on the 30th Prairial, he now became a royalist Director, elected to withstand the principles of democracy which had so often elevated him to power. Gohier was sincere and honest in his intentions, but he was

(1) Th. x. 322. Mign. ii. 443.

(2) Th. x. 326, 328. Lac. xiv. 356. Mign. ii. 443.

(3) Lac. xiv. 359. Th. x. 330. Staël, ii. 223, 224.

an infatuated republican, who, amidst the general wreck of its institutions, was dreaming only of the social compact and the means of averting a counter revolution. From the moment of their installation, their sentiments on most subjects were found to be so much at variance, that it was evident no cordial co-operation could be expected amongst them (1).

New ministerial appointments. The first and most pressing necessity was to stem the torrent of disaster which had overwhelmed the armies of the Republic. Immediately after the change in the government, news arrived of the forcing of the lines of Zurich; and, before the consternation which it occasioned had subsided, it was followed by intelligence of the battle of the Trebbia, and the evacuation of the ridge of the Apennines. These disasters rendered it absolutely necessary to take some steps to restore the public confidence, and for this purpose a great change was made in the military commanders of the Republic. Championnet, who had been thrown into prison for evading the orders of the Directory regarding the pillage of the Neapolitan dominions, was liberated from his fetters, and received the command of an army which it was proposed to establish along the line of the higher Alps; Bernadotte, from whose activity great results were justly expected, was appointed minister at war; and Joubert, whose exploits in the Tyrol had gained for him a brilliant reputation, nominated to the command of the shattered army of Italy (2).

Efforts of the Jacobins to revive the revolutionary spirit. The overthrow of the government was the signal for the issuing of the Jacobins from their retreats, and the recommencement of revolutionary agitation, with all the perilous schemes of democratic ambition. Every where the clubs were re-opened; the Jacobins took possession of the Riding-school hall, where the debates of the Constituent Assembly had been held, and began again to pour forth those impassioned declamations from which such streams of blood had already taken their rise. Taught by former disasters, however, they abstained from demanding any sanguinary proceedings, and confined themselves to a strenuous support of an agrarian law, and those measures for the division of property to which Babœuf had fallen a victim. The leading members of the Councils attended their meetings, and swelled the ardent multitudes who already crowded their assemblies (3), flattering themselves, even in the decrepitude of the revolutionary fervour, with the hopeless idea that they would succeed in directing the torrent.

Which totally fail. But the times were no longer the same, and it was impossible in 1799 to revive the general enthusiasm which ten years before had intoxicated every head in France. The people had not forgotten the Reign of Terror, and the dreadful calamities which had followed the ascendant of the Jacobins; they received their promises without joy, without allusion, and listened with undisguised anxiety to the menaces which they dealt out to all who opposed their designs. Their apathy threw the Jacobins into despair; who were well aware that, without the aid of the populace, they would be unable to overturn what yet remained of the fabric of society. "We cannot twice," said the citizens, "go through the same fiery ordeal; the Jacobins have no longer the power of the assignats at their command; the illusion of the people has been dispelled by their sufferings; the army regards their rule with horror." The respectable citizens, worn out with convulsions, and apprehensive beyond every thing of a return to the yoke of the multitude, sighed for the restoration of a stable government, and were pre-

(1) Th. x. 331, 332. Lac. xiv. 358, 360, 361. Mign. ii. 446. Goh. Mem. i. 104.

(2) Th. x. 333. Jom. Vie de Nap. i. 361.

(3) Lac. xiv. 358. Mign. ii. 445.

pared to rally round any leader who would subject the passions of the Revolution to the yoke of despotic power (1).

Forced loan, and conscription of 200,000 men decreed by the councils. To supply the enormous and daily increasing deficit in the public treasury, the Revolutionists maintained that it was indispensable to recur to the energy and patriotic measures of 1793; to call into active service all the classes of the state, and levy a forced loan of 120,000,000 of francs, or L.4,800,000, upon the opulent classes, increasing in severity with the fortunes of those from whom it was to be extracted. After long debates, this arbitrary measure was adopted; and, at the same time, a conscription of two hundred thousand men ordered, to recruit the armies. These vigorous measures promised, in the course of time, to procure a great supply for the public necessities; but in the mean while the danger was imminent; and it was much to be feared that the frontiers would be invaded before any efficient support could be afforded to the armies intrusted with their defence (2).

Anarchy of the provinces. What rendered every measure for the supply either of the army or the treasury difficult of execution, was the complete state of anarchy into which the provinces had fallen, and the total absence of all authority from the time that the troops had been removed to the frontier. The Vendéens and Chouans had, in the west, broken into fearful activity; the companies of the Sun renewed their excesses in the south, and every where the refractory conscripts, forming themselves into bands of robbers, occupied the forests, and pillaged travellers and merchandise of every description along the highways. To such a height had these disorders, the natural and inevitable consequence of a revolution, arisen, that in most of the departments there was no longer any authority obeyed, or order maintained, but the strong pillaged the weak with impunity, as in the rudest ages. In these circumstances a law, named the law of the *hostages*, was proposed and carried in the councils, and remains a singular and instructive monument of the desperate tyranny to which those are in the end reduced, who adventure on the perilous course of democratic innovation. Proceeding on the supposition, at once arbitrary and unfounded, that the relations of the emigrants were the sole cause of the disorders, they enacted, that whenever a commune fell into a notorious state of anarchy, the relations of emigrants, and all those known to have been at all connected with the ancient *régime*, should be seized as hostages, and that four of them should be *transported* for every assassination that was committed in that district, and their property be rendered liable for all acts of robbery which there occurred. But this law, inhuman as it was, proved wholly inadequate to restore order in this distracted country; and France was menaced with an anarchy, so much the more terrible than that of 1793, as the Committee of Public Safety was wanting, whose iron arm, supported by victory, had then crushed it in its grasp (3).

Insurrection in Brittany and la Vendée. The disturbances in the western provinces, during this paralysis of the authority of government, had again risen to the most formidable height. That unconquerable band, the Vendéens and Chouans, whom the utmost disasters could never completely subdue, had yielded only a temporary submission to the energetic and able measures of General Hoche, and with the arrival of less skilful leaders of the republican forces, and the

(1) Lac. xiv. 358, 359. Tb. x. 332, 333.

(2) Th. x. 336, 337. Jom. Vie de Nap. i. 362.

(3) Th. x. 337, 338. Mig. ii. 446. Goh. i. 62, 66 and Jom. Vie de Nap. i. 364.

increasing weakness of government, their activity again led them to insurrection. This fresh outbreak of the insurrection, was chiefly owing to the cruel and unnecessary persecutions which the Director Laréveillière-Lépeaux kept up against the priests; and it soon rose to the most formidable height. In March 1799, the spirit of Chouanism, besides its native departments in Brittany, had spread to la Vendée, and the Republic beheld with dismay the fresh breaking out of that terrible volcano. Chollet, Montaigne, Herbiere, names immortalized in those wonderful wars, were again signalized by the successes of the Royalists; and the flame, spreading further than the early victories of the Vendéens, menaced la Touraine (1). BOURMONT, afterwards conqueror of Algiers, a chief of great ability, revenged in Mans the bloody catastrophe of the Royalist army; and Godet de Chatillon, after a brilliant victory, entered in triumph into Nantes, which had six years before defeated the utmost efforts of the grand army under Cathelineau.

Nor did the financial measures of government inspire less dread than the external disasters and internal disorders which overwhelmed the country. The forced loan was levied with the last severity; and as all the fortunes of the Royalists had been extinguished in the former convulsions, it now fell on those classes who had been enriched by the Revolution, and thus spread an universal panic through its most opulent supporters. They now felt the severity of the confiscation which they had inflicted on others. The ascending scale, according to which it was levied, rendered it especially obnoxious. No fixed rule was adopted for the increase according to the fortune of the individual, but every thing was left to the tax-gatherers, who proceeded on secret and frequently false information. In these circumstances, the opulent found their whole income disappearing under a single exaction. The tax voted was 120,000,000 francs, or L.4,800,000; but in the exhausted state of the country, it was impossible to raise this sum, and specie, under the dread of arbitrary exactions, entirely disappeared from circulation. Its collection took three years, and then only realized three-fourths of its amount (2). The three per cents consolidated, that melancholy relic of former bankruptcy, had fallen to six *per cent* on the remnant of a third which the great confiscation of 1797 had left; little more than a *sixtieth* part of the former value of the stock at the commencement of the Revolution.

The executive were more successful in their endeavours to recruit the military forces of the Republic. Under the able and vigorous management of Bernadotte, the conscription proceeded with great activity; and soon a hundred thousand young men were enrolled and disciplined at the dépôts in the interior of the country. These conscripts were no sooner instructed in the rudiments of the military art, than they were marched off to the frontier, where they rendered essential service to the cause of national independence. It was the reinforcements thus obtained which enabled Masséna to extricate the Republic from extreme peril at the battle of Zurich; and it was in their ranks that Napoléon, in the following year, found the greater part of those dauntless followers who scaled the barrier of the Great St.-Bernard, and descended like a thunderbolt on the plain of Marengo (3).

While the Republic, after ten years of convulsions, was fast relapsing into that state of disorder and weakness which is at once the consequence

(1) Lac. xiv. 366, 369, Beauch. iii. 120, 349.
Goh. i. 6.

(2) Lac. xiv. 399, 400. Goh. i. 73, 75, 78.

(3) Goh. i. 90.

Increased
violence of
the Jacobins.

and punishment of revolutionary violence, the hall of the Jacobins resounded with furious declamations against all the members of the Directory, and the whole system which in every country has been considered as the basis of social union. The separation of property was, in an especial manner, the object of invective, and the agrarian law, which Babœuf had bequeathed to the last Democrats of the Revolution, universally extolled as the perfection of society. Felix Lepelletier, Arena, Drouet, and all the furious revolutionists of the age, were there assembled, and the whole atrocities of 1798 speedily held up for applause and imitation. They celebrated the manes of the victims shot on the plain of Grenelle, demanded in loud terms the instant punishment of all "the leeches who lived on the blood of the people," the general disarming of the Royalists, a levy *en masse*, the establishment of manufactures of arms on the public places, and the restoration of their cannon and pikes to the inhabitants of the faubourgs. These ardent feelings were roused into a perfect fury, when the news arrived of the battle of Novi, and the retreat of the army of Italy over the Alps. Talleyrand became, in an especial manner, the object of attack. He was accused of having projected the expedition to Egypt, the cause of all the public disasters; Moreau was overwhelmed with invectives, and Sièyes, the president of the Council of the Ancients, stigmatized as a perfidious priest, who was about to belie in power all the patriotic resolutions of his earlier years (1).

Fouché is
appointed
Minister of
Police. His
character,
and co-
servative de-
signs.

In these perilous circumstances, the Directory named Fouché minister of police. This celebrated man, who under Napoléon came to play so important a part in the government of the empire, early gave indication of the great abilities and versatile character which enabled him so long to maintain his influence, not only with many different administrations, but under so many different governments. An old member of the Jacobin club, and thoroughly acquainted with all their designs; steeped in the atrocities of Lyon; a regicide and atheist; bound neither by affection nor principle to their cause, and seeking only in the shipwreck of parties to make his own fortune, he was eminently qualified to act as a spy upon his former friends, and to secure the Directory against their efforts. He perceived at this critical period that the ascendant of the revolutionists was on the wane; and, having raised himself to eminence by their passions, he now resolved to attach himself to that conservative party who were striving to reconstruct the elements of society, and establish regular authority by their subversion. The people beheld with dismay the associate of Collot d'Herbois and a regicide member of the Convention, raised to the important station of head of the police; but they soon found that the massacres of Lyon were not to be renewed; and that the Jacobin enthusiast, intrusted with the direction of affairs, was to exhibit, in combating the forces of anarchy, a vigour and resolution unknown in the former stages of the Revolution. His accession to the administration at this juncture was of great importance; for he soon succeeded in confirming the wavering ideas of Barras, and inducing him to exert all his strength in combating those principles of democracy which were again beginning to dissolve the social body (2).

He closes
the Jacobin
Club.

Under the auspices of so vigorous a leader, the power of the Jacobins was speedily put to the test. He at once closed the Riding-school hall, where their meetings were held, and, supported by the Council

(1) Th. x. 60, 61. Lac. xiv. 59, 60. Jour. Vie de Nap. i. 364.

(2) Goh. i. 110. Th. x. 364. Lac. xiv. 362.

of the Ancients, within whose precincts it was placed, prohibited any further assemblies in that situation. The Democrats, expelled from their old den, reassembled in a new place of meeting in the Rue du Bac, where their declamations were renewed with as much vehemence as ever. But public opinion had changed; the people were no longer disposed to rise in insurrection to support their ambitious projects. Fouché resolved to follow up his blow by closing their meetings altogether. The Directory were legally invested with the power of taking this decisive step, as the organization of the society was contrary to law; but there was a division of opinion among its members as to the expedience of adopting it, Moulins and Gohier insisting that it was only by favouring the clubs, and reviving the revolutionary spirit of 1793, that the Republic could make head against its enemies. However, the majority, consisting of Sièyes, Barras, and Roger Ducos, persuaded by the Aug. 12. 1799. arguments of Fouché, resolved upon the decisive step. The execution of the measure was postponed till after the anniversary of the 10th August; but it was then carried into effect without opposition, and the Jacobin club, which had spread such havoc through the world, at last and for ever closed (1).

Violence of the daily press. Deprived of their point of rendezvous, the Democrats had recourse to their usual engine, the press; and the journals immediately were filled with the most furious invectives against Sièyes, who was stigmatized as the author of the measure. This able, but speculative man, the author of the celebrated pamphlet, "What is the Tiers-Etat," which had so powerful an effect in promoting the Revolution in 1789, was now held up to public execration as a perfidious priest, who had sold the Republic to Prussia. In truth, he had long ago seen the pernicious tendency of the democratic dogmas with which he commenced in life, and never hesitated to declare openly that a strong government was indispensable to France, and that liberty was utterly incompatible with the successive tyranny of different parties, which had so long desolated the Republic. These opinions were sufficient to point him out as the victim of republican fury, and, aware of his danger, he was already beginning to look around for some military leader who might execute the *coup d'état*, which he foresaw was the only remaining chance of salvation to the country (2).

Attack on the journalists by the Directory. In the meanwhile, the state of the press required immediate attention; its license and excesses were utterly inconsistent with any stable or regular government. The only law by which it could be restrained, was one which declared that all attempts to subvert the Republic should be punished with death; a sanguinary regulation, the offspring of democratic apprehensions, the severity of which prevented it, in the present state of public feeling, from being carried into execution. In this extremity, the three directors declared that they could no longer carry on the government, and France was on the point of being delivered over to utter anarchy when the Directory thought of the expedient of applying to the press the article of the constitution which gave the executive power the right to arrest all persons suspected of carrying on plots against the Republic. Nothing could be more forced than such an interpretation of this clause (3), which was obviously intended for a totally different purpose; but necessity and the well-known principle, *Salus Populi suprema Lex*, seemed to justify, on

(1) Th. x. 366, 367. Lac. xiv. 363. Mign. ii. 417. Goh. 123, 130.

(2) Th. x. 336. Mign. ii. 446.
(3) Art. 114.

Sept. 3. 1799. the ground afterwards taken by Charles X., a stretch indispensable for the existence of regular government, and an *arrêt*, was at length resolved on, which authorized the apprehension of the editors of eleven journals, and the immediate suppression of their publications (1).

Their continued vigorous measures against the Jacobins. Sept. 11. This bold step produced an immediate ebullition among the democrats; but it was confined to declamations and threats, without any hostile measures. The tribune resounded with "dictators, the fall of liberty," and all the other overflowings of revolutionary zeal; but not a sword was drawn. The three resolute directors, continuing their advantage, succeeded in throwing out, by a majority of 248 to 171, a proposal of Jourdan to declare the country in danger, which was supported by the whole force of the Jacobin party, and soon after successfully ventured on the bold step of dismissing Bernadotte, the minister of Sept. 17. war, whose attachment to democratical principles was well known. All thoughts were already turned towards a military chief capable of putting an end to the distractions of the Republic, and extricating it from the perilous situation in which it was placed from the continued successes of the Allies. "We must have done with declaimers," said Siéyès; "what we want is a head and a sword." But where to find that sword was the difficulty. Joubert had recently been killed at Novi; Moreau, notwithstanding his consummate military talents, was known not to possess the energy and moral resolution requisite for the task; Masséna was famed only as a skilful soldier; while Augereau and Bernadotte had openly thrown themselves into the arms of the opposite party. In this emergency, all eyes were already turned towards that youthful hero who had hitherto chained victory to his standards, and whose early campaigns, splendid as they were, had been almost thrown into the shade by the romantic marvels of his Egyptian expedition. The Directory had already assembled an immense fleet in the Mediterranean to bring back the army from the shores of the Nile, but it had broken up without achieving any thing. But Lucien and Joseph Bonaparte had conveyed to Napoléon full intelligence of the disastrous state of the Republic, and it was by their advice that he resolved to brave the English cruisers and return to France. The public mind was already in that uncertain and agitated state which is the general precursor of some great political event; and the journals, a faithful mirror of its fleeting changes, were filled with conjectures as to the future revolutions he was to achieve in the world (2).

Deplorable state of France at this period In truth, it was high time that some military leader of commanding talent should seize the helm, to save the sinking fortunes of the Republic. Never since the commencement of the war had its prospects been so gloomy, both from external disaster and internal oppression. A contemporary republican writer, of no common talent, has drawn the following graphic picture of the internal state of France at this period:—"Merit was generally persecuted; all men of honour chased from public situations; robbers every where assembled in their infernal caverns; the wicked in power; the apologists of the system of terror thundering in the tribune; spoliation re-established under the name of forced loans; assassination prepared; thousands of victims already designed, under the name of hostages; the signal for pillage, murder, and conflagration anxiously looked for, couched in the words the 'country is in danger;' the same cries, the same shouts were heard

(1) Th. x. 360. Lac. xiv. 363.

(2) Th. x. 375, 377. Mign. ii. 448. Lac. xiv. 362, 363. Goh. i. 140, 155.

in the clubs as in 1793; the same executioners, the same victims; liberty, property, could no longer be said to exist; the citizens had no security for their lives—the state for its finances. All Europe was in arms against us; America even had declared against our tyranny; our armies were routed, our conquests lost, the territory of the Republic menaced with invasion (1). Such was the situation of France before the revolution of the 18th Brumaire.” And such is the picture of the ultimate effect of democratic convulsions, drawn by their own authors; such the miseries which compelled the nation, instead of the feeble sceptre of Louis, to receive the dreaded sword of Napoléon.

Arrival of Napoléon at Fréjus. The despatches, containing the account of the expedition into Syria, and of the marvellous victories of Mont Thabor and Aboukir, arrived at this time, and spread far and wide the impression that the conqueror of Rivoli was the destined saviour of the state, for whom all classes were so anxiously looking. His name was in every mouth. Where is he? What will he do? What chance is there that he will avoid the English cruisers? were the questions universally asked. Such was the anxiety of the public mind on the subject, that rumour had twice outstripped the hopes of his friends, and announced his arrival; and when at length the telegraph gave the official intelligence that he had arrived at Fréjus, the public transports knew no bounds (2).

Universal enthusiasm which it excited. When the people at Fréjus heard that the conqueror of Egypt was on their coast, their enthusiasm broke through all the restraints of government. The laws of quarantine were in a moment forgotten. A multitude, intoxicated with joy and hope, seized the first boats, and rushed on board the vessels; Napoléon, amidst universal acclamations, landed and immediately set out for Paris. The telegraph, with the rapidity of the winds, announced his arrival, and the important intelligence speedily spread over the capital. The intoxication was universal, the joy unanimous. All wishes had been turned towards a hero who could restore peace to desolated France, and here he was, dropt from the clouds: a fortunate soldier presented himself, who had caused the French standards to float on the Capitol and the Pyramids; in whom all the world recognised both civil and military talents of the very highest order. His proclamations, his negotiations, his treaties, bore testimony to the first; his astonishing victories afforded irrefragable evidence of the second. So rare a combination might suggest alarm to the friends of liberty, were it not that his well-known principles and disinterestedness precluded the idea that he would employ the dictatorship to any other end than the public good and the termination of the misfortunes of the country. Discourses of this sort, in every mouth, threw the public into transports, so much the more entrancing as they succeeded a long period of disaster; the joyful intelligence was announced, amidst thunders of applause, at all the theatres; patriotic songs again sent forth their heart-stirring strains from the orchestra; and more than one enthusiast expired of joy at the advent of the hero who was to terminate the difficulties of the Republic (3).

His journey, and arrival at Paris. The conqueror was greeted with the most enthusiastic reception the whole way from Fréjus to Paris. At Aix, Avignon, Vienne, and Lyon, the people came forth in crowds to meet him; his journey resembled a continual triumph. The few bells which the Revolution had left

(1) Prem. Ann. du Consulat de Bonaparte, 7. Dum. ii. 335. Th. x. 429. Bour. iii. 27.

(2) Th. x. 429, 431. Mign. ii. 449.

(3) Bour. iii. 28, 29. Th. x. 432. Nap. i. 56.

in the churches were rung on his approach; his course at night marked by Oct. 16. the bonfires on all the eminences. On the 16th October he arrived unexpectedly at Paris; his wife and brothers, mistaking his route, had gone out to meet him by another road. Two hours after his arrival he waited on the Directory; the soldiers at the gate of the palace, who had served under him at Arcola, recognised his figure, and loud cries of *Vive Bonaparte!* announced to the government that the dreaded commander had arrived. He was Oct. 17. received by Gohier, and it was arranged that he should be presented in public on the following day (1). His reception then was, to external appearance, flattering, and splendid encomiums were pronounced on the victories of the Pyramids, of Mont Thabor, and Aboukir; but mutual distrust prevailed on both sides, and a vague disquietude already pervaded the Directory at the appearance of the renowned conqueror, who at so critical a moment had presented himself in the capital.

Reception
there by
the Direc-
tory.

Though convinced that the moment he had so long looked for had arrived, and resolved to seize the supreme authority, Napoléon landed in France without any fixed project for carrying his design into execution. The enthusiasm, however, with which he had been received in the course of his journey to Paris, and the intelligence which he there obtained of the state of the country, made him at once determine on the attempt. The circumstances of the time were singularly favourable for such a design. None of the Directory were possessed of any personal consideration except Sièyes, and he had long revolved in his mind the project of substituting, for the weak and oppressive government which was now desolating France, the firm hand of a vigorous and able military leader. Even so far back as the revolt of the sections on the 15th Vendémiaire (10th Nov. 1795), he had testified his opinion of the weakness of his colleagues to Napoléon. At the most critical moment of the day, when the Committee of Government had lost their heads, Sièyes approached Napoléon, and, taking him into the embrasure of a window, said, "You see how it is, general; they are haranguing when the moment for action has arrived; large bodies are unfit for the lead of armies, they never know the value of time. You can be of no use here. Go, general, take counsel only of your own genius, and the dangers of the country; the sole hope of the Republic is in you." These words were not lost on Napoléon; they pointed him out as the fit associate in his designs; and to these were soon added M. Talleyrand, who was too clear-sighted not to perceive that the only chance of safety was in the authority of a dictator, and who had also private grievances of his own to induce him to desire the overthrow of the government (2).

Previous
intrigues of
the Direc-
tory with
Louis
XVIII.

Indeed, so general was the impression at that period of the impossibility of continuing the government of France under the Republican form, that, previous to Napoléon's arrival, various projects had been not only set on foot, but were far advanced, for the restoration of monarchical authority. The brothers of Napoléon, Joseph and Lucien, were deeply implicated in these intrigues. The Abbé Sièyes at one time thought of placing the Duke of Brunswick on the throne; Barras was not averse to the restoration of the Bourbons, and negotiations were on foot with Louis XVIII for that purpose (3). They had even gone so far, that the terms of the director

(1) Bour. iii. 38, 59. Th. x. 433. Nap. i. 55, 56. Goh. i. 197, 202.

(2) Nap. i. 57, 59. Jom. xii. 392, 393. Bour. ii. 32.

(3) Bour. iii. 45. Capéfigue, Hist de la Restauration, i. 129.

were fixed for playing the part of General Monk; twelve millions of livres were to have been his reward, besides two millions to divide among his associates (1). But in the midst of these intrigues, Joseph and Lucien Bonaparte were in a more effectual way advancing their brother's interests, by inducing the leaders of the army to co-operate in his elevation; they had already engaged Macdonald, Leclerc, Lefebvre, Augereau, and Jourdan, to favour his enterprise; but Moreau hung back, and all their efforts had failed in engaging Bernadotte, whose republican principles were proof against their seductions (2).

Junction of
the male-
contents of
all parties
to support
Napoléon.

No sooner had Napoléon arrived at his unassuming dwelling in the rue Chantereine, than the whole generals who had been sounded, hastened to pay their court to him, and with them all who had been dismissed or conceived themselves ill-used by the Directory. His saloon soon resembled rather the court of a monarch than the rendezvous of the friends of any private individual, how eminent soever. Besides Lannes, Murat, and Berthier, who had shared his fortunes in Egypt, and were warmly attached to him, there were now assembled Jourdan, Augereau, Macdonald, Bournonville, Leclerc, Lefebvre, and Marbot, who, notwithstanding their many differences of opinion on other subjects, had been induced, by the desperate state of the Republic, to concur in offering the military dictatorship to Napoléon; and although Moreau at first appeared undecided, he was at length won by the address of his great rival, who made the first advances, and affected to consult him on his future designs. In addition to this illustrious band of military chiefs, many of the most influential members of the legislature were also disposed to favour the enterprise. Roederer, the old leader in the municipality, Regnault St.-Angely, long known and respected for his indomitable firmness in the most trying scenes of the Revolution, and a great number of the leading deputies in both Chambers, had paid their court to him on his arrival. Nor were official functionaries, and even the members of administration, wanting. Sièyes and Roger Ducos, the two Directors who chiefly superintended the civil concerns, and Moulins, who was at the head of the military department of the Republic, Cambacérès, the minister of justice, Fouché, the head of the police, and Réal, a commissary in the department of the Seine, an active and intriguing partisan, were assiduous in their attendance. Eight days had hardly elapsed, and already the direction of government seemed to be insensibly gliding into his hands (3).

The ideas of these different persons, however, were far from being unanimous as to the course which should be adopted. The Republican generals offered Napoléon a military dictatorship, and agreed to support him with all their power, provided he would maintain the principles of the Riding-school Club. Sièyes, Talleyrand, Roger Ducos, and Regnier, proposed to place him simply at the head of affairs, and to change the constitution, which experience had proved to be so miserably defective; while the Directors Barras and Gohier vainly endeavoured to rid themselves of so dangerous a rival, by offering and anxiously pressing upon him the command of the armies (4).

Profound
dissimula-
tion of his
conduct.

In the midst of this flattering adulation, the conduct of Napoléon was influenced by that profound knowledge of human nature and thorough dissimulation, which formed such striking features of his character. Affecting to withdraw from the eager gaze of the multitude, he

(1) Capefigue, Hist. de la Restauration. i. 129, 135. Nap. i. 66.

(2) Th. x. 434. Bour. iii. 41, 45.

(3) Goh. i. 211, 212. Nap. i. 64, 65, 74. Th. x. 435, 437.

(4) Th. x. 436, 437. Nap. iii. 64, 65. Goh. i. 218

seldom showed himself in public; and then only in the costume of the National Institute, or in a grey surtout, with a Turkish sabre suspended by a silk ribbon; a dress which, under seeming simplicity, revealed the secret pride of the Conqueror of the Pyramids. He postponed from day to day the numerous visits of distinguished individuals who sought the honour of being presented to him; and, when he went to the theatre, frequented only a concealed box, as if to avoid the thunders of applause which always attended his being recognised. When obliged to accept an invitation to a sumptuous repast, given in his honour by the minister of justice, he requested that the leading lawyers might be invited; and selecting M. Tronchet, the eloquent defender of Louis XVI, conversed long with him and Treilhard on the want of a simple code of criminal and civil jurisprudence which might be adapted to the intelligence of the age. To private dinners in his own house, he invited only the learned men of the Institute, and conversed with them entirely on scientific subjects; if he spoke on politics at all, it was only to express his profound regret at the misfortunes of France. In vain the directors exaggerated to him the successes of Masséna in Switzerland, and Brune in Holland; he appeared inconsolable for the loss of Italy, and seemed to consider every success of no moment till that gem was restored to the coronet of the Republic (1).

His efforts
to gain Gohier and
Moulins,
who refuse.

Napoléon's first attempt was to engage in his interest Gohier, the president of the Directory, and Moulins, who were both strongly attached to the Republican side; and, with this view, he not only paid them in private the greatest attention, but actually proposed to them that he should be taken into the government instead of Sièyes, though below the age of forty, which the constitution required for that elevated function. "Take care," said he, "of that cunning priest Sièyes; it is his connexion with Prussia, the very thing which should have excluded him from it, which has raised him to the Directory; unless you take care, he will sell you to the coalesced powers. It is absolutely necessary to get quit of him. It is true, I am below the legal age required by the constitution; but in the pursuit of forms we must not forget realities. Those who framed the constitution did not recollect that the maturity of judgment produced by the Revolution was often far more essential than the maturity of age which in many is much less material. Ambition has no share in these observations; they are dictated alone by the fears which so dangerous an election could not fail to inspire in all the friends of real freedom." Gohier and Moulins, however, agreed in thinking that the Republic had more to fear from the young general than the old metaphysician; and therefore replied, that though, if of the legal age, he would doubtless have secured all suffrages, yet nothing in their estimation could counterbalance a violation of the constitution, and that the true career which lay before him was the command of the armies (2).

After much
hesitation,
he at length
resolves to
join Sièyes.

Meanwhile all Europe was resounding with the return of Napoléon, and speculation with its thousand tongues was every where busied, in anticipating the changes which he was to effect in the fate of France and of the world. "What will Bonaparte do? Is he to follow the footsteps of Cromwell, or Monk, or Washington? What change is he like-

(1) Nap. i. 60, 61. Lac. xiv. 401. Th x. 437.

(2) Goh. i. 205, 210.

At this period, Sièyes's indignation at Napoléon knew no bounds. "Instead," said he, "of lamenting his inactivity, let us rather congratulate ourselves upon it; far from putting arms into the hands

of a man whose intentions are so suspicious; far from giving him a fresh theatre of glory, let us cease to occupy ourselves more about his concerns, and endeavour, if possible, to cause him to be forgot."—Gohier, i. 216.

ly to make in the fate of the war?" were the questions asked from one end of Europe to the other. But the general himself was for a short time undecided as to the course which he should pursue. To avail himself of the support of the Jacobins and the Riding-school Club seemed the plan most likely to disarm all opposition, because they were the only efficient or energetic body in the state; but he well knew that the Jacobins were jealous of every leader, and were at once exclusive and violent in their passions; and to make use of them for his own elevation, and immediately break the alliance and persecute them, would be a dangerous course. Sièyes, on the other hand, was at the head of a numerous body of leading men in the Chambers. His character precluded him from becoming an object of jealousy to the dictator; and although many of his party were firm Republicans, they were not of such an impetuous and energetic kind as to be incapable of employment under a regular government, after the struggle was over; and, besides, their strife with the Riding-school Club was too recent to render any coalition between such opposite bodies the subject of apprehension. Influenced by these considerations, Napoléon resolved to attach himself to Sièyes and his party, and enter into none of the projects of the Jacobins (1).

On the 50th October, he dined with Barras. "The Republic is perishing," said the Director; nothing can be in a more miserable state; the government is destitute of all force. We must have a change, and name Hédouville President of the Republic. Your intention, you know, is to put yourself at the head of the army. As for me, I am ill, my popularity is gone, and I am fit for private life." Napoléon looked at him steadily, without making any answer. Barras cast down his eyes, and remained silent: they had divined each other. Hédouville was a man of no sort of celebrity; his name had been used merely as a cover to the searching question. The conversation here dropped; but Napoléon saw that the time for action had arrived, and a few minutes after he called on Sièyes, and agreed to make the change between the 15th and 20th Brumaire (9th to 11th November). On returning home, he recounted to Talleyrand, Fouché, and others, what had passed; they communicated it during the night to Barras, and at eight the following morning the Director was at his bed-side, protesting his devotion, and that he alone could save the Republic; but Napoléon declined his open assistance, and turned the conversation to the difference between the humid climate of Paris and the burning sands of Arabia (2).

Notwithstanding his utmost efforts, however, Napoléon was unable to make any impression on Bernadotte. That general, partly from republican principles, partly from jealousy, resisted all his advances. "You have seen," said he, to Bourrienne, "the enthusiasm with which I was received in France, and how evidently it springs from the general desire to escape out of a disastrous predicament. Well! I have just seen Bernadotte,

(1) Nap. i. 67, 68. Th. x. 438, 439. Bour. iii. 61, 62.

Though political considerations, however, led to this alliance, there were no two men in France who hated each other more cordially than Napoléon and Sièyes. They had lately met at dinner at the Director Gohier's; the former, though he had made the first advances to Moreau, thought it unworthy of him to do the same to the veteran of the Revolution, and the day passed over without their addressing each other. They separated mutually exasperated. "Did you see that little insolent fellow?" said Sièyes; "he would not even condescend to notice

a member of the government, who, if they had done right, would have caused him to be shot."—"What on earth," said Napoléon, "could have made them put that priest in the Directory? he is sold to Prussia, and unless you take care, he will deliver you up to that power." Yet these men, stimulated by ambition, acted cordially together in the revolution which so soon approached. Such is the friendship of politicians. [Th. x. 443. Bour. iii. 39, 61. Lac. 403. Goh. i. 202.]

(2) Nap. i. 69, 70. Th. x. 448, 449. Lac. xiv. 407, 408.

who boasts, with a ridiculous exaggeration, of the great successes of the Republic; he spoke of the Russians beat, and Genoa saved; of the innumerable armies which were about to be raised. He even reproached me with not having brought back my soldiers from Egypt.—‘What!’ I answered, ‘you tell me that you are overflowing with troops, that two hundred thousand infantry, and forty thousand cavalry, will soon be on foot. If that is so, to what purpose should I have brought back the remains of my army?’ He then changed his tone, and confessed that he thought us all lost. He spoke of external enemies, of *internal* enemies, and at that word he looked steadily in my face. I also gave him a glance;—but patience, the pear will soon be ripe.” Soon after, Napoléon expressed himself with his wonted vehemence, against the agitation which reigned among the Jacobins, and of which the Riding-school hall was the centre. “Your own brothers,” replied Bernadotte, “were its principal founders, and yet you accuse me of having favoured that club: it is to the instructions of some one, *I know not who*, that we are to ascribe the agitation that now prevails.” At these words Napoléon could no longer contain himself. “True, general,” he replied with the utmost vehemence, “and I would rather live in the woods than in a society which presents no security against violence.” Their conversation only augmented the breach, and soon after they separated in sullen discontent (1).

Progress of
the conspi-
racy

Though a few of the military, however, held out, the great proportion of them were gained. Berthier, Lannes, and Murat, were daily making converts of such as were backward in sending in their adhesion. The officers of the garrison, headed by Moreau, demanded that they should be presented to Napoléon. The forty adjutants of the national guard of Paris made the same request; his brothers, Lucien and Joseph, daily augmented his party in the Councils; the 8th and 9th regiments of dragoons, who had served under him in Italy, with the 21st chasseurs, who had been organized by him, were devoted to his service. Moreau said, “He did not wish to be engaged in any intrigues, but that, when the moment for action arrived, he would be found at his post (2).” The people of Paris, who awaited in anxious expectation the unfolding of the plot, could no longer conceal their impatience. “Fifteen days have elapsed,” said they, “and nothing has been done (3). Is he to leave us, as he did on his return from Italy, and let the Republic perish in the agony of the factions who dispute its remains?” Every thing announced the approach of the decisive moment.

Nov. 6.
Great banquet at the
Hall of the
Ancients.

By the able and indefatigable efforts of Lucien Bonaparte, a banquet, at which he himself was president, was given at the Council of the Ancients, in honour of Napoléon. It passed off with sombre

(1) Bour. iii. 46, 51.

(2) An interesting conversation took place between Napoléon and Moreau when they met, for the first time in their lives, at a dinner party at Gohier's. When first introduced, they looked at each other a moment without speaking. Napoléon was the first to break silence, and testify to Moreau the desire which he had long felt to make his acquaintance. “You have returned victorious from Egypt,” replied Moreau, “and I from Italy, after a great defeat. It was the month which his marriage induced Joubert to spend at Paris which caused our disasters, by giving the Allies time to reduce Mantua, and bring up the force which besieged it to take a part in the action. It is always the greater number which defeats the less.”—“True,” replied Napoléon, “it is always the greater number which beats the less.”—“And yet,” said Gohier, “with

small armies you have frequently defeated larger ones.”—“Even then,” rejoined he, “it was always the inferior force which was defeated by the superior. When with a small body of men I was in presence of a large one, collecting my little band, I fell like lightning on one of the wings of the enemy and defeated it; profiting by the disorder which such an event never failed to occasion in their whole line, I repeated the attack, with similar success, in another quarter, still with my whole force. I thus beat it in detail; and the general victory, which was the result, was still an example of the truth of the principle, that the greater force defeats the lesser.”—See GOHIER, i. 203, 204. Two days after, Napoléon made Moreau a present of a dagger, set with diamonds, worth 10,000 francs.—*Moniteur*, 1799, p. 178.

(3) Th. x. 451, 452. Nap. i. 71, 72.

tranquillity. Every one spoke in a whisper, anxiety was depicted on every face, a suppressed agitation was visible even in the midst of apparent quiet. His own countenance was disturbed; his absent and preoccupied air sufficiently indicated that some great project was at hand. He rose soon from table, and left the party, which, although gloomy, had answered the object in view, which was to bring together six hundred persons of various political principles, and thus engage them to act in unison in any common enterprise. It was on that night, that the arrangements for the conspiracy were finally made between Sièyes and Napoléon. It was agreed that the government should be overturned; that, instead of the five directors, three consuls should be appointed, charged with a dictatorial power which was to last for three months; that Napoléon, Sièyes, and Roger Ducos, should fill these exalted stations; and that the Council of the Ancients should pass a decree on the 18th Brumaire (9th Nov.), at seven in the morning, transferring the legislative body to St.-Cloud, and appointing Napoléon commander of the guard of the legislature, of the garrison at Paris, and the national guard. On the 19th, the decisive event was to take place (1).

Preparations of the conspirators in the Council of the Ancients.

During the three critical days which followed, the secret, though known to a great number of persons, was faithfully kept. The preparations, both civil and military, went on without interruption.

Orders were given to the regiments, both infantry and cavalry, which could be relied on, to parade in the streets of Chantierne and Mont-Blanc, at seven o'clock in the morning of the 18th. Moreau, Lefebvre, and all the generals, were summoned to attend at the same hour, with the forty adjutants of the national guard. Meanwhile the secret Council of the Ancients laboured, with shut doors and closed windows, to prepare the decree which was to pass at seven in the morning; and as it forbade all discussion, and the Council of Five Hundred were only summoned to meet at eleven, it was hoped the decree would pass at once, not only without any opposition, but before its opponents could be aware of its existence (2).

Efforts of Napoléon with all parties

Meanwhile Napoléon, in his secret intercourse with the different leaders, was indefatigable in his endeavours to disarm all opposition. Master of the most profound dissimulation, he declared himself, to the chiefs of the different parties, penetrated with the ideas which he was aware would be most acceptable to their minds. To one he protested that he certainly did desire to play the part of Washington, but only in conjunction with Sièyes: the proudest day of his life would be that when he retired from power; to another, that the part of Cromwell appeared to him ignoble, because it was that of an impostor. To the friends of Sièyes he professed himself impressed with the most profound respect for that mighty intellect before which the genius of Mirabeau had prostrated itself; that, for his own part, he could only head the armies, and leave to others the formation of the constitution. To all the Jacobins who approached him he spoke of the extinction of liberty, the tyranny of the Directory, and used terms which sufficiently recalled his famous proclamation which had given the first impulse to the revolution of the 18th Fructidor (3). In public he announced a review of the

(1) Bour. iii. 57, 59. Goh. i. 226. Nap. i. 73. Mign. ii. 450 Th. x. 452, 455.

(2) Th. x. 456, 457 Nap. i. 73, 75.

(3) Th. x. 457. Lac. xiv. 408, 409.

At a small dinner party, given by Napoléon at this time, where the Director Gohier was present, the conversation turned on the turquois used by the

Oriental to clasp their torbans. Rising from his chair, Napoléon took out of a private drawer two brooches, richly set with those jewels, one of which he gave to Gohier, the other to Desaix. "It is a little toy," said he, "which we Republicans may give and receive without impropriety."

Soon after, the conversation turned on the

troops on the morning of the 18th Brumaire, after which he was to set off to take the command of the army on the frontier.

The 18th
Brumaire,
Nov. 8.

All the proposed arrangements were made with the utmost precision. By daybreak on the 18th Brumaire (8th Nov.); the boulevards were filled with a numerous and splendid cavalry, and all the officers in and around Paris repaired, in full dress, to the rue Chantereine. The Deputies of the Ancients, who were not in the secret, assembled, with surprise at the unwonted hour, in their place of meeting, and already the conspirators were there in sufficient strength to give them the majority. The president of the commission charged with watching over the safety of the legislative body, opened the proceedings; he drew, in energetic and gloomy colours, a picture of the dangers of the Republic, and especially of the perils which menaced their own body, from the efforts of the anarchists. "The Republic," said he, "is menaced at once by the anarchists, and the enemy; we must instantly take measures for the public safety. We may reckon on the support of General Bonaparte; it is under the shadow of his protecting arm that the Councils must deliberate on the measures required by the interests of the Republic." The uninitiated members were startled, and a considerable agitation prevailed in the assembly; but the majority were instant and pressing, and at eight o'clock the decree was passed, after a warm opposition, transferring the seat of the legislative body to St.-Cloud, appointing them to meet there on the following day at noon, charging Napoléon with the execution of the decree, authorizing him to take all the measures necessary for its due performance, and appointing him to the command of the garrison of Paris, the national guard, the troops of the line in the military divisions in which it stood, and the guard of the two Councils. This extraordinary decree was ordered to be instantly placarded on all the walls of Paris, dispatched to all the authorities, and obeyed by all the citizens (1).

Meeting of
the conspirators in the
rue Chantereine.

Napoléon was in his own house in the rue Chantereine when the messenger of state arrived; his levee resembled rather the court of a powerful sovereign than the dwelling of a general about to undertake a perilous enterprise. No sooner was the decree received, than he opened the doors, and, advancing to the portico, read it aloud to the brilliant assemblage, and asked if he might rely on their support? They all answered with enthusiasm in the affirmative, putting their hands on their swords. He then addressed himself to Lefebvre, the governor of Paris, who had arrived in ill humour at seeing the troops put in motion without his orders, and said, "Well, Lefebvre, are you, one of the supporters of the Republic, willing to let it perish in the hands of lawyers? Unite with me to save it; here is the sabre which I bore at the battle of the Pyramids; I give it you as a pledge of my esteem and confidence." The appeal was irresistible to a soldier's feelings. "Yes," replied Lefebvre, strongly moved, "let us throw the advocates into the river." Joseph Bonaparte had brought Bernadotte, but, upon seeing what was in agitation, he rapidly retired to warn the Jacobins of their danger. Fouché, at the first intelligence of what was going forward, had ordered the

prospect of an approaching pacification. "Do you really," said Napoléon, "advocate a general peace? You are wrong, president; a Republic should never make but *partial accommodations*; it should always contrive to have some war on hand to keep alive the military spirit."—GODIER, i. 214, 215.

(1) Nap. i. 75, 77. Lac. xiv. 411, 412. Th. x. 459.

To lull the suspicions of Gobier, Napoléon invited himself to dine with him on *that very day* (the 18th Brumaire), and sent that director a pressing invitation, carried by Eugène Beauharnais, to breakfast with him in the rue Chantereine on the preceding morning.—See GODIER, i. 228, 234.

barriers to be closed, and all the usual precautions taken which mark a period of public alarm, and hastened to the rue Chantierine to receive his orders; but Napoléon ordered them to be opened and the usual course of things to continue, as he marched with the nation and relied on its support. A quarter of an hour afterwards he mounted on horseback, and put himself at the head of his brilliant suite and fifteen hundred horsemen, and rode to the Tuileries. Names since immortalized in the rolls of fame were there assembled: Moreau and Macdonald, Berthier and Murat, Lannes, Marmont, and Lefebvre. The dragoons, assembled as they imagined for a review, joyfully followed in the rear of so splendid a *cortége*; while the people, rejoicing at the termination of the disastrous government of the Directory, saw in it the commencement of the vigour of military, instead of the feebleness of legal ascendant, and rent the air with their acclamations (1).

Napoléon's
speech at
the bar of
the An-
cients.

The military chief presented himself at the bar of the Ancients, attended by that splendid staff. "Citizen-representatives," said he, "the Republic was about to perish when you saved it. Wo to those who shall attempt to oppose your decree! Aided by my brave companions in arms, I will speedily crush them to the earth. You are the collected wisdom of the nation; it is for you to point out the measures which may save it. I come, surrounded by all the generals, to offer you the support of their arms. I name Lefebvre my lieutenant: I will faithfully discharge the duty you have intrusted to me. Let none seek, in the past, examples to regulate the present; nothing in history has any resemblance to the close of the eighteenth century; nothing in the eighteenth century resembles this moment. *We are resolved to have a Republic*; we are resolved to have it founded on true liberty and a representative system. I swear it in my own name, and in that of my companions in arms."—"We swear it," replied the generals. A deputy attempted to speak: the president stopped him, upon the ground that all deliberation was interdicted till the Council met at St.-Cloud. The assembly immediately broke up; and Napoléon proceeded to the gardens of the Tuileries, where he passed in review the regiments of the garrison, addressing to each a few energetic words, in which he declared that he was about to introduce changes which would bring with them abundance and glory. The weather was beautiful; the confluence of spectators immense; their acclamations rent the skies; every thing announced the transition from anarchy to despotic power (2).

Proceedings
of the
Council of
Five Hun-
dred.

While all was thus proceeding favourably at the Tuileries, the Council of Five Hundred, having received a confused account of the revolution which was in progress, tumultuously assembled in their hall. They were hardly met, when the message arrived from the Ancients, containing the decree removing them to St.-Cloud. No sooner was it read

(1) Lac. xiv. 413. Nap. i. 78. Th. x. 461, 462. Goh. i. 254.
(2) Th. x. 461, 463. Nap. i. 79. Lac. xiv. 413, 414.

During these events, the anxiety of all classes in Paris on the approaching revolution had risen to the highest pitch. A pamphlet, eagerly circulated at the doors of the Councils, contains a curious picture of the ideas of the moment, and the manner in which the most obvious approaching events are glossed over to those engaged in them. The dialogue ran as follows:—"One of the Five Hundred. Between ourselves, my friend, I am seriously alarmed at the part assigned to Bonaparte in this affair. His renown, his consideration, the just confidence of the

soldiers in his talents themselves, may give him the most formidable ascendant over the destinies of the Republic. Should he prove a Caesar, a Cromwell?"—"The Ancient. A Caesar, a Cromwell! Bad parts; stale parts; unworthy of a man of sense, not to say a man of property. Bonaparte has declared so himself on several occasions. 'It would be a sacrilegious measure,' said he, on one occasion, 'to make any attempt on a representative government in this age of intelligence and liberty.' On another—'There is none but a fool who would attempt to make the Republic lose the gauntlet it has thrown down to the royalty of Europe, after having gone through so many perils to uphold it.'" —Bour-RIENNE, iii. 76, 77.

than a host of voices burst forth at once : but the president, Lucien Bonaparte, succeeded in reducing them to silence, by appealing to the decree which interdicted all deliberation till they were assembled at that palace. At the same moment an aide-de-camp arrived from Napoléon to the guard of the Directory, communicating the decree, and enjoining them to take no orders but from him. They were in deliberation on the subject, when an order of an opposite description arrived from the Directory. The soldiers, however, declared for their comrades in arms, and ranged themselves round the standard of Napoléon. Soon after, a part of the Directory sent in their resignation. Sièyes and Roger Ducos were already in the plot, and did so in concert with Napoléon. Barras was easily disposed of. Boutot, his secretary, waited on Napoléon. He bitterly reproached him with the public disasters. "What have you made of that France," exclaimed he, "which I left so brilliant? I left you in peace, I find you at war : I left you victories. I find only disasters : I left you the millions of Italy, and in their stead I find only acts of spoliation! What have you made of the hundred thousand men, my companions in glory? They are dead! This state of things cannot continue; in less than three years it would lead to despotism." At length the Director yielded : and, accompanied by a guard of honour, set out for his villa of Gros-Bois (1).

The two Directors who remained, however, were not disposed of without considerable difficulty. These were Gohier and Moulins, brave republicans, but whose powers of acting, according to the constitution, which required a majority of the Directory for every legal act, were paralysed by the resignation or desertion of the majority of their brethren. Napoléon waited upon them, and said that he believed they were too good citizens to attempt to oppose a revolution which appeared inevitable; and that he therefore expected they would quietly send in their resignations. Gohier replied with vehemence, that, with the aid of his colleague Moulins, he did not despair of saving the Republic. "With what?" said Napoléon. "With the means of the constitution which is falling to pieces?" At this instant a messenger arrived with the intelligence that Santerre was striving to raise the faubourgs. "General Moulins," said Napoléon, "you are the friend of Santerre. I understand he is rousing the faubourgs; tell him, that at the first movement I will cause him to be shot." Moulins replied with equal firmness. "The Republic is in danger," said Napoléon; "we must save it : *it is my will*. Sièyes and Roger Ducos have sent in their resignations; you are two individuals insulated and without power. I recommend you not to resist." The directors replied, that they would not desert their post. Upon that they were sent back to the Luxembourg, separated from each other, and put under arrest by orders of Napoléon transmitted to Moreau. Meanwhile, Fouché, minister of police, Cambacérès, minister of justice, and all the public authorities, hastened to the Tuileries to make their submission (2). Fouché, in the name of the Directory, provisionally dissolved the twelve municipalities of Paris, so as to leave no rallying point to the Jacobins. Before night the government was annihilated, and there remained no authority in Paris but what emanated from Napoléon.

Napoléon,
Sièyes, and
Roger
Ducos, are
named
counsuls.

A council was held in the evening at the Tuileries, to deliberate on the course to be pursued on the following day. Sièyes strongly urged the necessity of arresting forty leaders of the Jacobins, who were already fomenting opposition in the Council of Five Hundred,

(1) Th. x. 468, 469. Goh. i. 243, 258, 261. Lac.

(2) Th. x. 464, 466. Lac. xiv. 414, 415. Nap. i. 81, 82. Goh. i. 254.

and by whom the faubourgs were beginning to be agitated; but Napoléon declared that he would not violate the oath which he had taken to protect the national representation, and that he had no fear of such contemptible enemies. At the same time a provisional government was formed. Napoléon, Sièyes, and Roger Ducos were named First Consuls, and it was agreed that the Councils should be adjourned for three months (1). Murat was appointed to the command of the armed force at St.-Cloud, Ponsard to that of the guard of the legislative body, Serrurier, of a strong reserve stationed at Point-du-Jour. The gallery of Mars was prepared for the Council of the Ancients, the Orangery for the Five Hundred.

The 19th Brumaire at St.-Cloud. On the morning of the 19th Brumaire (9th November), a formidable military force, five thousand strong, surrounded Saint-Cloud: the legislature were not to deliberate, as on June 2d, under the daggers of Nov. 9. the populace, but the bayonets of the soldiery. The Five Hundred, however, mustered strong in the gardens of the palace. Formed into groups, while the last preparations were going on in the hall which they were to occupy, they discussed with warmth the extraordinary position of public affairs, mutually sounded and encouraged each other, and succeeded, even during that brief space, in organizing a very formidable opposition. The members of the Five Hundred demanded of the Council of the Ancients what they really proposed to themselves as the result of the proceedings of the day. "The government," said they, "is decomposed."—"Admitted," replied the others; "but what then? Do you propose, instead of weak men, destitute of renown, to place there Bonaparte?" Those of the Ancients who were in the secret, ventured to insinuate something about the necessity of a military leader; but the suggestion was ill received, and the majority of the Five Hundred was every moment becoming stronger, from the rumours which were spread of the approaching dictatorship. The Ancients were violently shaken at the unexpected resistance they had experienced, and numbers in the majority were already anxious to escape from the perilous enterprise on which they had adventured (2). The opinions of the Five Hundred were already unequivocally declared; every thing seemed to indicate that the legislature would triumph over the conspirators.

Excessive vehemence in the Five Hundred. It was in the midst of this uncertainty and disquietude that the Councils opened. Lucien Bonaparte was in the chair of the Five Hundred. Gaudin ascended the tribune, and commenced a set speech, in which he dwelt in emphatic terms on the dangers which threatened the country, and concluded by proposing a vote of thanks to the Ancients for having transferred their deliberations to Saint-Cloud, and the formation of a committee of seven persons to prepare a report upon the state of the Republic. Had this been carried, it was to have been immediately followed up by the appointment of the consuls and an adjournment. But no sooner had Gaudin concluded, than the most violent opposition arose. "The winds," says Napoléon, "suddenly escaping from the caverns of Æolus, can give but a faint idea of that tempest." The speaker was violently dragged from the tribune, and a frightful agitation rendered any farther proceedings impossible. "Down with the dictators! long live the constitution!" resounded on all sides. "The constitution or death!" exclaimed Delbrel; "bayonets will not deter us; we are still free here." In the midst of the tumult,

(1) Mign. ii. 454. Th. x. 467. Nap. i. 83, 85. Lac. xiv. 419.

(2) Th. x. 469, 472. Nap. i. 86, 87. Lac. xiv. 419, 420. Jom. xii. 403. Gob. i. 272, 273.

Lucien in vain endeavoured to restore his authority. After a long scene of confusion, one of the deputies proposed that the assembly should swear fidelity to the constitution; this proposal was instantly adopted, and the roll called for that purpose. This measure answered the double purpose of binding the Council to support its authority, and giving time for the Jacobin leaders to be sent for from the capital. In fact, during the two hours that the calling of the roll lasted, intelligence of the resistance of the Five Hundred circulated in Paris with the rapidity of lightning, and Jourdan, Augereau, and other leaders of the Jacobin party, believing that the enterprise had miscarried, hastened to the scene of action. The Five Hundred, during this delay, hoped that they would have time to communicate with the Directory; but before it terminated the intelligence arrived that the government was dissolved, and no executive authority remaining but in the person of Napoléon (1).

The danger was now imminent to that audacious general; the Five Hundred were so vehement in their opposition to him, that the whole members, including Lucien, were compelled to take the oath to the constitution; and in the Ancients, although his adherents had the majority, the contest raged with the utmost violence, and the strength of the minority was every instant increasing. The influential Jacobins were rapidly arriving from Paris; they looked on the matter as already decided. Every thing depended on the troops, and although their attachment to Napoléon was well known, it was extremely doubtful whether they would not be overawed by the majesty of the legislature. "Here you are," said Augereau to him the moment he arrived, "in a happy position."—"Augereau," replied Napoléon, "recollect Arcola; things then appeared much more desperate. Take my word for it; remain tranquil if you would not become a victim. Half an hour hence you will thank me for my advice." Notwithstanding this seeming confidence, however, Napoléon fully felt the danger of his situation. The influence of the legislature was sensibly felt on the troops; the boldest were beginning to hesitate; the zealous had already become timid (2): the timid had changed their colours. He saw that there was not a moment to lose; and he resolved to present himself, at the head of his staff, at the bar of the Ancients. "At that moment," said Napoléon, "I would have given two hundred millions to have had Ney by my side."

In this crisis Napoléon was strongly agitated. He never possessed the faculty of powerful extempore elocution; a peculiarity not unfrequently the accompaniment of the most profound and original thought; and on this occasion, from the vital interests at stake, and the vehement opposition with which he was assailed, he could hardly utter any thing intelligible (3). So far as his meaning could be gathered, amidst the frightful tumult which prevailed, it was to the following purpose:—"You are on the edge of a volcano. Allow me to explain myself; you have called me and my companions in arms to your aid * * * but you must now take a decided part. I know they talk of Cæsar and Cromwell, as if any thing in antiquity resembled the present moment. And you, grenadiers, whose feathers I perceive already waving in the hall, say, have I ever failed in performing the promises I made to you in the camps?" The soldiers replied by waving their hats, and loud acclamations; but this appeal to the military, in the bosom of the legislature,

His speech there.

(1) Nap. i. 87. Lac. xiv. 420, 422. Th. x. 473, 474. Goh. i. 273, 276.

(2) Th. x. 474, 475. Lac. xiv. 423, 424. Nap. i. 87, 88. Las Cas. vii. 235.

(3) Bour. iii. 83, 84, 112, 114.

wrought up to a perfect fury the rage of the Opposition. One of their number, Linglet, rose, and said, in a loud voice, "General, we applaud your words; I swear then obedience and fidelity to the Constitution, which can alone save the Republic." Napoléon hesitated; then replied with energy: "The Constitution does not exist; you yourselves violated it on the 10th Fructidor, when the government violated the independence of the legislature; you violated it on the 50th Prairial, when the legislative body overthrew the independence of the executive; you violated it on the 22d Floreal, when, by a sacrilegious decree, the government and legislature violated the sovereignty of the people by annulling the elections which they had made. Having subverted the constitution, new guarantees, a fresh compact, is required. I declare, that as soon as the dangers which have invested me with these extraordinary powers have passed away, I will lay them down. I desire only to be the arm which executes your commands. If you call on me to explain what are the perils which threaten our country, I have no hesitation in answering, that Barras and Moulins have proposed to me to place myself at the head of a faction, the object of which is to effect the overthrow of all the friends of freedom." The energy of this speech, the undoubted truths and audacious falsehoods which it contained, produced a great impression: three-fourths of the assembly arose and loudly testified their applause. His party, recovering their courage, spoke in his behalf, and he concluded with these significant words: "Surrounded by my brave companions in arms, I will second you. I call you to witness, brave grenadiers, whose bayonets I perceive, whom I have so often led to victory; I can bear witness to their courage; we will unite our efforts to save our country. And if any orator," added he, with a menacing voice, "paid by the enemy, should venture to propose to put me *hors la loi*, I shall instantly appeal to my companions in arms to exterminate him on the spot. Recollect that I march accompanied by the god of fortune and the god of war (1)."

He enters
the Hall of
the Five
Hundred.
Frightful
disorder
there.

Hardly was this harangue concluded, when intelligence arrived that in the Council of Five Hundred the calling of the roll had ceased; that Lucien could hardly maintain his ground against the vehemence of the Assembly, and that they were about to force him to put to the vote a proposal to declare his brother *hors la loi*. It was a similar proposal which had proved fatal to Robespierre: the cause of Napoléon seemed wellnigh desperate, for if it had been passed, there could be little doubt it would have been obeyed by the soldiers. In truth, they had gone so far as to declare, that the oath of 18th Brumaire should receive a place as distinguished in history as that of the *Jeu de Paume*, "the first of which created liberty, while the second consolidated it," and had decreed a message to the Directory to make them acquainted with their resolution. This decree was hardly passed, when a messenger arrived with a letter from Barras, containing his resignation of the office of Director, upon the ground, "that now the dangers of liberty were *all surmounted*, and the interests of the armies secured." This unlooked-for communication renewed their perplexity; for now it was evident that the executive itself was dissolved (2).

Napoléon, who clearly saw his danger, instantly took his resolution. Boldly advancing to the hall of the Five Hundred, whose shouts and cries already resounded to a distance, he entered alone, uncovered, and ordered

(1) Th. x. 477. Bour. iii. 35. Gob. i. 281, 288.

(2) Gob. i. 291, 293, 295.

the soldiers and officers of his suite to halt at the entrance. In his passage to the bar he had to pass one half of the benches. No sooner did he make his appearance, than half of the assembly rose up, exclaiming, "Death to the tyrant! down with the dictator!" The scene which ensued baffles all description. Hundreds of deputies rushed down from the benches, and surrounded the general, exclaiming, "your laurels are all withered; your glory is turned into infamy; is it for this you have conquered? respect the sanctuary of the laws; retire." Two grenadiers left at the door, alarmed by the danger of their general, rushed forward, sword in hand, seized him by the middle, and bore him, almost stupified, out of the hall; in the tumult one of them had his clothes torn. Nothing was to be heard but the cries, "No Cromwell! down with the dictator! death to the dictator (1)!"

Intrepid
conduct of
Lucien. His removal increased rather than diminished the tumult of the assembly. Lucien alone, and unsupported in the president's chair, was left to make head against the tempest. All his efforts to justify his brother were in vain. "You would not hear him," he exclaimed. "Down with the tyrant! *hors la loi* with the tyrant!" resounded on all sides. With rare firmness, he for long resisted the proposal. At length, finding further opposition fruitless, he exclaimed, "You dare to condemn a hero without hearing him in his defence. His brother has but one duty left, and that is to defend him. I renounce the chair, and hasten to the bar to defend the illustrious accused;" and with these words, deposing his insignia of president, mounted the tribune. At that instant an officer, dispatched by Napoléon, with ten grenadiers, presented himself at the door. It was at first supposed that the troops had declared for the Council, and loud applause greeted their entrance. Taking advantage of the mistake, he approached the tribune and laid hold of Lucien, whispering at the same time in his ear, "By your brother's orders;" while the grenadiers exclaimed, "Down with the assassins!" At these words a mournful silence succeeded to the cries of acclamation, and he was conducted without opposition out of the hall (2).

Dissolution
of the Five
Hundred by
an armed
force. Meanwhile Napoléon had descended to the court, mounted on horseback, ordered the drums to beat the order to form circle, and thus addressed the soldiers:—"I was about to point out the means of saving the country, and they answered me with strokes of the poniard. They desire to fulfil the wishes of the Allied sovereigns—what more could England do? Soldiers, can I rely on you?" Unanimous applause answered the appeal; and soon after the officer arrived, bringing out Lucien from the Council. He instantly mounted on horseback, and with Napoléon rode along the ranks, then halting in the centre, said, with a voice of thunder which was heard along the whole line, "Citizen-soldiers! the President of the Council of Five Hundred declares to you, that the immense majority of that body is enthralled by a factious band, armed with stilettoes, who besiege the tribune, and interdict all freedom of deliberation! General, and you soldiers, and you citizens, you can no longer recognise any as legislators but those who are around me. Let force expel those who remain in the Orangery; they are not the representatives of the people, but the representatives of the poniard. Let that name for ever attach to them, and if they dare to show themselves to the people, let all fingers point to them as the representatives of the poniard."—"Soldiers," added Napoléon, "can I rely on you?" The soldiers,

(1) Nap. i. 91. Th. x. 477, 478. Lac. xiv. 428. (2) Goh. i. 293, 308.
Goh. i. 298.

however, appeared still to hesitate, when Lucien as a last resource, turned to his brother, and raising his sword in his hand, swore to plunge it in his breast if ever he belied the hopes of the Republicans, or made an attempt on the liberty of France. This last appeal was decisive. "Vive Bonaparte!" was the answer. He then ordered Murat and Leclerc to march a battalion into the Council, and dissolve the Assembly. "Charge bayonets," was the word given. They entered slowly in, and the officer in command notified to the Council the order to dissolve. Jourdan and several other deputies resisted, and began to address the soldiers on the enormity of their conduct. Hesitation was already visible in their ranks, when Leclerc entering with a fresh body, in close column, instantly ordered the drums to beat and the charge to sound. He exclaimed, "Grenadiers, forward!" and the soldiers slowly advancing, with fixed bayonets, speedily cleared the hall, the dismayed deputies throwing themselves from the windows, and rushing out at every aperture to avoid the shock (1).

Nocturnal meeting of the conspirators in the Orangery. Their decrees. Intelligence of the violent dissolution of the Five Hundred was conveyed by the fugitives to the Ancients, who were thrown by this event into the utmost consternation. They had expected that that body would have yielded without violence, and were thunderstruck by the open use of bayonets on the occasion. Lucien immediately appeared at their bar, and made the same apology he had done to the troops for the *coup d'état* which had been employed, viz. that a factious minority had put an end to all freedom of deliberation by the use of poniards, which rendered the application of force indispensable; that nothing had been done contrary to forms; that he had himself authorized the employment of the military. The Council were satisfied, or feigned to be so, with this explanation; and at nine at night the remnant of the Five Hundred who were in the interests of Napoléon, five-and-thirty only in number, under the direction of Lucien, assembled in the Orangery, and voted a resolution, declaring that Bonaparte and the troops under his orders had deserved well of their country. "Representatives of the people," said that audacious partisan in his opening speech, "this ancient palæe of the Kings of France, where we are now assembled, attests that *power is nothing*, and that *glory is every thing*." At eleven at night, a few members of the two Councils, not amounting in all to sixty persons, assembled, and unanimously passed a decree abolishing the Directory, expelling sixty-one members from the Councils as demagogues, adjourning the legislature for three months, and vesting the executive power in the mean time in Napoléon, Sièyes, and Roger Ducos, under the title of Provisional Consuls. Two Commissions of twenty-five members each, were appointed from each Council, to combine with the Consuls in the formation of a new constitution (2).

Joy in Paris at these events. During these two eventful days, the people of Paris, though deeply interested in the issue of the struggle, and trembling with anxiety lest the horrors of the Revolution should be renewed, remained perfectly tranquil. In the evening of the 19th, reports of the failure of the enterprise were generally spread, and diffused the most mortal disquietude; for all ranks, worn out with the agitation and sufferings of past convulsions, passionately longed for repose, and it was generally felt that it could be obtained only under the shadow of military authority. But at length the result was

(1) Nap. i. 93. Mign. ii. 458, 459. Th. x. 479, 480. Lac. xiv. 431. Journ. xii. 406, 408. Bour. iii. 95, 97. Goh. i. 309, 311. (2) Nap. i. 94, 95. Journ. xii. 409. Th. x. 481. Goh. i. 314, 334.

communicated by the fugitive members of the Five Hundred, who arrived from St.-Cloud, loudly exclaiming against the military violence of which they had been the victims; and at nine at night the intelligence was officially announced by a proclamation of Napoléon, which was read by torchlight to the agitated groups (1).

General satisfaction which it diffused through the country.

With the exception of the legislature, however, all parties declared for the revolution of 18th Brumaire. The violation of the laws and *coups d'état* had been so common during the Revolution, that the people had ceased to regard them as illegal; and they were judged of entirely by their consequences. To such a height had the anarchy and distresses of the country arisen in the latter years of the Revolution, that repose and a regular government had become the object of universal desire at any price, even the extinction of the very liberty to attain which all these misfortunes had been undergone. The feeling, accordingly, not only of Paris, but of France, was universal in favour of the new government. All parties hoped to see their peculiar tenets forwarded by the change. The Constitutionals trusted that rational freedom would at length be established; the Royalists rejoiced that the first step towards a regular government had been made, and secretly indulged the hope that Bonaparte would play the part of General Monk, and restore the throne; the great body of the people, weary of strife, and exhausted by suffering, passionately rejoiced at the commencement of repose; the numerous exiles and proscribed families regained the prospect of revisiting their country, and drawing their last breath in that France which was still so dear to them. Ten years had wrought a century of experience. The nation was as unanimous in 1799 to terminate the era of Revolution, as in 1789 it had been to commence it (2).

Clemency of Napoléon after his victory.

Napoléon rivalled Cæsar in the clemency with which he used his victory. No proscriptions or massacres, few arrests or imprisonments, followed the triumph of order over Revolution. On the contrary, numerous acts of mercy, as wise as they were magnanimous, illustrated the rise of the Consular throne. The law of hostages and the forced loan were abolished; the priests and persons proscribed by the revolution of 18th Fructidor permitted to return; the emigrants who had been shipwrecked

(1) Nap. i. 98. Th. x. 482. Jom. xii. 410.

This proclamation is chiefly remarkable for the unblushing effrontery with which it set forth a statement of facts, utterly at variance with what above a thousand witnesses, only five miles from the capital, had themselves beheld, and which Napoléon himself has subsequently recorded in his own Memoirs, from which the preceding narrative has in part been taken. He there said, "At my return to Paris, I found division among all the authorities, and none agreed except on this single point, that the constitution was half destroyed and could no longer save the public liberty. All parties came to me, and unfolded their designs, but I refused to belong to any of them. The Council of the Ancients then summoned me; I answered their appeal. A plan for a general restoration had been concerted among the men in whom the nation had been accustomed to see the defenders of its liberty, its equality, and property; but that plan demanded a calm and deliberate investigation, exempt from all agitation or control, and therefore the legislative body was transferred by the Council of the Ancients to St.-Cloud." After narrating the events of the morning of the 18th, it proceeded thus:—"I presented myself to the Council of the Five Hundred,

alone and unarmed, in the same manner as I had been received with transport by the Ancients. I was desirous of rousing the majority to an exertion of its authority, when *twenty assassins precipitated themselves on me*, and I was only saved from their hands by the brave grenadiers, who rushed to me from the door. The savage cry of '*Hors la loi*' arose; the howl of violence against the force destined to repress it. The assassins instantly surrounded the president; I heard of it, and sent ten grenadiers, who extricated him from their bands. The factious, intimidated, *left the hall and dispersed*. The majority, relieved from their strokes, re-entered peaceably into its hall, deliberated on the propositions submitted to it in the name of the public weal, and passed a salutary resolution, which will become the basis of the provisional constitution of the Republic." Under such colours did Napoléon veil one of the most violent usurpations against a legislature recorded in history. When such falsehood was employed in matters occurring at St.-Cloud, it renders probable all that Bourrienne has said of the falsehood of the bulletins in regard to more distant transactions.—See Napoléon, i. 98, 101.

(2) Mign. ii. 462. Lac. xiv. 433, 434.

on the coast of France, and thrown into prison, where they had been confined for four years, were set at liberty. Measures of severity were at first put in force against the violent Republicans, but they were gradually relaxed, and finally abandoned. Thirty-seven of this obnoxious party were ordered to be transported to Guiana, and twenty-one to be put under the observation of the police; but the sentence of transportation was soon changed into one of *surveillance*, and even that was shortly abandoned. Nine thousand state prisoners, who languished at the fall of the Directory in the state prisons of France, received their liberty. Their numbers, two years before, had been sixty thousand. The elevation of Napoléon was not only unstained by blood, but not even a single captive long lamented the car of the victor. A signal triumph of the principles of humanity over those of cruelty, glorious alike to the actors and the age in which it occurred; and a memorable proof how much more durable the victories gained by moderation and wisdom are, than those achieved by violence, and stained by blood (1).

The revolution of the 18th Brumaire had established a provisional government, and overturned the Directory; but it still remained to form a permanent constitution. In the formation of it a rupture took place between Sièyes and Napoléon. The views of the former, long based on speculative opinions, and strongly tinged with republican ideas, were little likely to accord with those of the young conqueror, accustomed to rule every thing by his single determination; and whose sagacity had already discovered the impossibility of forming a stable government out of the institutions of the Revolution. He allowed Sièyes to mould, according to his pleasure, the legislature, which was to consist of a Senate, or Upper Chamber; a Legislative Body, without the power of debate; and a Tribunate, which was to discuss the legislative measures with the Council of State: but opposed the most vigorous resistance to the plan which he brought forward for the executive, which was so absurd, that it is hardly possible to imagine how it could have been seriously proposed by a man of ability. The plan of this veteran constitution-maker, who had boasted to Talleyrand ten years before, that "politics was a science which he flattered himself he had brought to perfection (2)," was to have vested the executive in a single *Grand Elector*, who was to inhabit Versailles, with a salary of 600,000 francs a-year, and a guard of six thousand men, and represent the state to foreign powers. This singular magistrate was to be vested with no immediate authority; but his functions were to consist in the power of naming two consuls, who were to exercise all the powers of government, the one being charged with the interior, the finances, police, and public justice; the other the exterior, including war, marine, and foreign affairs. He was to have a council of state, to discuss with the legislature all public measures. He was to be irresponsible, but liable to removal at the pleasure of the Senate.—It was easy to perceive that, though he imagined he was acting on general principles, Sièyes in this project was governed by his own interests; that the situation of grand elector he destined for himself, and the military consulship for the conqueror of Arcola and Rivoli (3).

Napoléon, who saw at once that this senseless project, besides presenting insurmountable difficulties in practice, would reduce him to a secondary part, exerted all his talents to combat the plan of Sièyes. "Can you sup-

(1) Nap. in Month, i. 173. Mign. ii. 463. Lac. (2) Dum. 64. *Ante*, i. 201.

xiv. 434, 440.

(3) Jom. vii. 413, 415. Mign. ii. 464, 465.

pose," said he, "that any man of talent or consideration will submit to the degrading situation assigned to the grand elector? What man, disposing of the national force, would be base enough to submit to the discretion of a Senate, which, by a simple vote, could send him from Versailles to a second flat in Paris? Were I a grand elector, I would name as my Consul of the exterior Berthier, and for the interior some other person of the same stamp. I would prescribe to them their nominations of ministers; and the instant that they ceased to be my staff-officers I would overturn them." Sièyes replied, "that in that case the grand elector would be *absorbed* by the Senate." This phrase got wind, and threw such ridicule over the plan in the minds of the Parisians, that even its author was compelled to abandon it. He soon found that his enterprising colleague would listen to no project which interfered with the supreme power, which he had already resolved to obtain for himself, and which, in truth, was the only form of government capable at that period of arresting the disorders, or terminating the miseries, of France (1).

Napoléon's
appointment
as First
Consul.

The ideas of Napoléon were unalterably fixed; but he was too clear-sighted not to perceive that time and a concession, in form at least, to public opinion were necessary to bring them into practice. "I was convinced," says he, "that France could not exist but under a monarchical form of government; but the circumstances of the times were such, that it was thought, and perhaps was, necessary to disguise the supreme power of the president. All opinions were reconciled by the nomination of a FIRST CONSUL, who alone should possess the authority of government, since he singly disposed of all situations, and possessed a deliberative voice, while the two others were merely his advisers. That supreme officer gave the government the advantage of unity of direction; the two others, whose names appeared to every public act, would soothe the republican jealousy. The circumstances of the times would not permit a better form of government." After long discussion, this project was adopted. The government was in fact exclusively placed in the hands of the First Consul; the two other Consuls had a right to enlighten him by their counsels, but not to restrain him by their vote. The Senate, itself nominated by the Consuls, selected out of the list of candidates who had been chosen by the nation those who were to be the members of the Tribune and Legislature. Government alone was invested with the right of proposing laws. The Legislative Body was interdicted the right of speaking; it was merely to deliberate and decide upon the questions discussed before it by the Tribune, and the Council of State nominated by the Consuls; the first being understood to represent the interests of the people, the second that of the government. The Legislative Body was thus transformed from its essential character in a free state, that of a deliberative assembly, into a supreme court, which heard the state pleadings, and by its decision formed the law (2).

The people no longer were permitted to choose deputies for themselves, either in their primary assemblies or electoral colleges. They were allowed only to choose the *persons eligible* to these offices, and from the lists thus furnished, government made its election. The whole citizens first chose a tenth of their number in each arrondissement, who formed the electors of the *commune*. This body, composed of the electors, again chose out of the

(1) Jom. xii. 417, 418. Nrp. ii. 141, 143. Mign. ii. 468.

(2) Mign. ii. 464, 465. Const. Tit. iii. Nap. i. 363, 364. Bignon, i. 27, 28.

list of eligible persons for the *department* a tenth, who were to form the departmental electors, and they again a tenth of their body, who formed the list out of which the legislature was to be chosen. The Senate, in the close of all, selected such as it chose out of the last list, thus trebly purified, to form the Legislative body. The senators being nominated by the First Consul, and holding their situations for life, the whole legislature was subjected to the control of the executive. Its duty was strictly conservative, to watch over the maintenance of the fundamental laws, and the purification of the other branches of the legislature. All public functionaries, civil and military including the whole judges, instead of being chosen, as heretofore, by the people, were appointed by the First Consul, who thus became the sole depository of influence. The lowest species of judges, called *juges-de-paix*, were alone left in the gift of the people (1). By means of the Senate, chosen from his creatures, he regulated the legislature, and possessed the sole initiative of laws; by the appointment to every office, he wielded the whole civil force of the state; by the command of the military, he overawed the discontented, and governed its external relations.

Outlines of
the new
constitution The departmental lists were the most singular part of the new constitution. Every person born and residing in France, above twenty-one, was a citizen, but the rights of citizenship were lost by bankruptcy, domestic service, crime, or foreign naturalization. But the *electors* were a much more limited body. "The citizens of each *arrondissement* chose by their suffrages those whom they deemed fit to conduct public affairs, amounting to not more than a *tenth* of the electors. The persons contained in this first list were alone eligible to official situations in the *arrondissement* from which they were chosen. The citizens embraced in this list chose a tenth of their number for each *department*, which formed the body alone eligible for departmental situations. The citizens chosen by the departmental electors again selected a tenth of their number, which formed the body alone capable of being elected for national situations (2)." The persons on the first list were only eligible to the inferior situations, such as *juges-de-paix*, a species of arbiters to reconcile differences and prevent lawsuits; those on the second were the class from whom might be selected the prefects, the departmental judges, tax-gatherers, and collectors; those on the third, who amounted only to *six thousand persons*, were alone eligible to public offices, as the Legislature, any of the Ministries of State, the Senate, the Council of State, the Tribunal of Cassation, the ambassadors at foreign courts. Thus, the whole offices of state were centred in six thousand persons, chosen by a triple election from the citizens. The lists were to be revised, and all the vacancies filled up every three years. These lists of notability, as Napoléon justly observed, formed a limited and exclusive nobility, differing from the old noblesse only in this, that it was elective, not hereditary; and it was, from the very first, subject to the objection, that it excluded from the field of competition many of the most appropriate persons to hold public situations. The influence of the people in the legislature was, by these successive elections, completely destroyed, and the whole power of the state, it was early foreseen, would centre in the First Consul (3). The changes introduced diffused, however, general satisfaction.

All the members of the legislature received pensions from government :

(1) *Jom.* xii. 420, 421. *Mign.* ii. 464, 468, 469.
Const. Tit. iv. Sect. 41. Bign. i. 27, 28.

(2) *Const. Tit. i. sec. 78, 79.*
(3) *Nap. i. 139, 141.*

that of the senators was 25,000 francs, or L.4000 a year; that of the Tribunate, 15,000 francs; or L.650 yearly; that of the Legislative Body, 10,000 fr. or L.400 a-year. The Senate was composed of persons above forty years of age; the Legislative Body, above thirty. A senator remained in that high station for life, and was ineligible to any other situation (1).

Appoint-
ments in ad-
ministration
made by
Napoléon.

On the 24th December, 1799, the new constitution was proclaimed; and the whole appointments were forthwith filled up, without waiting for the lists of the eligible, who were, according to its theory, to be chosen by the people. Two consuls, eighty senators, a hundred tribunes, three hundred legislators, were forthwith nominated, and proceeded to the exercise of all the functions of government. In the choice of persons to fill such a multitude of offices, ample means existed to reward the moderate, and seduce the Republican party; and the consuls made a judicious and circumspect use of the immense influence put into their hands. Sièyes, discontented with the overthrow of his favourite ideas, retired from the government; received as a reward for his services 600,000 francs and the estate of Crosne, afterwards changed for the more valuable domain of la Faisanderie in the park of Versailles; and the democratic fervour of the author of the pamphlet—"What is the Tiers-État?" sunk into the interested apathy of the proprietor of fifty thousand pounds. Roger Ducos also withdrew, perceiving the despotic turn which things were taking; and Napoléon appointed in their stead Cambacérès and Lebrun, men of moderation and probity, who worthily discharged the subordinate functions assigned to them in the administration. "In the end," said Napoléon, "you must come to the government of boots and spurs; and neither Sièyes nor Roger Ducos was fit for that (2)." Talleyrand was made minister of foreign affairs, and Fouché retained in that of the police; the illustrious La Place received the portfolio of the interior. By the latter appointments Napoléon hoped to calm the fears and satisfy the ambition of the Republican party. Sièyes was very adverse to the continuance of Fouché in office; but Napoléon was resolute. "We have arrived," said he, "at a new era; we must recollect in the past only the good, and forget the bad. Age, the habits of business, and experience,

(1) Const. Tit. ii. and iii. Nap. i. 364, 362.

(2) Las Cas. ii. 353.

A curious incident occurred on occasion of the dismissal of Sièyes, highly characteristic of the disposition of that veteran of the Revolution, as well as of the preceding governments. At the first meeting which Napoléon had with him in the apartments of the Directory, Sièyes, after cautiously shutting the doors, and looking around to see that he was not overheard, said, in a low voice, to Napoléon, pointing to a bureau, "Do you see that piece of furniture? You will not easily guess what it is worth. It contains 800,000 francs. During our ministerial duties, we came to perceive that it would be uselessly for a Director to leave office without being worth a farthing; and we therefore fell upon the expedient of getting this depot, from whence every one who retired might take a suitable sum. But now the Directory is dissolved, what shall we do with it?"—"If I had been officially informed of it," said Napoléon, "it must have been restored to the public treasury; but as that is not the case, I am not supposed to know any thing of the matter. Take it, and divide it with Ducos, but make haste, for to-morrow it may be too late." Sièyes did not require a second bidding; that very day he took out the treasure, "but appropriated," says Napoléon, "600,000 francs to himself, and gave only

200,000 to poor Ducos." In truth, Ducos got only 100,000; the Grand Elcctor absorbed all the rest. [Goh. ii. 5.] This treasure, however, was far from satisfying Sièyes. One day, soon after, he said to Napoléon, "How fortunate you are; all the glory of the 18th Brumaire has fallen to your lot; while I shall probably incur only blame for my share in the attempt."—"What!" exclaimed Napoléon, "have not the consular commissaries passed a resolution that you have deserved well of your country? Tell me honestly, what do you want?" Sièyes, with a ridiculous grimace, replied, "Do you not think, citizen-consul, that some *national domain*, a monument of the national gratitude, would be a fit recompense to one who has co-operated with you in your great designs?"—"Oh! I understand you now," said Napoléon; "I will speak with Ducos on the subject." Two days afterwards appeared a decree of the commission of the Councils, awarding to Sièyes the national domain of Crosne, in "name of national recompense." But Sièyes soon found out that the nation had not the right to dispose of the estate of Crosne; and it was exchanged for the superb Hotel del Infantado in Paris, and the rich lands of la Faisanderie in the park of Versailles—See NAPOLÉON, i. 146, LAS CASAS, ii. 350, and GOMIEN, ii. 5, 8.

have formed or modified many characters." High salaries were given to all the public functionaries, on condition only that they should live in a style of splendour suitable to their station : a wise measure, which both secured the attachment of that powerful body of men, and precluded them from acquiring such an independence as might enable them to dispense with the employment of government (1).

Such was the exhaustion of the French people, occasioned by revolutionary convulsions, that this constitution, destroying, as it did, all the objects for which the people had combated for ten years, was gladly adopted by an immense majority of the electors. It was approved of by 3,011,007 citizens; while that of 1793 had only obtained 1,801,918 suffrages, and that in 1795, which established the Directory, 1,037,590 (2). These numbers are highly instructive. They demonstrate, what so many other considerations conspire to indicate, that even the most vehement changes are brought about by a factious and energetic minority, and that it is often more the supineness than the numerical inferiority of the better class of citizens which subjects them to the tyranny of the lowest. In 1789, indeed, the great majority of all classes were carried away by the fever of innovation; but these transports were of short duration; and from the time that the sombre days of the Revolution began, their numerical superiority was at an end. It was the terrors and disunion of the class of proprietors, which, by leaving no power in the state, but the populace and their demagogues, delivered the nation over to the horrors of Jacobin slavery.

Such was the termination of the changes of the French Revolution; and such the government which the people brought upon themselves by their sins and their extravagance. On the 25d June, 1789, before one drop of blood had been shed or one estate confiscated, Louis offered the States-General a constitution containing all the elements of real freedom, with all the guarantees which experience has proved to be necessary for its duration; the security of property, the liberty of the press, personal freedom, equality of taxation, provincial assemblies, the voting of taxes by the States-General, and the vesting of the legislative power in the representatives of the three estates in their separate chambers (3). The popular representatives, seduced by the phantom of democratic ambition, refused the offer, usurped for themselves the whole powers of sovereignty, and with relentless rigour pursued their victory, till they had destroyed the clergy, the nobles, and the throne. France waded through an ocean of blood; calamities unheard of assailed every class, from the throne to the cottage; for ten long years the struggle continued, and at length it terminated in the establishment, by universal consent, of a government which swept away every remnant of freedom, and consigned the state to the tranquillity of military despotism (4).

(1) Migo. ii. 468, 469. Jom. xii. 422. 423. Nap. i. 113. Gob. ii. 6, 8.

(2) Mign. ii. 469.

(3) See Vol. i. 203, 207.

(4) So evidently was this result the punishment of the crimes of the Revolution, that it appeared in that light even to some of the principal actors in that convulsion. In a letter written by Sieyès to Riouffe at that period, he said, "It is then for such a result that the French nation

has gone through its Revolution! The ambitious villain! He marches successfully through all the ways of fortune and crime—all is vanity, distrust, and terror. There is here neither elevation nor liberality. *Providence wishes to punish us by the Revolution itself.* Our chains are too humiliating; on all sides nothing is to be seen but powers prostrated; leaden oppression, military despotism is alone triumphant. If any thing could make us retain some esteem for the nation, it is the luxury of per-

Durable freedom had been rendered impossible by the destruction of the aristocracy and clergy. Had this been merely a temporary result, the friends of freedom might have found some consolation in the reflection, that the elements at least of ultimate liberty were laid, and that the passing storm had renovated, not destroyed, the face of society. But the evil went a great deal deeper. In their democratic fervour, the people had pulled down the bulwarks, not only of order, but of liberty; and when France emerged from the tempest, the classes were extinct whose combined and counteracting influence are necessary for its existence.

"The principle of the French Revolution," says Napoléon, "being the absolute equality of all classes, there resulted from it a total want of aristocracy. If a republic is difficult to construct on any durable basis without an order of nobles, much more so is a monarchy. To form a constitution in a country destitute of any species of aristocracy, is like attempting to navigate in a single element. The French Revolution has attempted a problem as insoluble as the direction of balloons (1)." "A monarchy," says Lord Bacon, "where there is no nobility at all, is ever a pure and absolute tyranny, as that of the Turks; for nobility attempts sovereignty, and draws the eyes of the people somewhat aside from the line royal (2)." In these profound observations is to be found the secret of the subsequent experienced impossibility of constructing a durable free government in France, or preserving any thing like a balance between the different classes of society. The Revolution had left only the government, the army, and the people; no intermediate rank existed to counteract the influence of the former, or give durability to the exertions of the latter. Left to themselves, the people were no match in the long run for an executive wielding the whole military force of the kingdom, and disposing, in offices and appointments, of above L.40,000,000 a-year. In moments of excitement, the democratic spirit may become powerful; and, by infecting the military, give a momentary triumph to the populace; but, with the cessation of the effervescence, the influence of government must return with redoubled force, and the people be again subjected to the yoke of servitude. Casual bursts of democratic passion cannot maintain a long contest in a corrupted age with the steady efforts of a regular government; and if they could, they would lead only to the transference of despotic power from one set of rulers to another. It is hard to say whether liberty has most to dread, in such circumstances, from its friends or its enemies.

Durable freedom is to be secured only by the steady, persevering efforts of an aristocracy, supported, when necessary, by the enthusiasm of the people, and hindered from running into excess by the vigour of the executive. In all ages of the world, and under all forms of government, it is in the equipoise of these powers that freedom has been formed, and from the destruction of one of them that the commencement of servitude is to be dated. The French Revolution, by totally destroying the whole class of the aristocracy, and preventing, by the abolition of primogeniture, its reconstruction, has rendered this balance impossible, and, instead of the elements of European freedom, left in society only the instruments and the victims of Asiatic despotism. It is as impossible to construct a durable free government with such materials, as it would be to form glass or gunpowder with two only of the three elements

fidy of which it has been the victim. But the right of the sabre is the weakest of all; for it is the one which is soonest worn out."—*Letter, St. Yves to RIGOURFF, Jan. 17, 1800; HARD. vii. 371.*

(1) Nap. i. 145, 146.

(2) Bacon, ii. 282.

of which they are composed; and the result has completely established the truth of these principles. The despotism of Napoléon was, till his fall, the most rigorous of any in Europe: and, although France enjoyed fifteen years of liberty under the Restoration, when the swords of Alexander and Wellington had righted the balance, and the recollection of subjugation had tamed for a time the aspirations of democracy; yet, with the rise of a new generation and the oblivion of former disaster, the scales were anew subverted, the constitutional monarchy was overturned, and from amidst the smoke of the Barricades, the awful figure of military power again emerged.

Grievous as has been the injury, however, to the cause of freedom which the ruin of the French aristocracy has occasioned, it is not so great or so irreparable as has resulted from the destruction of the Church, and consequent irreligion of the most energetic part of the population. This evil has spread to an unparalleled extent, and produced mischiefs of incalculable magnitude. If it be true, as the greatest of their philosophers has declared, that it was neither their numbers, nor their talent, nor their military spirit which gave the Romans the empire of the world, but the religious feeling which animated their people (1), it may be conceived what consequences must have resulted from the extinction of public worship over a whole country, and the education of a generation ignorant of the very elements of religious belief. It is the painful duty of the moralist, to trace the consequences of so shocking an act of national impiety, in the progressive dissolution of manners, the growth of selfishness, and the unrestrained career of passion, by which so large a portion of the French people have since been distinguished; but its effects upon public freedom, are, in a political point of view, equally important. Liberty is essentially based on the generous feelings of our nature; it requires often the sacrifice of private gratification for the public good; it can never subsist for any length of time without that heroic self-denial, which can only be founded on the promises and the belief of religion. We must not confound with this generous and elevated spirit the desire for licentiousness, which chafes against every control, whether human or divine; the one is the burst of vegetation in its infancy, and gives promise of the glories of summer and the riches of harvest; the other, the fermentation which precedes corruption. By destroying the Church, and educating a whole generation without any religious principles, France has given a blow to her freedom and her prosperity, from which she can never recover. The fervour of democracy, the extension of knowledge, will give but a transient support to liberty when deprived of that perennial supply which is derived from the sense of duty which religion inspires. "As Atheism," says Lord Bacon, "is in all respects hateful, so in this, that it depriveth human nature of the means of exalting itself above human frailty; and as it is in particular persons, so it is in nations." Passion will find as many objects of gratification under a despotism as a republic; seduction is as easy from private as public desires; pleasure is as alluring in the palace of opulence as in the forum of democracy. The transition is in general slow from patriotic principle or public spirit to private gratification, because they spring from the opposite motives to human conduct; but it is rapid, from rebellion against the restraints of virtue, to thralldom under the chains of vice, for the former

(1) Nec numero Hispanos, nec robore Gallos, nec calliditate Pœnos, nec artibus Græcos, nec denique hoc ipso hujus gentis et terræ domesticio nativoque sensu, Italos ipsos et Latinos; sed pietate ac reli-

gione, atque hac una sapientia, quod Deorum immortalium numine omnia regi gubernarique perpeximus, omnes gentes, nationesque superavimus. —CICERO.

is but the commencement of the latter. "The character of democracy and despotism," says Aristotle (1), "is the same. Both exercise a despotic authority over the better class of citizens; decrees are in the one what ordinances and arbitrary violence are in the other. In different ages, the democrat and court favourite are not unfrequently the same men, and always bear a close analogy to each other; they have the principal power in their respective forms of government; favourites with the absolute monarch; demagogues with the sovereign multitude." "Charles II" says Chateauhriand, "threw Republican England into the arms of women;" but, in truth, it was not the amorous monarch who effected the change; it was the easy transition from democratic license to general corruption, which debased the nation at the Restoration. Mr. Hume has observed, that religious fanaticism during the Civil Wars disgraced the spirit of liberty in England; but, in truth, it was the only safeguard of public virtue during those critical times; and but for the unheeding austerity of the Puritans, public freedom would have irrecoverably perished in the flood of licentiousness which overwhelmed the country on the accession of Charles II.

"Knowledge," says Lord Bacon, "is power;" he has not said it is either wisdom or virtue. It augments the influence of opinion upon mankind; but whether it augments it to good or evil purpose, depends upon the character of the information which is communicated, and the precautions against corruption which are simultaneously taken. As much as it enlarges the foundations of prosperity in a virtuous, does it extend the sources of corruption in a degenerate age. Unless the moral and religious improvement of the people extends in proportion to their intellectual cultivation, the increase of knowledge is but an addition to the lever by which vice dissolves the fabric of society.

Prodigious
effects of the
centraliza-
tion of
power in-
troduced by
the Revolu-
tion.

The revolutionary party have frequently said, that it was Napoléon who constructed with so much ability the fabric of despotism in France; but, in truth, it was not he that did it, nor was his power, great as it was, ever equal to the task. It was the Constituent Assembly who broke the bones of France, and left only a disjointed, mis-shapen mass, forming an easy prey to the first despotism which should succeed it. By destroying the parliaments, provincial assemblies, and courts of law; by annihilating the old divisions and rights of the provinces; by extinguishing all corporations and provincial establishments, at the same time that they confiscated the property of the Church, drove the nobles into exile, and soon after seized upon their estates, they took away for the future all elements of resistance even to the power of the metropolis. Every thing was immediately centralized in its public offices; the lead in all public matters taken by its citizens; and the direction of every detail, however minute, assumed by its ministers. France, ever since, has fallen into a state of subjection to Paris to which there is nothing comparable even in the annals of Oriental servitude. The ruling power in the East is frequently shaken, sometimes overturned, by tumults originating in the provinces; but there has been no example, since the new *régime* was fully established by the suppression of the la Vendée rebellion, of the central authority in France being shaken but by movements originating in the capital. The authority of Robespierre, Napoléon, Louis, and Louis-Philippe, were successively acknowledged by thirty millions over the country, as soon as a faction in Paris had obtained the as-

(1) Arist. de Pol. iv. c. 4.

ceudency; and the obedient departments waited for the announcement of the telegraph, or the arrival of the mail, to know whether they should salute an emperor, a king, a consul, or a decemvir (1). This total prostration of the strength of a great nation to the ruling power in the metropolis, could never have taken place under the old government; and, accordingly, nothing of the kind was experienced under the monarchy. It was the great deeds of democratic despotism perpetrated by the Constituent Assembly which destroyed all the elements of resistance in the provinces, and left France a helpless multitude, necessarily subject to the power which had gained possession of the machinery of government. Despotic as the old government of France was, it could never have attempted such an arbitrary system; even the power of the Czar Peter, or the Sultan Mahmoud, would have been shattered against such an invasion of established rights and settled interests. A memorable instance of the extreme danger to which the interests of freedom are exposed from the blind passions of democracy; and of the fatal effect of the spring flood which drowns the institutions of a state, when the opposing powers of the people and the government are brought for a time to draw in the same direction.

To all human appearance, therefore, the establishment of permanent freedom is hopeless in France; the bulwarks of European liberty have disappeared in the land, and over the whole expanse is seen only the level surface of Asiatic despotism. This grievous result is the consequence and the punishment of the great and crying sins of the Revolution; of the irreligious spirit in which it was conceived; the atheistical measures which it introduced; the noble blood which it shed; the private right which it overturned; the boundless property which it confiscated. But for these offences, a constitutional monarchy, like that which for a century and a half has given glory and happiness to England, might have been established in its great rival; because, but for these offences, the march of the Revolution would have been unstained by crime. In nations, as in individuals, a harvest of prosperity never yet was reaped from seed sown in injustice. But nations have no immortality; and that final retribution which in private life is often postponed, to outward appearance at least, to another world, is brought with swift and unerring wings upon the third and fourth generation in the political delinquencies of mankind.

Distinction
between the
safe and
dangerous
spirit of
freedom.

Does, then, the march of freedom necessarily terminate in disaster? Is improvement inevitably allied to innovation, innovation to revolution? And must the philosopher, who beholds the infant struggles of liberty, ever foresee in their termination the blood of

Robespierre, or the carnage of Napoléon? No! The distinction between the two is as wide as between day and night—between virtue and vice. The simplest and rudest of mankind may distinguish, with as much certainty as belongs to erring mortals, whether the ultimate tendency of innovations is beneficial or ruinous—whether they are destined to bring blessings or curses on their wings. This test is to be found in the character of those who support them, and the moral justice or injustice of their measures. If those who forward the work of reform are the most pure and upright in their private conduct, if they are the foremost in every moral and religious duty; most unblemished in their intercourse with men, and most undeviating in their duty to God; if they are the best fathers, the best husbands, the best landlords, the most charitable and humane of society who take the lead; if their

(1) St.-Clairans, 237, 260.

proceedings are characterised by moderation, and they are scrupulously attentive to justice and humanity in all their actions : then the people may safely follow in their steps, and anticipate blessings to themselves and their children from the measures they promote. But if the reverse of all this is the case; if the leaders who seek to rouse their passions are worthless or suspicious in private life; if they are tyrannical landlords, faithless husbands, negligent fathers; if they are sceptical or indifferent in religion, reckless or improvident in conduct, ruined or tottering in fortune; if they are selfish in their enjoyments, and callous and indifferent to the poor; if their liberty is a cloak for licentiousness, and their patriotism an excuse for ambition; if their actions are hasty and inconsiderate, and their measures calculated to do injustice or create suffering to individuals, on the plea of state necessity : then the people may rest assured that they are leading them to perdition; that the fabric of liberty never yet was reared by such hands, or on such a basis; and that, whatever temporary triumph may attend their steps, the day of reckoning will come, and an awful retribution awaits them or their children.

Immense
impulse
given, by
changes of
revolution,
to the
spread of
Christianity
over the
world.

The final result of the irreligious efforts of the French people is singularly illustrative of the moral government to which human affairs are subject, and of the vanity of all attempts to check that spread of religion which has been decreed by Almighty power. When the Parisian philosophers beheld the universal diffusion of the spirit of scepticism which they had produced; when a nation was seen abjuring every species of devotion, and a generation rising in the heart of Europe ignorant of the very elements of religious belief, the triumph of infidelity appeared complete, and the faithful trembled and mourned in silence at the melancholy prospects which were opening upon the world. Yet in this very spirit were preparing, by an unseen hand, the means of the ultimate triumph of civilized over barbaric belief, and of a greater spread of the Christian faith than had taken place since it was embraced by the tribes who overthrew the Roman empire. In the deadly strife of European ambition, the arms of civilisation acquired an irresistible preponderance; with its last convulsions the strength of Russia was immeasurably augmented, and that mighty power, which had been organized by the genius of Peter and matured by the ambition of Catharine, received its final developement from the invasion of Napoléon. The Crescent, long triumphant over the Cross, has now yielded to its ascendant; the barrier of the Caucasus and the Balkhan have been burst by its champions; the ancient war-cry of Constantinople, "Victory to the Cross!" has, after an interval of four centuries, been heard on the Ægean Sea; and that lasting triumph, which all the enthusiasm of the Crusaders could not effect, has arisen from the energy infused into what was then an unknown tribe, by the infidel arms of their descendants. In such marvellous and unforeseen consequences, the historian finds ample grounds for consolation at the temporary triumph of wickedness; from the corruption of decaying, he turns to the energy of infant civilisation; while he laments the decline of the principles of prosperity in their present seats, he anticipates their resurrection in those where they were first cradled; and traces through all the vicissitudes of nations, the incessant operation of those general laws which provide, even amidst the decline of present greatness, for the final improvement and elevation of the species.



